



South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

South Texas Project
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
Technical Specification Bases Change

Reference: Letter from Thomas J. Jordan to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk dated April 27, 2000 (NOC-AE-00000820)

In the referenced letter, the STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) submitted a change to the STP Technical Specification Bases for Section 3/4.6.1.7, "Containment Ventilation System." The referenced submittal contained a typographical error in Bases section 3/4.6.2.2 "Recirculation Fluid pH Control System". The corrected Technical Specification Bases page is attached.

In addition, Technical Specification Bases Section 3/4.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," has been changed pursuant to 10CFR50.59. This change clarifies the requirement that the personnel airlock door must be capable of being closed includes the capability to inflate the associated door seal. Attached is a copy of the revised Technical Specification Bases page.

If there are any questions, please contact M.K. Johnson at (361) 972-8385 or me at (361) 972-7136.

Scott M. Head

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott M. Head".

Manager,
Licensing

mkj

Attachment: Revised Technical Specification Bases Pages 3/4 6-3 and 3/4 9-2

A-001

cc:

Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, Texas 76011-8064

Mohan C. Thadani
Project Manager
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1 White Flint North, Mail Stop: O-7D1
11555 Rockville Place
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

Cornelius F. O'Keefe
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 289, Mail Code MN116
Wadsworth, TX 77483

A. H. Gutterman, Esquire
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1800 M. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5869

M. T. Hardt/W. C. Gunst
City Public Service
P. O. Box 1771
San Antonio, TX 78296

A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady
City of Austin
Electric Utility Department
721 Barton Springs Road
Austin, TX 78704

Jon C. Wood
Matthews & Branscomb
112 East Pecan, Suite 1100
San Antonio, Texas 78205-3692

Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations - Records Center
700 Galleria Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-5957

Richard A. Ratliff
Bureau of Radiation Control
Texas Department of Health
1100 West 49th Street
Austin, TX 78756-3189

R. L. Balcom/D. G. Tees
Reliant Energy, Inc.
P. O. Box 1700
Houston, TX 77251

C. A. Johnson/A. C. Bakken, III
AEP - Central Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5022
Wadsworth, TX 77483

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Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

ATTACHMENT
REVISED BASES PAGES

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

fore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment PURGING operation.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust supply valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop. Allowed leakage rates will be governed by the Containment Leakage Rate Program.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS – BASES

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System both provide post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLUID PH CONTROL SYSTEM

The operability of the recirculation fluid pH control system ensures that there is sufficient trisodium phosphate available in containment to guarantee a sump pH of ≥ 7.0 during the recirculation phase of a postulated LOCA. This pH level is required to reduce the potential for chloride induced stress corrosion of austenitic stainless steel and assure the retention of iodine in the recirculating fluid. The specified amount of TSP will result in a recirculation fluid pH between 7.0 and 9.5.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post LOCA conditions.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATION (Continued)

Operability of a containment personnel airlock door requires that the door is capable of being closed and capable of seal inflation, i.e., that the door is unblocked and no cables or hoses run through the personnel airlock. Containment personnel airlock door closure is required to take place within 30 minutes of initiation of a fuel handling accident inside containment if the reactor has been subcritical for less than 165 hours. Fuel movement is not permitted with personnel airlock doors open, if the reactor has not been subcritical for ≥ 95 hours. If the reactor has been subcritical for 165 hours or more, containment personnel airlock door closure is to occur as soon as practicable, but is assumed to occur within 2 hours to be consistent with the accident analysis. These requirements assure that the associated doses are limited to within acceptable levels. The requirement to have 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange is consistent with the fuel handling accident analysis assumptions, Regulatory Guide 1.25, and Technical Specification 3.9.10, Water Level - Refueling Cavity.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

3/4.9.6 (NOT USED)

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool, unless handled by the single-failure-proof main hoist of the FHB 15-ton crane, ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.