

Docket Nos. 50-325, 50-324

Mr. Lynn W. Eury  
Executive Vice President  
Power Supply  
Carolina Power & Light Company  
Post Office Box 1551  
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Eury:

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO TS PAGES B3/4 6-2, AMENDMENT NOS. 136 AND 166, REVISED  
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.6.1.2 - BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT,  
UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. 73030 AND 73031)

This letter is in response to your September 6, 1989 request to correct page  
B3/4 6-6 of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical  
Specifications.

We agree that the Bases pages were not properly updated in your previous  
submittal to reflect a previously issued amendment concerning primary  
containment airlocks. A corrected page is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Ngoc B. Le, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-1  
Division of Reactor Project I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:  
As stated

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September 27, 1989

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Original Signed by:

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ENCLOSURE

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT  
CORRECTIONS TO RECENT LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NOS. 136 AND 166

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.6.1.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and leak rate given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2. The specification makes allowances for the fact that there may be long periods of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position during reactor operation. Only one closed door in each air lock is required to maintain the integrity of the containment. In the event of an inoperable door interlock, locking shut the inner door will ensure containment integrity while permitting access to the lock for maintenance and surveillance testing.

#### 3/4.6.1.4 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the primary containment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 49 psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

#### 3/4.6.1.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations of primary containment internal pressure ensure that the containment peak pressure of 49 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 62 psig during LOCA conditions. The limit of 1.75 psig, for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 49 psig, which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.6.1.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitation in containment average air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 300°F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the accident analyses.

Corrected letter from 9/27/89

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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