

Anthony R. Pietrangelo DIRECTOR, RISK & PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION NUCLEAR GENERATION

December 3, 2001

Dr. William D. Beckner, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Forwarding of TSTFs

PROJECT NUMBER: 689

Dear Dr. Beckner:

Enclosed for NRC consideration are the following NEI Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Travelers:

- TSTF-373, Revision 1 Increase CIV Completion Time from 72 Hours to 7 Days (NPSD-1168). The revision addresses NRC comments.
- TSTF-420, Revision 0 Relocate BIT SDM to COLR.
- TSTF-421, Revision 0 Revision to RCP Flywheel Inspection Program (WCAP-15666).

Please contact me at (202) 739-8081 or Mike Schoppman at (202) 739-8011, if you have any questions or desire further communication regarding these recommended changes.

Sincerely,

Author 1. Pretrand

Anthony R. Pietrangelo

Enclosures

Do46

PHONE 202.739.8000

Dr. William D. Beckner December 3, 2001 Page 2

c: Leslie A. Hill, NRC Noel Clarkson, B&WOG Steve Wideman, WOG John Arbuckle, BWROG Tom Weber, CEOG Donald Hoffman, EXCEL Services Corporation

	(CEOG-160, Re	v. 0)	TSTF-373, Rev. 1
Industry/TSTF Standard Te	chnical Specification	on Change Ti	raveler
Increase CIV Completion Time from 72 Hours to	7 Days (NPSD-1168)		
Classification: 1) Technical Change			
Priority: 1)High		,	
NUREGs Affected: 🗌 1430 🗌 1431 👿 14	432 🔲 1433 🗍 1434	4	
This change extends the Completion Time for penetra This change is applicable to both penetrations with tw valve. This change is not applicable to the containme See Attached	ation flowpaths with one value to containment isolation value ont sump supply values to the	ve inoperable from ves and with one co e ECCS and contain	72 hours to 7 days. ntainment isolation ment spray pump.
Industry Contact: Weber, Tom	(602) 393-5764	tweber01@2	upsc.com
NRC Contact: Giardina, Bob	301-415-3152	lbb1@nrc.go	-)V
Revision History OG Revision 0 Revision St	tatus: Active	Next Action:	
Revision Proposed by: CEOG			
Revision Description: Original Issue			
Owners Group Review Information	1		
Date Originated by OG: 11-Jul-00			
Owners Group Comments: (No Comments)			
Owners Group Resolution: Approved	Date: 05-Dec-00		
TSTF Review Information			
TSTF Received Date: 15-Jan-01	Date Distributed for Revie	ew: 15-Jan-01	
OG Review Completed: 🔽 BWOG 👿 Wo	OG 🖌 CEOG 🔽 BWR	OG	
TSTF Comments:			
 WOG, BWOG, BWROG - Not applicable. The TSTF requested the following changes: Change "NRC SER" to "NRC Safety Evalua Bracket Condition B Eliminate references to a CRMP as Mainten Move the Reviewer's Note to the Bases. Returned to CEOG for prioritization. 	ation" ance Rule a.4 is now in effe	ct.	
TSTF Resolution: Approved Date: 1	4-Feb-01		

NRC Review Information

11/24/2001

OG Revision 0

Revision Status: Active

Next Action:

Final Resolution Date: 07-May-01

11/24/2001

NRC Received Date: 10-Apr-01

NRC Comments:

1. Proposed Condition A has an applicability Note that restricts the Condition to the containment sump supply valves to the ECCS and containment spray pumps. The staff safety evaluation implies that those penetrations that don't meet the topical report criteria and/or the plant specific evaluations must retain the 4 hour Completion Time. The Condition A Note should be modified to reflect these additional or potential penetrations. See comment 3 for a variation of this comment.

2. New Condition B (STS Condition A) has a bracketed exception. The bracketed exception as proposed implies that proposed Condition A has limits of some sort. Since Rev. 2 to the STS is about to be issued, it is felt that the wording used in TSTF-207, R.5 better reflects the intent of the current and proposed exception. The exception and the proposed change should be modified accordingly.

3. New Condition D (STS Condition C) was revised in TSTF-30 from 4 hours to 72 hours. It is unclear from the staff SE if all types of configurations for penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation value and a closed system have been evaluated by the Topical Report. If they have, this comment is moot. If they have not, then an Action similar to STS Condition C as modified by TSTF-30 needs to be proposed with an applicability Note based on Comment 1 above.

4. Proposed Insert 2 is the Reviewer's Note to be added to the Bases which specifies the conditions for adopting the 7 day Completion Time. The Note just references the staff SE for the Topical Report. The Note should specifically state the staff conditions that must be met in order to use the 7 day Completion Time. The reviewer implementing the TSTF at the plant and/or the staff reviewer may not have ready access to the staff SE. Also see comment 7 below. In addition the Reviewer's Note should state that if the conditions or criteria cannot be met then the 4/72 hour Completion Times should be used, otherwise the [7 days] in Conditions B and D would be confusing in terms of what to put in their place.

