



Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station

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TRM 3.3.101 E

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-37
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

**Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2
Docket No. STN 50-529
Special Report 2-SR-2001-001**

Attached please find Special Report 2-SR-2001-001 prepared and submitted pursuant to the PVNGS Technical Requirements Manual, section T3.3.101, Required Action E.2.2. This report discusses the inoperability of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter.

If you have questions regarding this request, please contact Daniel G. Marks, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, Compliance, at (623) 393-6492.

Sincerely,

WEI/DGM/DFH

cc: E. W. Merschoff
T. A. Gody
L. R. Wharton
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Special Report No. 2-SR-2001-001

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2

Post Accident Sampling System Inoperable

Docket No. STN 50-529

Reporting Requirement:

The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) section T3.3.101, Condition E.2.2, requires a report be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission if the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) is inoperable for greater than seven days. The report should include the actions(s) taken, cause of the inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

Identification of the inoperable equipment:

On December 11, 2001, Unit 2 Chemistry personnel discovered the normally open manual isolation valve (SSN-V306) for the PASS sample line from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg was isolated. This prevented samples from being drawn from that sample point and rendered that portion of the PASS inoperable.

Cause of the inoperability:

The cause of the inoperability was an inadequate procedure which failed to restore SSN-V306 to its normally open position. On October 20, 2001, a clearance was hung to support work on Containment Isolation Valve SSN-V203. The clearance included the closure of SSN-V306, as required by Technical Document 40TD-9SS01 (Primary Sampling). The clearance was removed on October 21, 2001, after work on SSN-V203 was complete. Technical Document (TD), 40TD-9SS01 was used to restore the valves to their desired position, but did not include SSN-V306 in the restoration.

Plans and Schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status:

On December 11, 2001, at 1410 (MST), Unit 2 Operations declared the PASS inoperable and entered TLCO 3.3.101, condition E. Valve SSN-V306 was reopened and a sample drawn, allowing the unit to exit TLCO 3.3.101, condition E. PASS was declared OPERABLE on December 11, 2001 at 16:27 (MST).

On December 12, 2001, valve SSN-V306 was verified open in Unit 1 and 3 to ensure the procedural error was not transported to the other units. Technical Document 40TD-9SS01 was revised on December 12, 2001, to include the restoration of the valve.