

May 12, 1987

Docket No. 50-325/324

Mr. E. E. Utley  
Senior Executive Vice President  
Power Supply and Engineering & Construction  
Carolina Power & Light Company  
Post Office Box 1551  
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Utley:

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL EXEMPTION FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX J

Re: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2

The Commission has issued an exemption from certain requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 in response to your letter dated October 25, 1985. Supplemental letters dated December 20, 1985, March 20, September 4, and December 11, 1986 and February 27, 1987, clarified the request and responded to NRC staff requests for additional information. The October 25, 1985 letter requested exemption from the Appendix J requirements for Type C testing for (1) instrument isolation valves, (2) lines terminating below minimum torus level, and (3) hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2. By letter dated September 4, 1986, you withdrew the exemption request for the testing of lines terminating below minimum torus level. By letter dated March 17, 1987, you requested that the exemption for hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves be extended to include Unit 1.

We have granted the exemption requested by you from the Type C testing requirements of Appendix J for the hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves. We have determined that Appendix J requirements do not apply to the instrument isolation valves and the lines terminating below minimum torus level for which exemptions are requested by your October 25, 1985 letter. Therefore, exemptions for these two items are not required and have not been granted. The bases for these actions are discussed in the enclosed Exemption and Safety Evaluation.

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The Exemption is being forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. The enclosed Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact has been published in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ernest D. Sylvester, Project Manager  
BWR Project Directorate #2  
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosures:

- 1. Exemption
- 2. Safety Evaluation
- 3. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

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Mr. E. E. Utley  
Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant  
Units 1 and 2

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## UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of	)	
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY	)	Dockets Nos. 50-325 and 50-324
(Brunswick Steam Electric Plant,	)	
Units 1 and 2)	)	

EXEMPTION

## I.

Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 which authorize operation of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively (Brunswick or the facilities). These licenses provide, among other things, that the facilities are subject to all rules, regulations and Orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.

The facilities are boiling water reactors located at the licensee's site in Brunswick County, North Carolina.

## II.

Section 50.54(o) of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that primary reactor containments for water cooled power reactors be subject to the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix J contains the leakage test requirements, schedules and acceptance criteria for test of the leak-tight integrity of the primary reactor containment and systems and components which penetrate the containment. Section III.D of Appendix J requires that Type C local leak rate tests be performed during each reactor shutdown for refueling, but in no case at intervals greater than two years.

By letter dated October 25, 1985, the licensee requested exemptions from the Appendix J requirements for Type C testing for certain primary containment penetrations associated with (1) instrument isolation valves, (2) lines terminating below the minimum torus level, and (3) hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 (Brunswick 2). Additional information clarifying the exemption request was provided by letters dated December 20, 1985, and March 20, 1986. By letter dated September 4, 1986, the licensee withdrew the exemption request related to lines terminating below minimum torus level and provided additional information on the hydrogen/oxygen isolation valves. By letter dated December 11, 1986, the licensee committed to perform soap bubble leak testing of the hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system in lieu of the Type C tests. Soap bubble testing would be performed at the frequency and pressure specified in Appendix J for Type C tests and also after maintenance work performed on the system. By letter dated March 17, 1987, the licensee requested that the exemption request related to the hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves be extended to include the same valves on Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1 (Brunswick 1).

With the withdrawal of the exemption request related to Type C testing of lines terminating below minimum torus level, the NRC staff considered only the exemption requests related to instrument isolation valves and hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves. Subsequently, the NRC staff determined that the instrument isolation valves listed in the licensee's October 25, 1985 letter do not require Type C testing because the instrument lines are exposed to containment pressure during Type A tests. These instrument lines are connected

to sealed transducers and are designed to withstand the stresses of a design basis loss of coolant accident. Since the valves are required to be operable during normal operation, shutdown and accidents in order to monitor critical parameters, the lines are considered a part of the containment barrier. Therefore, the instrument isolation valves do not require Type C testing to meet the intent of Appendix J; and no exemption is required.

The acceptability of the remaining exemption request relating to certain hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves is addressed below. More details are contained in the Commission's related Safety Evaluation (concurrently issued with this Exemption).