5. The bases changes should be compared to TSTF-207 and TSTF-30 for applicability; if there are differences or changes that are required they should be discussed in the Background portion of the TSTF.

6. The Background portion of the TSTF discuss the change from 4 hours to 7 days. TSTF-30 changed STS Condition C from 4 hours to 72 days. While this should not affect the results of the Topical Report for that type of penetration or the TSTF, the Background should be revised to reflect the current STS (STS Rev. 2).

7. The Background portion of the TSTF list the conditions for acceptance of the 7 days found in the staff SE. Condition 4 does not reflect the staff's requirement that the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) be found acceptable to the staff. In addition staff condition CRMP (ii) has not been addressed in the Background section. This requirement deals with common cause failures and operability verification.

Final Resolution: Superceded by Revision

TSTF Revision 1	Revision Status: Active	Next Action:	TSTF
Revision Proposed by:	CEOG	 	

Revision Description:

On May 7, 2001, the NRC provided comments on TSTF-373, Revision 0. Those comments are addressed below.

1. Proposed Condition A has an applicability Note that restricts the Condition to the containment sump supply valves to the ECCS and containment spray pumps. The staff safety evaluation implies that those penetrations that don't meet the topical report criteria and/or the plant specific evaluations must retain the 4

11/24/2001

TSTF Revision 1 Revision Status: Active Next Action: TSTF

hour Completion Time. The Condition A Note should be modified to reflect these additional or potential penetrations. See comment 3 for a variation of this comment.

Response: 1. The proposed condition A note is modified to bracket the valve description. A Reviewer's Note is added to the Bases stating that Condition A only applies to those valves that meet the conditions in the Topical Report.

2. New Condition B (STS Condition A) has a bracketed exception. The bracketed exception as proposed implies that proposed Condition A has limits of some sort. Since Rev. 2 to the STS is about to be issued, it is felt that the wording used in TSTF-207, R.5 better reflects the intent of the current and proposed exception. The exception and the proposed change should be modified accordingly.

Response: The changes are re-marked on Revision 2 pages.

3. New Condition D (STS Condition C) was revised in TSTF-30 from 4 hours to 72 hours. It is unclear from the staff SE if all types of configurations for penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation value and a closed system have been evaluated by the Topical Report. If they have, this comment is moot. If they have not, then an Action similar to STS Condition C as modified by TSTF-30 needs to be proposed with an applicability Note based on Comment 1 above.

Response: The changes are re-marked on Revision 2 pages. A Reviewer's Note is added to the Bases stating that the 7 day Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is only applicable to the containment isolation valves that meet the conditions in the Topical Report. For any containment isolation valves meeting Condition D and not meeting the conditions of the Topical Report, a 72 hour Completion Time is applied.

4. Proposed Insert 2 is the Reviewer's Note to be added to the Bases which specifies the conditions for adopting the 7 day Completion Time. The Note just references the staff SE for the Topical Report. The Note should specifically state the staff conditions that must be met in order to use the 7 day Completion Time. The reviewer implementing the TSTF at the plant and/or the staff reviewer may not have ready access to the staff SE. Also see comment 7 below. In addition the Reviewer's Note should state that if the conditions or criteria cannot be met then the 4/72 hour Completion Times should be used, otherwise the [7 days] in Conditions B and D would be confusing in terms of what to put in their place.

Response: The NRC requested that the specific conditions form the SER be restated in NUREG 1432. This would not be appropriate since it could be taken out of context and possibly misused by individuals reading only the conditions and not the balance of the entire SE for the Topical Report. Therefore, the conditions will not be added to the NUREG. However, the approved version of the Topical resport includes the SE. As use of the TSTF would require use of the Topical, and the SE is part of the Topical, both documents would be consulted when incorporating this change. The TSTF strongly believes that individual plant licensing engineers or NRC staff members working on a licensing amendment involving this Topical Report needs a complete copy of the Topical and the NRC SE for the Topical and can not rely on extracted statements from the SE to comprehend the intent of the Topical and the SE for the Topical. No changes are needed for the response to this question.

5. The bases changes should be compared to TSTF-207 and TSTF-30 for applicability; if there are differences or changes that are required they should be discussed in the Background portion of the TSTF.

Response: The changes are re-marked on Revision 2 pages. Revision 2 includes TSTF-207 and TSTF-30.

6. The Background portion of the TSTF discuss the change from 4 hours to 7 days. TSTF-30 changed STS Condition C from 4 hours to 72 days. While this should not affect the results of the Topical Report for that type of penetration or the TSTF, the Background should be revised to reflect the current STS (STS Rev. 2).

TSTF Revision 1	Revision Status: Active	Next Action:	TSTF
-----------------	--------------------------------	--------------	------

Response: The background has been revised. Changes are not from 72 hours to 7 days.

7. The Background portion of the TSTF list the conditions for acceptance of the 7 days found in the staff SE. Condition 4 does not reflect the staff's requirement that the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) be found acceptable to the staff. In addition staff condition CRMP (ii) has not been addressed in the Background section. This requirement deals with common cause failures and operability verification.

