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Docket No. 50-325

MAR 26 1981

Mr. J. A. Jones
Executive Vice President
Carolina Power & Light Company
336 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Jones:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 35 to Facility License No. DPR-71 for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications and is in response to your request dated March 5, 1981. Your request was processed as an emergency authorization request. Amendment No. 35 was authorized by telephone conversation between CP&L and the NRC staff (Dietz/Novak) on March 5, 1981, and was confirmed by our letter dated March 6, 1981. Your follow-up submittal dated March 13, 1981, provided supplemental information supporting the request.

This amendment changes the Technical Specifications to permit operation with one recirculation loop our of service for up to 10 days to expire on March 15, 1981.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

RECEIVED
APR 06 1981
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
T. A. Ippolito
Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 35 to DPR-71
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/encl:
See next page

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OFFICE	DL:ORB#2	DL:ORB#2	DL:ORB#2	OELD			
SURNAME	JHannon:lb	SNorris	TIppolito	KARMAN	T. Novak		
DATE	3/20/81	3/20/81	3/20/81	3/24/81	3/23/81		

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 27, 1981

Docket No. 50-325

Mr. J. A. Jones
Executive Vice President
Carolina Power & Light Company
336 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Jones:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.35 to Facility License No. DPR-71 for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications and is in response to your request dated March 5, 1981. Your request was processed as an emergency authorization request. Amendment No. 35 was authorized by telephone conversation between CP&L and the NRC staff (Dietz/Novak) on March 5, 1981, and was confirmed by our letter dated March 6, 1981. Your follow-up submittal dated March 13, 1981, provided supplemental information supporting the request.

This amendment changes the Technical Specifications to permit operation with one recirculation loop out of service for up to 10 days to expire on March 15, 1981.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

T. A. Ippolito

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 35 to DPR-71
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/encl:
See next page

Mr. J. A. Jones
Carolina Power & Light Company

cc:

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Carolina Power & Light Company
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Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

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Burney, Burney, Sperry & Barefoot
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Wilmington, North Carolina 28461

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Board of Commissioners
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Bolivia, North Carolina 28422

Denny McGuire (Ms)
State Clearinghouse
Division of Policy Development
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Raleigh, North Carolina 27603

Southport - Brunswick County Library
109 W. Moore Street
Southport, North Carolina 28461

Director, Criteria and Standards
Division
Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IV Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
345 Courtland Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 1057
Southport, North Carolina 28461

Mr. Charles R. Dietz
Plant Manager
P. O. Box 458
Southport, North Carolina 28461

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-325

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 35
License No. DPR-71

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Carolina Power & Light Company dated March 5, 1981, with supplement dated March 13, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 35 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

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3. This license amendment is effective as of March 5, 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

T. A. Ippolito

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 27, 1981.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 35

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71

DOCKET NO. 50-325

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

3/4 2-1 / 3/4 2-2

3/4 2-7 / 3/4 2-8

3/4 3-41 / 3/4 3-42

3/4 4-1 / 3/4 4-2

The underlined pages are those being changed. Overleaf pages are provided for convenience.

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 ALL AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATES (APLHGR's) for each type of fuel as a function of AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE shall not exceed the limits shown in Figures 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5 or 3.2.1-6.*

APPLICABILITY: CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER ≥ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With an APLHGR exceeding the limits of Figure 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5 or 3.2.1-6, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and continue corrective action so that APLHGR is within the limit within 4 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1 All APLHGR's shall be verified to be equal to or less than the applicable limit determined from Figure 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5 or 3.2.1-6:

a. At least once per 24 hours,

b. Within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for APLHGR.

*In single reactor recirculation loop operation, the APLHGR limit shall be reduced to .65 of the values specified in the above tables. This portion of the Specification expires on March 15, 1981.



AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE (MWd/t)
FUEL TYPE 1 (8 x 8)

MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT
GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR)
VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE

gure 3.2.1-1



PLANAR AVERAGE EXPOSURE (MWd/t)
FUEL TYPE P8DRB265H (P8X8R)
MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT
GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR)
VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE

FIGURE 3.2.1-6

correction
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3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 The flow biased APRM scram trip setpoint (S) and rod block trip set point (S_{RB}) shall be established according to the following relationship:

$S \leq (0.66W + 54\%)\ T$ $S \leq (0.66W + 50.7\%)$ (Single Loop)*

$S_{RB} \leq (0.66W + 42\%)\ T$ $S_{RB} \leq (0.66W + 38.7\%)$ (Single Loop)*

where: S and S_{RB} are in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER.
W = Loop recirculation flow in percentor of rated flow,
T = Lowest value of the ratio of design TPF divided by the HTPF - obtained for any class of fuel in the core ($T \leq 1.0$), and

Design TPF for: 8 x 8 fuel = 2.45.
8 x 8R fuel = 2.48.
P8 x 8R fuel = 2.48.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER $\geq$ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With S or S_{RB} exceeding the allowable value, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and continue corrective action so that S and S_{RB} are within the required limits within 4 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2 The MTPF for each class of fuel shall be determined, the value of T calculated, and the flow biased APRM trip setpoint adjusted, as required:

a. At least once per 24 hours,

b. within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for MTPF.

*This portion of the specification expires on March 15, 1981.

TABLE 3.3.4-1 (Continued)

CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

NOTE

* When THERMAL POWER exceeds the preset power level of the RWM and RSCS.

a. The minimum number of OPERABLE CHANNELS may be reduced by one for up to 2 hours in one of the trip systems for maintenance and/or testing except for Rod Block Monitor function.

b. This function is bypassed if detector is reading > 100 cps or the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.

c. This function is bypassed when the associated IRM channels are on range 8 or higher.

d. A total of 6 IRM instruments must be OPERABLE.

e. This function is bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 1.

TRIP FUNCTION AND INSTRUMENT NUMBER	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. APRM (C51-APRM-CH. A,B,C,D,E,F)		
a. Upscale (Flow Biased)	$\leq (0.66W + 42\%) \frac{T^*}{MTPF}$ **	$\leq (0.66\,W + 42\%) \frac{T^*}{MTPF}$ **
b. Inoperative	NA	NA
c. Downscale	$\geq$ 3/125 of full scale	$\geq$ 3/125 of full scale
d. Upscale (Fixed)	$\leq$ 12% of RATED THERMAL POWER	$\leq$ 12% of RATED THERMAL POWER
2. ROD BLOCK MONITOR (C51-RBM-CH.A,B)		
a. Upscale	$\leq (0.66W + 41\%) \frac{T^*}{MTPF}$ ***	$\leq (0.66W + 41\%) \frac{T^*}{MTPF}$ ***
b. Inoperative	NA	NA
c. Downscale	$\geq$ 3/125 of full scale	$\geq$ 3/125 of full scale
3. SOURCE RANGE MONITORS (C51-SRM-K600A,B,C,D)		
a. Detector not full in	NA	NA
b. Upscale	$< 1 \times 10^5$ cps	$< 1 \times 10^5$ cps
c. Inoperative	NA	NA
d. Downscale	$\geq$ 3 cps	$\geq$ 3 cps
4. INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS (C51-IRM-K601A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H)		
a. Detector not full in	NA	NA
b. Upscale	$\leq$ 108/125 of full scale	$\leq$ 108/125 of full scale
c. Inoperative	NA	NA
d. Downscale	$\geq$ 3/125 of full scale	$\geq$ 3/125 of full scale

*T=2.43 for 8x8 fuel
T=2.48 for 8x8R fuel
T=2.48 for P8x8R fuel

**When in single loop, trip setpoint and allowable value shall be reduced to $\leq (.66W + 38.7\%) \frac{T}{MTPF}$* within 24 hours in single recirculation loop operation. This Specification expires on March 15,1981.

***When in single loop, trip setpoint and allowable value shall be reduced to $\leq (.66W + 35.7\%) \frac{T}{MTPF}$* within 24 hours in single recirculation loop operation.
This Specification expires on March 15, 1981.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

RECIRCULATION LOOPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1 Two reactor coolant recirculation loops shall be in operation with the cross-tie valve closed, the pump discharge valves OPERABLE and the pump discharge bypass valves OPERABLE or closed.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

With one or both recirculation loops not in operation, operation may continue; restore both loops to operation within 12 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.**

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.1 Each pump discharge valve and bypass valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by cycling each valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel during each COLD SHUTDOWN which exceeds 48 hours, if not performed in the previous 31 days.