### III.

The exemption request under consideration involves an exemption from the Type C testing requirements of Appendix J for valves in the sample supply and return lines for the hydrogen/oxygen monitors. Type C tests are tests intended to measure containment isolation valve leakage rates in valves whose failure to close after a postulated accident could result in an uncontrolled discharge of radiation outside of the plant. The valves for which an exemption was requested are in the following penetrations in both the Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2 primary containments:

Penetration Number*	Function*
X-57A	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-57B	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-60E	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-209B-A	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-245E	CAC-AT-4409 Return
X-73A	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-73B	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-73C(E)	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-206A-A	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-244B	CAC-AT-4410 Return

\*The penetration and instrument numbers are identical for both Units.

By letter dated February 27, 1987, the licensee provided information relevant to the "special circumstances" finding required by 10 CFR 50.12(a). The licensee stated that these valves are designed to be open after a loss of coolant accident to permit discharge of the containment atmosphere into the closed hydrogen/oxygen sampling system outside of containment. The licensee stated that these sampling system lines constitute an extension of the containment boundary, and with these valves open, leakage outside the plant is prevented by the leak-tight nature of the monitoring system lines. Assurance is provided that system piping will not leak by the performance of periodic integrated leak rate (Type A) tests and soap bubble testing of the pipe joints. The licensee stated that these tests ensure system integrity and therefore, accomplish the underlying purpose of the rule. The licensee further stated that compliance with the Type C test requirements would result in undue hardship. Compliance with Appendix J for this system would result in 20 periodic tests per outage for each unit. These tests involve entry into the primary containment to attach test equipment, thus increasing occupational radiation exposure. The licensee estimated that the performance of the Type C tests on the hydrogen/oxygen monitor isolation valves cost approximately \$21,000 per outage. Type C testing would therefore involve higher personnel exposures and financial expenditure compared to the soap bubble tests.

The staff agrees with the licensee's determination and therefore concludes that "special circumstances" exist for the licensee's requested exemption in that application of the regulations in these particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 and additional costs would be imposed if the exemption were not granted. See 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).

We have evaluated other information provided by the licensee to justify the exemption. The instrument lines associated with the penetrations listed above are one-half inch sampling lines connected to hydrogen/oxygen monitors CAC-AT-4409 and CAC-AT-4410 for both units. The piping used in these systems is seismic Category 1, Quality Group 1B. The valves are not designed for containment isolation; and, although they receive an isolation signal after a postulated accident, they are reopened for long-term containment atmosphere monitoring. Previous containment integrated leak rate tests showed no piping leakage problems with the valves opened. The staff concurs that these valves need not be considered necessary for containment isolation if assurance is provided that the system piping is leak-tight and therefore can be considered an extension of containment. However, the system piping contains some threaded and compression fittings which are not qualified to be used as extensions of the containment boundary. Threaded fittings are used in the system to permit disassembly for equipment connections and maintenance. To ensure leak tightness of these fittings, the licensee committed, by letter dated December 11, 1986, to perform soap bubble tests on the system at the same pressure and frequency as would be required for Type C testing by Appendix J and also after maintenance is performed on the system. The licensee has also stated that this system piping will continue to be tested for leak tightness during performance of the containment integrated leak rate tests as required by Appendix J.

Based on the above discussion, the licensee's request for exemption from the requirements of Appendix J for the above-listed penetrations for the hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system is granted for Brunswick 1 and 2.

IV.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, this exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. The Commission further determines that special circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present justifying the exemption, namely that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule and is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule - to ensure the leak-tight integrity of systems which penetrate primary containment, and would impose additional costs. The leak-tight integrity of the hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system is ensured through the performance of soap bubble tests and integrated leak rate tests on the system.

Accordingly, the Commission hereby grants an exemption from the Type C testing requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 for valves in the following hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system penetrations in both the Brunswick 1 and 2 primary containments:

<u>Penetration Number</u>	<u>Function</u>
X-57A	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-57B	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-60E	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-209B-A	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-245E	CAC-AT-4409 Return
X-73A	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-73B	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-73C(E)	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-206A-A	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-244B	CAC-AT-4410 Return

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this Exemption will have no significant impact on the environment (52 FR 17650).