Response: This question mentions a discusses a Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) and requests that the CRMP be addressed in the Background section of the TSTF. The need for a CRMP has been changed as a result of the revision of the Maintenance Rule . 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) which requires that the licensee "shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities." This requirement takes the place of a CRMP.

Additional Changes:

The References are renumbered to appear in presentation order as required by the Writer's Guide.

The format of a Reviewer's Note to SR 3.6.3.9 is corrected.

TSTF Review Information

TSTF Received Date:	28-Oct-01	Date I	Distributed fo	r Review:	28-Oct-01	
OG Review Completed:	☑ BWOG ☑	WOG 🖌	CEOG 🔽	BWROG		
TSTF Comments: (No Comments)						
TSTF Resolution:	Date	:				

Incorporation Into the NUREGs

File to BBS/LAN Date:	TSTF Informed Date:	TSTF Approved Date:
NUREG Rev Incorporated:		

Affected Technical Specifications

Ref. 3.6.3 Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)					
Action 3.6.3.A	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)					
	Change Description: Renamed Condition B and revised					
Action 3.6.3.A	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)					
	Change Description: New					
Action 3.6.3.A Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)					
	Change Description: Renamed Condition B and revised					
Action 3.6.3.A Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)					
	Change Description: New					

11/24/2001

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 2001, Excel Services Corporation. Use by Excel Services associates, utility clients, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is granted. All other use without written permission is prohibited.

11/24/2001

Action 3.6.3.B	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition C
Action 3.6.3.B Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition C
Action 3.6.3.C	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition D and revised
Action 3.6.3.C Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition D and revised
Action 3.6.3.D	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition E
Action 3.6.3.D Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition E
Action 3.6.3.E	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition F
Action 3.6.3.E Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition F
Action 3.6.3.F	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition G
Action 3.6.3.F Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
	Change Description: Renamed Condition G
SR 3.6.3.1 Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
SR 3.6.3.6 Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
SR 3.6.3.9 Bases	Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)

TSTF-373, Rev. 1

2.0 Proposed Change

The proposed change allows 7 days, vice 72 hours, to isolate an inoperable containment isolation valve. It adds a new Condition A for those components which retain the 72 hour Completion Time and revises the existing Conditions A and C (now B and D) to provide for a 7 day Completion Time.

3.0 Background

The CEOG Joint Applications Report (JAR) NPSD-1168 provides a risk-informed technical basis for specific changes to Technical Specification Completion Times (CTs) of Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual) in NUREG 1432. The primary intent of the proposed change is to provide for the potential of on-line maintenance, repair and testing of a Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) that is declared inoperable during operation in the applicable MODES (MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4). These changes are warranted based on the low risk associated with the extended CTs and the relatively greater risk associated with transitioning from the existing MODE to cold shutdown (MODE 5).

This application is being pursued by the CEOG as a risk informed plant modification in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. As stated in NPSD-1168 and the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE), all plants that adopt these changes will implement a Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) to provide risk informed maintenance controls. However, the NRC SE associated with NPSD-1168 was issued prior to the changes associated with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) becoming effective. (The NRC SE for NPSD-1168 is dated 6/26/2000 and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) became effective on 11/28/2000.) With the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), licensees are required to assess and manage the risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. The activities necessary for implementation of 50.65(a)(4) satisfy the condition in the NRC SE for implementing a CRMP and supercede the need for a separate program.

To expedite the review process, the JAR provides, where appropriate, generic bounding risk assessments of the impact of adopting these TS changes. The risk calculations included in this evaluation consider all significant impacts of CIV TS modification, including:

- Assessment of the Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) and Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP) resulting from allowing CIVs to remain in the OPEN position for the duration of the Completion Time.
- For systems with CIVs that are connected to the RCS, ICCDP/ICLERP assessments include consideration of Interfacing System LOCA (ISLOCA).
- Assessment of Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) associated with retaining valves, which have a safety function (in addition to containment isolation), in the closed position for an extended time.

Risk evaluations also include explicit consideration of incremental risks associated with CIVs connected to systems containing non-seismically qualified piping. All risk assessments consider the effect of maintaining the CIV in an open position

In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.177, risks associated with a single Completion Time are evaluated against the "very small risk" metrics of 5.0E-7 for ICCDP and 5.0E-8 for ICLERP. The cumulative impact of multiple simultaneous and sequential entries into the Condition are also considered.

The supporting/analytical material contained within the JAR is considered applicable to all CE NSSS designed units of the CEOG member utilities regardless of the details of the valve actuators.

4.0 Technical Analysis

The CEOG Joint Applications Report developed a process for evaluating plant risk associated with the proposed changes to the CIV Technical Specification CT. The process involves grouping the various containment penetrations into defined classes. For each class, the containment penetrations are further sub-divided into generic type of configurations. An evaluation is then performed for each of the generic configurations of containment penetration to assess the impact on plant risk due to the proposed CT extension for the associated CIVs. The evaluation of the impact on plant risk determines the change in core damage frequency (Δ CDF), the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), the change in large early release frequency (Δ LERF) and the incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP).

The results of the evaluation in the CEOG Joint Applications Report demonstrate that the proposed CT extension provides plant operational flexibility while simultaneously allowing plant operation with an acceptable level of risk. The results demonstrate that the risk level associated with the proposed CT is below the guidelines set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.174.

