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DOCKET NO(S). 50-366

Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

The following documents concerning our review of the subject facility are transmitted for your information.

☐ Notice of Receipt of Application.

☐ Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated _____.

☐ Notice of Availability of Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated _____.

☐ Safety Evaluation Report, or Supplement No. _____, dated _____.

☐ Notice of Hearing on Application for Construction Permit.

☐ Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License.

☐ Application and Safety Analysis Report, Volume _____.

☐ Amendment No. _____ to Application/SAR dated _____.

☐ Construction Permit No. CPPR- _____, Amendment No. _____, dated _____.

☐ Facility Operating License No. _____, Amendment No. _____, dated _____.

☐ Order Extending Construction Completion Date, dated _____.

☒ Other *(Specify)* Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing concerning amendment application dated January 23, 1984, as supplemented April 3, 1984, to modify the TSs to reflect the use of the new Analog Transmitter Trip System.

"ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:"
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
George Rivenbark, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: w/enclosures:
See next page

*This reflects a change in format only. see attached concurrences. *

OFFICE	ORB#4:DL	ORB#4:DL	ORB#4:DL	OELD *			
SURNAME	RIngram	GRivenbark;cf JStolz					
DATE	4/24/84	4/24/84	4/24/84	4/ /84			

NRC FORM 318 (10/80) NRCM 0240

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We agree with the licensees' evaluations that changes 1 through 8 meet the three criteria of the Commission's guidance as stated above.

The Commission has also provided guidance for the application of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration (48 FR 14870). One such example is (ii), a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications.

Change 9, noted above, lowers the level at which a high reactor water level action will be taken and therefore constitutes a more conservative and restrictive requirement than the existing requirement. Therefore, it is similar to the above example (ii).

On the bases stated above, the Commission proposes to determine that the application for amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Appling County Public Library, 301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia

Attorney for licensee: G. F. Trowbridge, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

NRC Branch Chief: John F. Stolz

John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4, DL

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
May 10, 1984

DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File
ORB#4 Rdg
RIngram

DOCKET No. 50-366

MEMORANDUM FOR: Docketing and Service Branch
Office of the Secretary of the Commission

FROM: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

One signed original of the *Federal Register* Notice identified below is enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (6) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).

☐ Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s): Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.

☒ Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License. *

☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility License(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.

☐ Notice of Availability of NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.

☐ Notice of Limited Work Authorization.

☐ Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.

☐ Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).

☐ Notice of Issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).

☐ Order.

☐ Exemption.

☐ Notice of Granting of Relief.

☒ Other: *Please insert date on the 12th page 5th paragraph of this notice for a 30-day intervention period, and call Caryn on extension 28960 to inform her of the date inserted.

Referenced documents have been provided PDR.

Division of Licensing, ORB#4
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As stated

OFFICE	ORB#4:DL						
SURNAME	RIngram;cf						
DATE	5/10/84						

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7590-01

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL

DOCKET NO. 50-366

NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-5, issued to Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), for operation of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2, located in Appling County, Georgia.

In accordance with the licensees' application for amendment dated January 23, 1984, as supplemented April 3, 1984, the amendment would modify the Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications to reflect the use of the new Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) that is currently being installed at Hatch Unit 2. The ATTS related changes include new instrument trip setpoints/allowable values and surveillance intervals which take credit for the advantages that the new devices have over those currently installed at the plant, in terms of setpoint drift and instrument accuracy. In addition

to these types of revisions, this amendment would make a number of other types of Technical Specification changes including the following:

- Changes to plant-specific equipment identification (MPL) numbers as the result of new numbering which has been assigned to ATTS components.
- Changes which account for modifications to instrument loops or trip logic resulting from the new ATTS design.
- Changes which correct minor typographical or description errors found in the Hatch 2 Technical Specifications during the safety review process for ATTS. The errors found do not necessarily affect sections covering requirements for ATTS components.
- Changes to the Technical Specification Bases Sections to correct existing errors and to update them with respect to the other proposed ATTS changes.

