May 22, 1998

Mr. W. R. Robinson, Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 78 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REGARDING- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE FOR AC-SOURCES-OPERATING - SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 (TAC NO. M99938)

Dear Mr. Robinson:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued Amendment No. 78 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-63 for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1, in response to your request dated October 29, 1997. This amendment changes the Technical Specifications TS 3.8.1.1.a.3, 3.8.1.1.b.4, and 3.8.1.1.d.2 by eliminating the plant shutdown requirements in these TS, and instead allowing the applicable required redundant feature TS to direct the plant shutdown.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Scott C. Flanders, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 78 to NPF-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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OFFICE	PM:PDII-1	LA:PDII-1	D:PDII-1	OGC	
NAME	SFlanders	Dunnington ETD	PKuo		
DATE	5/6/98	5/6/98	5/6/98	5/1/98	
COPY	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No	

OFFICIAL RECORD

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AMENDMENT NO. 78 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63 - HARRIS, UNIT 1

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-400

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 78
License No. NPF-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Carolina Power & Light Company, (the licensee), dated October 29, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 78 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Pao-Tsin Kuo, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 22, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 78

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63

DOCKET NO. 50-400

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 8-1	3/4 8-1
3/4 8-2	3/4 8-2
3/4 8-3	3/4 8-3
B3/4 8-1	B3/4 8-1

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and

b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1. A separate day tank containing a minimum of 1457 gallons of fuel, which is equivalent to a minimum indicated level of 40%**,

2. A separate main fuel oil storage tank containing a minimum of 100,000 gallons of fuel, and

3. A separate fuel oil transfer pump.

c. Automatic Load Sequencers for Train A and Train B.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1.a inoperable:

1. Perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and once per 8 hours thereafter; and

2. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

3. Verify required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE offsite A.C. source are OPERABLE. If required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE offsite circuit are discovered to be inoperable at any time while in this condition, restore the required feature(s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours from discovery of inoperable required feature(s) or declare the redundant required feature(s) powered from the inoperable A.C. source as inoperable.

**Minimum indicated level with a fuel oil specific gravity of 0.83 and the level instrumentation calibrated to a reference specific gravity of 0.876.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

b. With one diesel generator of 3.8.1.1.b inoperable:

1. Perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and once per 8 hours thereafter; and

*2. Within 24 hours, determine the OPERABLE diesel generator is not inoperable due to a common cause failure or perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4#; and

3. Restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

4. Verify required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE diesel generator are OPERABLE. If required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE diesel generator are discovered to be inoperable at any time while in this condition, restore the required feature(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours from discovery of inoperable required feature(s) or declare the redundant required feature(s) powered from the inoperable A.C. source as inoperable.

c. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of 3.8.1.1 inoperable:

NOTE: Enter applicable Condition(s) and Required Action(s) of LCO 3/4.8.3, ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING, when this condition is entered with no A.C. power to one train.

1. Restore one of the inoperable A.C. sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

2. Following restoration of one A.C. source (offsite circuit or diesel generator), restore the remaining inoperable A.C. source to OPERABLE status pursuant to requirements of either ACTION a or b, based on the time of initial loss of the remaining A.C. source.

*This ACTION is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.

#Activities that normally support testing pursuant to 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, which would render the diesel inoperable (e.g., air roll), shall not be performed for testing required by this ACTION statement.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

d. With two of the required offsite A.C. sources inoperable:

1. Restore one offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

2. Verify required feature(s) are OPERABLE. If required feature(s) are discovered to be inoperable at any time while in this condition, restore the required feature(s) to OPERABLE status within 12 hours from discovery of inoperable required feature(s) or declare the redundant required feature(s) inoperable.

3. Following restoration of one offsite A.C. source, restore the remaining offsite A.C. source in accordance with the provisions of ACTION a with the time requirement of that ACTION based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. source.

e. With two of the required diesel generators inoperable:

1. Perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and once per 8 hours thereafter; and

#2. Restore one of the diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

3. Following restoration of one diesel generator, restore the remaining diesel generator in accordance with the provisions of ACTION b with the time requirement of that ACTION based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable diesel generator.

f. With three or more of the required A.C. sources inoperable:

1. Immediately enter Technical Specification 3.0.3.

2. Following restoration of one or more A.C. sources, restore the remaining inoperable A.C. sources in accordance with the provisions of ACTION a,b,c,d and/or e as applicable with the time requirement of that ACTION based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. sources.

g. With contiguous events of either an offsite or onsite A.C. source becoming inoperable and resulting in failure to meet the LCO:

1. Within 6 days, restore all A.C. sources required by 3.8.1.1 or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#Activities that normally support testing pursuant to 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, which would render the diesel inoperable (e.g., air roll), shall not be performed for testing required by this ACTION statement.