Conditions of Implementation

The NRC Safety Evaluation, dated June 26, 2000, which approved the CEOG Joint Applications Report contained a number of conditions on the use of the report. They are:

- Individual licensees requesting CIV Completion Time relaxations should state in their plant-specific application that they have verified that the JAR results apply to their plant. Licensees should verify that the relaxed Completion Times will only apply to penetrations analyzed to meet the risk guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.177 and fall within the 14 containment penetration configurations considered in the Joint Applications Report. Any other containment penetration configurations must be supported by a plantspecific analysis. Licensee submittals must retain the current Completion Times for the three configurations that were not analyzed in the Joint Applications Report: containment sump supply valves to the ECCS and containment spray systems pumps, valves associated with the main feedwater system, and main steam isolation valves.)
- 2. Licensees should provide sufficient quantitative or qualitative substantiation to demonstrate that external events will not affect the results of the analysis supporting the extended Completion Times.

- 3. Licensees should state that they have verified acceptable PRA quality as described in Regulatory Guide 1.177.
- 4. Licensees should require verification of the operability of the remaining CIV(s) in a penetration flow path before entering the extended Completion Time for corrective maintenance. The Joint Applications Report assumes that the penetrations remain physically intact in MODES in which these valves are to be operable during corrective maintenance. Licensees should describe in their plant specific application how the affected penetration will remain physically intake, or state that the penetration will be isolated so as to not permit a release to the outside environment.

5.0 Regulatory Analysis

5.1 Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration

The TSTF has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed generic change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change revises the Completion Time for an inoperable containment isolation valve within the scope of the CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168 from 72 hours to 7 days. Containment isolation valves are not accident initiators in any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.

Containment isolation valves (CIV's), individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the containment following an accident. The proposed CT extension applies to the reduction in redundancy in the containment isolation function by the CIV's for a limited period of time but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT extension a probabilistic risk assessment evaluation was performed in CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168. The risk assessment concluded that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for CE-designed plants, the proposed increase in the CIV CT from four hours to seven days does not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. It also concluded that the proposed change does not result in an unacceptable incremental conditional core damage probability or incremental conditional large early release probability according to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.177. As a result, there would be no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The change revises the allowed outage time for an inoperable containment isolation valve within the scope of the CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168 from 72 hours to 7 days. Containment isolation valves, individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the containment following an accident. The proposed CT extension applies to the reduction in redundancy in the containment isolation function by the CIV's for a limited period of time but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. The proposed change does not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new of different type of equipment will be installed). Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change revises the Completion Time for an inoperable containment isolation valve within the scope of the CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168 from 72 hours to 7 days. Containment isolation valves, individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the containment following an accident. The proposed CT extension applies to the reduction in redundancy in the containment isolation function by the CIV's for a limited period of time but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT extension a probabilistic risk assessment evaluation was performed in CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168. The risk assessment concluded that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for CE-designed plants, the proposed increase in the CIV CT from four hours to seven days does not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. It also concluded that the proposed change does not result in an unacceptable incremental conditional core damage probability or incremental conditional large early release probability according to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.177. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, the TSTF concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria

The proposed change increases a Completion Time for an inoperable containment isolation valve. Completion Times are not dictated by or relied on by any regulatory requirement, but are used to minimize the time that regulatory requirements, especially those regarding single failure protection, cannot be met.

The design of the applicable plants are not changed and single failure protection is still a design requirement. However, the proposed change extends the limited time during which single failure protection for a containment penetration is relaxed.

The analysis presented in CE-NPSD-1168 demonstrates that the extension of the Completion Time is acceptable.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the approval of the proposed change will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public

6.0 Environmental Consideration

A review has determined that the proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.

7.0 References

- Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) Joint Applications Report (JAR) CE-NPSD-1168, Joint Applications Report for Containment Isolation Valve AOT Extension, dated June 1999.
- 2. NRC Safety Evaluation for CEOG Joint Applications Report CE-NPSD-1168, "JAR for CIV AOT Extension," dated June 26, 2000.

TSTF-373, Pev.1

- 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
- 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)
- LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

nsert ACTIONS

- NOTES -
- 1. Penetration flow paths [except for [42] inch purge valve penetration flow paths] may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
- 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system(s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves.
- 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
 - NOTE - Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment isolation valves. One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable [for 	AND	Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.	A hours [7 days]
reasons other than Condition[s] D [and E]].			

