50-325/324



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 17, 1997

Mr. C. S. Hinnant, Vice President Carolina Power & Light Company Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Post Office Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71 AND AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 RELOCATING REVISED VALUES FOR MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER VOLUME WHICH ACCOUNT FOR LARGER SUCTION STRAINERS - BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M99291 AND M99292)

Dear Mr. Hinnant:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 188 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 and Amendment No. 219 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated July 8, 1997, and a Bases page correction as requested in your letter dated August 22, 1997 (BSEP 97-0343).

The amendments remove the suppression chamber water volume band from TS 3.6.2.1.a.1 while retaining the equivalent water level band. The values for suppression chamber water volume corresponding to the maximum and minimum suppression chamber water levels will be retained in the Bases section of the TS and will be revised to account for the displacement of water due to the installation of larger emergency core cooling system suction strainers. The revised relationship between the maximum and minimum suppression chamber water

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levels and volume will also be described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly <u>Federal Register</u> Notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

David C. Trimble, Project Manager Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 188 to License No. DPR-71
- 2. Amendment No. 219 to
- License No. DPR-62
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page FILENAME - G:\BRUNSWIC\BR99291.AMD

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9/16/97 OGC revisions incorporated 1387 AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71 - BRUNSWICK, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 - BRUNSWICK, UNIT 2

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-325

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 188 License No. DPR-71

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated July 8, 1997, as supplemented on August 22, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) <u>Technical Specifications</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 188, are hereby incorporated in the license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented prior to startup from refueling outage B112R1.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

E Edison

Gordon Edison, Acting Director Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 17, 1997

- 2 -

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 188

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71

DOCKET NO. 50-325

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3/4 6-9	3/4 6-9
B3/4 6-3	B3/4 6-3

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS

SUPPRESSION CHAMBER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 The suppression chamber shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The pool water:
 - 1. Level between -27 inches and -31 inches, and a
 - Maximum average temperature of 95°F during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, except that the maximum average temperature may be permitted to increase to:
 - a) 105°F during testing which adds heat to the suppression chamber.
 - b) 110°F with THERMAL POWER less than or equal to 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
 - c) 120°F with the main steam line isolation valves closed following a scram.
- b. Two OPERABLE suppression chamber water temperature instrumentation channels with a minimum of 11 operable RTD inputs per channel.
- c. A total leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber of less than the equivalent leakage through a 1-inch diameter orifice at a differential pressure of 1 psig.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the suppression chamber water level outside the above limits, restore the water level to within the limits within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with the suppression chamber average water temperature greater than 95°F, restore the average temperature to less than or equal to 95°F within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours, except, as permitted above:

BASES

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the calculated pressure of 49 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure.

The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blowdown from 1045 psig. Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss of coolant accident. the pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig. the suppression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression chamber, water and air, was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49 psig, which is below the design pressure of 62 psig. Maximum water level of -27 inches (equivalent to a volume of 89,750 ft³) results in a downcomer submergence of 3'4" and the minimum level of -31 inches (equivalent to a volume of 86,450 ft³) results in a submergence approximately four inches less. The Monticello tests were run with a submerged length of three feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to the downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown tested during the Humboldt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170°F, and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperatures above 170°F.

When it is necessary to make the suppression chamber inoperable, this shall only be done as provided in Specification 3.5.3.3.

Under full power operation conditions, blowdown from an initial suppression chamber water temperature of 90°F results in a water temperature of approximately 135°F immediately following blowdown, which is below the temperature 170°F used for complete condensation. At this temperature and atmospheric pressure, the available NPSH exceeds that required by both the RHR and core spray pumps; thus, there is no dependency on containment overpressure during the accident injection phase. If both RHR loops are used for containment cooling, there is no dependency on containment overpressure for post-LOCA operations.



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-324

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 219 License No. DPR-62

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated July 8, 1997, as supplemented on August 22, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) <u>Technical Specifications</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 219, are hereby incorporated in the license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented prior to startup from refueling outage B213R1.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Gordon Edison, Acting Director Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 17, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 219 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 DOCKET NO. 50-324

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>		
3/4 6-9	3/4 6-9		
B3/4 6-3	B3/4 6-3		

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS

SUPPRESSION CHAMBER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.6.2.1 The suppression chamber shall be OPERABLE with:
 - a. The pool water:
 - 1. Level between -27 inches and -31 inches, and a
 - 2. Maximum average temperature of 95°F during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, except that the maximum average temperature may be permitted to increase to:
 - a) 105°F during testing which adds heat to the suppression chamber.
 - b) 110°F with THERMAL POWER less than or equal to 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
 - c) 120°F with the main steam line isolation valves closed following a scram.
 - b. Two OPERABLE suppression chamber water temperature instrumentation channels with a minimum of 11 operable RTD inputs per channel.
 - c. A total leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber of less than the equivalent leakage through a 1-inch diameter orifice at a differential pressure of 1 psig.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the suppression chamber water level outside the above limits, restore the water level to within the limits within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with the suppression chamber average water temperature greater than 95°F. restore the average temperature to less than or equal to 95°F within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours, except, as permitted above:

BASES

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the calculated pressure of 49 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure.

