

Attachment 1 P21 93270  
 IN 89-89  
 December 26, 1989  
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DENNIS HERRIN  
 615-365-3819

NRC FORM 351 (8-89)  
**EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET**  
 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 OPERATIONS CENTER

NOTIFICATION TIME <b>1430 5-26-93</b>	FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION <b>WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT</b>	UNIT <b>112</b>	CALLER'S NAME <b>P.L. PARE 615-365-1824</b>	CALL BACK #: ENS or ( )
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EVENT TIME & ZONE <b>UNKNOWN</b>	EVENT DATE <b>03, 27, 93</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-Hr Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> (i)(A) TS Required S/D <input type="checkbox"/> (i)(B) TS Deviation <input type="checkbox"/> (ii) Degraded Condition <input type="checkbox"/> (ii)(A) Unanalyzed Condition <input type="checkbox"/> (ii)(B) Outside Design Basis <input type="checkbox"/> (iv)(C) Not Covered by OPs/EPs <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Earthquake <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Flood <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Hurricane <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Ice/Melt <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Lightning <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Tornado <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Oth Natural Phenomenon <input type="checkbox"/> (iv) ECG Discharge to RCS <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Loss ENS <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Loss Emerg. Assessment	<input type="checkbox"/> (v) Loss Offsite Comm <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Fire <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Toxic Gas <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Rad Release <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Oth Hampering Safe Op.  <input type="checkbox"/> 4-Hr Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) <input type="checkbox"/> (i) Degrade While S/D <input type="checkbox"/> (ii) RPS Activation (scram) <input type="checkbox"/> (ii) EGF Activation <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(A) Safe S/D Capability <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(B) RHM Capability <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(C) Control of Rad Release <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(D) Accident Mitigation <input type="checkbox"/> (iv)(A) Air Release > 2X App B <input type="checkbox"/> (iv)(B) Liq Release > 2X App B <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Offsite Medical <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Offsite Notification
POWER/MODE BEFORE <b>NA</b>	POWER/MODE AFTER <b>NA</b>	<b>EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS</b> <input type="checkbox"/> GENERAL EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> SITE AREA EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> ALERT <input type="checkbox"/> UNUSUAL EVENT <input type="checkbox"/> 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) <input type="checkbox"/> TRANSPORTATION <input type="checkbox"/> 20.403 MATERIAL/EXPOSURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER <b>10CFR 50.55(e)</b>	

**DESCRIPTION**

Inadequate selective breaker coordination was reported to NRC Region II on December 5, 1991, in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) as Significant Corrective Action Report (SCAR) WBSA 910278. TVA's final report on the subject was submitted to NRC on February 10, 1992, and committed to defeat the type LS Amptector discriminator circuit for Westinghouse type DS-206 breakers.

During a system drawing review on March 27, 1993, the completed actions taken to satisfy the above commitment were questioned. Four Westinghouse type DS-206 breakers with type LS Amptectors were identified as not having the discriminator circuit defeated. This condition was documented on SCAR WBSA 930043 and is the subject of NRC Notice of Violation 50-390/93-23-01. Subsequently, two additional Westinghouse type DS-206 breakers were found without the type LS Amptector discriminator circuits defeated.

Since the 480-volt shutdown board breakers are interchangeable, these six breakers must be assumed to supply power to the most critical components during a postulated accident. Failure to defeat these DS-206 LS Amptector discriminator circuits could have resulted in partial loss of selective breaker coordination. This deficiency is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) based on the following: (1) the 480-volt breakers in question are basic components, (2) the type LS Amptector discriminator circuits on six breakers were not defeated as required by DCN M-18153-A which constitutes a defect, and (3) if left uncorrected, the subject deficiency could have created a substantial safety hazard by (a) causing a major degradation of essential safety-related equipment or (b) resulting in a loss of safety function necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident, considering an independent single failure.

Include: Systems affected, actions & their initiating signals, cause, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc.

NOTIFICATIONS NRC RESIDENT	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	WILL BE	ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT UNDERSTOOD?	YES (Explain above)	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
STATE(S)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?	YES	NO (Explain above)
LOCAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL CORRECTED: <b>NA</b>	ESTIMATE FOR RESTART DATE: <b>NA</b>	ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK? <b>NO</b>
OTHER GOV AGENCIES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				