Duke Energy Corporation

Duke Energy.

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January 22, 2002

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume C Revision 2002-01

Please find attached for your use and review copies of the revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan: Volume C Revision 2002-01 January 2002.

This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50-54(q) and does not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

Any questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Mike Thorne, Emergency Planning Manager at 864-885-3210.

By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region_II, Atlanta, Georgia.

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W. H. Mscollum, Jr. VP, Oconee Nuclear Site

xc: (w/2 copies of attachments) Mr. Luis Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 24T23 Atlanta, GA 30303

> w/copy of attachments Mr. Steven Baggett Rockville, Maryland

(w/o Attachments, Oconee Nuclear Station)
NRC Resident Inspector
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
January 22, 2002

OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE INTRASITE LETTER

SUBJECT: Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume C, Revision 2002-01

Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume C by following the below instructions.

REMOVE	ADD
Cover Sheet - Rev. 2001-12	Cover Sheet Rev. 2002-01
Table of Contents, Page 1 & 2	Table of Contents, Page 1 &2
RP/0/B/1000/001 - 05/14/01	RP/0/B/1000/001 - 01/15/02
Human Resources Procedure 04/26/00	Human Resources Procedure 01/07/02



HP/0/B/1009/018	Off-Site Dose Projections	05/19/00
HP/0/B/1009/020	Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post Accident Conditions	10/09/98
HP/0/B/1009/021	Source Term Assessment Of A Gaseous Release From Non-Routine Release Points	12/01/97
HP/0/B/1009/022	On Shift Off-Site Dose Projections	10/08/01
RP/0/B/1000/001	Emergency Classification	01/15/02
RP/0/B/1000/002	Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure	11/05/01
RP/0/B/1000/003 A	ERDS Operation	12/03/98
RP/0/B/1000/007	Security Event	11/05/01
RP/0/B/1000/009	Procedure For Site Assembly	11/15/01
RP/0/B/1000/010	Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel	04/24/01
RP/0/B/1000/015 A	Offsite Communications From The Control Room	12/11/01
RP/0/B/1000/015 B	Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center	12/11/01
RP/0/B/1000/015 C	Offsite Communications From The Emergency Operations Facility	12/11/01
RP/0/B/1000/016	Medical Response	01/30/01
RP/0/B/1000/017	Spill Response	11/30/00
RP/0/B/1000/018	Core Damage Assessment	09/30/97
RP/0/B/1000/019	Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure	12/05/01
RP/0/B/1000/020	Emergency Operations Facility Director Procedure	12/05/01
RP/0/B/1000/021	Operations Interface (EOF)	04/30/01
RP/0/B/1000/022	Procedure For Site Fire Damage Assessment And Repair	09/18/01
RP/0/B/1000/024	Protective Action Recommendations	11/10/99
RP/0/B/1000/028	Communications & Community Relations World Of Energy Emergency Response Plan	02/17/97

VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS

Revision 2002-01 January 2002

RP/0/B/1000/029	Fire Brigade Response	11/07/01
RP/0/B/1000/031	Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan	06/12/00
SR/0/B/2000/001	Standard Procedure For Public Affairs Response To The Emergency Operations Facility	03/23/00
Business Management	Business Management Emergency Plan	03/21/01
SSG Functional Area Directive 102	SSG Emergency Response Plan – ONS Specific	03/01/01
NSC – 110	Nuclear Supply Chain – SCO Emergency Response Plan	04/02/01
Engineering Directive 5.1	Engineering Emergency Response Plan	09/12/01
Human Resources Procedure	ONS Human Resources Emergency Plan	01/07/02
Radiation Protection Manual Section 11.3	Off-Site Dose Assessment And Data Evaluation	04/06/99
Radiation Protection Manual Section 11.7	Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions	11/26/01
Safety Assurance Directive 6.1	Safety Assurance Emergency Response Organization	11/28/94
Safety Assurance Directive 6.2	Emergency Contingency Plan	03/27/00
Training Division	Training Division Emergency Response Guide DTG-007	12/17/01

VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS

Revision 2002-01 January, 2002

		<u>RP/O/</u> on No. <u>0</u>	<u>B/1000/001</u> 11
ς.	ONLY		<u> </u>
	PARATION		
(2)	Station OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION		
(3)	Procedure Title Emergency Classification		
(4)	Prepared By Donice Kelley (Signature) Donice Kelley Da		
(5)	Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?		
(3)	 Yes (New procedure or revision with major changes) No (Revision with minor changes) No (To incorporate previously approved changes) 		()
(6)	Reviewed By Ray Waterman (QR)	Date	1/14/02
	Cross-Disciplinary Review By(QR)NA MW	_Date	4/14/02
	Reactivity Mgmt Review By(QR)NA	_Date	1/14/022
	Mgmt Involvement Review By(Ops Supt) NA		
(7)	Additional Reviews		
	Reviewed By	Date	
	Reviewed By	Date	
(8)	Temporary Approval (if necessary)		
	By(OSM/QR)	Date	<u></u>
\sim	By(QR)	Date	
(9)	Approved By M. Q. Thome	Date	1-15-02
PER	FORMANCE (Compare with control copy every 14 calendar days while work is being perform	med.)	
(10)	Compared with Control Copy	Date	
	Compared with Control Copy	Date	
	Compared with Control Copy	Date	
(11)	Date(s) Performed		
	Work Order Number (WO#)		
	Procedure Completion Verification:		
	Unit 0 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Procedure performed on what unit?		
	 □ Yes □ NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as app □ Yes □ NA Required enclosures attached? □ Yes □ NA Data sheets attached, completed, dated, and signed? □ Yes □ NA Charts, graphs, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked? □ Yes □ NA Procedure requirements met? 	propriate	?
	Verified By	Date	<u></u>
3)	Procedure Completion Approved	Date	

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(14) Remarks (Attach additional pages)

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Duke Power Company	Procedure No.
Oconee Nuclear Site	RP/ 0 /B/1000/001
	Revision No.
Emergency Classification	011
Reference Use	Electronic Reference No.
	OX002WOS

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Emergency Classification

NOTE: This procedure is an implementing procedure to the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency plan and must be forwarded to Emergency Planning within three (3) working days of approval.

1. Symptoms

- 1.1 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.
- 1.2 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and their corresponding Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
- 1.3 This procedure provides reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events.
- 1.4 The following guidance is to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in assessing emergency conditions:
 - 1.4.1 The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.
 - 1.4.2 The BASIS Document (Volume A, Section D of the Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.
 - 1.4.3 **IF** An event occurs on more than one unit concurrently,
 - **<u>THEN</u>** The event with the higher classification will be classified on the Emergency Notification Form.
 - A. Information relating to the problem(s) on the other unit(s) will be captured on the Emergency Notification Form as shown in RP/0/B/1000/015A, (Offsite Communications From The Control Room), RP/0/B/1000/015B, (Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center) or RP/0/B/1000/015C, (Offsite Communications From The Emergency Operations Facility).
 - 1.4.4 **IF** An event occurs,
 - AND A lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the Classification can be made,
 - **<u>THEN</u>** The classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.

- 1.4.5 The Fission Product Barrier Matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at Hot Shutdown or higher.
 - A. An event that is recognized at Cold Shutdown or lower shall not be classified using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.
 - 1. Reference should be made to the additional enclosures that provide Emergency Action Levels for specific events (e.g., Severe Weather, *Fire*, Security).
- 1.5 **IF** A transient event should occur,
 - THEN Review the following guidance:
 - 1.5.1 **IF** An Emergency Action Level (EAL) identifies a specific duration
 - AND The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded, (i.e.; condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses),
 - THEN Classify the event.
 - 1.5.2 **IF** A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded,
 - **THEN** The event is **NOT** classified by that EAL.
 - A. Review lower severity EALs for possible applicability in these cases.

NOTE: Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required for the following step. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

1.5.3	<u>IF</u>	A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g.; as a result of routine log or record review)
	AND	The condition no longer exists,
	<u>THEN</u>	An emergency shall NOT be declared.

- 1.5.4 **IF** An emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification,
 - THENThe Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the
initiating condition (e.g.; Failure of Reactor Protection System)
may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on
shift personnel through activation of the Emergency Response
Organization.

A. **IF** An *Unusual Event* condition exists,

- **THEN** Make the classification as required.
- 1. The event may be terminated in the same notification or as a separate termination notification.
- B. <u>IF</u> An Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency condition exists,
 - **THEN** Make the classification as required,
 - **AND** Activate the Emergency Response Organization.
- 1.6 Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment determines that the Emergency Action Levels for the Initiating Condition have been exceeded.