The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blowdown from 1045 psig. Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss of coolant accident. the pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the suppression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression chamber, water and air, was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49 psig, which is below the design pressure of 62 psig. Maximum water level of -27 inches (equivalent to a volume of 89,750 ft³) results in a downcomer submergence of 3'4" and the minimum level of -31 inches (equivalent to a volume of 86,450 ft³) results in a submergence approximately four inches less. The Monticello tests were run with a submerged length of three feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to the downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown tested during the Humboldt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170°F, and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperatures above 170°F.

When it is necessary to make the suppression chamber inoperable, this shall only be done as provided in Specification 3.5.3.3.

Under full power operation conditions, blowdown from an initial suppression chamber water temperature of 90°F results in a water temperature of approximately 135°F immediately following blowdown, which is below the temperature 170°F used for complete condensation. At this temperature and atmospheric pressure, the available NPSH exceeds that required by both the RHR and core spray pumps; thus, there is no dependency on containment overpressure during the accident injection phase. If both RHR loops are used for containment cooling, there is no dependency on containment overpressure for post-LOCA operations.



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71

AND AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.2.1.a.1 requires that suppression pool water volume be maintained between specified maximum and minimum values. The TS states that this is equivalent to a level between -27 in. and -31 in.

In an application dated January 15, 1997, the licensee requested changes to correct the values for maximum and minimum suppression pool water volumes to reflect the results of new containment analyses. The corrections were necessary to ensure that the volume limits were indeed equivalent to the specified -27 in. to -31 in. level band. That application was approved and amendments were issued on August 28, 1997. However, that application did not reflect the water displacement effects of the forthcoming modification to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction strainers, since, at the time the application was prepared, the strainer modification had not yet been planned. By application dated July 8, 1997, the Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L or the licensee) submitted a second application to revise the same Technical Specifications (TS) to reflect the effects of the strainers on the specified values for water volume.

CP&L's July 8, 1997, application additionally proposed that TS 3.6.2.a.1 be modified in a manner that would retain the values for maximum and minimum values for suppression pool water level but relocate the corresponding values for water volume to the TS Bases and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

Current TS 2.1

The current Technical Specification 3.6.2.1.a.1 states:

The "suppression chamber shall be operable with: 3.6.2.1

а. The pool water:

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1. Volume between 86,545 ft³ and 89,843 ft³, equivalent to a level between -27 inches and -31 inches...

The associated BASES states:

Maximum water volume of 89,843 ft^3 results in a downcomer submergence of 3'4" and the minimum volume of 86,545 ft^3 results in a submergence approximately four inches less.

These values were established by Amendments 186 and 217 issued August 28. 1997.

2.2 Proposed TS

The TS would be changed to read as follows:

3.6.2.1 The suppression chamber shall be operable with:

- a. The pool water:
 - 1. Level between -27 inches and -31 inches, ...

The associated BASES would be revised as follows:

Maximum water level of -27 inches (equivalent to a volume of $89,750 \, \text{ft}^3$) results in a downcomer submergence of 3'4" and the minimum level of -31 inches (equivalent to a volume of $86,450 \, \text{ft}^3$) results in a submergence approximately four inches less.

2.3 Reason For Change

The proposed changes would:

- (1) reflect the change in the calculated minimum and maximum suppression pool water inventory, due to additional water displacement (≈94ft³) by the larger strainers (no change would be made to the minimum and maximum levels); and
- (2) revise the LCO wording to specify the operating limits solely in terms of level rather than level and corresponding volume; and
- (3) relocate the corresponding maximum and minimum volumes to the TS BASES and the UFSAR.

Change (1) is due to the new ECCS suction strainers being installed in response to NRC Bulletin 96-03 "Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling Water Reactors." The strainer modification results in a slight change (decrease) in the water inventory present in the suppression pool for any given water level in the pool. Changes (2) and (3) restate the operating limits solely in terms of the level

parameter, which is the parameter measured by existing instrumentation, and ensure that the correlation between suppression chamber water level and volume is preserved in the TS Bases and UFSAR.

