



January 18, 2002  
RC-02-0012

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION  
DOCKET NO. 50/395  
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12  
TRANSMITTAL OF EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE CHANGES

In compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix E(V), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, acting for itself and as agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority, transmits an updated Table of Contents and one controlled copy each of the following Emergency Plan Procedure Changes.

PROCEDURE	REV.	CHG.	TITLE
EPP-001	24	E	Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
EPP-051	6	A	Emergency Operations Facility

The effectiveness of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan is not decreased by these procedure changes.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mrs. Donna Railey at (803) 345-4107.

Very truly yours,



Melvin N. Browne

DWR/MNB/dr  
Attachments

- c: (Without Attachment unless noted)
- L. A. Reyes (With 2 Attachments)
- NRC Resident Inspector
- RTS (0-L-99-0354)
- File (810.10-2, RR 6000)
- DMS (RC-02-0012)

A045

This is an updated Table of Contents for EPP's.

Please file. Thank you.

Copy Number 157

Mail Code 830

## VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

## TABLE OF CONTENTS REPORT

Document Type: PROCEDURE		Series EPP%	
Document Number	Sheet Number	Status	Title
EPP-001	NA	A	ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN
EPP-001.1	NA	A	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
EPP-001.2	NA	A	ALERT
EPP-001.3	NA	A	SITE AREA EMERGENCY
EPP-001.4	NA	A	GENERAL EMERGENCY
EPP-002	NA	A	COMMUNICATION AND NOTIFICATION
EPP-003	NA	A	PLANT RADIOLOGICAL SURVEYING
EPP-005	NA	A	OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONS
EPP-006	NA	A	TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
EPP-007	NA	A	ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
EPP-009	NA	A	ONSITE MEDICAL
EPP-010	NA	A	PERSONNEL/VEHICLE DECONTAMINATION
EPP-011	NA	A	PERSONNEL SEARCH AND RESCUE
EPP-012	NA	A	ONSITE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION
EPP-013	NA	A	FIRE EMERGENCY
EPP-014	NA	A	TOXIC RELEASE
EPP-015	NA	A	NATURAL EMERGENCY (EARTHQUAKE, TORNADO, HURRICANE)
EPP-017	NA	A	POST-RECOVERY AND RE-ENTRY
EPP-020	NA	A	EMERGENCY PERSONNEL EXPOSURE CONTROL
EPP-021	NA	A	ACTIVATION OF THE EARLY WARNING SIREN SYSTEM [EWSS]
EPP-023	NA	A	EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES
EPP-026	NA	A	OPERATION OF THE SIREN CONTROL SYSTEM
EPP-051	NA	A	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY
EPP-052	NA	A	EMERGENCY INFORMATION PLAN
EPP-102	NA	A	EMERGENCY PLAN TRAINING

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

**TABLE OF CONTENTS REPORT**

<b>Document Type: PROCEDURE</b>		<b>Series EPP%</b>
<b>Document Number</b>	<b>Sheet Number</b>	<b>Status Title</b>
EPP-103	NA	A EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT CHECKLIST
EPP-104	NA	A VERIFICATION OF COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY
EPP-105	NA	A CONDUCT OF DRILLS AND EXERCISES

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

EPP-001

ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
EMERGENCY PLAN

REVISION 24

SAFETY RELATED

Harry J. Ogium  
DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR

12/12/96  
DATE

St. A. Bue  
APPROVAL AUTHORITY

12/17/96  
DATE

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	P	2-26-97		E	P	12/25/01	
B	P	03-03-98					
C	P	11/25/98					
D	P	11-16-01					

INFORMATION USE

Procedure may Be Performed From Memory.  
User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.

# NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139  
ATTACHMENT II  
PAGE 1 OF 3  
REVISION 20

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: 11-29-01 PROC.# EPP-001 REV.# 24 CHG. E COMM.# \_\_\_\_\_  
 TITLE: Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROCEDURE \_\_\_\_\_ REVISION \_\_\_\_\_ SAFETY RELATED   
 CHANGE:  PERMANENT  QUALITY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_  
 RESTRICTED \_\_\_\_\_ FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ NON-SAFETY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_

ii. DESCRIPTION:  
See attached

REASON FOR CHANGE:  
See attached

R. Schwartz / R.J. Schwartz  
 Originator - Sign and Print Name

iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)										Other Reviews:	
<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPLE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> CWPS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISEG	<input type="checkbox"/> NOET	<input type="checkbox"/> QC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> MPSE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P	<input type="checkbox"/> MSPD	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> FFD	<input type="checkbox"/> MQS	<input type="checkbox"/> NTET	<input type="checkbox"/> RC	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMPR	<input type="checkbox"/> MPO	<input type="checkbox"/> SAS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> RE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISD	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 150.59					

iv. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES.  
John Kelly 12-5-01  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

v. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:  
 QUALIFIED REVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ QA REVIEW \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_ TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE \_\_\_\_\_

vi. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

P/CAP AFFECTED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

COMMENTS RESOLVED: CM Clark 12/19-01  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

vii. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?  
 C. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO N/A / \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 N. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO N/A / \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 RESP. MGR.

viii. FINAL QA REVIEW (If Applicable)  
N/A / \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA Concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

ix. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:  
N/A / \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Training Completed \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
John Kelly 12-25-01  
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

x. PSRC REVIEW:  
 A. REVIEWED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 COMMENTS: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Responsible Manager \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change E  
Attachment to PDF-A, Section ii, Description and Reason for Change  
Page 1 of 2**

**Description:** Attachment II, Page 4 of 17: Site Area Emergency Detection Method for a "Major Steam Line Break with Greater Than 50 Gallons per Minute Primary-to-Secondary Leakage and Indication of Fuel Damage": Changed "RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

**Reason for the Change:** This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**Description:** Attachment II, Page 4 of 17: General Emergency Detection Method for a "Loss of Two of Three Fission Product Barriers with Potential Loss of the Third Barrier": Changed "Laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

**Reason for the Change:** This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**Description:** Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Notification of Unusual Event for a "Fuel Damage Indication": Changed "Laboratory analysis which indicates dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration  $\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

**Reason for the Change:** This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**Description:** Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Alert Detection Method for a "Possible Fuel Damage": Changed "Laboratory analysis which indicates dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

**Reason for the Change:** This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**Description:** Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Site Area Emergency Detection Method for a "Degraded Core with Possible Loss of Coolable Geometry": Changed "RM-L1 High Range off scale ( $>10^6$  cpm) with laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 High Range off scale ( $>10^6$  cpm) with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

**Reason for the Change:** This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change E  
Attachment to PDF-A, Section ii, Description and Reason for Change  
Page 2 of 2**

**Description:** Attachment II, Page 7 of 17: General Emergency Detection Method for "Transient Requiring Operation of Shutdown Systems with Failure to Trip Which Results in Core Damage or Additional Failure of Core Cooling and Makeup Systems Which Could Lead to Core Melt": Changed "RM-L1 alarm, with laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity  $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

**Reason for the Change:** This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**Description:** Attachment III: Made various changes to the format and the wording of some sections. Format changes include providing lines next to each step for place keeping.

**Reason for the Change:** Feedback from users to make the attachment more usable and to provide clarification.

**Description:** Attachment III: Removed the provision for certain TSC duty personnel to report to the TSC instead of the EOF during a security emergency. The entire ERO duty will now be instructed to report to the EOF in the event of a security emergency.

**Reason for the Change:** This action simplifies and clarifies the response instructions. The EOF provides a safe staging area away from the plant site. TSC and OSC personnel can be directed to respond to the plant site from the EOF as necessary and as conditions permit.

# NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139  
ATTACHMENT II  
PAGE 1 OF 3  
REVISION 20

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: 11-12-01 PROC.# EPP-001 REV.# 24 CHG. D COMM.# \_\_\_\_\_  
 TITLE: Activation and implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROCEDURE \_\_\_\_\_ REVISION \_\_\_\_\_ SAFETY RELATED   
 CHANGE:  PERMANENT  QUALITY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_  
 RESTRICTED \_\_\_\_\_ FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ NON-SAFETY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_

ii. DESCRIPTION: ① Added a SCOPE statement to section 1.0. ②  
changed Attachment III, consideration for a Security Emergency.

REASON FOR CHANGE: ① To comply with SAP-139. ② To meet the intent  
of NRC information Advisory 1A-01-6, dated 11-6-01.

R. J. Schwartz  
 Originator - Sign and PRINT Name

iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)

<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPLE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> CWPS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISEG	<input type="checkbox"/> NOET	<input type="checkbox"/> QC
<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> MPSE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OR
<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P	<input type="checkbox"/> MSPD	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> FFD	<input type="checkbox"/> MQS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NTET	<input type="checkbox"/> RC
<input type="checkbox"/> MMPR	<input type="checkbox"/> MPO	<input type="checkbox"/> SAS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> RE
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISD	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> TU
<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE						<input type="checkbox"/> 50.59	

Other Reviews:  
 GMNSS  
 QA 11-12-01  
 J. Wozniak

iv. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES:  
Peter Kelly, 11/12/01  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

v. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:  
 QUALIFIED REVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ QA REVIEW \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_ TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE \_\_\_\_\_

vi. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:  
 PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO   
 IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO   
 TRAINING REQUIRED? YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_  
 IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO   
 P/CAP AFFECTED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO   
 COMMENTS RESOLVED: Peter Kelly, 11/16/01  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

vii. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE? N/A  
 C. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 N. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ NL&OE / \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
N/A  
 RESP. MGR. \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

viii. FINAL QA REVIEW (if Applicable)  
N/A  
 QA Concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

ix. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:  
N/A  
 Training Completed \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Peter Kelly, 11/16/01  
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

x. PSRC REVIEW:  
 A. REVIEWED BY:  
 PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 COMMENTS: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
 B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:  
 Responsible Manager \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_



**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to PDF-A, Section II  
Description and Reason for Changes  
Page 1 of 2**

**Change Description:**

Changed reference 2.9 from SAP-1122 to SAP-1131.

**Reason for Change:**

To update the reference to the new procedure for the CER Program.

**Change Description:**

Added section 5.3, Undeclared and Misclassified Events and supporting reference 2.10, NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. Section 5.3 is designated Commitment #C01.

**Reason for Change:**

To provide guidance to the user for actions to take when it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists.

**Description:**

Deleted Definition 3.1.5, EWSS Inoperable which is Commitment #N01.

**Reason for Change:**

The Detection Method for an EAL in which this definition was used was deleted in a previous revision and does not appear elsewhere in this procedure.

**Description:**

Attachment II Page 10 of 17: Detection Method for Emergency Action Levels (EAL) 231 and 331: Changed the detection method for EAL 231 to "An automatic reactor trip fails when required, and, a manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is successful" and changed detection method for EAL 331 to "Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1".

**Reason for Change:**

Revision 24 has nearly identical detection methods for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency indicating any Site Area Emergency from an ATWS would also warrant a General Emergency classification.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to PDF-A, Section II  
Description and Reason for Changes  
Page 2 of 2**

**Description:**

Attachment II Page 16 of 17: Added the following note to each of the Security related EALs, "See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance".

**Reason for Change:**

To remind the user of the location of additional guidance for actions to take in a Security event.

**Description:**

Attachment II Page 17 of 17: Corrected typographical error in the detection method for the first Alert EAL.

**Reason for Change:**

Correct typographical error.

**Description:**

Section 5.2.C: Removed the reference to declaring the emergency classification by using EIS.

**Reason for Change:**

Declaring an emergency is a decision made by the IED/ED and is not dependent on the availability of EIS.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation  
Page 1 of 5**

**Change Description:**

Changed reference 2.9 from SAP-1122 to SAP-1131.