This Exemption is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steve A. Varga, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects I-II

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland  
This 12th day of May, 1987.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO APPENDIX J EXEMPTION REQUESTS

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKETS NOS. 50-325 and 50-324

1.0 BACKGROUND

By letter dated October 25, 1985, the licensee (Carolina Power & Light Company) requested exemptions from Type C testing requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J for Brunswick Unit 2 (1) instrument isolation valves, (2) valves in lines terminating below the minimum torus water level, and (3) hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system isolation valves. The licensee subsequently submitted additional information by letters dated March 20, and September 4, 1986. In the September 4, 1986 submittal, the licensee also withdrew the exemption request related to valves in lines terminating below the minimum torus water level. By letter dated March 17, 1987, the licensee requested that the exemption for the hydrogen/oxygen isolation valves be extended to include the same valves on Unit 1. The licensee's exemption requests are itemized below, and the staff's evaluation is included in the discussion of each exemption requested:

2.0 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

2.1 Instrument Isolation Valves

The licensee requested an exemption from Type C testing of the valves associated with the following penetrations:

<u>Pen No.</u>	<u>Function</u>
X-51D	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-68D	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-51C	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-68A(C)	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-51B	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-68B	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-51A	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-68C(A)	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-76C	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-57D	Drywell Pressure Sensing Line
X-206B-B	Torus Pressure Sensing Line
X-206B-C	Torus Level
X-225A	Torus Level
X-206A-C	Torus Level
X-225B	Torus Level
X-206A-D	Torus Level
X-206C-D	Torus Level
X-206B-D	Torus Level
X-206D-D	Torus Level

The licensee stated that these instrument lines are connected to sealed transducers and are designed to withstand the stresses of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. Since they are required to be operable during normal operation, shutdown and accidents in order to monitor critical parameters, they are considered a part of the containment barrier. These lines are exposed to containment pressure during the periodic Type A test and, therefore, Type C testing is not required.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and finds that the instrument isolation valves in the penetrations listed above do not require Type C testing because these lines are considered an extension of the containment boundary. Consequently, the instrument isolation valves do not require testing to meet the intent of Appendix J, and no exemption is required.

## 2.2 Lines Terminating Below Minimum Torus Water Level

The licensee has requested an exemption from Type C testing of the valves associated with the following penetrations on the basis that these lines terminate below the minimum torus water level:

<u>Pen No.</u>	<u>Function</u>
X-210A/B	HPCI/RCIC/RHR Pump Test and Minimum Flow Line
X-225A/B	RHR Pump Suction
X-227A/B	Core Spray Pump Suction
X-223A/B	Core Spray Pump Test Line
X-224	RCIC Pump Suction
X-212	RCIC Turbine Exhaust
X-221	RCIC Barometer Condenser Drain
X-214	HPCI Turbine Exhaust
X-222	HPCI Turbine Drain Line
X-226	HPCI Pump Suction
X-231	Torus Drain Line

Since the penetrations listed above are located below the minimum torus drawdown level, they do not constitute a potential atmospheric leak path. Consequently, Type C testing is not required. However, leakrate tests of these valves to assure leak tight integrity is required in accordance with the ASME Code, Section XI. The staff called the licensee on June 19, 1986, to suggest a hydro-testing on these valves, but the licensee stated that they prefer to test these valves with air rather than water. Therefore, the licensee withdrew the exemption request in a letter dated September 4, 1986. The licensee will continue air testing the valves in lines terminating below minimum torus water level, but the test results are not required to be added to the Appendix J local leak tests total.

## 2.3 H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> Monitor Isolation Valves

The licensee requested an exemption from the Type C test requirements for the valves in the following penetrations, which provide sample supply and return for the hydrogen/oxygen monitors.

<u>Pen No.</u>	<u>Function</u>
X-57A	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-58B	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-60E	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-209B-A	CAC-AT-4409 Supply
X-245E	CAC-AT-4409 Return
X-73A	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-73B	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-73C(E)	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-206A-A	CAC-AT-4410 Supply
X-244B	CAC-AT-4410 return

The instrument lines associated with the above listed penetrations are the small diameter ( $\frac{1}{2}$ "OD) sampling lines connected to  $H_2/O_2$  monitors (CAC-AT-4409 and CAC-AT-4410), which are the major components of the containment monitoring system (CMS). The piping used in the  $H_2/O_2$  monitoring system is Seismic Category 1, Quality Group 1B. The licensee stated that these lines are essential for long term post-accident monitoring of the containment and, therefore, do not require automatic isolation. The valves in these lines are not designed for containment isolation purpose. Consequently, Type C testing of these valves is not required to meet the intent of the regulation.

