Docket

March 30, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-325
and 50-324

DISTRIBUTION:
See next page

Mr. Lynn W. Eury
Executive Vice President
Power Supply
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 1551
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Eury:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71 AND AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 REGARDING - BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, (TAC NOS. M81905 AND M81906)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.157 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 and Amendment No. 188 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your submittal dated October 16, 1991.

The amendments change the Technical Specification requirements for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system to be operable when reactor pressure is at or above 150 psig instead of the present requirement of 113 psig.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,
Original signed by
Ngoc B. Le, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 157 to License No. DPR-71
2. Amendment No. 188 to License No. DPR-62
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PD21	PE:PD21	PM:PD2	D:PD21	OGC
PAnderson	MWebb	NLe:dt	EAdensam	
3/10/92	3/10/92	3/10/92	03/10/92	3/11/92

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cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-325

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 157
License No. DPR-71

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated October 16, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 157, are hereby incorporated in the license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Elinor G. Adensam

Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 30, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 157

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71

DOCKET NO. 50-325

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 5-1	3/4 5-1
B 3/4 5-1	B 3/4 5-1
--	B 3/4 5-1a

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system shall be OPERABLE with:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure coolant injection pump, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression pool and transferring the water to the pressure vessel.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 with reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 150 psig.

ACTION:

a. With the HPCI system inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the ADS, CSS, and LPCI systems are OPERABLE; restore the inoperable HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With the surveillance requirements of Specification 4.5.1 not performed at the required frequencies due to low reactor steam pressure, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the appropriate surveillance is performed within 48 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the tests.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1 The HPCI shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that the system piping from the pump discharge valve to the system isolation valve is filled with water.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM

BACKGROUND:

The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system consists of a steam driven turbine-pump unit, piping and valves to provide steam to the turbine, and piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line where the coolant is distributed within the reactor vessel through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping for the system is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction for the HPCI system is normally aligned to the CST source to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the reactor vessel. However, if the CST water supply is low or if the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source assures a water supply for continuous operation of the HPCI system. The steam supply to the HPCI system turbine is piped from the main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The HPCI system is designed to provide core cooling at reactor pressures between 1120 psig and 150 psig. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the HPCI system turbine stop valves and turbine control valves open simultaneously and the turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the HPCI system flow increases, the turbine governor valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the HPCI system turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the HPCI system during normal operation without injecting water into the reactor vessel.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel cladding temperature in the event of a small break in the nuclear system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor pressure is below the pressure at which Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system operation or Core Spray system operation maintains core cooling.

APPLICABILITY:

The HPCI system is required to be OPERABLE during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 150 psig, the HPCI system is not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS systems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure.

3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM (Continued)

ACTIONS:

With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the demonstrated operability of the redundant and diversified Automatic Depressurization system and the low pressure cooling systems. In addition, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated operability of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

REFERENCES:

1. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.1.

2. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.1.3.

3. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.2.5.

4. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.2.6.

5. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.5.2.

3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS)

Upon failure of the HPCIS to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the ADS automatically causes the safety-relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure cooling system can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200°F. ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 113 psig even though low pressure cooling systems provide adequate core cooling up to 150 psig.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-324

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 188
License No.DPR-62

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated October 16, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 188 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Elinor G. Adensam

Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 30, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 188

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62

DOCKET NO. 50-324

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 5-1	3/4 5-1
B 3/4 5-1	B 3/4 5-1
--	B 3/4 5-1a

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system shall be OPERABLE with:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure coolant injection pump, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression pool and transferring the water to the pressure vessel.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 with reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 150 psig.

ACTION:

a. With the HPCI system inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the ADS, CSS, and LPCI systems are OPERABLE; restore the inoperable HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With the surveillance requirements of Specification 4.5.1 not performed at the required frequencies due to low reactor steam pressure, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the appropriate surveillance is performed within 48 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the tests.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1 The HPCI shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that the system piping from the pump discharge valve to the system isolation valve is filled with water.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM

BACKGROUND:

The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system consists of a steam driven turbine-pump unit, piping and valves to provide steam to the turbine, and piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line where the coolant is distributed within the reactor vessel through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping for the system is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction for the HPCI system is normally aligned to the CST source to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the reactor vessel. However, if the CST water supply is low or if the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source assures a water supply for continuous operation of the HPCI system. The steam supply to the HPCI system turbine is piped from the main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The HPCI system is designed to provide core cooling at reactor pressures between 1120 psig and 150 psig. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the HPCI system turbine stop valves and turbine control valves open simultaneously and the turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the HPCI system flow increases, the turbine governor valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the HPCI system turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the HPCI system during normal operation without injecting water into the reactor vessel.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel cladding temperature in the event of a small break in the nuclear system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor pressure is below the pressure at which Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system operation or Core Spray system operation maintains core cooling.

APPLICABILITY:

The HPCI system is required to be OPERABLE during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 150 psig, the HPCI system is not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS systems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure.

3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM (Continued)

ACTIONS:

With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the demonstrated operability of the redundant and diversified Automatic Depressurization system and the low pressure cooling systems. In addition, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated operability of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

REFERENCES:

1. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.1.

2. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.1.3.

3. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.2.5.

4. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.2.6.

5. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Updated FSAR, Section 15.5.2.

3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS)

Upon failure of the HPCIS to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the ADS automatically causes the safety-relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure cooling system can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200°F. ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 113 psig even though low pressure cooling systems provide adequate core cooling up to 150 psig.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71

AND AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 16, 1991, Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would change the requirements for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system to be operable when reactor pressure is at or above 150 psig instead of the present requirement of 113 psig.

