

February 25, 2002

Dr. Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14649

SUBJECT: STAFF DECISION REGARDING R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
RESPONSE TO BULLETIN 2001-01, "CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING OF
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION NOZZLES,"
(TAC NO. MB2632)

Dear Dr. Mecredy:

On August 3, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles," requesting that addressees provide information related to the structural integrity of the reactor pressure vessel head penetration (VHP) nozzles for their respective facilities. Specifically, the NRC staff requested information on the extent of VHP nozzle leakage and cracking that has been found to date, the inspections and repairs that have been undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis for concluding that plans for future inspections will ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements at their respective pressurized-water reactor plants. You were requested to provide your response to Items 1 and 3 of the Bulletin within 30 days of its issuance.

By letter dated September 4, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated December 31, 2001, you responded to the Bulletin indicating that the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant is classified as having moderate susceptibility to primary water stress corrosion cracking in the VHP nozzles, based on a relative susceptibility ranking of 5 to 30 effective full-power years from the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, condition. In your December 31 supplement, you stated that Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) had obtained sufficient inspection data during the 1999 refueling outage (RFO) which, when coupled with the analysis performed for potential crack growth, justifies deferral of reactor VHP nozzle inspections until the fall of 2003 at which time RG&E has committed to replace the reactor vessel head. You also described plans for additional licensed operator training regarding the highest risk sequences for a postulated loss-of-coolant accident resulting from VHP nozzle ejection.

The NRC staff has completed its review and concluded that your fracture mechanics analysis of the reactor VHP nozzles and prior VHP nozzle inspection provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be maintained at your plant, and therefore no additional inspection beyond that currently required is necessary during your next scheduled refueling outage. The NRC staff also finds that you have provided the requested information pursuant to NRC Bulletin 2001-01.

However, should you conduct reactor VHP nozzle inspections or should you observe degradation (or even no degradation) while performing normal operational surveillance

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inspections during the next scheduled RFO, you are reminded that item 5 of the Bulletin requests the following information within 30 days after plant restart:

- a. a description of the extent of VHP nozzle leakage and cracking detected at your plant, including the number, location, size, and nature of each crack detected;
- b. if cracking is identified, a description of the inspections (type, scope, qualification requirements, and acceptance criteria), repairs, and other corrective actions you have taken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements. This information is requested only if there are any changes from prior information submitted in accordance with this Bulletin.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert L. Clark, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-244

cc: See next page

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

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