2. Immediate Actions

- 2.1 Determine the operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response to the event.
- 2.2 **IF** The unit is at Hot Shutdown or higher
 - AND The condition/event affects fission product barriers,
 - **THEN** GO TO Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).
 - 2.2.1 Review the criteria listed in Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and make the determination if the event should be classified.

- 2.3 Review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.
 - 2.3.1 **IF** One or more categories are applicable to the event,
 - 2.3.2 **THEN** Refer to the associated enclosures.
 - 2.3.3 Review the EALs and determine if the event should be classified.
 - A. **IF** An EAL is applicable to the event,
 - **<u>THEN</u>** Classify the event as required.
- 2.4 **IF** The condition requires an emergency classification,
 - THEN GO TO RP/0/B/1000/002, (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure) Subsequent Actions.
- 2.5 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.

3. Enclosures

	Enclosures	Page Number
4.1	Fission Product Barrier Matrix	6
4.2	System Malfunctions	7
4.3	Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluents	9
4.4	Loss Of Shutdown Functions	11
4.5	Loss of Power	13
4.6	Fires/Explosions And Security Actions	14
4.7	Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety	15
4.8	Radiation Monitor Readings For Emergency Classification	18
4.9	Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings	19
4.10	Definitions	20
4.11	Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications	23
4.12	Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1	24

Ench .e 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix

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DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW:

CIRCLE EALS CHOSEN. ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY. (SEE NOTE BELOW)

DCODUDT			THE ALL OF LED				DDIEDC (DD 10 12)	
	ERS (BD 5-7)		FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (BD 8-9) CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD					
Potential Loss (4 Points) RCS Leakrate > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in normal makeup mode (approx. 160 gpm) with Letdown isolated.	Loss (5 RCS Leak rate > capacity as indica subcooling	available makeup	Potential Loss (4 Points) Average of the 5 highest CETC ≥ 700° F	Loss (5 Points) Average of the 5 highest CETC ≥ 1200° F	$CETC \ge 1200^{\circ} F$	R ≥ 15 minutes with	Loss (3 Points) Rapid unexplained containment pressure decrease after increase OR containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA	
SGTR > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in normal makeup mode (approx. 160 gpm) with Letdown isolated.			Valid RVLS reading of 0" NOTE: RVLS is NOT	Coolant activity ≥ 300 µCi/ml DEI	RB pressure ≥ 10 RBCU or RBS	R) psig and no	Failure of secondary side of SG results in a direct opening to the environment with P/S leakage ≥ 10 gpm in the same SG	
Entry into the PTS (Pressurized Thermal Shock) Operation	1RIA 57/58 readi 2 RIA 57 reading 2 RIA 58 reading 3RIA 57/58 readi	≥ 1.6 R/hr ≥ 1.0 R/hr	valid if one or more RCPs are running <u>OR</u> if LPI pump(s) are running.	Hours Since SD RIA57/58 R/hr $0 - < 0.5$ \geq 300/150 $0.5 - < 2.0$ \geq 80/40 $2.0 - 8.0$ \geq 32/16	Hours Since SD 0 - < 0.5 0.5 - < 2.0 2.0 - 8.0	RIA57/58 - R/hr ≥ 1800/860 ≥ 400/195 ≥ 280/130	Failure of secondary side of SG results in a direct opening to the environment with P/S leakage ≥ 10 gpm in the other SG <u>AND</u> Feeding SG with secondary side failure from the affected unit	
HPI Forced Cooling	RCS pressure spi	ke≥2750 psig			Hydrogen conce	ntration ≥ 9%	Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists	
Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment	Emergency Coord Director judgmen		Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment	Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment	Emergency Coor Director judgme		Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment	
UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 1	Fotal Points)	ALER	T (4-6 Total Points)	SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-	10 Total Points)	GENERAL EM	ERGENCY (11-13 Total Points)	
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 • Any potential loss of Containment • Any potential		10DE: 1, 2, 3, 4 Itial loss or loss of the Fuel Clad Itial loss or loss of the RCS	OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 • Loss of any two barriers • Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers		 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrier Loss of all three barriers 			
		SEE EMERGENC	CATION REQUIREMENTS: Y TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY S		INITIAL NOTIFICA SEE EMERGENCY NOTIFY 1,2,3,4	NITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY IOTIFY 1,2,3,4	
	NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is <u>IMMINENT</u> (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.							