By letters dated March 20, and September 4, 1986, the licensee provided the following justification in support of the exemption request:

1. The system is open post-LOCA.
2. Previous CILRTs have indicated no leakage problem with the entire system exposed.
3. The system was designed with socket weld fittings over the bulk of the sample line length to minimize leakage. Threaded and compression type fittings are used only where required for equipment connection or for maintenance. An integrated leak rate test of the containment verified that there was no tubing leakage.
4. FSAR calculations for a total shearing of an instrument line indicate a thyroid dose of 1.7 mrem and a whole-body dose of less than 0.1 mrem at the exclusion area boundary. The tests add additional manpower requirements and system manipulation to an already extensive leak test program without significant gain.
5. The piping system was designed under the engineered safety feature criteria and for containment extension essential to the safe shutdown of the plant, failure of the  $H_2/O_2$  monitoring system itself would result in no hazard to the public.

6. The requirement for Type C testing of the system results in 20 periodic tests per outage. The tests involve drywell entry to disconnect instrument tubing, thereby providing test connections. Since access to the drywell is limited, the tests cause an extension to the outage duration.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and finds these valves do receive a Group 6 isolation signal to close immediately following a postulated accident for instrumentation protection, and reopen for long term monitoring of the containment. The staff concurs with the licensee's justification that these valves are not required for containment isolation purpose only if the system piping are closed systems and designed as containment extensions. However, the system piping as designed uses both socket weld fittings and threaded and compression type fittings for pipe connections. The staff noted that these threaded and compression type fittings are not qualified to be used as extensions of the containment boundary. As stated in the licensee's submittal, these threaded and compression fittings are used where required for equipment connection or for maintenance purposes. These fittings may be required to be occasionally disassembled for equipment maintenance, creating potential sources of containment leakage. Consequently, leak testing of these fittings to identify potential leak paths is necessary, and a soap bubble testing on these fittings is recommended.

By letter dated December 11, 1986, the licensee committed to perform soap bubble testing of the H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> monitoring system at the frequency and pressure specified for Type C testing to assure a leak tight boundary. Based on this commitment, the licensee's exemption request is acceptable.

Principal Contributor: J. Guo

Dated: May 12, 1987

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
DOCKETS NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324  
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF  
NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 to Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Brunswick County, North Carolina.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

Identification of Proposed Action:

The proposed action would grant an exemption from the Type C testing requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 for certain isolation valves associated with the hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system.

The Need for the Proposed Action:

The licensee has stated that the application of the Type C testing requirements is not necessary to ensure the leak-tight integrity of the hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system. Since the system is designed to be open to primary containment after a postulated accident, the licensee states that testing of the valves is not required. However, to ensure that the system piping will not leak when the system function is required (valves open), the licensee has proposed to supplement the ongoing periodic Type A tests with soap bubble testing of the system pipe fittings. The alternative tests will result in lower personnel radiation exposure and a lower financial burden to the licensee.

Environmental Impact of the Proposed Action:

The proposed exemption only affects components which are within the site boundaries and actually within reactor secondary containment. There is no anticipated decrease in the reliability of these components to operate as designed in the event of an accident. Post-accident radiological releases will not differ from those determined previously and the proposed exemption does not otherwise adversely affect facility radiological effluent or occupational exposures. With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed exemption does not affect plant nonradiological effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes there are no measurable radiological or nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed exemption.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action:

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed exemption, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. The principal alternative to the exemption would be to require rigid compliance with the test procedures for Type C components required in Appendix J. Such action would not enhance the protection of the environment.

Alternative Use of Resources:

The action does not involve the use of resources not considered previously in the Final Environmental Statement for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2.

Agencies and Persons Consulted:

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request and did not consult other agencies or persons.

FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed exemption. Based upon the environmental assessment, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this proposed action, see the licensee's letters dated October 25, and December 20, 1985, March 20, September 4 and December 11, 1986 and February 27 and March 17, 1987. These letters are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington, William Madison Randall Library, 601 S. College Road, Wilmington, North Carolina 28403-3297.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 5th day of May 1987.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Elinor G. Adensam, Director  
Project Directorate II-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II