**Reason for Change:**

To update the reference to the new procedure for the CER Program.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:**

This change does not affect sections in 10CFR50.47(b) or 10CFR50 Appendix E. This change is administrative in nature. Procedures for evaluation of events are not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

**Change Description:**

Added section 5.3, Undeclared and Misclassified Events and supporting reference 2.10, NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. Section 5.3 is designated Commitment #C01.

**Reason for Change:**

To provide guidance to the user for actions to take when it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:**

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E IV.C. This change provides guidance to the user for the actions to take for undeclared and misclassified events as described in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73, Rev 1, section 3.1.1, Immediate Notification Requirements. This section of the NUREG states that when such a condition is discovered that a one hour report to the NRC is appropriate and that emergency declaration and termination is unnecessary. At annual training for State and local governments conducted on 9/3/98 this issue was discussed and authorizing representatives of the State and the four Risk Counties stated that they also want to be notified within one hour of when such an event is discovered. Unclassified and misclassified events are not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation  
Page 2 of 5**

**Description:**

Deleted Definition 3.1.5, EWSS Inoperable which is Commitment #N01.

**Reason for Change:**

The Detection Method for an EAL in which this definition was used was deleted in a previous revision and does not appear elsewhere in this procedure.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:**

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E IV.C. EWSS Inoperability is no longer used as a detection method for emergency classification. This detection method was removed from the EALs in a prior revision to this procedure and to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This revision to the Plan was approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

**Description:**

Attachment II Page 10 of 17: Detection Method for Emergency Action Levels (EAL) 231 and 331: Changed the detection method for EAL 231 to "An automatic reactor trip fails when required, and, a manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is successful" and changed detection method for EAL 331 to "Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1".

**Reason for Change:**

Revision 24 Change B has nearly identical detection methods for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency indicating any Site Area Emergency from an ATWS would also warrant a General Emergency classification.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation:**

These changes affect 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). The Alert level is entered as a result of safety system degradation. This condition indicates a failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a first line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that could lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS integrity. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded, rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded, is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. For some transients, the timing of the manual reactor trip would not be critical and fuel damage could be avoided. For other events, fuel damage could occur that would warrant the increased monitoring that would occur for an

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation  
Page 3 of 5**

Alert. Failure of the manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if entry into EOP-13.0 is required due to failure of both the automatic and manual reactor trip functions (both switches). Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that could lead to the loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Again, timing and the type of event that required the reactor trip initially are important factors on the expected damage. But to simplify the classification scheme, entry into EOP-13.0 indicates some time may pass before reactor power is low enough to prevent fuel damage.

The General Emergency EAL 431 detection method was not changed. The General Emergency classification is more closely related to the loss of fission product barriers. This event assumes continued power generation and demonstrated evidence of fuel damage or the loss of functions needed to support core cooling which could lead to core melt. With respect to critical safety functions, this event would represent a severe challenge to both "Subcriticality" and "Core Cooling".

The above changes match the intent of the Initiating Conditions of these EALs and reduce the possibility for misclassification. Therefore, these changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. These changes do require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. These changes do not require further revision to implementing procedures.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation  
Page 4 of 5**

**Description:**

Attachment II Page 16 of 17: Added the following note to each of the Security related EALs, "See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance".

**Reason for Change:**

To remind the user of the location of additional guidance for actions to take in a Security event.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation**

These changes affect 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). These changes help to insure appropriate actions are taken in a Security event and enhance emergency response. Therefore, these changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. These changes do require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. These changes do not require further revision to implementing procedures.

**Description:**

Attachment II Page 17 of 17: Corrected typographical error in the detection method for the first Alert EAL.

**Reason for Change:**

Correct typographical error.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation**

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). This change corrects a typographical error and is administrative in nature. Therefore, this change do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. This change does not require further revision to implementing procedures.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan  
Revision 24, Change C  
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation  
Page 5 of 5**

**Description:**

Section 5.2.C: Removed the reference to declaring the emergency classification by using EIS.

**Reason for Change:**

Declaring an emergency is a decision made by the IED/ED and is not dependent on the availability of EIS.

**10CFR50.54.q Evaluation**

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). This change does not alter the Emergency Action Level scheme. This change simplifies the emergency declaration process by removing a restrictive and inappropriate statement about using EIS to declare an emergency. EIS is not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan, therefore, this change do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. This change does not require further revision to implementing procedures.

**NUCLEAR OPERATIONS**  
**COPY NO. 157**

SAP-139  
 ATTACHMENT IV  
 PAGE 1 OF 3  
 REVISION 18

**PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A**

DATE: 1-26-98 PROC.# EPP-001 REV.# 24 CHG. B COMM.# \_\_\_\_\_  
 TITLE: ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN

NEW PROC \_\_\_\_\_ CHANGE  PERMANENT  SAFETY RELATED   
 REVISION \_\_\_\_\_ RESTRICTED \_\_\_\_\_ FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ QUALITY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_  
 NON-SAFETY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_

II. DESCRIPTION: DELETE REF. 2.9 STEP 4.3 DELETE REFERENCE TO ERONS, ATT. 1 page 2 of 2 DELETE 11.E and REVISE NEW 11.E, ATT 11 page 1 REVISE INITIATING CONDITION FOR NUC (SEE ATTACHED SUMMARY) and 16

REASON FOR CHANGE:  
(SEE ATTACHED SUMMARY)

Originator: CM Counts Sign/Print: CM Counts

III. WILL THIS REVISION/CHANGE/NEW PROCEDURE:

	*YES	NO	N/A
1. Result in significant increased personnel radiation exposure? (ALARA review)	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environment?	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
3. Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan?	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
4. Degrade the safeguards effectiveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency of Training and Qualification Plans?	_____	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

\* If any question 1 through 4 is answered "YES", refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.

REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT:

<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	<input type="checkbox"/> ISD	REQUESTED REVIEWS: <u>GMNPS</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> QC	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> RC	<u>QA</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> MCS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> SFADC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RJS	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> MSCE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input type="checkbox"/> SCE	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	_____

Discipline Supervisor: [Signature] Date: 12/7/98

IV. 10CFR50.59 SCREENING REVIEW/SAFETY EVALUATION  
 REQUIRED  EXEMPT  PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT: 10CFR50.54(a)  
 Discipline Supervisor Concurrence: [Signature]

V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE NA QA REVIEW \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_ TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE \_\_\_\_\_

VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

P/CAP AFFECTED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

COMMENTS RESOLVED: [Signature] 12-2-98  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

VII. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?

C. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO NA Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 N. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ NL&OE Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 RESP. MGR. Date \_\_\_\_\_

VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW (As Applicable)  
NA Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA Concurrence Date \_\_\_\_\_

IX. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

NA Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Training Completed Date \_\_\_\_\_  
[Signature] 12/3/98  
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence Date \_\_\_\_\_

X. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 COMMENTS: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED: Responsible Manager \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**EPP-001**  
**REVISION 24, CHANGE B**  
**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

- A. Reference 2.9, EPP-025, "Use of the ERON System" was deleted. The ERON System is no longer in use. The ERON System was used only for recording results of radio-pager drills and has been replaced by another system. It was not used for communicating with the Emergency Response Organization or offsite agencies. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.
- B. Step 4.3 was revised to remove all reference to the ERON System. (See A. above for justification.)
- C. Attachment I, page 2 of 2, item 11. E was deleted. This item described an Initiating Condition that is being revised to delete the referenced condition. The new 11. E was revised to better reflect the condition described in the referenced Initiating Condition. (See E. below for justification.)
- D. Attachment II, page 1 of 17, The Initiating Condition and Detection Methods for the Notification of Unusual Event was revised. NRC approval for the revision was granted per letter dated July 11, 1997. The new Initiating Condition and Detection Methods were taken from NUMARC/NESP-007 which is approved by the NRC for use. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.
- E. Attachment II, page 16 of 17, The Initiating Condition and Detection Methods for the Notification of Unusual Event was revised. NRC approval for the revision was granted per letter dated July 11, 1997. The new Initiating Condition and Detection Methods were taken from NUMARC/NESP-007 which is approved by the NRC for use. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139  
ATTACHMENT IV  
PAGE 1 OF 3  
REVISION 17

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

I. DATE: 2-3-97 PROC. # EPP-001 REV. # 24 CHG. A COMM. # \_\_\_\_\_  
 TITLE: Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROC \_\_\_\_\_ CHANGE  PERMANENT  SAFETY RELATED   
 REVISION \_\_\_\_\_ RESTRICTED \_\_\_\_\_ FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ QUALITY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_  
 NON-SAFETY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_

II. DESCRIPTION: Add Note 4.4 and Attachment III

REASON FOR CHANGE: To provide guidance to the IED/ED during Security-related emergencies

CMC 2/3/97  
 Originator Sign/Print

III. WILL THIS REVISION/CHANGE/NEW PROCEDURE:

	* YES	NO	N/A
1. Result in significant increased personnel radiation exposure? (ALARA review)	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environment?	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
3. Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan?	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
4. Degrade the safeguards effectiveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency or Training and Qualification Plans?	_____	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

\* If any question 1 through 4 is answered "YES", refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.

REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT: REQUESTED REVIEWS:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OR (RS)	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GMNSS
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MINTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input type="checkbox"/> SCE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> QC	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> _____

J. Kelly 12-6-97  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

IV. 10CFR50.59 SCREENING REVIEW/SAFETY EVALUATION

REQUIRED  EXEMPT  PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT: 10CFR50.91(a)

J. Kelly  
 Discipline supervisor concurrence

V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE NA QA REVIEW \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_ TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE \_\_\_\_\_

VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

P/CAP AFFECTED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

COMMENTS RESOLVED: J. Kelly 12/25/97  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

TRAINING COMPLETED: J. Kelly 12-25-97  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

VII. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?

C. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO NA NL&OE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

N. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ RESP. MGR. \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW (As Applicable)

H. K... 12/26/97  
 QA Concurrence Date

IX. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

S. A. B... 12/26/97  
 Approval/Concurrence Date

X. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED: Responsible Manager \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ATTACHMENTS

- Attachment I - Emergency Action Level Cross Reference Guide
- Attachment II - Emergency Action Levels
- Attachment III - Considerations for a Security Emergency

| Chg  
A

## 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1.1 To define the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that will activate and implement the Emergency Plan and to provide a means of classifying the emergency.
- 1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q. and 10CFR50 Appendix B. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

Chg  
D

## 2.0 REFERENCES

- 2.1 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station FSAR, Appendix 13A, "South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan".
- 2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 2.3 10CFR50, Appendix E.
- 2.4 10CFR50.54 (x) and (y), Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.
- 2.5 EPP-001.1, Notification of Unusual Event.
- 2.6 EPP-001.2, Alert.
- 2.7 EPP-001.3, Site Area Emergency.
- 2.8 EPP-001.4, General Emergency.
- 2.9 SAP-1131, Electronic Processing of Condition Evaluation Reports.
- 2.10 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.

Chg B  
and C

Chg C

## 3.0 DEFINITIONS

- 3.1 Definitions
  - 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - Off normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
  - 3.1.2 Alert - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency - Events which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

3.1.4 General Emergency - Events which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

Chg C

## 3.2 Abbreviations

3.2.1 EAL - Emergency Action Level

3.2.2 NUE - Notification of Unusual Event

3.2.3 IED - Interim Emergency Director

3.2.4 ED - Emergency Director

3.2.5 EPP - Emergency Plan Procedure

3.2.6 EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure

3.2.7 TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent

3.2.8 CDE- Committed Dose Equivalent

#### 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES

- 4.1 The Emergency Plan shall be implemented whenever an "Initiating Condition" (as identified in Attachment II) has occurred.

##### NOTE 4.2

The implementation of any specific Emergency Plan Procedure (except this procedure) does not necessarily implement the Emergency Plan, but may do so at the discretion of the IED/ED. For example: a small chlorine leak would implement the toxic release procedure but not necessitate implementation of the Emergency Plan, whereas a large release with the potential of affecting the level of safety of the plant would implement the toxic release procedure and the Emergency Plan due to the declaration of a NUE.