2.4 Safety Concerns

Maximum and minimum suppression pool water inventory limits are established for nuclear power plants that use a water pressure suppression type of containment. A proper pool water mass inventory is necessary to assure proper functioning of the pressure suppression chamber. An inadequate suppression pool water inventory reduces the thermal heat capacity of the suppression pool and creates the potential for containment overpressurization during a loss-ofcoolant accident (LOCA) blowdown. An excessive inventory would result in a reduced volume available to receive compressed noncondensible gases during the blowdown, which could also result in containment overpressure. An excessive inventory could reduce the post-accident containment pressure and thereby adversely affect the net positive suction head (NPSH) available to pumps that take suction from the pool. In addition, an excessive inventory could exceed the bounding assumptions used in various containment structural analyses (e.g., deadweight loads). Therefore, a significant increase in maximum inventory or decrease in minimum inventory is analyzed to assure that with the new limits, the calculated containment loads under normal, faulted and natural phenomena conditions remain within acceptable limits.

2.5 Licensee's Analysis Of Safety Concerns

The licensee's analysis for the January 15, 1997, application established that a pool level of -27 inches corresponded to a water volume of 89,843 ft³, and a level of -31 inches corresponded to a volume of 86,545 ft³. The licensee determined that with the recalculated water inventory corresponding to the -27 and -31 level limits, the peak accident pressure, NPSH availability, containment and safety relief valve (SRV) piping hydrodynamic loads would all remain acceptable (Ref: SE accompanying Amendment Nos. 186 and 217). The reduction in pool inventory associated with the larger strainers is relatively small, i.e., approximately 0.1%. The licensee considered the potential effects on wetwell and drywell pressurization rates, vent thrust loads, condensation oscillation loads, chugging loads, and SRV discharge loads. The licensee also considered the potential effect on station blackout, alternate safe shutdown and on the NPSH for residual heat removal and core spray pumps. The licensee determined that the proposed changes to the pool inventory limits have no significant adverse impact. The licensee found that the additional effects of the strainers are bounded by the available margin from the analyses used in support of the earlier amendments.

2.6 Staff Review of Revised LCO and Relocation of Volume Limits

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.36(C)(2)(ii) a TS LCO must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:

(A) *Criterion* 1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

(B) Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

(C) Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

(C) Criterion 4. A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

TS LCO 3.6.2.1.a.1 is an operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis. As such, it meets *Criterion 2* and must be retained as a TS LCO. CP&L's proposed change to TS LCO 3.6.2.1.a.1 will still provide the requisite operating restriction on suppression chamber water inventory. This will be accomplished by requiring that suppression chamber water level be maintained between -27 and -31 inches. Therefore the staff has concluded that the revised LCO is acceptable.

The values for suppression chamber water volume corresponding to these level limits would be relocated to the TS Bases and included in the UFSAR. This is consistent with plant design in that only suppression chamber level indication is available to operators in the control room. The only purpose served by inclusion of the volume limits in the LCO is to provide a correlation between suppression chamber water level and volume. The staff finds the relocation of the volume limits acceptable in that the correlation between level and volume will be readily available for reference, and, by virtue of its inclusion in the UFSAR, any changes to that correlation will be subject to the controls of 10 CFR 50.59.

2.7 Additional Change To TS Bases

By letter dated August 22, 1997 (BSEP 97-0343), CP&L requested a correction to the Bases for Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 3/4.6.2, Depressurization and Cooling Systems, reflecting the fact that the recently approved 5 percent uprate in authorized power level (Amendment Nos. 183 for Unit 1 and 214 for Unit 2 dated November 1, 1996) increased the primary system operating pressure from the 1020 psig to 1045 psig.¹ That amendment was implemented on Unit 1 at the conclusion of its fall 1996 refueling outage and will be implemented on Unit 2 at the conclusion of its fall 1997 refueling outage. The information provided in CP&L's August 22, 1997 (BSEP 97-0343), letter does not affect the conclusions stated in the notice of "Proposed No Significant Hazards

¹With respect to this Bases correction, CP&L's request was duplicative in that the correction was previously incorporated on Unit 1 under Amendment No. 186 dated August 28, 1997; therefore, the amendments addressed by this safety evaluation will only include this Bases correction on Unit 2.

Consideration Determination" published in the <u>Federal Register</u> on August 13, 1997 (62 FR 43366).

The staff has no objection to this Bases change in that it merely reflects a change in an operating parameter associated with the previously-approved power uprate amendment.

2.8 Results Of Staff Review

Based on NRC staff review of the information presented in the licensee's application, the proposed TS change is acceptable. This conclusion encompasses only the acceptability of the approximately 93 ft³ reduction in suppression pool water inventory and does not constitute a finding that the proposed strainer modification satisfies the guidelines of Generic Letter 96-03 "Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling Water Reactors."

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 43366). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. Long, NRR/DSSA/SCSB

Date: September 17, 1997