3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, AND 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for: (1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The switchyard is designed using a breaker-and-a-half scheme. The switchyard currently has seven connections with the CP&L transmission network; each of these transmission lines is physically independent. The switchyard has one connection with each of the two Startup Auxiliary Transformers and each SAT can be fed directly from an associated offsite transmission line. The Startup Auxiliary Transformers are the preferred power source for the Class 1E ESF buses. The minimum alignment of offsite power sources will be maintained such that at least two physically independent offsite circuits are available. The two physically independent circuits may consist of any two of the incoming transmission lines to the SATs (either through the switchyard or directly) and into the Class 1E system. As long as there are at least two transmission lines in service and two circuits through the SATs to the Class 1E buses, the LCO is met.

During MODES 5 and 6, the Class 1E buses can be energized from the offsite transmission net work via a combination of the main transformers, and unit auxiliary transformers. This arrangement may be used to satisfy the requirement of one physically independent circuit.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source. The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974. There are additional ACTION requirements to verify that all required feature(s) that depend on the remaining OPERABLE A.C. sources as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE. These requirements allow a period of time to restore any required feature discovered to be inoperable, e.g. out-of-service for maintenance, to an OPERABLE status. If the required feature(s) cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status, the ACTION statement requires the redundant required feature, i.e. feature receiving power from an inoperable A.C. source, to be declared inoperable. The allowed operating times to restore an inoperable required feature to an OPERABLE status is based on the requirements in NUREG 1431. The term "verify", as used in these ACTION statements means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine the OPERABILITY of required feature(s). It does not mean to perform the Surveillance Requirement needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the required feature(s).

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-400

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 29, 1997, Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee) proposed that the Technical Specification (TS) and its associated Bases Section for 3/4.8.1, "A.C. SOURCES-OPERATING," be revised for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP). Under the current TS 3.8.1.1.a.3, 3.8.1.1.b.4, and 3.8.1.1.d.2, if one or both offsite circuits become inoperable, or if an emergency diesel generator (EDG) becomes inoperable, the licensee must verify that the required (engineered safety) features powered from the opposite train ac sources are operable. If a required feature powered from the operable ac sources is found to be inoperable, the licensee must restore either the required feature or the inoperable ac power source to operable status within the allowed outage time (i.e., 24, 4, and 12 hours, respectively). If neither feature is restored within the allowed completion time, the licensee must declare both required features inoperable and be in hot standby within 6 hours and cold shutdown within 30 hours. The proposed TS amendment would eliminate this requirement for a plant shutdown from TS 3.8.1.1.a.3, 3.8.1.1.b.4, and 3.8.1.1.d.2; instead, the applicable Action statement of the redundant required feature would direct any required plant shutdown.

The intent of this requirement is to provide assurance that an event on one train concurrent with a single failure of the associated EDG or offsite power circuit(s) on the other train would not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features. The licensee contends that the proposed change is consistent with NUREG-1431, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants," dated April 1995.

2.0 EVALUATION

The staff has reviewed the proposed TS and the associated Bases changes for the ac power sources at HNP, and its evaluation of the proposed changes follows:

2.1 Modification of TS 3.8.1.1.a.3, 3.8.1.1.b.4, and 3.8.1.1.d.2

With one of the two offsite circuits inoperable, TS 3.8.1.1.a.3 currently states that:

> Verify required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE offsite A.C. source are OPERABLE. If required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE offsite circuit are discovered to be inoperable at any time while in this condition, restore the required feature(s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours from discovery of

> inoperable required feature(s) or declare the redundant required feature(s) powered from the inoperable A.C. source as inoperable, and be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours or within the ACTION time of applicable ACTION statement(s) for the inoperable required feature(s), whichever is more limiting.

With one diesel generator inoperable, TS 3.8.1.1.b.4 currently states:

> Verify required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE diesel generator are OPERABLE. If required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE diesel generator are discovered to be inoperable at any time while in this condition, restore the required feature(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours from discovery of inoperable required feature(s) or declare the redundant required feature(s) powered from the inoperable A.C. source as inoperable, and be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours or within the ACTION time of applicable ACTION statement(s) for the inoperable required feature(s), whichever is more limiting.

With two required offsite A.C. sources inoperable, TS 3.8.1.1.d.2 currently states:

> Verify required feature(s) are OPERABLE. If required feature(s) are discovered to be inoperable at any time while in this condition, restore the required feature(s) to OPERABLE status within 12 hours from discovery of inoperable required feature(s) or declare the redundant required feature(s) inoperable, and be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours or within the ACTION time of applicable ACTION statement(s) for the inoperable required feature(s), whichever is more limiting.