Encle e 4.2 Systems dunctions

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UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
1. RCS LEAKAGE (BD 14) OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4	1. UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/ INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM	1. INABILITY TO MONITOR A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT IN PROGRESS (BD 21)	
A. Unidentified leakage ≥ 10 gpm	(BD 19)	<u>OPERATING MODE:</u> 1, 2, 3, 4	
B. Pressure boundary leakage ≥ 10 gpm	OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 A.1 Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following	A.1 Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:	
C. Identified leakage ≥ 25 gpm	annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:	<u>Units 1 & 3</u>	
1. UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/ INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM	<u>Units 1 & 3</u> 1 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 3 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18	1 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 3 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18	
FOR > 15 MINUTES (BD 15) 	<u>Unit 2</u> 2 SA1-9, 14-16	<u>Unit 2</u> 2 SA1-9, 14-16 <u>AND</u>	
A.1 Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:	AND A.2 Loss of annunciators /indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift	A.2 A significant transient is in progress	
<u>Units 1 & 3</u> 1 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 3 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18	complement) to safely operate the unit	A.3 Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications	
<u>Unit 2</u> 2 SA1-9, 14-16	A.3 Significant plant transient in progress	AND	
AND	OR	A.4 Inability to directly monitor any one of the following functions:	
A.2 Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to safely operate the unit	A.4 Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications	 Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink 	
3. INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN LIMITS (BD 16)		 Heat Sink RCS Integrity Containment Integrity RCS Inventory 	
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4			
A. Required operating mode not reached within TS LCO action statement time (CONTINUED)	(END)	(END)	
INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

	Enc	e 4.2 Junctions	RP/0/B/7 '001 Page 2 of
UNUSUAL EVENT 4. UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS (BD 17) OPERATING MODE: All A. Loss of all onsite communications	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
capability (ROLM system, PA system, Pager system, Onsite Radio system) affecting ability to perform Routine operations			
 B. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, Offsite Radio System, AT&T line) affecting ability to communicate with offsite authorities. 			
5. FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION (BD 18)			
A. DEI - >5μCi/ml			
(END) INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:			
SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1,2,3,4			

Enc/ e 4.3 Abnormal Rad Lev. .adiological Effluent

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	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
1	ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT	1. ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT	1. BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUAL/IMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 32)	1. BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUAL/ IMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 36)
	EXCEEDS TWO TIMES THE SLC LIMITS FOR 60 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 23)	EXCEEDS 200 TIMES RADIOLOGICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 28)	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: All
*==31	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: All	 Valid reading on RIA 46 of ≥ 2.98E+05 cpm for >15 minutes (See Note 2) 	 A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of ≥ 2.98E+06 cpm for ≥15 minutes (See Note 3)
Α.	Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 of \geq 4.06E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes (See Note 1)	A. Valid indication on RIA 46 of ≥ 2.98E+04 cpm for >15 minutes (See Note 1)	B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 2)	B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 3)
B.	Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 45 of \geq 1.33E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes	B.1 RIA 33 HIGH Alarm	C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the <i>site boundary</i> of:	C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the <i>site boundary</i> of:
C. D.	(See Note 1) Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two	 B.2 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for > 15 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure C. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >15 minutes 	 ≥ 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE adult thyroid D. Field survey results indicate <i>site boundary</i> dose rates exceeding ≥100 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour 	 C.1 ≥ 1000 mRem TEDE <u>OR</u> C.2 ≥ 5000 mRem CDE adult thyroid D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose
f	times SLC 16.11.2 for > 60 minutes as determined by RP Procedure NOTE 1: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure	 as determined by RP Procedure 2. RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR INCREASES IN RADIATION LEVELS THAT IMPEDES OPERATION OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED 	OR D.1 Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of ≥ 500 mRem CDE (3.84 E ⁻⁷ µCi/ml) for one hour of inhalation	rates exceeding ≥1000 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR D.1 Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult
t	calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the walid Radiation Monitor reading.	TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 30) OPERATING MODE: All	NOTE 2: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the <i>valid</i> radiation monitor reading should be	thyroid dose commitment of ≥ 5000 mRem CDE for one hour of inhalation NOTE 3: If actual Dose Assessment cannot
		 Valid radiation reading ≥ 15 mRad/hr in CR, CAS, or, Radwaste CR 	used for emergency classification.	be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.
		B. Unplanned/unexpected valid area monitor readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9		(END)
	(CONTINUED)	(CONTINUED)	(CONTINUED)	
SEE I	IAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY IFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

Assumptions used for calculation of vent monitors RIA 45 & 46:

Average annual meteorology ($1.672 \text{ E-6 sec/m}^3$), semi-elevated Vent flow rate 65,000 cfm (average daily flow rate) No credit is taken for vent filtration 1.