- 4.2 The "Initiating Condition" and "Detection Method" shall be used to determine the applicable EAL. The Detection Methods are intended to be a guide for the proper classification of an emergency. The judgment of the IED/ED may take precedence in determining if the Initiating Condition has been met or exceeded.
- 4.3 The 3 digit number in parenthesis associated with EALs on Attachment II is the Emergency Information System (EIS) Emergency Type Code.

Chg.  
B

##### NOTE 4.4

When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. See Attachment III for additional guidance.

Chg.  
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- 4.4 The Duty Shift Supervisor must concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety (Reference 2.4).

- 4.5 Attachment I provides a cross reference for the EAL Classification and should only be used as a guide to locate the "Initiating Condition" in Attachment II, Emergency Action Levels.

### 5.0 PROCEDURE

- 5.1 Upon recognition of an abnormal plant or site condition, the observer shall notify the Duty Shift Supervisor of the potential emergency plan condition.

NOTE 5.2

When the TSC is activated, the ED is responsible for determining the appropriate EAL and emergency classification.

- 5.2 The IED/ED shall:
- A. Using Attachment I for guidance, locate the appropriate initiating condition and turn to the referenced page in Attachment II.
  - B. Determine the EAL by comparing the verified plant parameters or conditions to the detection method for each emergency condition.
  - C. Declare the appropriate emergency classification. Perform additional actions in accordance with the EOPs and the appropriate EPPs.

Chg  
C

Notification of Unusual Event	-	EPP-001.1
Alert	-	EPP-001.2
Site Area Emergency	-	EPP-001.3
General Emergency	-	EPP-001.4

### 5.3 Undeclared or Misclassified Events

- C01→ A. When it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists, the IED/ED shall insure that an ENS notification to the NRC and ESSX notification to the State and local governments is made within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared or misclassified event. No "after-the-fact" emergency declaration is necessary.

Chg  
C

6.0 RECORDS

- 6.1 There are no records generated by this procedure.

7.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 7.1 Include use of Emergency Type Codes in EIS in step 4.3.
- 7.2 Include use of Emergency Type Codes in EIS in step 5.2.C.
- 7.3 Incorporate Change A.
- 7.4 Addition of SAP-1122.

**EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE**

**NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for Event Classification. Refer to Attachment II.**

<u>INITIATING EVENT/TOPIC</u>	<u>REFERENCE PAGE IN ATTACHMENT II</u>
1. Reactor Coolant System	
A. Reactor Coolant Leakage	1
B. Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)	1
C. Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve Fails to Reseat	2
D. Loss of Fission Product Barriers	4
E. Primary to Secondary Leakage	3, 4
F. Major Steam Line Break with Primary to Secondary Leak	4
2. Secondary System	
A. Major Steam Line Break	4
B. Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve Fails to Reseat	2
C. Secondary System Depressurization	5
D. Loss of Feedwater and Condensate System	5
E. Failure of Emergency Feedwater System	5, 8
F. Turbine-Generator Rotating Component Failure	5
3. Fuel	
A. Fuel Damage	1, 2, 4, 6, 7
B. Fuel Handling Accident	6
C. Loss of Fission Product Barriers	4
D. Loss of Coolable Geometry	1, 2, 6
4. Engineered Safety Feature	
A. Failure of the Reactor Protection System	7
B. Operation of Shutdown Systems with Failure to Trip	7
5. Station Power	
A. Loss of Offsite Power	3, 8
B. Loss of Onsite AC Power	8
C. Loss of Onsite DC Power	8
6. Containment	
A. Loss of Containment Integrity	4
7. Radiological Effluents	
A. Liquid or Gaseous Effluent Exceeds Technical Specification	9, 10
B. High Radiation Levels	9
C. Radiation Levels Detected/Projected at the Exclusion Area Boundary	9, 10

**EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE**

**NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for Event Classification. Refer to Attachment II**

<b><u>INITIATING EVENT/TOPIC</u></b>	<b><u>REFERENCE PAGE IN ATTACHMENT II</u></b>
8. Fire	
A. Fire Lasting More Than 15 Minutes	11
B. Fire Effecting Safety Trains, Systems or Functions	11
9. Security	
A. Security Threats, Attempted Entry or Sabotage	12
10. Natural Phenomenon	
A. Natural Events Onsite or Near Site (Earthquake, Tornado, or Hurricane)	13
B. Other Hazards Onsite or Near Site (Aircraft Crash, Train Derailment, Explosion or Toxic/Flammable Gas Release)	14
11. Other	
A. Emergency Director Discretion Based On Other Plant Conditions	15
B. Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits	15
C. Loss of Function for Plant Cold or Hot Shutdown	16
D. Control Room Evacuation	16
E. Loss of Communications Capability	16
F. Loss of RHR	1, 17

Chg.  
B

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (101)</b>            RCS LEAKAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><b>EITHER 1 OR 2:</b>            (Only applicable in Modes 1 through 4.)</p> <p>1. Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 10 gpm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Identified Leakage greater than 25 gpm.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (201)</b>            REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE RATE EXCEEDS 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Excessive Makeup to the Volume Control Tank.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (301)</b>            KNOWN LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 7) <u>OR</u> 8:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip,</li> <li>2. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal,</li> <li>3. Reactor Building pressure &gt;1.5 psig,</li> <li>4. Reactor Building sump level above zero,</li> <li>5. RBCU Drain Flow High,</li> <li>6. RM-A2, RM-G7, RM-G18 high alarm,</li> <li>7. Reactor Building temperature &gt;120°F.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>8. Pressurizer Relief Tank conditions above normal (for PORV <u>OR</u> Safety Valve LOCA's).</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (401)</b>            SMALL OR LARGE LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM TO PERFORM, LEADING TO SEVERE CORE DEGRADATION OR MELT.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Items 1 - 7 <u>OR</u> 8 under Site Area Emergency and <b>EITHER 1 OR 2:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Indications that safety injection and RHR pumps are not running (no AMPS).</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Flow indication for safety injection and RHR pumps reading zero.</li> </ol>

Chg.  
 B

**EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (102)</b>  <b>FAILURE OF A PRESSURIZER OR STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE TO RESEAT (EXCEEDING NORMAL WEEPAGE)</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve opens and then fails to reseat as indicated by <u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3</u>:</p> <p>1. Valid open indication of Pressurizer Relief <u>OR</u> Safety Valve <u>OR</u> valid Acoustical Monitor indication.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Visual <u>OR</u> audible indication at vent stacks of open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. Excess feedwater flow to and steam flow from affected Steam Generator.</p>			<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (402)</b>  <b>SMALL LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS THAT COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 5):</p> <p>1. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. RHR flow indicators show zero flow for greater than 30 minutes after shift to RHR,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>4. RCS temperature rising,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>5. Reactor Building Spray and Reactor Building Cooling Units fail to function.</p>

**EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (103)</b>  <b>EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION            PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE LIMIT</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Exceeds T.S.            3.4.6.2 Limits:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt;1 gpm Total for &gt; 4 hours.</li> <li>&gt; 500 gpd any one Steam Generator for &gt; 4 hours.</li> </ol>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (202)</b>  <b>RAPID GROSS FAILURE OF ONE STEAM            GENERATOR TUBE WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE            POWER</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 5):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pressurizer low pressure alarm <u>AND</u> reactor trip,</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pressurizer low level alarm,</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RM-A9, G19A, G-19B, <u>OR</u> G19C valid high alarm supported by laboratory analysis,</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal,</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Loss of 115 KV <u>AND</u> 230 KV ESF Potential Lights.</li> </ol> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (203)</b>  <b>RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM            GENERATOR TUBES (e.g., SEVERAL            HUNDRED GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-            TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE)</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Entry into EOP-4.0.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (302)</b>  <b>RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM            GENERATOR TUBES (SEVERAL HUNDRED            GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO-            SECONDARY LEAK RATE) WITH LOSS OF            OFFSITE POWER</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Entry into EOP-4.0,</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Loss of 115KV and 230KV Emergency Safeguards Power Potential Lights,</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lifting of Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves or Safety Valves.</li> </ol>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (204)</b>            MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) WITH A SIGNIFICANT PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. All of the following rapidly decreasing:</p> <p>a. Tavg            b. PZR pressure            c. PZR level,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>2. High alarms on either RM-L3, L10, OR A9,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>3. EITHER a OR b:</p> <p>a. For break inside RB:            High-1RB pressure AND safety injection actuation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>b. For break outside RB:            safety injection actuation due to steamline ΔP or low steamline pressure</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (303)</b>            MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK WITH GREATER THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE AND INDICATION OF FUEL DAMAGE.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 4):</p> <p>1. All of the following rapidly decreasing:</p> <p>a. Tavg            b. PZR pressure            c. PZR level,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>2. High alarms on RM-A9 and laboratory analysis of secondary coolant activity supporting 50 gpm leakage,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>3. RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity ≥ 300 μCi/gm,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>4. EITHER a OR b:</p> <p>a. For break inside RB:            High-1 RB pressure AND safety injection actuation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>b. For break outside RB:            safety injection actuation due to steamline ΔP or low steamline pressure.  <b>Refer to Loss of 2 of 3 FP Barriers (Possible General Emergency).</b></p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (403)</b>            LOSS OF TWO OF THREE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE THIRD BARRIER (e.g., LOSS OF FUEL INTEGRITY AND PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARY AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</p> <p>1. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity ≥ 300 μCi/gm AND LOCA in progress AND Reactor Building pressure ≥ 30 psig for at least 2 minutes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity ≥ 300 μCi/gm AND breach of containment integrity and EITHER a OR b:</p> <p>a. RCS leakage greater than Technical Specification allowable.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>b. RCS pressure ≥ 2335 psig.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>3. LOCA AND breach of containment integrity and EITHER a OR b:</p> <p>a. Dose equivalent I-131 activity ≥ 1μCi/gm in primary coolant.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>b. Core Exit temperature ≥ 700 °</p>

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 SECONDARY SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (104)</b>  <b>RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Rapid decrease in S/G pressure resulting in a safety injection actuation.</p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (105)</b>  <b>OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY</b>  <b>(TURBINE-GENERATOR ROTATING COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN)</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            All of the following ( 1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. Turbine Trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Observation of Failure of <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Turbine Rotating Assembly,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. Generator Rotating Assembly.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (292)</b>  <b>OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY</b>  <b>(TURBINE -GENERATOR FAILURE CAUSING CASING PENETRATION)</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            All of the following ( 1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. Turbine Trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Observation of penetration of the turbine casing</p>		<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (411)</b>  <b>TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPLE HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM) FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>  <u>EITHER</u> 1 <u>OR</u> 2:</p> <p>1. a. Failure of feed and bleed of the RCS to maintain core cooling,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. Steam Generator wide range levels less than 15% in two or more steam generators.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Failure of feed and bleed of the RCS to maintain core cooling,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. RCS Pressure &gt; 2335 psig due to loss of heat sink.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
**FUEL**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (106)</b>  <b>FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity <math>\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}</math>. <span style="float: right;">Chg E</span></p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (221)</b>  <b>POSSIBLE FUEL DAMAGE</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity <math>\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}</math>. <span style="float: right;">Chg E</span></p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (222)</b>  <b>FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR <u>OR</u> FUEL HANDLING BUILDING</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u></p> <p>1. a. In the Reactor Building:        Observation of damage to spent fuel assembly,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-G5, RM-G17A, 17B high alarm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. In the Fuel Handling Building:        Observation of damage to spent fuel assembly,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-A6 high alarm, <u>OR</u> RM-G8 high alarm.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (321)</b>  <b>DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF COOLABLE GEOMETRY</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range off scale (<math>&gt;10^6</math> cpm) with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity <math>\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}</math>, <span style="float: right;">Chg E</span></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Core Exit Temperatures <math>\geq 700^\circ\text{F}</math>,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. No indication of forced or natural circulation.</p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (322)</b>  <b>MAJOR DAMAGE TO MORE THAN ONE SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR BUILDING <u>OR</u> FUEL HANDLING BUILDING LEADING TO CLAD RUPTURE (e.g., LARGE OBJECT DAMAGES FUEL OR WATER LOSS BELOW FUEL LEVEL)</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. a. In the Reactor Building:        Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly <u>OR</u> water level below the tops of spent fuel assemblies,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-G5, G17A, G17B high alarms.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. In the Fuel Handling Building:        Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly <u>OR</u> water level below the tops of spent fuel assemblies,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-A6 or RM-G8 high alarm.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (231)</b>            FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A TRIP WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            An automatic reactor trip fails when required,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>A manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is <u>successful</u>.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (331)</b>            TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP (CONTINUED GENERATION, NO FUEL DAMAGE EVIDENT)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (431)</b>            TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEMS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</p> <p>1. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity <math>\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{gm}</math>.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Flow indicators on safety injection system <u>AND</u> RHR systems show zero flow with safety injection initiated.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Status lights show safety injection system <u>AND</u> RHR pumps not running with safety injection initiated.</p>