4.4.1.2 Each pump discharge bypass valve, if not OPERABLE, shall be verified to be closed at least once per 31 days.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

**Until March 15, 1981, with one recirculation pump not in operation, reduce power to less than 50% and reduce the setpoints as specified in Table 2.2.1-1, Table 3.3.4-2, Section 3.2.1, and Section 3.2.2, within 24 hours. With both recirculation loops not in operation, operation may continue; restore at least one loop to operation within 12 hours or be in at least Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

JET PUMPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 All jet pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With less than 20 jet pumps OPERABLE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2 Each of the above required jet pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER and at least once per 24 hours by verifying that all of the following conditions do not occur simultaneously.

a. The recirculation pump flow differs by more than 10% from the established speed-flow characteristics,

b. The indicated total core flow differs by more than 10% from the core flow value derived from established power-core flow relationships, and

c. The diffuser-to-lower plenum differential pressure reading on any individual jet pump varies from the mean of all jet pump differential pressures, in that loop, by more than 10%.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 35 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-71

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-325

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated March 5, 1981, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) (licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit No. 1. The requested changes would permit the BSEP 1 to operate at up to 50% of rated power with one recirculation loop out of service for up to 10 days while a failed recirculation pump motor generator set underwent repairs.

On March 5, 1981, the "A" loop recirculation pump motor generator set tripped. Subsequent investigations indicated that the slip rings required refurbishing. The licensee estimates a maximum of 10 days is required for motor repair. The licensee provided additional technical information in support of the request by letter dated March 13, 1981.

2.0 Evaluation

2.1 Accidents (Other than LOCA) and Transients Affected by One Recirculation Loop Out of Service

2.1.1 One Pump Seizure Accident

The licensee has qualitatively compared the consequences of a pump seizure accident during single loop operation with the consequences of a LOCA during full power operation with both loops in service. Previous analyses have demonstrated that the pump seizure accident is not as severe as a LOCA for two pump operation. The same conclusion can be made for the one pump case by analyzing the two events. In both events, the recirculation driving loop flow is lost instantaneously, in the seizure because of pump stoppage, in the LOCA because of a line severance. In the seizure event, natural circulation flow continues, water level is maintained, and the core remains submerged; thus a continuous core cooling mechanism is provided. However, for a LOCA complete flow stoppage occurs and the water level decreases, resulting in core uncovery and subsequent fuel rod cladding overheating.

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In addition, the reactor pressure does not decrease for a pump seizure event, whereas complete depressurization occurs for the LOCA. Since the potential effects of a pump seizure accident are bounded by the effects of a LOCA, the licensee has taken the position that specific pump seizure analyses for one loop operation are not necessary. Although this gives some assurance of acceptability of the pump seizure event, the staff notes that the acceptance criteria for pump seizure are more stringent than the criteria for a LOCA. Standard Review Plan 15.3.3 (Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure, and Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break) requires that for the pump seizure accident, the release of radioactivity should be a fraction of 10 CFR 100 guidelines. Only limited amounts of fuel failures are acceptable for pump seizures, whereas significantly more failures are acceptable for LOCA.

The licensee, however, will limit reactor power during single loop operation to 50% of rated power. As indicated on the BSEP 1 power/flow operating map, the natural circulation line intersects the 100% flow control line at 53% power. Thus, with power limited to 50%, reactor power is at a value where no fuel damage will occur even if pump seizure should occur.

The staff finds the power limit of 50% to be acceptable on the basis that the power limit will assure no significant fuel damage will result should the pump seizure event occur during one loop operation at BSEP 1.

2.1.2 Abnormal Transients

2.1.2.1 Idle Loop Startup

The idle loop startup transient was analyzed, in the BSEP FSAR, with an initial power of 65%. The licensee has committed to operate at no greater than 50% power with one loop out of service. Additionally, the idle loop recirculation pump motor generator set field breaker will be pulled and placed under administrative controls to preclude operation of the pump and consequent injection of a cold slug into the vessel.

2.1.2.2 Flow Increase

The Minimum Critical Power Ratios (MCPRs) in the present Technical Specifications for operation at full power have previously been reviewed and found to be acceptable. A large inadvertent flow increase could cause the MCPR to decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR for a low initial MCPR at reduced flow conditions. Therefore, the required MCPR must be increased at reduced core flow by a flow factor, K_f. The K_f factors are derived assuming both recirculation loops increase speed to the maximum permitted by the scoop tube position set screws. This condition maximizes the power increase and hence the ΔMCPR for transients initiated from less than rated conditions. When operating on one loop the flow and power increase will be less than with two pumps increasing speed, therefore the K_f factors derived from the two-pump assumption are conservative for one loop operation.