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed change is being made to provide additional operating margin between the HPCI steam line low pressure isolation setpoint, presently established at "greater than or equal to 100 psig," and the required HPCI availability pressure, presently established at greater than 113 psig.

The primary purpose of the HPCI system is to maintain reactor vessel inventory after small breaks that do not depressurize the reactor vessel. Use of the 150 psig as the lower operability limit for HPCI is technically supported by the performance specifications given for these systems in the BSEP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). As stated in the design data Table 6.3.1-1, the minimum pressure for the low pressure accident mode of operation of the HPCI system is greater than or equal to 150 psig. As noted in UFSAR Table 6.3.1-1, the HPCI system uses a single 100 percent capacity pump with a design flow of 4250 gallons per minute over a pressure range of 1120 psid (drywell to reactor vessel) to 150 psid (drywell to reactor vessel).

Presently, T/S 3.5.1 requires the HPCI system to be operable when reactor steam dome pressure is greater than 113 psig. The General Electric Company (GE) has indicated that the existing TS requirement that the HPCI system be operable when reactor pressure is greater than 113 psig is derived from early performance requirements for the core spray system. Originally, the maximum pressure at which the

core spray system could adequately supply cooling water to all fuel assemblies was 113 psig. The HPCI system was required operable when reactor pressure was greater than 113 psig to provide additional protection, even though rated flow could not be achieved when reactor pressure was less than 150 psig. Since that time, the core spray system has been demonstrated to provide adequate core cooling over a wider range of operating pressures; however, the TS requirements for HPCI system operability have never been revised to reflect this.

During reactor start-up, the HPCI system can be placed in service as required by the TS after the HPCI low steam line pressure isolation switches reset. The pressure switches provide isolation signals for low HPCI steam supply pressure and are required to have a setpoint of "greater than or equal to 100 psig" (see TS Table 3.3.2-2, Item 4.a.3). These switches also are required to reset before the HPCI system steam supply isolation valves can be opened. The actual as-installed setpoint for these pressure switches is set at a few pounds above the required minimum pressure to allow for instrument drift and uncertainty. The resulting operating margin, between the actual as-installed instrument setpoint and the minimum pressure at which the HPCI system is required to be operable, is less than 13 psig. This narrow operating margin, between the HPCI low steam supply isolation setpoint and the minimum HPCI operability pressure, has resulted in several complications in the past, as discussed below:

(1) During plant start-up, these pressure switches may not reset in a timely manner, resulting in the reactor being maintained for an extended period of time (i.e., hours) at approximately 110 psig while awaiting completion of the special procedure used to reset the pressure switches. Maintaining the reactor in stable condition in this operating condition for an extended period of time provides increased opportunities for inadvertent reactor transients. In addition, the consequences of a control rod drop accident are the most severe when the reactor is operating in this pressure/temperature domain. NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-325/91-18 and 50-324/91-18 dated August 12, 1991, discusses this operating experience.

(2) The HPCI system has inadvertently isolated upon opening of the HPCI steam supply isolation valves. This isolation resulted from the sudden pressure decrease in the HPCI system steam line. This phenomenon has been discussed in CP&L Licensee Event Report 1-91-020 dated August 23, 1991.

The above operational problems could be avoided by increasing the operating margin between the actual as-installed instrument setpoint and the minimum pressure at which the HPCI system is required operable. After evaluating several alternatives, the licensee

determined the best overall method of correcting these operational nuisances would be to increase the minimum reactor pressure for HPCI system operability from greater than 113 psig to greater than 150 psig. This alternative is consistent with several other GE BWR facilities, such as Hatch, Fitzpatrick, Browns Ferry, Duane Arnold, Quad Cities, and Fermi 2, which have similar HPCI and low pressure cooling systems. These facilities require their HPCI systems to be operable prior to exceeding 150 psig.

TS 3.5.1 presently requires the HPCI system to be operable when reactor pressure is greater than 113 psig; however, in contrast, the minimum reactor pressure for HPCI rated flow is 150 psig. Based on the fact that (1) the HPCI system may not achieve rated flow at the present minimum pressure at which the system is required to be operable (113 psig), and (2) other backup core cooling systems (the LPCI and core spray systems) are required to be available and capable of fulfilling their functions, the staff concludes that the minimum pressure for the HPCI system operability may be changed to be consistent with the actual minimum reactor pressure at which rated HPCI system flow is designed to be achieved (150 psig). This change (1) will eliminate the current operational constraints that result from the narrow operating margin between the as-installed HPCI system supply pressure-low isolation signal and the minimum HPCI system operability pressure, and (2) will promptly place the HPCI system in service and minimize the amount of time the reactor must remain in a restricted operating region where the consequences of a postulated control rod drop accident would be the most significant.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there

has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 57691). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: M. Razzaque

Date: March 30, 1992

AMENDMENT NO. 157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71 - BRUNSWICK, UNIT 1, AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 - BRUNSWICK, UNIT 2

Docket File
NRC PDR
Local PDR
S. Varga (14E4)
G. Lainas
E. Adensam
P. Anderson
M. Webb
N. Le
OGC
D. Hagan (MNBB 3302)
E. Jordan (MNBB 3701)
G. Hill (4 ea Docket (P1-37)
Wanda Jones (P-130A)
C. Grimes (11D3)
ACRS (10)
RC Jones
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cc: Brunswick Service List