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
**STATION POWER**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (107)</b>  <b>TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>In Modes 1-6, <u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF Potential Lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded or undervoltage conditions.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. Both Diesel Generator inoperable for &gt; 1 hour.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (241)</b>  <b>LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE 5 MINUTES</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF Potential Lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded or undervoltage conditions.</p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (242)</b>  <b>LOSS OF ALL ONSITE DC POWER FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all buses,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. 480 V ESF Channel A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. DG A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (341)</b>  <b>LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. a. Both Diesel Generators Inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF Potential Lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Both Diesel Generators Inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded or undervoltage conditions.</p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (342)</b>  <b>LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all buses,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. 480V ESF Channel A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. DG A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (441)</b>  <b>FAILURE OF OFFSITE AND ONSITE POWER ALONG WITH TOTAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER MAKEUP CAPABILITY.</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. Both Diesel Generators inoperable</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. <u>EITHER a OR b:</u></p> <p>a. Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF potential lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded voltage or undervoltage conditions,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. <u>EITHER a OR b:</u></p> <p>a. Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump fails to start <u>AND</u> is inoperable for one hour.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Core Exit temperatures <math>\geq 700^{\circ}</math> F.</p>



EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (109)</b>  LIQUID EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 15 MINUTES (APPENDIX B TABLE II COLUMN 2 10CFR20)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Any of the following liquid effluent monitors in valid High Alarm for longer than 15 min. <u>AND</u> isolation valve(s) fail to close:</p> <p>RM-L5 <u>OR</u>  RM-L7 <u>OR</u>  RM-L9.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (262)</b>  RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASE RATE EXCEEDING 10 TIMES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSTANTANEOUS LIMITS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Any of the following valid radiation monitor readings for longer than 15 minutes:</p> <p>1. RM-A3 (Gas) is off scale high.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. RM-A3 (Iodine) is off scale high.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 40 times high alarm setpoint.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>4. RM-A4 (Iodine) exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>5. RM-L5, RM-L7, or RM-L9 exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint <u>AND</u> isolation valve(s) fail to close.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (362)</b>  DOSE RATES LISTED BELOW ARE PROJECTED BASED ON GAMMA RADIATION MONITOR (RMG) READINGS AND/OR OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS OR ARE MEASURED AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. Reactor Building leak rate results in calculated dose rate at exclusion area boundary greater than 50 mrem/hr whole body for 0.5 hr. or 500 mrem/hr whole body for 2 min.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure dose rates greater than 50 mrem/hr for 0.5 hr. or greater than 500 mrem/hr for 2 min. (beta + gamma) at one mile or greater from the plant.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure thyroid dose rates (equivalent I-131 concentrations) greater than <u>EITHER</u> a or b:</p> <p>a. 250 mrem/hr  (1.3x10<sup>-7</sup> µCi/cc) for 0.5 hr.  <u>OR</u></p> <p>b. 2500 mrem/hr  (1.3x10<sup>-6</sup> µCi/cc) for 2 min. at one mile or greater from the plant.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
**FIRE**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (110)</b>            FIRE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA OR THE SWITCHYARD LASTING MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <p>1. Observation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>2. Fire Detection Device alarm with confirming observation.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (271)</b>            FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY SYSTEMS.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of fire that could affect one or more safety systems.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (371)</b>            FIRE AFFECTING SAFETY TRAINS OR FUNCTIONS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of major fire that defeats both trains of a safety system or function.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
**SECURITY**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (111)</b>  <b>SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Report to the Control Room by Security or observer.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (281)</b>  <b>ONGOING SEVERE SECURITY THREAT</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Security safeguards contingency event which results in adversaries commandeering an area of the plant, but not impacting shutdown capability.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (381)</b>  <b>SECURITY THREAT INVOLVING IMMINENT LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Physical attack on the Plant involving imminent occupancy of <u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u>:</p> <p>1. Control Room.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (481)</b>  <b>SECURITY THREAT RESULTING IN LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY</b></p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Physical attack on the Plant has resulted in occupation of <u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u>:</p> <p>1. Control Room.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
**NATURAL PHENOMENON**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (112)</b>  <b>NATURAL EVENTS:</b>            1. EARTHQUAKE            2. TORNADO ONSITE            3. HURRICANE NEAR SITE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>  <u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. For Earthquake:            Seismic Recording System Start Indication and confirmation of a seismic event thru observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room.    <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. For Tornado:            Observation of event in Exclusion Area.    <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. For Hurricane:            Sustained winds in excess of 50 mph due to a hurricane as measured by onsite meteorological instrumentation or the National Weather Service.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (291)</b>  <b>SEVERE NATURAL EVENT NEAR SITE:</b>            1. EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN THE 2/3 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL            2. TORNADO STRIKING FACILITY            3. SUSTAINED HURRICANE WINDS GREATER THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>  <u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. For Earthquake:            Seismic Event Annunciator 2/3 OBE exceeded (one or more yellow lights lit) and confirmation of a seismic event through observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room.    <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. For Tornado:            Observation of the event within the Protected Area or Switchyard.    <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. For Hurricane:            Sustained winds in excess of 75 mph due to a hurricane as measured by onsite meteorological instrumentation or the National Weather Service.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (391)</b>  <b>SEVERE NATURAL PHENOMENON BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN:</b>            1. EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL            2. SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MILES PER HOUR ONSITE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>  <u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. For Earthquake:            Observation of the event (felt or heard) lasting &gt;2 seconds and <u>EITHER a OR b:</u></p> <p>a. RB Foundation Seismic Switch OBE exceeded.    <u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Seismic Event Annunciator OBE exceeded (one or more red lights lit).    <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. For sustained winds in excess of 100 mph onsite:            As measured by onsite meteorological instrumentation or the National Weather Service.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 MANMADE PHENOMENON

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (113)</b>            OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. ONSITE AIRCRAFT CRASH</li> <li>2. ONSITE TRAIN DERAILMENT</li> <li>3. ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING PLANNED ACTIVITIES)</li> <li>4. NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT THREATENS PERSONNEL</li> </ol> <p>Detection Method:</p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. For Aircraft Crash: Observation of event.  <u>OR</u></li> <li>2. For Train Derailment: Observation of event.  <u>OR</u></li> <li>3. For Onsite Explosion: Observation of explosion or warning from offsite.  <u>OR</u></li> <li>4. For Onsite Toxic or Flammable Gas Release: Observation of release or warning from offsite.</li> </ol>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (292)</b>            OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. AIRCRAFT CRASH ON FACILITY</li> <li>2. MISSILE IMPACTS ON FACILITY WITH RESULTANT MAJOR DAMAGE</li> <li>3. KNOWN EXPLOSION AT FACILITY RESULTING IN MAJOR DAMAGE TO PLANT STRUCTURES OR EQUIPMENT</li> <li>4. ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES IN CONCENTRATION WHICH EXCEED THE LIMITS OF FLAMMABILITY OR TOXICITY</li> </ol> <p>Detection Method:</p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. For Aircraft Crash: Observation of aircraft crash into Plant structures.  <u>OR</u></li> <li>2. For Missile Impact: Observation of missile impacts on Plant structures or components.  <u>OR</u></li> <li>3. For Onsite Explosion: Observation of damage by explosion.  <u>OR</u></li> <li>4. For Onsite Toxic or Flammable Gas Release: Observation or warning from outside the Plant; detection of gasses (using portable instrumentation) which exist in concentrations which exceed the limits of flammability or toxicity.</li> </ol>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (392)</b>            OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. AIRCRAFT CRASH INTO VITAL STRUCTURES,</li> <li>2. MISSILE OR EXPLOSION IMPACT ON FACILITY RENDERING SEVERE DAMAGE TO SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT</li> <li>3. ENTRY OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INTO VITAL AREA WHICH INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF PLANT SAFETY</li> </ol> <p>Detection Method:</p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Aircraft crash causing damage <u>OR</u> fire in:           <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Reactor Building; <u>OR</u></li> <li>b) Control Room; <u>OR</u></li> <li>c) Auxiliary Building; <u>OR</u></li> <li>d) Fuel Handling Building; <u>OR</u></li> <li>e) DG Building; <u>OR</u></li> <li>f) Intermediate Building; <u>OR</u></li> <li>g) SW Intake Structures.  <u>OR</u></li> </ol> </li> <li>2. For Missile or Explosion Impact: Loss of functions needed for hot shutdown (see specific Initiating Condition for this situation).  <u>OR</u></li> <li>3. Entry of toxic or flammable gases into:           <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Control Room; <u>OR</u></li> <li>b) Cable spreading rooms; <u>OR</u></li> <li>c) Reactor Building; <u>OR</u></li> <li>d) Switchgear room; <u>OR</u></li> <li>e) Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms;  <u>OR</u></li> <li>f) Emergency Diesel Generator rooms; (as detected by portable instrumentation <u>AND</u> which renders a train of a safety related system inoperable).</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
**OTHER**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (114)</b>            INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN            WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (293)</b>            OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT            WARRANT ACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL            SUPPORT CENTER AND PLACING            EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY            PERSONNEL ON STANDBY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            As determined by IED/ED.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (393)</b>            OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT            WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY            FACILITIES AND RADIATION MONITORING            TEAMS AND A PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC            WARNING</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            As determined by IED/ED.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (493)</b>            OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT            WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY            FACILITIES AND RECOMMENDED            PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PUBLIC</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            As determined by IED/ED.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS  
 OTHER

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (115)</b>            UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <p>1. Loss of all onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. (Internal telephone system, Ga-Tronics system and radio system.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Loss of all offsite communications capability. Internal telephone system, Bell lines, Fiberoptic links, radio system. (When extraordinary means must be used to make communications.)</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (294)</b>            LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. RHR system not functional in Modes 1-4,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and atmosphere.</p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITIONS (295)</b>            EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM ANTICIPATED OR REQUIRED WITH CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	<p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (394)</b>            LOSS OF FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT HOT SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            All of the following (1 - 4):</p> <p>1. Inability to establish charging pump injection,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Inability to establish Emergency Feedwater Flow,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. RHR System not functional (applicable to Modes, 1, 2, and 3 only),</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>4. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and atmosphere.</p> <p><b>INITIATING CONDITION (395)</b>            EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN 15 MINUTES.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u>            Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	

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### CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

The Security Team Leader will notify the Control Room of a security emergency. A security emergency may be classified as an **Intrusion** or a **Site-Specific Credible Threat**. See the following considerations for each of these situations. Lines to the left of the considerations are for place keeping and are optional.

#### Intrusion:

#### CAUTION

Avoid moving personnel within the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

- 1. Immediately direct an Operator to install the "Ultra Dogs" on the two card reader doors that lead into the Control Room area.
- 2. Make the following plant announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.  
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel. (Repeat announcement once.)

- 3. DO NOT sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- 4. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.
- 5. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.
- 6. If the ERO is needed, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 8). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

— a) Dialogics Communicator:

- 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at (70) 58716 or dial toll free 1 (877) 262-5585.
- 2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows: **“This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign”**. Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.
- 3) **“To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options”**. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

**“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions”**.

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

**“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.**

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- \_\_\_\_\_ 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, **“You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue”**. Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6) **“To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #”**. Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

Or

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- \_\_\_\_\_ b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. Evacuate Non-essential personnel when it is safe to do so.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. During normal working hours, consider utilizing personnel responding to the EOF to assist in making notifications.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

**Site-Specific Credible Threat:**

CAUTION

Avoid moving personnel inside or outside the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

- 1. Declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), at a minimum, based on Security Threat, EAL #111. A higher initial classification could be made based on the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences.
- 2. Implement the Radiation Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures. State and local governments should be notified as required. Do not activate the Early Warning Siren System unless directed by the government agencies, per our procedures.
- 3. TSC/OSC staffing and other personnel decisions are made based on the nature of the threat and the timing of the threat. These decisions are independent of the NOUE activities.

Evacuate plant personnel if the information about the threat indicates that time is available. The ERO Duty Team is directed to report to the EOF or Backup EOF as described below. The EOF or Backup EOF is used as a staging area for TSC and OSC personnel. The IED may contact the EOF or Backup EOF to direct specific TSC and OSC personnel to come to the plant site, as necessary. The TSC and OSC should not be fully manned until the threat is resolved.

- 4. Make one of the following plant announcements:

**TAKE COVER:**

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.  
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel.

OR

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

**EVACUATE:**

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.  
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All non-essential and off-duty ERO personnel evacuate the site. All Duty ERO personnel report to the EOF. (Provide the exit route, if appropriate. See Page 8)

- \_\_\_\_\_ Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Repeat the Plant Announcement.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. The Duty Emergency Director should evaluate assuming emergency duties from the IED without a staffed and activated TSC. The Duty Emergency Director should only assume emergency duties from the IED if the Duty Emergency Director is located in the TSC.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. Reactor and plant operational decisions should be as directed by Management.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 8). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ a) Dialogics Communicator:
    - \_\_\_\_\_ 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at (70) 58716 or dial toll free 1 (877) 262-5585.
    - \_\_\_\_\_ 2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows. **“This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign”**. Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- 3) **“To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options”**. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

**“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions”**.

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

**“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.**

- 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, **“You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue”**. Press 1 if no supplemental instructions, such as access routes to the EOF, are needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- 6) **“To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #”**. Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Or

- \_\_\_\_\_ b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. Notify Security of the intended routes and direct them to ensure gates are open, as appropriate.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

**Access/Exit Routes:**

As dictated by the events, select one of the below Basic Routes and the closest open bridge(s) to access/exit the plant and the EOF.

**Three Basic Routes:**

- 1. Normal Route via Highway 215.
- 2. Northern Route via the dirt road over the Fairfield Pumped Storage dam.
- 3. Southern Route via the dirt road from the south end of the plant access road to Parr.

**Bridges Across the Broad River:**

- 1. Pinner Bridge, Highway 213.
- 2. Highway 34 Bridge, located near the junction of Highway 34 and Highway 215, in the northern section of the 10-mile EPZ.
- 3. I-20 Bridge, located in Columbia, west of the junction of I-20 and Monticello Rd. (Highway 215).

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

EPP-051

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

REVISION 6

LC Hill  
DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR

7/9/01  
DATE

James H. Hixon  
APPROVAL AUTHORITY

7/11/01  
DATE

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	P	01/09/02					

INFORMATION USE

Procedure May Be Performed From Memory.  
User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.

# NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139  
ATTACHMENT II  
PAGE 1 OF 3  
REVISION 20

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: 11-20-01 PROC.# EPP-051 REV.# 6 CHG. A COMM.# \_\_\_\_\_  
 TITLE: Emergency Operations Facility

NEW PROCEDURE \_\_\_\_\_ REVISION \_\_\_\_\_ SAFETY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_  
 CHANGE:  PERMANENT  QUALITY RELATED \_\_\_\_\_  
 RESTRICTED \_\_\_\_\_ FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ NON-SAFETY RELATED

ii. DESCRIPTION: 1.) Add information to I.C of Attachment I-J. LRB 01-15-02  
2.) Add Note to 2.b of Attachment I-J.  
3.) Add statement 2.b to Attachment I-N.  
4.) Add statement to Step 6 of Att 1-G.  
5.) Correct typos and alignments.

REASON FOR CHANGE: 1) Provide additional guidance on the setup of the Backup EOP.  
2) Provide guidance on the distribution of Emergency Notification Forms in the EOP.  
3) Add guidance to attend press briefings to the Lead Technical Briefing.  
4) Provide guidance to ECO at Site Area and Gench. Emergency.  
5) Correct typos and alignments

Originator - Sign and PRINT Name: Norman Boukemy Leonard Banknight

iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)

<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPLE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> CWPS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISEG	<input type="checkbox"/> NOET	<input type="checkbox"/> QC	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> MPSE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QR	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P	<input type="checkbox"/> MSPD	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> FFD	<input type="checkbox"/> MQS	<input type="checkbox"/> NTET	<input type="checkbox"/> RC	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> MMPR	<input type="checkbox"/> MPO	<input type="checkbox"/> SAS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> RE	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISD	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.59	<input type="checkbox"/> _____

Other Reviews: \_\_\_\_\_

iv. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES: [Signature] 11-30-01  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

v. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ QA REVIEW \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_ TELECON BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE \_\_\_\_\_

vi. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

P/CAP AFFECTED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO

COMMENTS RESOLVED: [Signature] 11-8-02  
 Discipline Supervisor Date

vii. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?

C. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO  NL&OE Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 N. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ RESP. MGR. Date \_\_\_\_\_

viii. FINAL QA REVIEW (if Applicable)

QA Concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

ix. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

Training Completed \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence: [Signature] 11/19/02  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

x. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: \_\_\_\_\_  
 PSRC Chairman Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 COMMENTS: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

Responsible Manager \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 PSRC Chairman \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

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## 1.0 PURPOSE

- 1.1 This procedure describes the functional capabilities of the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
- 1.2 This procedure describes the action necessary to activate the EOF and the Backup EOF.

## 2.0 SCOPE

- 2.1 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

## 3.0 REFERENCES

- 3.1 NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities.
- 3.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 3.3 EP-100, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan .
- 3.4 EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan.
- 3.5 EPP-001.1, Notification of Unusual Event.
- 3.6 EPP-001.2, Alert.
- 3.7 EPP-001.3, Site Area Emergency.
- 3.8 EPP-001.4, General Emergency.
- 3.9 EPP-002, Communication and Notification.
- 3.10 EPP-005, Offsite Dose Calculations.
- 3.11 EPP-007, Environmental Monitoring.
- 3.12 EPP-009, On-site Medical.
- 3.13 EPP-013, Fire Emergency.
- 3.14 EPP-014, Toxic Release.
- 3.15 EPP-015, Natural Emergency (Earthquake, Tornado, Hurricane).
- 3.16 EPP-021, Activation of the Early Warning Siren System (EWSS).

- 3.17 EPP-052, Emergency Information Plan.
- 3.18 HPP-1003, Radiological Emergency Operations of Health Physics Personnel at the NTC.
- 3.19 SPP-114, Security Force Responsibilities During Emergencies.
- 3.20 SAP-1131, Electronic Processing of Condition Evaluation Reports.

#### 4.0 DEFINITIONS

##### 4.1 Definitions

- 4.1.1 Backup EOF - An alternate Emergency Response Facility (ERF) to locate the Offsite Emergency Response Organization (ERO), located on the 11th Floor of the Corporate Offices in Columbia, S. C.
- 4.1.2 EOF - The primary ERF to locate the Offsite ERO, located in the basement of the Nuclear Training Center.
- 4.1.3 ESSX Telephone - Telephone lines which are used to notify the State and Counties simultaneously and are programmed in the Bell South Telephone system.
- 4.1.4 Facility Activation - Minimum regulatory staffing requirements have been met and the facility is prepared to provide its support function as determined by its facility manager.
- 4.1.5 Key Personnel - Positions located in the EOF Command Center, listed in Section 6.1.2.
- 4.1.6 Minimum Staff - Personnel who must be available in an ERF for facility activation.

#### 5.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES

- 5.1 The EOF is required to be activated within about one hour of the declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, but it may be activated at lower classifications.
- 5.2 The Backup EOF will be activated when the EOF must be evacuated or is not available to support offsite emergency operations.
- 5.3 The IED, using available information, will determine which offsite facility will be activated - either EOF or Backup EOF.

- 5.4 The Offsite ERO, located in the EOF will provide:
- A. Technical expertise in engineering.
  - B. Environmental monitoring.
  - C. Radiological assessment.
  - D. Logistical support such as transportation, food, communications, materials, supplies, and other needed services.
  - E. Focal point for the news media, NRC, and other federal, State, and local officials that are dispatched to the near site area.
- 5.5 The EOF will evaluate and coordinate all V. C. Summer Nuclear Station emergency related activities and will provide information and recommendations to federal, State, and local authorities responding to radiological emergencies.
- 5.6 All communications to the State, except for those made by EOF Communicators, should be done using 748-8010.

## 6.0 PROCEDURE

- 6.1 EOF Emergency Response Personnel
- 6.1.1 Attachment I provides guidance and expectations for EOF staff.
  - 6.1.2 The following Key Personnel are located in the EOF. A checklist of specific position responsibilities is provided in the indicated attachments. Blocks are provided beside responsibilities that are normally performed once. The blocks can be checked when the item is performed.
    - A. Offsite Emergency Coordinator (OEC) - Attachment I-A
    - B. EOF Plant Status Advisor - Attachment I-B
    - C. EP Representative - Attachment I-C
    - D. Technical Support Coordinator - Attachment I-D
    - E. General Services Coordinator - Attachment I-E
    - F. Media Coordinator - Attachment I-F
    - G. Emergency Control Officer (ECO) - Attachment I-G
    - H. Offsite Radiological Monitoring Coordinator (ORMC) - Attachment I-H

I. Security Coordinator - Attachment I-I

J. EOF Communicators - Attachment I-J

- 6.1.3 Key Personnel in the EOF shall maintain a log of their activities to include projects, decisions and their basis, etc.
- 6.1.4 When a member of the Offsite ERO in the Command Center must leave the facility, he/she shall designate and brief an interim substitute before leaving and receive a briefing upon returning.
- 6.1.5 The OEC communicates with the ED by a dedicated phone line to the TSC.
- 6.1.6 When the OEC is fully apprised of the emergency situation, minimum staff is available and facilities are ready, the OEC shall declare that the EOF is activated and inform the TSC.
- 6.1.7 The OEC shall routinely brief the EOF organization on the status of emergency support operations.
- 6.1.8 Requests for manpower, equipment, or material are made by the ED or his designee to the OEC at the EOF. The OEC confers with the appropriate members of the Offsite ERO in order to fulfill the request.
- 6.1.9 The NRC Site Team will be located in the EOF at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification to provide assistance and enhance information exchange between SCE&G and federal agencies.

6.2 Communications Center

- 6.2.1 The Communications Center, used by the EOF Communicators, is located in close proximity to the Command Center.
- 6.2.2 The Communications Center contains an SCE&G telephone extension, ESSX telephone, radio communications, and facsimile machine.