TSTF-373, Rev. 1

INSERT 1

CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
ANOTE Only applicable to the [containment sump supply valves to the ECCS and containned spray pumps]. 	A.1 A.1 A.1 A.1 A.1 A.2	Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.	72 hours Once per 31 days for isolation
		isolated.	devices outside containment <u>AND</u>
			Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment

Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual) 3.6.3 $T \leq TF - 373$, Bul

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	 NOTES - Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means. Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated. 	Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment <u>AND</u> Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
- NOTE - Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment isolation valves. One or more penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment isolation valves inoperable [for reasons other than Condition[s] D [and E]].	Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.	1 hour
- NOTE - Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable.	Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.	[72] hours & [7 days]

Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual) 3.6.3

TSTF-373, Au. 1

CONDITION		REG	UIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	() ²	. <u> </u>	- NOTES - Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. Isolation devices that	
			are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means.	
		Ver per isol	ify the affected netration flow path is ated.	Once per 31 days
 [One or more secondary containment bypass [eakage [or purge valve leakage] not within limit. 	1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Res limi	store leakage within t.	4 hours for secondary containment bypass leakage
				AND
				24 hours for purge valve leakage]
One or more penetration flow paths with one or more containment purge valves not within purge valve leakage limits.	¢1 D	Isol pen use and auto resi mar sea	ate the affected etration flow path by of at least one [closed de-activated omatic valve with lient seals, closed nual valve with resilient ls, or blind flange].	24 hours
	AND			

TSTF-373, Rul

CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	₽2 Ē	- NOTES - 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.	
		2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means.	
		Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.	Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment
			AND
			Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment
	AND		
	Ф ³ Ē	Perform SR 3.6.3.6 for the resilient seal purge valves closed to comply with Required Action E.1.	Once per [] days]
 Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. 	Ø.1 AND	Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	Ø.20	Be in MODE 5.	36 hours

ACTIONS (continued)

i 7

The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve.

A fourth Note has been added that requires entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1 when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage limit.

(_Inserts)	exceeding the overall containment leakage limit.
Fist	(A.1 and (R)2 (B) (Condition 4 and for)
[Insert] [Iday]	In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable, [except for purge valve leakage and shield building bypass leakage not within limit], the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action (A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment. Required Action (A.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting containment
	OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 bear Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action 1, the affected penetration flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the

INSERT 2

Adoption of the 7 day Completion Time is contingent on the conditions identified in Reference 4.

INSERT 3

A.1 and A.2

In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment. Required Action A.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Refs. 4 and 5).

For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 72 hour Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to [the containment sump supply valves to the ECCS and containment spray pumps].

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in

high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

ACTIONS (continued)

previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system, Condition provides appropriate actions.

Required Action **(**.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

<u> (j. 1</u>

B

With two [or more] containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, [except for purge valve leakage and shield building bypass leakage not within limit], the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action (6.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action (6.2, which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations

requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are

ACTIONS (continued)

7 day 1

(D)

D

 $\left[c \right]$

operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment isolation valves. Condition of this LCO addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve inoperable in this type of penetration flow path.

Insert4

With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action 0.1 must be completed within the [72] hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable, considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action 2.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference is This Note is necessary since this Condition is written to specifically address those penetration flow paths in a closed system.

Required Action @.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these

INSERT 4

Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual) B 3.6.3 $T \le T = -373$, Au. 1

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.



With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate (SR 3.6.3.9) [or purge valve leakage rate (SR 3.6.3.6)] not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis are not met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration(s) that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour Completion Time for secondary containment bypass leakage is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration(s) and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function. [The 24 hour Completion Time for purge valve leakage is acceptable considering the purge valves remain closed so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.]

- REVIEWER'S NOTE

[The bracketed options provided in ACTION Direflect options in plant design and options in adopting the associated leakage rate Surveillances.

The options (in both ACTION and ACTION for purge valve leakage, are based primarily on the design - if leakage rates can be measured (F) separately for each purge valve, ACTION is intended to apply. This would be required to be able to implement Required Action (C3. Should the design allow only for leak testing both purge valves simultaneously, then the Completion Time for ACTION is should include the "24 hours for purge valve leakage" and ACTION is should be eliminated.]]

ACTIONS (continued)

F [€.1. €.2, and €.3

In the event one or more containment purge valves in one or more penetration flow paths are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits, or the affected penetration must be isolated. The method of isolation must be by the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a [closed and de-activated automatic valve with resilient seals, a closed manual valve with resilient seals, or a blind flange]. A purge valve with resilient seals utilized to satisfy Required Action (21 must have been demonstrated to meet the leakage requirements of SR 3.6.3.6. The specified Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.

In accordance with Required Action $(\mathbf{E}, 2)$, this penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. (F)

For the containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action (2, 1, SR 3.6.3.6) must be performed at least once every [92] days. This assures that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge valve does not increase during the time the penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.3.6, 184 days, is based on an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-20 (Ref. (4)). Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per [92] days was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.



ACTIONS (continued)

Required Action (9.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned.]



If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE [SR 3.6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS

Each [42] inch containment purge valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals. This Surveillance is designed to ensure that a gross breach of containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a containment purge valve. Detailed analysis of the purge valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to limit offsite doses. Therefore, these valves are required to be in the sealed closed position during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. A containment purge valve that is sealed closed must have motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de-energizing the source of electric power or by removing the air supply to the valve operator. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. The Frequency is a result of an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-24 (Ref. 6), related to containment purge valve use during unit operations. This SR is not required to be met while in Condition E of this LCO. This is reasonable since the penetration flow path would be isolated.]

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

<u>SR 3.6.3.4</u>

This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located inside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. For containment isolation valves inside containment, the Frequency of "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate, since these containment isolation valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that they are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

The Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is small.