2.1.2.3 Rod Withdrawal Error

The rod withdrawal error at rated power analysis indicated that the rod block monitor (RBM) will stop rod withdrawal at a critical power ratio (CPR) which is higher than the safety limit. The minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) requirement for one loop operation will be equal to that for two loop operation because the nuclear characteristics are independent of whether core flow is attained by one or two pump operation, if flow asymmetries are not incurred with one-loop operation. Tests at Quad Cities have shown that flow is uniform across the core for one pump operation with the equalizer valve closed. The results of these tests are considered applicable and acceptable for BSEP 1.

One-pump operation results in backflow through 10 of the 20 jet pumps while flow is being supplied to the lower plenum from the active jet pumps. Because of this backflow through the inactive jet pumps the present rod-block equation and APRM settings must be modified. The licensee has modified the two-pump rod block equation and APRM settings that exist in the Technical Specification, for one-pump operation and the staff has found them acceptable.

The staff finds that one loop transients and accidents other than LOCA, which is discussed below, are bounded by the two loop operation analysis and are therefore acceptable.

2.2 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

The licensee has contracted General Electric Company (GE) to perform single loop operation analysis for BSEP LOCA. The licensee asserts that GE has performed a large number of single loop analyses for similar plants; and, in no case has a multiplier of less than 0.70 been required. However, the licensee has proposed that, until the GE calculations can be verified, a multiplier of 0.65 be utilized.

2.3 Thermal-Hydraulics

Except for total core flow and TIP reading, the uncertainties used in the statistical analysis to determine the MCPR fuel cladding integrity safety limit are not dependent on whether coolant flow is provided by one or two recirculation pumps. Uncertainties used in the two-loop operation analysis are documented in Table 5-1 of Reference 1 for reloads.

A 6% core flow measurement uncertainty has been established for single-loop operation (compared to 2.5% for two-loop operation). This value conservatively reflects the one standard deviation (one sigma) accuracy of the core flow measurement system documented in Reference 2. The core flow uncertainty analysis is described in Reference 3. The randum noise component of the TIP reading uncertainty was revised for single recirculation loop operation to reflect recent operating plant test results. This revision resulted in a single-loop operation process computer uncertainty of 9.1% for reload cores. A comparable two-loop process computer uncertainty value is 8.7% for reload cores. The net effect of the revised core flow and TIP uncertainties is a 0.01 incremental increase in the required MCPR fuel cladding integrity safety limit, and therefore a similar increase in "rated flow" MCPR operating limit.

The steady-state operating MCPR with single-loop operation will be conservatively established by multiplying the K_f factor to the revised rated flow MCPR limits. This ensures that the 99.9% statistical limit requirement is always satisfied.

The staff's evaluation finds that increasing the safety limit MCPR by a value of 0.01 is conservative and, therefore, acceptable.

2.4 References

1. NEDO-20566-2, Revision 1, GE Analytical Model for LOCA Analysis in Accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K Amendment No. 2 - One Recirculation Loop Out-of- Service

2. Generic Reload Fuel Application, General Electric Company, August 1979 (NEDE-24011-P-A-1)

3. General Electric BWR Thermal Analysis Basis (GETAB: Data, Correlation and Design Application, General Electric Company, January 1977 (NEDO-10958-A))

3.0 Summary

For the reasons previously discussed, the staff finds acceptable the proposed single loop operation during the period necessary to affect repairs to the recirculation pump motor generator. Power is limited to no greater than 50% of rated power.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-325

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 issued to Carolina Power & Light Company, which revises the Technical Specifications for operation of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1, located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. The amendment is effective as of March 5, 1981.

The amendment modifies the Technical Specifications to permit operation with one recirculation loop out of service.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 5, 1981, as supplemented March 13, 1981, (2) Amendment No. 35 to License No. DPR-71, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. and at the Southport-Brunswick County Library, 109 West Moore Street, Southport, North Carolina 28461. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 27th day of March, 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing