

LICENSEE: DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.

SITE: BEAVER VALLEY 2

EN NUMBER: 25185

DOCKET: 05000412

EVENT DATE: 03-04-93

RX TYPE: PWR

EVENT TIME: 16:00

VENDORS: W-3-LP

NOTIFY DATE: 03-04-93

EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A REGION: 1 STATE: PA

TIME: 17:23

OPS OFFICER: TIM MCGINTY

10 CFR SECTION: AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION

UNIT SCRAM RX INIT INITIAL MODE CURR CURRENT MODE

CODE CRIT PWR PWR

2 N Y 98 POWER OPERATION 98 POWER OPERATION

WESTINGHOUSE INFORMATION LETTER INDICATES A POTENTIAL PROBLEM WITH SWITCHOVER TO HOT LEG INJECTION 14 HOURS INTO A LOCA.

AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF RECENT WESTINGHOUSE INFORMATION REGARDING SAFETY INJECTION SWITCHOVER TO HOT LEG INJECTION INDICATES THAT INFORMATION THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY WESTINGHOUSE (WITH RESPECT TO SINGLE FAILURE CONSEQUENCES RELATED TO VALVE "2-SIS-MOV-8889") WAS INCORRECT. PREVIOUSLY, IT WAS STATED THAT FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT LOW HEAD HOT LEG INJECTION FLOW (DONE VIA THE "8889" VALVE APPROXIMATELY 14 HOURS INTO A DESIGN BASIS LOCA) WAS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE HIGH HEAD FLOW WAS ADEQUATE TO REMOVE CORE DECAY HEAT.

WESTINGHOUSE NOW SAYS (SEE LETTER #ET-NRC-933790, DATED JAN 8, 1993) THAT IT IS NOT ADEQUATE (HIGH HEAD INJECTION ALONE) AND THAT COLD LEG LOW HEAD INJECTION MUST BE RE-ESTABLISHED. THE SCENARIO INVOLVES TWO FAILURES: FIRST, A HOT LEG BREAK, SUCH THAT HIGH HEAD FLOW ALONE WOULD NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE FLOW TO THE CORE, WITH MUCH OF THAT FLOW GOING OUT THE HOT LEG BREAK. SECOND, THE FAILURE OF THE "8889" VALVE TO OPEN TO PROVIDE HOT LEG LOW HEAD INJECTION WHEN PERFORMED BY OPERATORS 14 HOURS AFTER THE BREAK. CURRENTLY, THE LICENSEES EOPs DO NOT ADDRESS RE-ESTABLISHING COLD LEG LOW HEAD INJECTION IF THIS SCENARIO WERE TO OCCUR, THUS PROVIDING THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING SITUATION (HIGH HEAD INJECTION ALONE IS NOW CONSIDERED TO BE INADEQUATE PER THE LETTER).

THE LICENSEE IS CURRENTLY ADDRESSING THE SITUATION BY "POSTING A CLEARANCE WITH TAGS ON THREE VALVES", THE TWO VALVES THAT WOULD SECURE LOW HEAD INJECTION TO THE COLD LEGS AND THE ONE VALVE (#8889) THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE OPENED TO PROVIDE HOT LEG LOW HEAD INJECTION. THE LICENSEE WILL ALSO BE MAKING THE SITUATION CLEAR IN THE EOPs IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THUS, THE LICENSEE IS PREVENTING THE OPERATOR ACTION THAT WOULD POTENTIALLY CAUSE THE PROBLEM BY THE USE OF THE TAGS ON THE VALVES, REMAINING ON COLD LEG INJECTION IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR. THE LICENSEE HAS INFORMED THE

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RESIDENT AND WILL PROVIDE HIM WITH THE WESTINGHOUSE LETTER. THE
LICENSEE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE SITUATION ARISES 14 HOURS INTO
AN EVENT SUCH THAT FULL TECHNICAL SUPPORT WOULD BE AVAILABLE.
UNIT 1 HAS A DIFFERENT SAFETY INJECTION ARRANGEMENT AND DOES NOT
HAVE THE SINGLE VALVE ARRANGEMENT THAT UNIT 2 DOES. THE
WESTINGHOUSE LETTER WAS ADDRESSED TO SOME OTHER PLANTS.