<u>SR 3.6.3.5</u>

Verifying that the isolation time of each automatic power operated containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. [The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program or 92 days.]

<u>SR 3.6.3.6</u>



For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option [A][B], (Ref.), is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight

STF-373, Ray 1

Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual) B 3.6.3

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

(due to the direct path between containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, "Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. $\hat{\Phi}$).

Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.

SR 3.6.3.7

Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation actuation signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The [18] month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

[<u>SR 3.6.3.8</u>

- REVIEWER'S NOTE -

This SR is only required for those units with resilient seal purge valves allowed to be open during [MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4] and having blocking devices on the valves that are not permanently installed.

Verifying that each [42] inch containment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to \leq [50]% is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analyses of References 1 and 2. If a LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis. At other times when purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

fully open. The [18] month Frequency is appropriate because the blocking devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage.]

[<u>SR 3.6.3.9</u>

This SR ensures that the combined leakage rate of all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than or equal to the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the safety analysis are met. The leakage rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.



- REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [].
 - 2. FSAR, Section [].
 - 3. Standard Review Plan 6.2.4.
 - 6 A. Generic Issue B-20.
 - **7**, ₺. Generic Issue B-24.
 - 8 6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option [A][B].

Insert 5

INSERT 5

- 3. Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) Joint Applications Report (JAR) CE-NPSD-1168, Joint Applications Report for Containment Isolation Valve AOT Extension, dated June 1999.
- 4. NRC Safety Evaluation for CEOG Joint Applications Report CE-NPSD-1168, "JAR for CIV AOT Extension," dated June 26, 2000.

Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler

Relocate BIT SDM to COLR

Classification: 3) Editorial Change

Priority: 4)Edit/Bases

NUREGs Affected: 🔄 1430 👽 1431 📋 1432 📄 1433 🚍 1434

1.0 Description

TSTF-9, approved by the NRC on 9/18/1996, relocated specific SHUTDOWN MARGIN values from the Technical Specifications to the COLR. One instance, the SDM to be achieved if the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) is inoperable and not restored, was overlooked in the preparation of TSTF-9. This change relocates this SDM value to the COLR.

2.0 Proposed Change

ISTS Required Action 3.5.6.B.2 is revised to state, "Borate to SDM provided in the COLR."

3.0 Background

TSTF-9 relocated the specific value for Shutdown Margin (SDM) located throughout the Technical Specifications to the COLR. SDM is a cycle-specific variable similar to Moderator Temperature Coefficient, Rod Insertion Limits, Axial Flux Difference, Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, and Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, which are currently contained in the COLR. In addition, there is an NRC-approved methodology for calculating SDM. TSTF-9 was requested because relocating SDM to the COLR will provide core design and operational flexibility that can be used for improved fuel management and to solve plant specific issues. TSTF-9 was approved by the NRC on 9/18/1996.

TSTF-9 overlooked the relocation of the specific SDM value in ITS 3.5.6, Boron Injection Tank. ITS 3.5.6, Required Action B.2 states, "Borate to an SDM equivalent to [1]% dk/k at 200 F." The bracketed SDM value is similar to the other bracketed SDM values which were relocated under TSTF-9.

Only two Westinghouse plants credit a Boron Injection Tank in their safety analyses. Both plants have concurred that this value is similar to other SDM values relocated under TSTF-9 and should have been relocated to the COLR in TSTF-9. This Traveler corrects that oversight.

This change is considered editorial as the justification and approval for TSTF-9 applies to this change.

Industry Contact:	Wideman, Steve	(316) 364-4037	stwidem@wcnoc.com
NRC Contact:	Tjader, Bob	(301) 415-1187	trt@nrc.gov
OG Revision 0	, y	Revision Status: Active	Next Action: TSTF
Revision	Proposed by: Nort	I Anna	
Revision Original I	Description: ssue		

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 2001, Excel Services Corporation. Use by Excel Services associates, utility clients, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is granted. All other use without written permission is prohibited.

Revision Status: Information -Jul-01	Active	Next Action: T	STF
Information -Jul-01			
-Jul-01			
Approved Date:	18-Jul-01		
tion			
Nov-01 Date	Distributed for	r Review: 01-Nov-01	
BWOG 🗹 WOG 🗹	CEOG 🔽	BWROG	
ed Date: 21-Nov-	-01		
on			
lov-01			
tion Pending		Final Resolution Date:	
Gs			
TSTF Informed Da	ite:	TSTF Approved Date	e:
	tion Nov-01 Date BWOG V WOG V ed Date: 21-Nove ion Nov-01 ction Pending Gs TSTF Informed Date Date	tion Nov-01 Date Distributed for BWOG V WOG CEOG V ed Date: 21-Nov-01 ion Nov-01 ettion Pending Gs TSTF Informed Date:	tion Nov-01 Date Distributed for Review: 01-Nov-01 BWOG ☑ WOG ☑ CEOG ☑ BWROG ed Date: 21-Nov-01 Non Nov-01 ettion Pending Final Resolution Date: Gs TSTF Informed Date: TSTF Approved Dat

Action 3.5.6.B

BIT

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 2001, Excel Services Corporation. Use by Excel Services associates, utility clients, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is granted. All other use without written permission is prohibited.