According to the underlined portions of the TS provisions, the licensee must declare the redundant required feature inoperable and must shut down the plant if it fails to restore either an inoperable required feature or an inoperable ac power source within the allowed outage time. For example, if the train "A" EDG was inoperable concurrent with the train "B" component cooling water (CCW) (required feature), after 4 hours the "A" CCW (redundant required feature) pump would be declared inoperable. On the basis of the underlined TS provisions, the plant would have to be in hot standby within 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours, or within the TS action time of applicable Action statement for the inoperable required feature, whichever is more limiting. Thus, TS 3.8.1.1.b.4 requires the plant to be in hot standby within 6 hours, while the applicable CCW Action statement, TS 3.0.3, would force the plant to be in hot standby within 7 hours. For a total loss of CCW, the underlined portions of TS 3.8.1.1 provision that requires the plant to be in hot standby within 6 hours would be more limiting than the applicable 7 hour in Action statement in TS 3.0.3. Therefore, the licensee finds that, in actuality, the provision of TS 3.8.1.1 (to be in hot standby within 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours) becomes more restrictive than the actual loss of the safety function of the critical redundant required features.

In a few instances, the licensee finds that there are redundant required plant safety features that do not require an immediate plant shutdown upon a complete loss of their safety function.

For these cases, the licensee believes that additional time could be granted by applying the allowed outage time provided by the applicable TS Action statement. However, the underlined TS, as currently written, do not allow such additional time because they do not distinguish the relative importance among redundant required features. For example, HNP has two containment hydrogen monitors that are safety-related and that perform the safety function of monitoring hydrogen levels in the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident. HNP's TS has a 30-day completion time if one hydrogen monitor is inoperable and a 72-hour completion time if both hydrogen monitors are inoperable. In connection with minimizing the potential transients associated with the shutdown, the licensee has previously analyzed and found that the safety function such as monitoring the containment hydrogen level can be completely lost without requiring an immediate plant shutdown. Therefore, when a safety system is found to be inoperable, the licensee proposed to delete the underlined portions of the TS that would avert an immediate plant shutdown, but it would permit the affected system TS to determine when a unit shutdown is required.

The licensee also finds that the plant shutdown provision in the underlined portions of the TS is based on a safety function that could be "potentially" lost due to the inoperability of an ac power source. This potential loss of a safety function has more severe consequences in terms of TS action requirements than the actual loss of the safety function. For example, if the train "A" and "B" hydrogen monitors are inoperable, the safety function is lost and the TS Action statement requires restoration of at least one hydrogen monitor within 72 hours or the unit must be shut down. However, if the "A" hydrogen monitor and the "B" EDG are inoperable, there is only potential loss of the safety function as "B" hydrogen monitor remains to be powered from the operable offsite power sources. Nevertheless, if either the hydrogen monitor or the EDG could not be restored within 4 hours, the current TS requires the plant to be shut down. On the basis of this information, the licensee asserts that the potential loss of the safety function becomes more restrictive than the actual loss of the same safety function.

The staff has reviewed similar TS provisions of Action A.2, B.2, and C.2 of TS 3.8.1 in NUREG-1431, Revision 1, and finds that it only requires declaring the redundant required feature inoperable when the required feature powered from the operable ac source is found to be inoperable, but it does not impose a separate plant shutdown requirement. By deleting the underlined portions from each of the above mentioned TS, the plant shutdown requirement would be eliminated, and, in turn, the plant shutdown would be directed by the applicable Action statement of the required feature in the current existing TS. The staff finds that the proposed changes are consistent with TS 3.8.1, Actions A.2, B.3, and C.2, of NUREG-1431, Revision 1. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed deletion of the underlined separate shutdown provision from TS 3.8.1.1.a.3, TS 3.8.1.1.b.4, and TS 3.8.1.1.d.2 is acceptable.

2.2 Modification of Bases Section 3/4.8

To be consistent with the proposed TS, the licensee has reviewed HNP's Bases Section that states:

> If the required feature(s) cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status, the ACTION statement requires the redundant required feature, i.e. feature receiving power from an inoperable A.C. source, to be declared inoperable, and a

controlled plant shutdown performed. The allowed operating times to restore an inoperable required feature to an OPERABLE status is based on the requirements in NUREG 1431.

With the deletion of the plant shutdown provision, the licensee finds that the underlined portion of the Bases Section 3/4.8, "ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS," is not necessary. The staff has reviewed the proposed change and finds it to be appropriate and consistent with the above TS amendment; therefore, deletion of the underlined portion is acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 68305). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff finds that the proposed changes are consistent with TS 3.8.1, Actions A.2, B.3, and C.2, of NUREG-1431, Revision 1. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed deletion of the underlined separate shutdown provision from TS 3.8.1.1.a.3, TS 3.8.1.1.b.4, and TS 3.8.1.1.d.2 is acceptable.

Principal Contributor: P. Kang

Date: May 22, 1998