

LICENSEE: VIRGINIA POWER CO.
 SITE: NORTH ANNA 1 2 EN NUMBER: 25138
 DOCKET: 05000338 05000339 EVENT DATE: 02-25-93
 RX TYPE: PWR PWR EVENT TIME: 18:00
 VENDORS: W-3-LP W-3-LP NOTIFY DATE: 02-25-93
 EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A REGION: 2 STATE: VA TIME: 19:54
 OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH
 10 CFR SECTION: AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
 UNIT SCRAM RX INIT INITIAL MODE CURR CURRENT MODE
 CODE CRIT PWR PWR
 1 N N 0 REFUELING 0 REFUELING
 2 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FAX RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE:
 "REVIEW OF WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY LETTER 92-012
 DETERMINED THAT NORTH ANNA UNITS 1 & 2 ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE
 SCENARIO PROPOSED IN THE LETTER. SPECIFICALLY, DURING THE
 RECIRCULATION PHASE FOLLOWING A MEDIUM BREAK LOCA, FAILURE OF A
 SINGLE CHECK VALVE TO SEAT MAY CAUSE THE SEAL WATER HEAT
 EXCHANGER RELIEF VALVE (RV) TO LIFT. THIS RV DISCHARGES TO THE
 VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT) WHICH RELIEVES TO THE LIQUID WASTE
 SYSTEM. THE EVENTUAL RESULT WOULD BE OVERFLOW OF THE LOW LEVEL
 LIQUID WASTE TANK TO THE AUX BUILDING SUMP. THIS PRESENTS A
 PREVIOUSLY UNANALYZED POTENTIAL RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASE
 PATH.

SYSTEM ENGINEERING HAS DETERMINED THAT THE ABILITY OF THE ECCS TO
 DELIVER INJECTION FLOW IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE EXISTING
 WESTINGHOUSE EOPs PROVIDE SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE TO THE OPERATING
 CREW TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS TO BELOW LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
 SHUTOFF HEAD PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF THIS POSTULATED RELEASE
 PATH. ACTION RECOMMENDED BY WESTINGHOUSE IN THE ADVISORY LETTER
 TO INCLUDE THE CHECK VALVE IN A LEAK TESTING PROGRAM ARE BEING
 IMPLEMENTED."

THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

HOO NOTE: AN SI ISOLATES THE VCT BY CLOSING MOV 2115C & E. IF
 CHECK VALVE 4-C42 LEAKS THE RELIEF VALVES ON THE SEAL WATER HEAT
 EXCHANGER WILL SEE WHATEVER THE DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF THE LOW
 HEAD SI PUMPS IS, WHICH IS ABOVE THE LIFT POINT OF THE RELIEF
 VALVES. SEE ALSO EVENT# 25140.

LICENSEE: VIRGINIA POWER CO.
 SITE: SURRY 1 2 EN NUMBER: 25140
 DOCKET: 05000280 05000281 EVENT DATE: 02-25-93
 RX TYPE: PWR PWR EVENT TIME: 18:00
 VENDORS: W-3-LP W-3-LP NOTIFY DATE: 02-25-93

EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A REGION: 2 STATE: VA TIME: 20:29
 OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH
 10 CFR SECTION: AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
 UNIT SCRAM RX INIT INITIAL MODE CURR CURRENT MODE
 CODE CRIT PWR PWR
 1 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION
 2 N Y 82 POWER OPERATION 82 POWER OPERATION

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FAX RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE:

"FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IN RESPONSE TO WESTINGHOUSE ADVISORY LETTER 92-012 CONCERNING CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE DURING A LOCA, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 & 2 COULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THIS EVENT. THE SCENARIO INVOLVES A MEDIUM-BREAK LOCA DURING WHICH THE SUCTION OF THE SI PUMPS IS TRANSFERRED FROM THE RWST (INJECTION PHASE) TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMP (RECIRC PHASE). DURING THE RECIRC PHASE, THE LHSI PUMPS PROVIDE SUCTION TO THE HHSI PUMPS IN A "PIGGYBACK" MODE OF OPERATION.

IT IS POSTULATED THAT DURING THE RECIRC PHASE, A SINGLE CHECK VALVE COULD FAIL ALLOWING LHSI PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE TO BE SEEN AT THE SEAL WATER RETURN HEAT EXCHANGER RELIEF VALVE TO THE VCT. IF THE SETPOINT OF THIS RELIEF VALVE IS EXCEEDED, THE VCT MAY BE FILLED TO A POINT WHERE THE VCT RELIEF LIFTS, CREATING A RELEASE TO THE LW SYSTEM. THIS REPRESENTS A PREVIOUSLY UNANALYZED POTENTIAL RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASE PATH.

...ADDITIONAL ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS ARE CONTINUING CONSISTENT WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE WESTINGHOUSE ADVISORY LETTER. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR IS AWARE OF THE STATION CONFIGURATION AND IS BEING INFORMED OF THIS REPORT."

HOO NOTE: SEE ALSO EVENT #25138.

*** UPDATE AT 1741 ON 03/16/93 BY MIKE SMITH ENTERED BY HOO JOLLIFFE ***

LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS EVENT DUE TO THE FOLLOWING RATIONALE:

LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE THE RELIEF PATH, SEVERAL IMPROBABLE EVENTS MUST OCCUR IN CONJUNCTION. EVEN THEN, THE 150 PSIG SETPOINT FOR THE SEAL RETURN HEAT EXCHANGER RELIEF VALVE IS NOT EXCEEDED AS THE MAXIMUM CALCULATED PRESSURE AT THE RELIEF VALVE INLET, ASSUMING VCT CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE, IS 142 PSIG.

FURTHER, THE INITIAL EVALUATIONS TOOK NO CREDIT FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS TO MITIGATE INCREASING LEVEL AND PRESSURE TRENDS IN THE VCT. EVEN WITH POSTULATED LEAKAGE PAST THE VCT CHECK VALVE AND SEAL RETURN RELIEF VALVE WEEPAGE, SEVERAL HOURS WOULD ELAPSE BEFORE THE POSTULATED CHECK VALVE/ RELIEF VALVE LEAKAGE COULD LEAD TO A POSTULATED RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE. THEREFORE, THE OPERATORS HAVE SEVERAL HOURS TO DIAGNOSE THE EVENT AND AFFECT CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION ELIMINATING THE POTENTIAL LEAK PATH.

THUS, THE CONDITIONS/EVENTS PRESENTED IN THE ADVISORY LETTER DO NOT CONSTITUTE A CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD RESULT IN A SYSTEM FAILURE LEADING TO A RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.

LICENSEE DOES NOT PLAN TO SUBMIT A 10CFR50.73 REPORT.

LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

HOO NOTIFIED R2DO McALPINE.