2. 3.

4.

One hour release duration for Unusual Event, 15 minute duration for Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; Site Area Emergency determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs

5. 6. 7. Calculations for monitor readings are based on whole body dose

Standard ODCM guidance together with NUMARC guidance indicates that effluent releases are based on Technical Specification releases

Ency e 4.3 Abnormal Rad Lev. .adiological Effluent

RP/0/B/1 Page 2 of

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SIFE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
2	UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 25)	2. MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 31)	2. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 35) OPERATING MODE: 5, 6
А.	LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage <u>WITH</u> fuel in the core	OPERATING MODE: All A. Valid RIA 3, 6, 41, OR 49 HIGH Alarm	A.1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold Shutdown condition
В.	Uncontrolled water level decrease in the SFP and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water	B. HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge	AND A.2 LT 5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup
C.	1 R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI	C Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered	B.1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold Shutdown condition
D.	Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9.	D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered	AND B.2 Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS
	(END)	(END)	makeup
			NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
			(END)
SEE	TIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY FIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
		NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

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Ench _re 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions

RP/0/B/1 _/001 Page 1 of 2

UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	1. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 39) OPERATING MODE 1, 2, 3	1. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 42) OPERATING MODE: 1, 2	1. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND MANUAL SCRAM NOT SUCCESSFUL WITH INDICATION OF CORE DAMAGE (BD 45)
	A.1 Valid reactor trip signal received or required <u>WITHOUT</u> automatic scram	A.1 Valid reactor trip signal received or required <u>WITHOUT</u> automatic scram	OPERATING MODE: 1, 2
	A.1.1 DSS has inserted Control Rod Groups 5, 6, 7	AND A.2 DSS has <u>NOT</u> inserted Control Rod	A.1 Valid Rx trip signal received or required <u>WITHOUT</u> automatic scram
	OR A.1.2 Manual trip from the Control Room is successful and reactor power is less	Groups 5, 6, 7 <u>AND</u>	AND A.2 Manual trip from the Control Room was <u>NOT</u> successful in reducing reactor power to < 5%
	than 5% and decreasing 2. INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PLANT IN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 41)	 A.3 Manual trip from the Control Room was <u>NOT</u> successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing 	and decreasing <u>AND</u>
	OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 A.1 Loss of LPI and/or LPSW	2. COMPLETE LOSS OF FUNCTION NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN (BD 43)	A.3 Average of the 5 highest CETCs ≥1200° F on ICCM
	AND	<u>OPERATING MODE:</u> 1, 2, 3, 4	
	A.2 Inability to maintain RCS temperature below 200° F as indicated by either of the following:	 A. Average of the 5 highest CETCs ≥1200° F shown on ICCM 	(END)
	A.2.1 RCS temperature at the LPI Pump Suction	B. Unable to maintain reactor subcriticalC. SSF feeding SG per EOP	
	A.2.2 OR Average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display	(CONTINUED)	
	A.2.3 Visual observation (END)		
	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
	NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

Enc. e 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions RP/0/BA .001 Page 2 of 2

UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
		3. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 44)	
		OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 A.1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold	
		Shutdown conditions	
		AND	
		A.2 LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS Makeup	
		B.1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold Shutdown conditions	
		AND	
		B.2 Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup	
		(END)	
		INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	
		NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	