The modifications are as follows:

1. Change the surveillance requirements for the ATTS instrumentation to once per shift for channel checks, once per month for channel functional tests, and once per operating cycle for channel calibrations. Additional changes to the nomenclature used in the Technical Specifications are included for clarification and consistency with this proposed change.

   ATTS replaces the pressure, level, and temperature switches in the reactor protection system and emergency core cooling system (ECCS) with analog sensor/trip unit combinations. The system is designed to improve sensor intelligence and reliability, while still providing continued monitoring of critical parameters and performing the intended basic logic

function. The licensees have stated that since the ATTS instrumentation is superior in design to the mechanical switches currently used at Hatch, certain surveillance intervals may be extended without any significant effect on the expected magnitude of sensor drift or frequency of instrument malfunction.

2. Lower the Level 2 trip setpoint/allowable value from -38 inches to -55 inches. This will decrease the number of plant transients by decreasing the number of HPCI/RCIC (High Pressure Coolant Injection/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) actuations due to normal operational perturbations in water level.

3. Delete the high drywell pressure isolation trip for residual heat removal (RHR) (shutdown cooling mode), reactor pressure vessel head spray valves, and reactor water cleanup (RWCU). The purpose of this change is to stop small steam leaks in the drywell from preventing operation of the RHR and RWCU systems during the shutdown cooling mode, thereby prohibiting an acceptable normal shutdown procedure.

4. Lower the water level trip setpoint for isolation of RWCU and secondary containment, and startup of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) from Level 3 to Level 2. A reactor scram from normal power (less than 50-percent rated) usually results in a reactor vessel water level transient due to a void collapse that causes RWCU isolation at Level 3. This usually results in the dropping of the cleanup filter cake and added radwaste processing. These problems may be avoided by

lowering RWCU isolation to Level 2. Lowering the SGTS actuation and secondary containment isolation from Level 3 to Level 2 reduces the potential for spurious isolations.

5. Designate the hot leg sensor of the RWCU area ventilation high temperature differential instrument as the RWCU area high temperature sensor, eliminating the current RWCU area high temperature sensor. Use of the hot leg of the differential temperature sensor for the high ambient temperature trip rather than using an independent trip element trip device may cause slight changes in the sensitivity of the RCWU area leak detection system, depending upon the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) design, but it will not defeat the intended function of the system. In general, this new arrangement will create more reliable leakage detection since the HVAC system will be drawing air across the resistance temperature detectors (RTDs). Therefore, there is no possibility of the sensors being located in a dead air space relative to certain break locations in the room.

6. Delete high drywell pressure sensors E11-N011A, B, C, D that are currently assigned a trip function for the Core Spray, RHR and HPCI and replace them with sensors E11-N010A, B, C, D that are also currently assigned a trip function for the automatic depressurization system (ADS). (There is an editorial error in the current Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1, Item 4a. The ADS high drywell pressure trip sensors should have been listed as E11-N010A, B, C, D.)

Since these sensors (E11-N010A, B, C, D) are being incorporated into the new ATTS modification, their numbers are being changed to E11-N694A, B, C, D.

7. Replace the trip setpoints listed in the Technical Specifications with newly generated allowable values. The purpose of this change is to update the Technical Specification trip setpoints for instruments being replaced by the ATTS. Since the time that the original setpoints were determined, a better calculational method has been developed. This proposed change uses Regulatory Guide 1.105 methodology in updating the setpoints for the instruments being replaced with the new ATTS units and takes credit for the improved error and drift characteristics of the new system.

8. Delete the reactor steam dome pressure permissive which prevents the group 1 isolation valves from being bypassed on a low condenser vacuum isolation at reactor pressure above the scram setpoint. With the permissive deleted, the operator may open the valves from a hot pressurized condition before clearing a scram. Currently, the operator must clear the scram signal prior to opening the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) when in this condition.