11/24/2001

3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

3.5.6 Boron Injection Tank (BIT)

LCO 3.5.6 The BIT shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

~

	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A.	BIT inoperable.	A.1	Restore BIT to OPERABLE status.	1 hour
B.	Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 <u>AND</u>	Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
		B.2	Borate to BOSDM equivalent to [1]% Ak/rat 200°F. provided in COLR.	6 hours
		B.3	Restore BIT to OPERABLE status.	7 days
C.	Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.	C.1	Be in MODE 4.	12 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.6.1	Verify BIT borated water temperature is \ge [145]°F.	24 hours

11/24/2001

Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler

Revision to RCP Flywheel Inspection Program (WCAP-15666)

Classification: 1) Technical Change

Priority: 2)Medium

NUREGS Affected: 1430 🔽 1431 🗌 1432 🗍 1433 🗍 1434

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Letter OG-01-051, dated August 24, 2001, transmitted WCAP-15666, Rev. 0 (Non-Proprietary Class 3), "Extension of Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Flywheel Examination" to the NRC for review and approval. WCAP-15666 provides the technical basis to extend the reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor flywheel examination frequency for all domestic WOG plants from the currently approved 10 year inspection interval to an interval not to exceed 20 years.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

ISTS Specification 5.5.7 is revised to change the frequency of the inspection of each RCP flywheel to be conducted at a maximum of 20 year intervals. Reviewer's Notes are revised or deleted consistent with the discussion in WCAP-15666, "Extension of Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Flywheel Examination."

3.0 BACKGROUND

An integral part of the reactor coolant system (RCS) in pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants is the RCP, a vertical, single stage, single-suction, centrifugal, shaft seal pump. The RCP ensures an adequate cooling flow rate by circulating large volumes of primary coolant water at high temperature and pressure through the RCS. Following an assumed loss of power to the RCP motor, the flywheel, in conjunction with the impeller and motor assembly, provide sufficient rotational inertia to assure adequate primary coolant flow during RCP coastdown, thus resulting in adequate core cooling.

During normal power operation, the RCP motor flywheel possesses sufficient kinetic energy to produce highenergy missiles in the event of flywheel failure. Conditions which may result in overspeed of the RCP, such as a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA), increase both the potential for failure and the kinetic energy of the flywheel. This concern led to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issuing Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.14, which described a range of actions to ensure flywheel integrity, including inservice inspections (ISI) at 40month intervals.

A previous WOG program established the technical basis that allowed for relaxation of RCP motor flywheel examinations for all domestic WOG plants and several Babcock and Wilcox plants. This was summarized in Westinghouse report WCAP-14535, which concluded that flywheels are well-designed, manufactured from excellent materials, have an excellent inspection history, and are structurally sound based on deterministic stress and fracture analyses. An assessment concluded that flywheel inspections beyond 10 years of plant life would have no significant benefit on reducing the likelihood of flywheel failure.

WCAP-14535 was submitted for NRC review in January 1996. The NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in September 1996, wherein they accepted the technical arguments, but did not allow for total elimination of the examinations. The SER did provide for partial relief from the examination requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.14, by allowing for an extension of the examination frequency from 40 months to 10 years, and a reduction in the required examination volume. The NRC stated in the SER that they had not reviewed the risk assessment in WCAP-14535, but had relied solely on the deterministic methodology to review the submittal. The final NRC-approved version of the report, which includes the SER is WCAP-14535A, which was issued in November 1996.

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 2001, Excel Services Corporation. Use by Excel Services associates, utility clients, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is granted. All other use without written permission is prohibited.

11/24/2001

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The currently approved 10-year inspection interval does not coincide with actual RCP refurbishment schedules at many WOG plants. Refurbishment currently occurs at 10 to 15 year intervals at all domestic WOG plants, but could be extended to 20 years, at most. The current WOG program summarized in WCAP-15666, provides the technical basis for the extension of the RCP motor flywheel examination frequency for all domestic WOG plants from the currently approved 10-years to a maximum of 20 years. The current WOG program builds on the WCAP-14535A justification, which assumed that a Leak-Before-Break (LBB) limits the RCP overspeed to 1500 rpm. It also provides additional rationale, including a risk assessment of all credible flywheel speeds, following the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis," to justify the interval extension to 20 years. The change in risk for extending the ISI interval is 3 to 4 orders of magnitude below the Regulatory Guide 1.174 core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) acceptance guidelines. The extension of the inservice inspection frequency for the RCP motor flywheel from 10 years to 20 years satisfies the Regulatory Guide 1.174 risk criteria as an acceptable change.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

The TSTF has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed generic change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the RCP flywheel examination frequency does not change the response of the plant to any accidents. The RCP will remain highly reliable and the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the risk of plant operation. Given the extremely low failure probabilities for the RCP motor flywheel during normal/accident conditions and the extremely low probability of LOCA/LOOP, and even assuming a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of 1.0 (complete failure of safety systems), the CDF and change in risk would still not exceed the NRC's acceptance guidelines contained in RG-1.174 (<1.0E-6 per year). Even considering the uncertainties involved in this evaluation, the risk associated with the postulated failure of an RCP motor flywheel is significantly low. Even if all four RCP motor flywheels are considered in the bounding plant configuration case, the risk is still acceptably low. Since the evaluation results for CDF and the conservative assumption that failure of the RCP motor flywheel is assumed to result directly in core damage and also a large early release (CDF=LERF), calculations were not performed for the large early release frequency (LERF). The CDF and LERF results are below the NRC's LERF acceptance guidelines.