- 6.2.3 After activation of the EOF, the EOF Communicator, with the approval and direction of the OEC, provides plant status updates, as required, to offsite authorities. The EOF Communicator will obtain the Emergency Notification Form from the EP Representative. If using the Emergency Information System (EIS), the Emergency Preparedness Representative will fax the approved Emergency Notification Form to the State and local governments. The EOF Communicators will verify receipt via a telephone call to each location in accordance with EPP-002. If not using EIS, the EOF Communicators will read the Emergency Notification Form to the State and counties and then Fax the form to them.
- 6.2.4 The EOF Communicator logs all communications to offsite agencies involving the EOF. Further descriptions of EOF communications are included in EPP-002, Communication and Notification, and Attachment I-J of this procedure.
- 6.3 Technical Support
- 6.3.1 The Technical Support Coordinator shall:
- A. Provide input to the General Services Coordinator in regard to facilities needed in the EOF to support technical support activities.
  - B. Direct, coordinate, and approve engineering and design activities.
  - C. Ensure Engineering Design and Design Review activities are controlled in support of short term mitigation requests. Communicate on going actions to the ERO.
  - D. Define, initiate, and coordinate plans to support long term recovery efforts.
- 6.3.2 The Technical Support Staff shall:
- A. Analyze plant problems, determine alternatives, and design and coordinate the installation of short-term modifications as requested by the TSC Technical Support Supervisor and the Technical Support Coordinator.
  - B. Analyze system operations problems, determine alternatives, and develop emergency procedures.
  - C. Assist the TSC in analyzing conditions and provide guidance to station personnel on protection of the reactor core.

6.4 General Services

- 6.4.1 The General Services Area provides space for personnel activated and supervised by the General Services Coordinator.
- 6.4.2 General Services personnel arrange for, or provide, the administrative, logistic, communications, and personnel support for emergency operations.
- 6.4.3 Telephones and a telecopier are available to the General Services personnel for use during an emergency.

6.5 Security Area

- 6.5.1 The Security Coordinator is normally located in EOF Room 142. When local government representatives respond to the EOF, the Security Coordinator will relocate to the Command Center.
- 6.5.2 Security personnel activated and supervised by the Security Coordinator will provide access control and other security related services at the EOF.

6.6 Media Area

- 6.6.1 Personnel supervised by the Media Coordinator are provided with working space in the EOF.
- 6.6.2 Telephones and a telecopier are available for use in the preparation of coordinated and accurate information for the News Media.
- 6.6.3 Operations in the EOF and News Media Area are described in EPP-052, Emergency Information Plan.

6.7 Offsite Radiological Monitoring Area

- 6.7.1 The Offsite Radiological Monitoring Coordinator's staff operates from both the EOF and Environmental Laboratory at the NTC.
- 6.7.2 Offsite Radiological Monitoring personnel acquire data reflecting radiological conditions outside the Protected Area.
- 6.7.3 Communications will be established with onsite radiological assessment personnel to obtain offsite radioactive release information.
- 6.7.4 Telephones and radio equipment are available for communicating with both onsite and offsite radiological monitoring activities.

- 6.7.5 Dose assessment equipment and supplies are available to determine and predict offsite dose projections to the general public.
  - 6.7.6 Offsite Radiological Monitoring personnel communicate and coordinate with S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) throughout the emergency on monitoring activities.
  - 6.7.7 Implement the guidelines specified in HPP-1003 to set up and operate the Dose Assessment Area of the EOF.
- 6.8 Activation of the EOF:
- 6.8.1 The OEC is notified of an emergency by the Shift Communicator in accordance with EPP-002, Communication and Notification.

NOTE

The EOF is not normally activated during an NUE.

- 6.8.2 Upon declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE):
  - A. The OEC shall notify the ECO.
  - B. If deemed necessary by the OEC or ECO, or requested by the IED or ED, all portions of the Offsite ERO may be activated.
  - C. When notified, the Media Coordinator may implement the applicable sections of EPP-052, Emergency Information Plan.
- 6.8.3 Upon declaration of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency:
  - A. When activated, the Offsite ERO shall respond to the appropriate facility.
  - B. The OEC shall notify the ECO of the emergency condition.
  - C. The Media Coordinator will implement EPP-052, Emergency Information Plan.
  - D. The ORMC, Security Coordinator, General Services Coordinator, and Technical Support Coordinator will ensure notification of other support personnel to staff the EOF.
  - E. Attachment II, Emergency Operations Facility Manning Chart, is used to record Minimum and Essential manning in the EOF.

6.9 Evacuation of the EOF:

NOTE

If the airborne radiation levels exceed 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table 1 limits, or the general area radiation levels exceed 100 mr/hr in the EOF, the EOF will be evacuated to the Backup EOF or a location designated by the OEC.

- 6.9.1 If the EOF must be evacuated and the Backup EOF activated, the OEC shall:
- A. Dispatch Communicator(s) to set up the Backup EOF immediately.
  - B. Notify the ED and determine time of turnover of operations for emergency during the transition to the Backup EOF.
  - C. Notify the Media Coordinator to inform him of the activation of the Backup EOF.
  - D. Notify Palmetto Center Security of intent to activate the Backup EOF.
  - E. Notify the State and Local Governments and inform them of the interim transfer of responsibility for emergency operations to the TSC.
  - F. Announce to the EOF the evacuation and the route to be taken to the Backup EOF.
  - G. Ensure the Communicators turn communications over to the TSC during the transition to the Backup EOF.
  - H. Ensure Offsite Radiological Monitoring and Dose Assessment activities are transferred to the TSC. Dispatch personnel from the EOF to the TSC to perform this function.

7.0 RECORDS

- 7.1 Forward all written material or copies of written material generated because of an emergency to the Emergency Services Unit (ESU). The ESU will insure appropriate written material is included in the applicable Condition Evaluation Report.

8.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 8.1 Incorporated Changes A and B.

- 8.2 Added section 2.0 Scope and renumbered the remainder of the text.
- 8.3 Section 5.3, Technical Support function, and Attachment I-D, Technical Support Coordinator item 4: Reworded to better reflect responsibilities of this function.
- 8.4 Added Section 5.8.3.E and Attachment II, Emergency Operations Facility Manning Chart to provide an improved method to ensure Minimum and Essential manning is met in the EOF.
- 8.5 Attachment I, EOF Staff General Guidance and Expectations: Changed Item 1 from EIS login procedure to completing the EOF Manning Chart to provide an improved method to ensure Minimum and Essential manning is met in the EOF.
- 8.6 Attachment I, EOF Staff General Guidance and Expectations: Added step to item 3, EIS login procedure, to describe action if EIS terminal is a PC. Some EIS terminals have been replaced with PCs.
- 8.7 Attachment I, EOF Staff General Guidance and Expectations Added guidance in step 5 for receiving emergency messages during briefings. Reason for Change is due to Training feedback.
- 8.8 Attachment I-A, Offsite Emergency Coordinator: Added a note to remind the OEC to include personnel outside the EOF Command Center in OEC Briefings, as necessary. Reason for the change is PIP C-01-0458 CA #11.
- 8.9 Attachment I-A, Offsite Emergency Coordinator: Deleted previous step 1.b to Notify the Emergency Control Officer. The Reason for Change is the Step is unnecessary.
- 8.10 Attachment I-A, Offsite Emergency Coordinator: Revised item 2.a to include EPP-009, 013, 014, 015 to remind OECs to check if these procedures are in use prior to EOF Activation.
- 8.11 Attachment I-A, Offsite Emergency Coordinator: Revised item 4.a to delete the last sentence concerning not maintaining Status Boards if EIS is operating because EOF Status Boards are more effective than EIS in keeping the EOF staff and the NRC up to date.
- 8.12 Attachment I-A, Offsite Emergency Coordinator: Added the protocol for validating offsite dose assessments to item 4.f. See Drill action item PIP C-00-0430, CA #5.
- 8.13 Attachment I-C, Emergency Preparedness Representative: Changed item 1.b to Emergency Operations Facility Manning Chart to provide an improved method to ensure Minimum and Essential manning is met in the EOF.

- 8.14 Attachment I-C, Emergency Preparedness Representative: Revised item 1.d to delete the last sentence concerning not maintaining Status Boards if EIS is operating because EOF Status Boards are more effective than EIS in keeping the EOF staff and the NRC up to date.
- 8.15 Attachment I-C, Emergency Preparedness Representative: Revised item 2.b to delete the last sentence concerning not giving approved Emergency Notification Forms (ENF) to the EOF Lead Communicator if EIS is operating. This action must take place whether the ENF is developed on EIS or developed manually.
- 8.16 Attachment I-H, Offsite Rad. Monitoring Coordinator: Added the protocol for validating offsite dose assessments to item 2.e. This is due to a Drill action item.
- 8.17 Attachment I-H, Offsite Rad. Monitoring Coordinator: Revised item 2.f to describe the process to access RMS and Met data on a PC. HP EIS workstations have been replaced with PCs.
- 8.18 Attachment I-I, Security Coordinator: Added step 1.d to monitor the completion of the EOF Manning Chart. This change is due to a Drill action item.
- 8.19 Attachment I-K, Field Team Driver, Attachment I-L, EOF Plant Status Communicator, Attachment I-M, EOF Major Events Logger, Attachment I-N, Lead Technical Briefer: Deleted Item 1.c on each attachment, step to log into EIS since EIS is no longer used to log people into the EOF.
- 8.20 Attachment I-M, EOF Major Events Logger: Added new step 1.c to synchronize clocks with the plant computer. This change is due to a Drill action item.
- 8.21 Added Attachment II, Emergency Operations Facility Manning Chart to provide an improved method to ensure Minimum and Essential manning is met in the EOF.

## EOF STAFF GENERAL GUIDANCE AND EXPECTATIONS

1. Print your name on the EOF Manning Chart next to your position.
2. Ensure all necessary equipment for your position is in place.
  - Test telephone.
  - Adequate supplies are available (pens, pencils, paper, etc.).
  - Procedures are available.
  - Position Checklist is available.
  - Adequate staffing in your functional area.
3. Upon arrival, get update on the plant status. Possible sources of information:
  - ED Briefing
  - OEC Briefing
  - Plant Computer
  - Dose Assessment Computer
  - Status Boards
  - Counterpart in TSC
  - EIS
    - To log into EIS if your terminal is a PC, perform the following:  
At the Logon Information Window, type EIS for User Name, type EIS for Password, and select the EIS Domain. Select OK. Then using the mouse, double click on the EIS001 icon.
4. Maintain a log of all major actions, projects, decisions and their bases, etc. throughout the emergency.
5. Personnel are to be attentive during Emergency Director and Offsite Emergency Coordinator Briefings. If your phone rings during a Briefing, answer the phone and tell the caller you are in a briefing and ask the caller if he/she has a Critical Emergency Message. Critical Emergency Messages are messages informing you of:
  - Loss of Safety Systems or Components
  - Offsite Radiological Releases
  - Security Intrusion
  - Medical Emergency
  - Fire Emergency

If the message is not critical, tell the caller to call back or write down the number and call back when the briefing is completed. Do not leave the phone off the hook because this prevents others from calling if they should have critical information.

If you decide the message is a Critical Emergency Message that warrants interrupting the Briefing, stand up and raise your hand to get the attention of the Offsite Emergency Coordinator and say you have a Critical Emergency Message.

The Offsite Emergency Coordinator tells the listeners to standby. The Offsite Emergency Coordinator evaluates the new information and returns to or reschedules the briefing.
6. If you leave the Command Center for any reason, ensure someone is briefed as a designated alternate. Receive an update upon your return.

### OFFSITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
<p>1. Initial Notification from Plant</p>	<p>a. Discuss:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emergency Classification and Facility Activation.</li> <li>2. Release in Progress.</li> <li>3. Notification Status.</li> <li>4. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).</li> </ol>
<p>2. Prior to Activation of EOF (EOF should be activated about 1 hour after Site Area Emergency or General Emergency is declared)</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> a. Contact ED and discuss:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emergency classification: Initiating Conditions. Detection Method.</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 2. Plant Status.</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 3. Releases: <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span> TDEFP Running: <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span> PORVs, Safeties: <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span> Normal Plant releases: <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span> Other: <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span></li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 4. Priorities:       <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TSC</li> <li>• EOF</li> </ul> </li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 5. Equipment status.</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 6. Injuries (EPP-009): <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span> Victim(s) _____</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 7. Fire (EPP-013) <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span></li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 8. Toxic Release (EPP-014) <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span></li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 9. Natural Emergency (EPP-015) <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span></li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 10. Notification status.</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 11. Protective Action Recommendations.</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 12. Early Warning Siren System Recommendation. <span style="float: right;">(SAE/GE)</span></li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 13. Site Evacuation/Accountability. <span style="float: right;">(SAE/GE)</span></li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 14. Offsite Emergency Services requested <span style="float: right;">Yes/No</span> (ambulance, fire department, law enforcement).</li> </ol> <p>b. Ensure minimum staffing as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Offsite Emergency Coordinator (1)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Offsite Dose Assessment Person (1)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Offsite Rad Monitoring Personnel (4)</li> </ul> <p><input type="checkbox"/> c. Verify habitability of EOF and News Media Area.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> d. Coordinate time of EOF activation.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> e. Ensure EOF Communicators coordinate assumption of communications.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> f. Ensure the Media Coordinator has initiated the activation of the News Media Area.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> g. Inform the ECO of EOF activation time.</p>

### OFFSITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

Major Task	Specific Actions
3. EOF Activation	<div data-bbox="808 495 1563 638" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Note</u></p> <p>Ensure personnel outside the EOF Command Center are included in OEC Briefings, as necessary, or are otherwise informed of the content of the briefings.</p> </div> <p><input type="checkbox"/> a. Brief the EOF on the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 The EOF is activated as of ____ hrs. My name is ____ I am the OEC. The ECO is ____ The ED in the TSC is ____.</li> <li>2. Remind staff:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To maintain log of activities.</li> <li>• If they leave Command Center, someone is to be briefed and assume their duties. Receive an update upon their return.</li> </ul> </li> <li>3. Plant priorities.</li> <li>4. EOF priorities.</li> </ol> <p><input type="checkbox"/> b. Direct the EOF Communicators to notify the offsite agencies of the EOF activation.</p>
4. Once EOF is activated	<p><input type="checkbox"/> a. Initiate status boards. Ensure status boards are maintained current.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> b. Provide periodic briefings of the EOF, to include the following information: (unless already covered in the ED briefing).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EAL</li> <li>• Priorities</li> <li>• Plant Status</li> <li>• Releases</li> <li>• PARs</li> <li>• Offsite Interface</li> </ul> <p><input type="checkbox"/> c. Ensure periodic habitability check. If Zone C-1 must be evacuated or sheltered, ensure the News Media Area is considered.</p> <p>d. Continually review priorities.</p> <p>e. Ensure the Plant Status Advisor reviews EPP-001 for EAL changes in support of the TSC.</p> <p>f. Review/Approve Emergency Notification Forms.</p>

## OFFSITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

Major Task	Specific Actions
	<p>g. The following protocol should be used to ensure dose assessment results are adequately reviewed prior to approving Forms and informing the State and local government officials:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Evaluation of dose projections should not delay the Emergency Notification Process. It is acceptable to communicate dose data on follow-up Notifications. Due to time constraints for adequate assessment of dose projections and development of the General Emergency Notification, it is preferred to send out the Initial General Emergency Notification with minimum PAR and send a follow-up message immediately after proper assessment of dose data. If radiation monitor readings provide sufficient data for assessment, it is not appropriate to wait for field monitoring data to become available to confirm the need to expand PARs.</li> <li>2. The EOF has a maximum of 15 minutes from the time dose data is available to evaluate the dose data and determine PARs.</li> <li>3. The ORMC will post the dose projection results in mRem with no scientific notation for the EOF staff to evaluate.</li> <li>4. The ORMC will explain the results, including the inputs and basis.</li> <li>5. The EOF staff will discuss and validate the results. This should include a determination and validation of the potential release pathways based on events in progress and a determination and validation of the release rate based on changes to plant parameter data.</li> <li>6. The results are approved or rejected by the OEC.</li> <li>7. The EOF has a maximum of 15 minutes to notify the State and locals of PARs.</li> </ol> <p>h. Approve press releases in ECO's absence.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> i. Dispatch County Liaison personnel to the County EOCs, as necessary.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> j. EOF log is maintained by the Tech Support Coordinator on EIS or manually.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> k. EOF manning completed.</p> <p>l. Fairfield Pumped Storage Facility evacuation (SAE/GE).</p> <p>m. Authorize Radiation Dose limit extensions, as necessary.</p>

## OFFSITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

5. Backup EOF activation, if the EOF must be evacuated
- n. Approval of revisions of plant procedures affecting offsite activities only.
  - a. Dispatch Communicator(s) to set up the Backup EOF immediately.
  - b. Notify the ED of evacuation.
  - c. Notify the Media Coordinator of Backup EOF activation.
  - d. Announce to the EOF the evacuation and the route to be taken to the Backup EOF.
  - e. Notify the State and local governments.
  - f. Ensure the Communicators turn communications over to the TSC (interim).
  - g. Ensure Radiological Monitoring and Dose Assessment activities are transferred to the TSC. Dispatch personnel from the EOF to the TSC to perform this function.

## EOF PLANT STATUS ADVISOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. EAL Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Continually monitor plant conditions and compare with EAL table in EPP-001 for change in EAL in support of TSC.</li><li>b. Advise OEC of any possible EAL changes not already recognized by the TSC.</li></ul>
2. Technical Input	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Provide technical input to the OEC and/or EOF personnel on plant status .</li></ul>

**EMERGENCY PLANNING REPRESENTATIVE**

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. EOF Activation	<input type="checkbox"/> a. Ensure EOF is set up. <input type="checkbox"/> b. Ensure the Emergency Operations Facility Manning Chart, Attachment II is completed. <input type="checkbox"/> c. Ensure equipment and supplies are available. <input type="checkbox"/> d. Ensure status boards are being initiated and maintained. e. Ensure ED Log is being received from the TSC and distributed in the EOF. If using EIS, this step is not necessary. f. Set the EIS Report and ENF Printers to the EOF and reset EIS Print queues.
CO2→ 2. Notification Forms	a. Complete Emergency Notification Forms at the required frequencies and submit to the OEC for review and approval. b. Give approved Emergency Notification Forms to the Lead Communicator for transmittal to State and counties.
3. Emergency Plan and Procedures	a. Provide guidance on implementation of EPPs. b. Coordinate with TSC EP Representative on issues.
4. EAL changes. EPP-001 EPP-001.1 - EPP-001.4	a. Ensure Plant Status Advisor and OEC are reviewing plant conditions for EAL change. b. Ensure notifications are made if EAL changes.
5. PARs	a. Ensure PARs are considered, when required. b. Provide input on PARs. c. Communicate with the State and local governments on PARs, as necessary.

## EMERGENCY PLANNING REPRESENTATIVE

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
6. EWSS Activation EPP-021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Ensure authorization for siren activation is requested at Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.</li><li>b. Communicate with State and local governments on siren activation, as necessary.</li><li>c. Coordinate with the TSC on the siren activation, as necessary.</li></ul>
7. State and Local Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Communicate with State and local government EOCs as necessary.</li></ul>
8. NRC Site Team Interface	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> a. Upon arrival and after initial briefing by the ECO, introduce NRC Site Team members to their counterparts and direct them to their work locations.</li></ul>

## TECHNICAL SUPPORT COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Staff	a. Essential staffing for Technical Support personnel: <input type="checkbox"/> Assistant Technical Support Coordinator (1) <input type="checkbox"/> Systems Engineer (1) <input type="checkbox"/> Plant Status Communicator (1) <input type="checkbox"/> Major Events Data Logger (1)
2. NSSS Supplier & Architect/Engineer	<input type="checkbox"/> a. Establish communications with Westinghouse and Architect/Engineer as necessary.
3. EOF Staff Support Activity	a. Maintain the EOF Log as follows: 1. Access the EOF Log from the Master Menu or the Main Menu. 2. Press PF1 to activate the Function Menu. 3. Using the arrow keys select the NEW EVENT option. Press RETURN. 4. Enter the text of the new event in the displayed window. Note that there is no "Word Wrap" function. 5. Press PF1 to activate the Function Menu of the New Event window and select SAVE. Press RETURN. 6. Verify the Declaration Date and Time is correct or overstrike to input the correct date and time. Press RETURN.
4. Technical Support Activities	a. Direct, coordinate and approve engineering and design activities. b. Ensure Engineering Design and Design Review activities are controlled in support of short term mitigation requests. Communicate ongoing actions to the ERO. c. Analyze plant problems, determine alternatives, and design and coordinate the installation of short-term modifications as requested by the TSC Technical Support Supervisor. d. Define, initiate, and coordinate plans to support long term recovery efforts. e. Assist the TSC in analyzing conditions and provide guidance to station personnel on protection of the reactor core. f. Call in additional Technical Support personnel, as needed.

## GENERAL SERVICES COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. General Services Staff	<input type="checkbox"/> a. Ensure adequate General Services personnel are located in work area.
2. Support Services and Supplies	a. Provide for general office support to include word processing, reproduction, etc., when required. b. Provide additional telephones, when required. c. Function as purchasing agent with responsibility for contract negotiation/administration and material control. d. Administer the petty cash fund and expense account. e. Handle payroll matters, if required. f. Provide for food deliveries, for operation of additional meal support, and for trash disposal. g. Arrange for motel, airline, and office space, if required. h. Coordinate the manpower request needs of the recovery operation. i. Provide vehicles and transportation for recovery operations.

## MEDIA COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Initial notification from Plant	<input type="checkbox"/> a. Discuss plant conditions for initial media statement. b. Implement EPP-052, Emergency Information Plan, for Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency.
2. Press releases and conferences	a. Prepare and issue official press releases as approved by the ECO or his designated alternate. b. Assist the ECO in preparing for Press Briefings.

## EMERGENCY CONTROL OFFICER

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Manage SCE&G's overall response to emergencies	a. Verify through the OEC: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emergency Response Facilities are activated and staffed.</li> <li>2. Notifications are being made to offsite authorities.</li> <li>3. PARs given to State and local governments.</li> <li>4. Status of the Plant and Releases.</li> </ol>
2. Ensure effective liaison with Westinghouse, Architect/Engineer, other services and equipment contractors	a. Verify Technical Support Coordinator has established communication with Westinghouse, Architect/Engineer, and other contractors.
3. Activate additional Corporate resources, as required	a. Approve purchase requisitions, as required. b. Authorize any additional Corporate resources, as required.
4. Approve press releases	a. Approve press releases to be released by the Media Coordinator.
5. Company Spokesperson	a. Speak for SCE&G while the emergency exists. b. Ensure factual information is given to the public in consistent, accurate, understandable manner. c. Explain plant conditions and Company actions in non-technical language during news conferences. d. Put dose estimates from radioactive releases into perspective by equating to exposure from common material. e. Reveal names of injured personnel only after next of kin has been notified.
6. Communications with State Officials	a. Communicate with State Officials on issues when required. b. Discuss the Protective Action Recommendations with State Officials when required. c. When a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency is declared, call the SEOC to discuss the circumstances for the declaration with the State Operations Officer or his designee.
7. Recovery Organization	a. Determine if a Recovery Organization is required. b. Determine the scope and functions of the Recovery Organization.
8. NRC Incidence Response Team	a. Brief NRC Site Team upon arrival.