9. Lower the reactor vessel water level-high (Level 8) trip setpoint from 58 inches to 56.5 inches. The licensees stated that they used the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.105 in determining this revised setpoint.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility or a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensees have provided the following evaluations against each of the above three criteria for each of the proposed changes:

Change 1

1) The proposed surveillance requirement changes would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the new ATTS instruments have been demonstrated to be superior in design to the existing devices in terms of instrument inaccuracy and drift characteristics. In addition, the new setpoints have been rigorously calculated assuming the proposed surveillance frequencies.
2) The proposed surveillance requirement changes would not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated because the new surveillance intervals for ATTS were developed to be consistent with the Hatch Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) descriptions.

3) The proposed surveillance requirement changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the new surveillance requirements are tailored to the ATTS instruments using the methodology of Regulatory Guide 1.105. In addition, the basis for the margins of safety, as described in the FSAR, have been maintained.

Change 2

1) This change would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because a reevaluation of the FSAR analysis showed that the new setpoint in conjunction with the new ATTS instrumentation would still provide the same degree of plant protection as described in the FSAR.

2) This change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the lowered setpoint is still within the bounds of the plant safety analysis and should decrease the number of unnecessary ECCS actuation system challenges.

3) This change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the setpoint still performs its intended safety function as described in the FSAR. In addition, the calculations which determined the new setpoint took credit for the improved drift characteristics of the ATTS instruments and the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.105.

Change 3

1) This change would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the requirements of 10 CFR 100 are still met, and the Appendix K calculations are not affected.

2) This change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the deletion of the drywell pressure isolation is only being made on closed-loop systems. In addition, Georgia Power Company has determined that the reactor vessel low water level trip function which isolates the shutdown cooling mode of RHR and RWCU is adequate for reactor protection. Furthermore, this change does eliminate the possibility for isolation of the shutdown cooling system, due to high drywell pressure, during periods when its function is essential for adequate decay heat removal.

3) This change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the high drywell pressure isolation has little effect in preventing coolant losses and presently hinders the operability of the RHR shutdown cooling systems during certain plant scenarios.

Change 4

1) These changes would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident from any accident previously evaluated because the FSAR ECCS analysis already assumes SGTS initiation at Level 2. Secondary containment requires a functioning train of SGTS for full

effectiveness, and isolation of the containment building is assumed to be simultaneous with SGTS initiation in the FSAR analysis. In addition, the changes will reduce operability problems associated with RWCU and secondary containment isolations.

2) These changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the lower setpoint is within the bounds of the FSAR analysis and will not change the basic functions of these trips.

3) These changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because these trips still perform their intended functions as described in the FSAR.

Change 5

1) The modification would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change is consistent with the applicable criteria listed in Sections 3.1 and 7.1.2 and in Appendix A of the FSAR and in general is more reliable in detecting leaks.

2) The modification would not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated because plant trip logic remains unchanged, and the current single-failure criteria are maintained.

3) The modification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because single-failure criteria and the level of redundancy for each trip function are maintained. Also, in general, the new location of the sensors will be more reliable for detecting leaks.

Change 6

1) This change would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change is consistent with applicable criteria listed in Sections 3.1 and 7.1.2 and in Appendix A of the FSAR.

2) This change would not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated because the basic trip functions and trip system redundancies, as described in the FSAR, are unchanged.

3) This change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because single-failure criteria and the level of redundancy for each trip function are maintained, and the new surveillance requirements are consistent with the capabilities of the new ATTS instrumentation.

Change 7

1) These changes would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the new ATTS instruments are of a superior design as compared to the current instruments. In addition, the setpoints were determined using the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.105 and therefore still meet the FSAR criteria.

2) These changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the basic trip functions, as described in the FSAR, are unchanged.

3) These changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because for most trips the original design basis was maintained. Any new design bases were fully addressed with regard to the FSAR requirements. In addition, the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.105 were used in the calculation of the new setpoints.

Change 8

1) The modification would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the permissive being deleted does not perform a safety function.
2) The modification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the elimination of this permissive has no effect on the reactor protection system. Also, the manual bypass of MSIV closure is performed only when the reactor is not operating at full power.
3) The modification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the permissive being deleted does not perform a safety function.

We agree with the licensees' evaluations that changes 1 through 8 meet the three criteria of the Commission's guidance as stated above.

The Commission has also provided guidance for the application of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration (48 FR 14870). One such example is (ii), a change that constitutes an

additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications.

Change 9, noted above, lowers the level at which a high reactor water level action will be taken and therefore constitutes a more conservative and restrictive requirement than the existing requirement. Therefore, it is similar to the above example (ii).

On the bases stated above, the Commission proposes to determine that the application for amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Comments should be addressed to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch.

By June 14, 1984 , the licensees may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Request for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules

of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR §2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought

to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided

that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at (800) 325-6000 (in Missouri (800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to John F. Stolz: petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and to G. F. Trowbridge, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, attorney for the licensees.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on the petition and/or request, that the petitioner has made a substantial showing of good cause for the granting of a late petition and/or request. That determination will be based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Appling County Public Library, 301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 10th day of May 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

INITIAL

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

AND NOTICING ACTION

Docket No. 50-366 Facility: Hatch Unit 2

Licensee: Georgia Power Company Date of application: 1/23/84, as supplemented 4/3/84

Request for: TS modifications to reflect the use of the new Analog Transmitter Trip System.

(See attached notice or press release for more details.)

Initial Determination:

(X) Proposed determination - amendment request involves no significant hazards considerations (NSHC).

( ) Final determination - amendment request involves significant hazards considerations (SHC).

Basis for Determination

( ) Licensee's NSHC discussion has been reviewed and is accepted. See attached amendment request.

(X) Basis for this determination is presented in the attached notice.

( ) Other (state):

Please place this in the docket file only

(Attach additional sheets as needed.)

Initial Noticing Action: (Attach appropriate notice or input for monthly FRN)

1. ( ) Monthly FRN. Notice of opportunity for hearing (30 days) and request for comments on proposed NSHC determination - monthly FRN input is attached (Attachment 8).

2. (X) Individual FRN (30 days). Same notice matter as above. Time does not allow waiting for next monthly FRN (Attachments 9a and 9b).

(THIS FORM SHOULD BE TYPED EXCEPT FOR UNUSUAL, URGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.)

3. ( ) Local media notice. Valid exigent circumstances exist (evaluated below). Local media notice requesting public comments on proposed NSHC determination is attached (Attachment 10).

4. ( ) No notice. A valid emergency situation exists (evaluated below) and there is no time for public notice on proposed NSHC determination. (No attachment.)

5. ( ) Individual FRN (30-days). Licensee's claim of exigent or emergency circumstances is invalid (evaluated below). Notice of opportunity for hearing (30 days) and request for comments on proposed NSHC determination is attached (Attachments 9a and 9b). Letter of explanation to licensee is also attached.

6. ( ) Individual FRN (30-days). The amendment request involves SHC. Notice of opportunity for prior hearing is attached (Attachment 5). Letter to licensee also attached.

7. ( ) Individual Short FRN. Valid emergency circumstances exist (evaluated below). There is no time for the usual 30-day FRN. (Attachment 16).

Evaluation of exigent or emergency circumstances (if applicable):

(attach additional sheets as needed)

Approvals:

		Date
1.	George Rivenbark G.W. Rivenbark 4/24/84 (Project Manager)	4/11/84
2.	John F. Stolz (Branch Chief)	4/24/84
3.	(OELD)	4.16.84

Additional approval (for noticing actions types 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7):

4.	(Assistant Director)	

Additional approval (for noticing action types 4 and 5):

5.	(Director, Division of Licensing)	

Attachment: as indicated

cc: Original - Docket File (with note "Docket File only")
Project Manager
Licensing Assistant
Branch Files

cc w/enclosure(s):

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