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility, or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change in flywheel inspection frequency does not involve any change in the design or operation of the RCP. The change to examination frequency does not change any existing accident scenarios, nor create any new or different accident scenarios.

The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The changes do not alter any assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

11/24/2001

11/24/2001

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by this change. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside of the design basis. The calculated impact on risk is insignificant and meets the acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guide 1.174. There are no significant mechanisms for inservice degradation of the RCP flywheel

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, the TSTF concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements

General Design Criteria 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Bases," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components important to safety be protected against the effects of missiles that might result from equipment failures.

Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, "Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity," describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff of implementing this requirement with regard to minimizing the potential for failures of the flywheels of RCP motors in light water-cooled power reactors.

As justified in WCAP-15666, the extension of the inservice inspection frequency for the RCP motor flywheel from 10 years to 20 years satisfies Regulatory Guide 1.174 risk criteria as an acceptable change. Based on the considerations discussed above and in WCAP-15666, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the approval of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

A. WCAP-15666, "Extension of Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Flywheel Examination," Revision 0.

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 2001, Excel Services Corporation. Use by Excel Services associates, utility clients, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is granted. All other use without written permission is prohibited.

		(WOC	G-161, Rev. 0)	TSTF-42
Industry Contact:	Wideman, Steve	(316) 364-4	037 stwidem@wo	cnoc.com
NRC Contact:	Tjader, Bob	(301) 415-1	187 trt@nrc.gov	
Revision Histo	ry	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	······································	
OG Revision 0		Revision Status: Active	Next Action:	WOG
Revision 1	Proposed by: WO	G		
Revision I Original I	Description: ssue			
Owners	Group Review	Information		
Date Orig	inated by OG: 18	-Jul-01		
Owners G (No Comr	roup Comments: nents)			
Owners G	roup Resolution:	Approved Date: 18-Jul-01		
TSTF R	eview Informat	tion		
TSTF Rec	eived Date: 07-N	Jov-01 Date Distributed	l for Review: 07-Nov-01	
OG Revie	w Completed: 👿 🛛	BWOG 🔽 WOG 🔽 CEOG 🧕	BWROG	
TSTF Cor	nments:			
(No Comm	nents)			
TSTF Res	olution: Approve	ed Date: 21-Nov-01		
NRC Re	view Informati	on		
NRC Rece	vived Date: 30-N	Jov-01		
NRC Com	ments:			
(No Comn	nents)			
Final Reso	lution: NRC Ac	tion Pending	Final Resolution Dat	e:
Incorporation 1	nto the NURE	Gs		
File to BBS/LAN D	ate:	TSTF Informed Date:	TSTF Approved D	ate:
NUREG Rev Incor	oorated:			
Affected Techn 5.5.7	ical Specification Reactor Coolant F	ONS Pump Flywheel Inspection Program		

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 2001, Excel Services Corporation. Use by Excel Services associates, utility clients, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is granted. All other use without written permission is prohibited.

Programs and Manuals 5.5

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (continued)

- i. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses to a member of the public from iodine-131, iodine-133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half lives > 8 days in gaseous effluents released from each unit to areas beyond the site boundary, conforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, and
- j. Limitations on the annual dose or dose commitment to any member of the public, beyond the site boundary, due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources, conforming to 40 CFR 190.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program surveillance frequency.

5.5.5 Component Cyclic or Transient Limit

This program provides controls to track the FSAR, Section [], cyclic and transient occurrences to ensure that components are maintained within the design limits.

5.5.6 [Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program

This program provides controls for monitoring any tendon degradation in prestressed concrete containments, including effectiveness of its corrosion protection medium, to ensure containment structural integrity. The program shall include baseline measurements prior to initial operations. The Tendon Surveillance Program, inspection frequencies, and acceptance criteria shall be in accordance with [Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3, 1989].

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Tendon Surveillance Program inspection frequencies.]

5.5.7 Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Program

This program shall provide for the inspection of each reactor coolant pump flywheel per the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975.

In lieu of Position C.4.b(1) and C.4.b(2), a qualified in-place UT examination over the volume from the inner bore of the flywheel to the circle one-half of the outer radius or a surface examination (MT and/or PT) of exposed surfaces of the removed flywheels may be conducted at expositively for the intervals capacity with the inservice Inspection schedule as required by ASME Section XI

WOG STS



a. Testing frequencies specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as follows:

Addenda terminology for	performing inservice testing
inservice testing activities	activities
Weekly	At least once per 7 days

WOG STS