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## OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. EOF Activation	<p>a. Ensure minimum staffing as follows</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 1 - Dose Assessment Person</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 4 - Offsite Rad Monitoring Persons (may include 2 Field Team Drivers)</li> </ul> <p><input type="checkbox"/> b. Ensure EOF and News Media Area habitability and advise <u>OEC</u> as necessary.</p>
2. Radiological Monitoring Task	<p>a. Conduct radiation surveys and sampling of the environment in areas outside of the Protected Area.</p> <p>b. Coordinate offsite surveys with local, State, and Federal survey teams.</p> <p>c. Retrieve the TLDs located offsite and determine cumulative population doses.</p> <p>d. Report data to the Radiological Assessment Supervisor in TSC and to the OEC.</p> <p>e. Provide technical assistance in the evaluation of offsite and onsite radiological conditions including dose projections.</p> <p>The following protocol should be used to ensure dose assessment results are adequately reviewed prior to informing the State and local government officials:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Offsite Rad. Monitoring Coordinator will post the dose projection results in mRem with no scientific notation.</li> <li>2. The Offsite Rad. Monitoring Coordinator will explain the results to the EOF Staff, including the inputs and basis.</li> <li>3. The EOF staff will discuss and validate the results. This should include a determination and validation of the potential release pathways based on events in progress and determination and validation of the release rate based on changes to plant parameter data.</li> <li>4. The results are approved or rejected by the OEC.</li> </ol> <p>f. Access plant RMS and Meteorological data as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Using the mouse, double click on the PID icon.</li> <li>2) Using the mouse, highlight the desired selection on the VCS Plant PID menu and click Execute. Note the selections on the menu are listed alphabetically by TOC Name.           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For Met Data, use EARMET.</li> <li>• For RMS Data, use RMLEMG.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>

### OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
3. Input on Protective Action Recommendations	a. Provide input to the OEC on Protective Action Recommendations, when required.
4. Ongoing EOF Functions	a. Periodically conduct radiological surveillances to assure habitability of the EOF and News Media Areas and advise the OEC, as necessary. b. Coordinate radiological assistance with State and Federal agencies as well as with private contractors. c. Arrange support for 24 hours per day offsite radiation monitoring support, when required. d. Authorize KI administration to emergency response personnel, as necessary.
5. Use of the Backup EOF (either initially or following evacuation of the Primary EOF)	a. The ORMC reports to the Backup EOF. The EOF Dose Assessor and the Field Team Dispatcher report to the Rad Assessment Supervisor in the TSC. EOF Count Room and habitability personnel report to the OSC.

## SECURITY COORDINATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. EOF Activation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> a. Ensure adequate staffing by security personnel at the EOF.</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> b. Establish security and access control at the EOF.</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> c. Ensure EOF emergency response personnel meet Fitness For Duty requirements.</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> d. Monitor the completion of Attachment II, Emergency Operations Facility Manning Chart, as follows:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Periodically monitor as personnel fill in their names.</li><li>2. Obtain the names of State and Local Government Liaison personnel from the EP Representative.</li><li>3. Inform the OEC when Minimum Staffing is met.</li><li>4. Inform the OEC when Essential Staffing is met.</li><li>5. Provide a copy of the completed Attachment II to the OEC and post the original.</li></ul></li></ul>
2. EOF Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Interface with Local Law Enforcement, when required.</li><li>b. Approve or deny access to the EOF for personnel requesting entry into the EOF.</li><li>c. Provide information to EOF staff relating to screening access requirements. Coordinate with offsite organizations, Station Security and Training, as required, to expedite prompt Station access for contractors, vendors, etc.</li><li>d. Obtain information on medical, fire, and security emergencies from Security Supervisor and provide to EOF staff (see pages 2 through 4 of this attachment).</li></ul>

### MEDICAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION

1. Name of Victim: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Not to be divulged until next of kin have been POSITIVELY notified.)
2. Position/Job Title: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
3. Age, Sex: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
4. What was injured person doing at the time of the accident?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
5. Medical Condition? Where taken and by whom?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
6. If a fatality, what was the cause of death? (fall, heat, explosion, etc.)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
7. Was radiation/contamination involved?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- \*8. Have accidents such as this previously occurred?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- \*9. Why/How did the accident take place?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\* The Security Coordinator is not responsible for obtaining this information. The ECO should obtain this information from any available source.

None of the above information is mandatory.

### FIRE EMERGENCY INFORMATION

1. What type of fire? How was it started?

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2. What was the extent of the damage?

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3. Were there any injuries? (Refer to Medical) YES or NO

4. What time did the fire start? Has it been extinguished?

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5. Was offsite assistance required? Who?

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\*6. Will the fire complicate recovery from the emergency?

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NOTES:

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\*The Security Coordinator is not responsible for obtaining this information. The ECO should obtain this information from any available source.

None of the above information is mandatory.

### SECURITY EMERGENCY INFORMATION

1. How many perpetrators were there?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
2. What was the age/sex of perpetrators?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
3. Have perpetrators been captured? \_\_\_\_\_
- \*4. How did the perpetrators breach security? (How did they get in?)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- \*5. Was damage sustained? Where? How?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
6. Were explosives involved? \_\_\_\_\_
7. Were injuries sustained by perpetrators/plant personnel? (See Medical for response.) YES or NO
8. Were shots fired? By whom? How many? What was hit?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
9. Refuse to answer questions specific to our Security Plan such as:  
What type of Security Force do we have? (i.e., How armed? How many?)  
How did Security fail? What will be done to ensure it doesn't fail again?

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\*Do not divulge this information if Safeguards information is involved.

None of the above information is mandatory.

## EOF COMMUNICATORS

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. EOF	<p><input type="checkbox"/> a. When notified to report, proceed to the EOF or Back Up EOF.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> b. Obtain a key from Security personnel at the NTC and unlock rooms and cabinets.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">If reporting to the Backup EOF, retrieve the supply carts from the Communicator and Storage Room adjacent to Room 1109 and follow the instructions on the carts to setup the Backup EOF.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> c. Set up the EOF or Back Up EOF.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> d. Notify the OEC when the EOF is set-up.</p>
2. Communications	<p><input type="checkbox"/> a. Coordinate with TSC Communicators on assuming responsibility for offsite notification and inform the OEC when the responsibility has been assumed.</p> <p>b. Ensure all Initial Notifications have been completed and faxed to the appropriate offsite authority in accordance with EPP-002.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"> <p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><b>NOTE</b></p> <p style="margin: 0;">For all Emergency Notification Forms the Communicators should make 8 copies and distribute as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. ECO</li> <li>b. OEC</li> <li>c. EP Representative</li> <li>d. 5 copies on the back table for State and Federal Government Representatives use</li> </ul> </div> <p>c. If the Emergency Classification is upgraded, ensure initial notifications are made to the State and Counties within 15 minutes of declaration.</p> <p>d. Ensure follow-up notifications are completed at least hourly and as conditions change and are faxed to the appropriate authorities.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> e. Ensure Fairfield Pumped Storage is notified of the emergency in an Alert condition and/or notified to evacuate in a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency.</p> <p>f. Ensure OEC is informed as notifications are completed.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> g. Ensure Early Warning Siren Authorization is requested per EPP-021. Notify TSC Communicators that EWSS Activation Authorization has been requested and fax EPP-021, Attachment I, to the TSC.</p>

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## EOF COMMUNICATORS

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
3. EOF turnover	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> i. Ensure INPO is notified within one working day.</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> j. Ensure the American Nuclear Insurer's Notification is completed in accordance with EPP-002.</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> k. Ensure termination messages are made to all authorities upon termination of an event.</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> a. When the EOF is manned and activated, assume all notifications per EPP-002 (excluding requests for emergency services, NRC communication, and receiving authorization to activate EWSS).</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> b. Ensure a thorough turnover briefing is performed prior to the EOF assuming responsibilities for notifications.</li><li>c. Ensure the TSC Communicator transmits and reviews updated information to and from the EOF as applicable.</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> d. Ensure the transfer of responsibility is documented.</li><li>e. Ensure that all completed pages of the ED Log Book are faxed to the EOF. If using EIS, this step is not necessary.</li></ul>

## FIELD TEAM DRIVER

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Manning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. When notified to report, proceed to the EOF. Field team drivers also report to the EOF if the BEOF is used.</li><li>b. Notify the Offsite Rad Monitoring Coordinator or Field Team Dispatcher that you have arrived.</li><li>c. Obtain dosimetry.</li></ul>
2. Duties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Follow directions of the environmental monitoring personnel for emergency kit and vehicle checkout and monitoring activities.</li><li>b. Remind the environmental monitoring person on your team of the radio check required every 15 minutes.</li><li>c. Periodically check dose and report results to rider. Team dispatcher will inform you when/if you reach your dose limits and must be pulled from field operations.</li><li>d. Put vehicle ventilation on recirculation when traversing plume to reduce dose.</li><li>e. Extra Field Team Drivers may be called upon to be Sample Runners between the EOF and the Field Teams.</li></ul>

## EOF PLANT STATUS COMMUNICATOR

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Manning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. When notified to report, proceed to the EOF or Backup EOF as required.</li><li>b. Notify the Technical Support Coordinator that you have arrived.</li></ul>
2. Duties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Establish communications with the Control Room and the TSC Plant Status Communicators as follows:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. All phones on hook.</li><li>2. TSC presses talk button on handset.</li><li>3. All lift handset.</li><li>4. If any parties drop off, call must be reinitiated.</li></ul></li><li>b. Keep the EOF staff informed of changing plant conditions.</li><li>c. Use judgment to convey critical plant information to the EOF staff in a timely manner with the appropriate degree of emphasis and urgency. Interrupt the OEC, if appropriate.</li></ul>

## EOF MAJOR EVENTS LOGGER

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Manning	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. When notified to report, proceed to the EOF or Backup EOF as required.</li><li>b. Notify the Technical Support Coordinator that you have arrived.</li><li>c. Synchronize the EOF digital clock with the Plant Computer.</li></ol>
2. Duties	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Sequentially log major events on the Status Board.</li><li>b. Sources of information:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ED and OEC Briefings.</li><li>• Listening to EOF staff.</li><li>• EIS.</li><li>• Directions from EOF staff to log specific items.</li></ul></li></ol>

## LEAD TECHNICAL BRIEFER

Major Tasks	Specific Actions
1. Manning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. When notified to report, proceed to the EOF or Backup EOF as required.</li><li>b. Notify the Media Coordinator that you have arrived.</li></ul>
2. Duties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Assist the ECO, Media Coordinator, and JIC personnel in preparing Press Releases and Press Briefings by providing an understanding of plant systems and operations. Strive to put technical information in terms the public can understand.</li><li>b. Attend all Press Briefings with the ECO.</li><li>c. Do not talk to representatives of the Media unless directed to by the JIC Coordinator or the Media Coordinator.</li><li>d. If approached by the Media directly, politely but firmly decline to answer questions and state that all information is being released through the JIC. Suggest they contact the JIC Coordinator.</li><li>e. When talking to the Media do not speculate.</li></ul>

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**EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY MANNING CHART**

Team: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

<b><u>Minimum Staffing</u></b> (Time Met: _____)	
Offsite Emergency Coordinator:	_____
Offsite Dose Assessor:	_____
Offsite Radiological Monitor:	_____
Offsite Radiological Monitor:	_____
Field Team Driver:	_____
Field Team Driver:	_____

**Essential Staffing** (Time Met: \_\_\_\_\_)

Emergency Control Officer:	_____
Security Coordinator:	_____
Lead Communicator:	_____
EOF Communicator:	_____
Emergency Preparedness Rep.:	_____
Offsite Rad. Monitoring Coordinator:	_____
Field Team Dispatcher:	_____
Technical Support Coordinator:	_____
TS Engineer, Assistant:	_____
TS Engineer, Systems:	_____
Plant Status Communicator:	_____
Major Events Logger:	_____
Plant Status Advisor:	_____
General Services Coordinator:	_____
Media Coordinator:	_____
Lead Technical Briefer:	_____

**State/Local Government Liaisons**

SC Emergency Operations Center:	_____
Fairfield County:	_____
Newberry County:	_____
Lexington County:	_____
Richland County:	_____

**Others**

\_\_\_\_\_

**Comments**

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_