.∡e 4.5 Enck Loss of Power

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT		SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
1.	LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 47)	1. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 49)	1.	LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 51)	1. PROLONGED LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER AND ONSITE AC POWER (BD 54)
	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 Defueled		OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4	<u>OPERATING MODE:</u> 1, 2, 3, 4
A.1	Loss of all offsite AC power to both the Red and Yellow Busses for > 15 minutes	A.1 MFB 1 and 2 de-energized	A.1	MFB 1 and 2 de-energized	A.1 MFB 1 and 2 de-energized
AND		AND	AND	2	AND
A.2	Unit auxiliaries are being supplied from Keowee or CT5	A.2 Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power	A.2	Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power	A.2 SSF fails to maintain Hot Shutdown AND
2.	UNPLANNED LOSS OF REQUIRED DC POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 48)	2. AC POWER CAPABILITY TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES REDUCED TO A SINGLE SOURCE FOR GREATER THAN	2.	LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER (BD 52)	A.3 At least one of the following conditions exist:A.3.1 Restoration of power to at least one
A.1	OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC	 15 MINUTES (BD 50) OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 A. AC power capability has been degraded to a single power source for > 15 minutes due to the loss of all but one of: Unit Normal Transformer Unit SU Transformer 	A.1 <u>AND</u> A.2	OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss	MFB within 4 hours is <u>NOT</u> likely <u>OR</u> A.3.2 Indications of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring (END)
A.2	Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss (END)	Another Unit SU Transformer CT4 CT5		(END)	
		(END)			
INIT SEE I	AL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY		IAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
NOT	IFY 1, 2, 3, 4	NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	NOT	IFY 1, 2, 3, 4	NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

Enc e 4.6 Fires/Explosions . Security Actions

RP/0/B/ Page 1 o

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
1.	FIRES/EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE PLANT (BD 57)	1. FIRE/EXPLOSION AFFECTING OPERABILITY OF PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO	1. SECURITY EVENT IN A PLANT VITAL AREA (BD 61)	1. SECURITY EVENT RESULTING IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO REACH AND MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 62)
n i	OPERATING MODE: All	ESTABLISH/MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN (BD 59)	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: All
	NOTE: Within the plant means Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building, Keowee Hydro.	OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.	NOTE: RP/0/B/1000/007, (Security Event), shall be used in conjunction with all security related emergency classifications	NOTE: RP/0/B/1000/007, (Security Event), shall be used in conjunction with all security related emergency classifications
А.	Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification or verification of a Control Room alarm	A.1 Fire/explosions AND	A. Intrusion into any of the following plant areas by a hostile force: Reactor Building Auxiliary Building	 A. Loss of physical control of the control room due to security event B. Loss of physical control of the Aux Shutdown
В.	Unanticipated explosion within the plant resulting in visible damage to permanent structures/equipment	A.1.1 Affected safety-related system parameter indications show degraded performance OR	B. Bomb detonated in any of the following areas:	panel and the SSF due to a Security Event
2.	CONFIRMED SECURITY THREAT INDICATES POTENTIAL DEGRADATION IN THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF PLANT (BD 58)	 A.1.2 Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown 2 SECURITY EVENT IN A PLANT PROTECTED AREA (BD 60) 	 Keowee Hydro Keowee Dam ISFSI Reactor Building Auxiliary Building SSF 	(END)
	NOTE: RP/0/B/1000/007, (Security Event), shall be used in conjunction with all security related emergency classifications. Discovery of <i>bomb</i> within plant <i>protected area</i>	OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: RP/0/B/1000/007, (Security Event), shall be used in conjunction with all security related emergency classifications.	(END)	
В.	and outside security vital areas <i>Hostage/Extortion</i> situation	A. Intrusion into plant protected area by a hostile force		
C.	Violent civil disturbance within the owner controlled area	B. Bomb discovered in an area containing safety related equipment		
D.	Credible Security threat to the site (END)	(END)		
SEE	TIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY FIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY. NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

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Enc e 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and C. Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

RP/0/B/ Page 1 o

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
1.	NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE <i>PROTECTED AREA</i> (BD 64)	1. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PLANT VITAL AREA (BD 69)	1. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION AND PLANT CONTROL CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED (BD 75) 1. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT DECLARATION OF GENERAL EMERGENCY (BD 78)
	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: All A. Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (0.05g)	OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All
Α.	Tremor felt and <i>valid</i> alarm on the strong motion accelerograph	B.1 Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic event	A.1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated A.1 Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment indicates:
в	Tornado striking within <i>Protected Area</i> Boundary	AND	A.2 Control of the plant cannot be established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or the SSF within 15 A.1.1 Actual/imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment
C.	Vehicle crash into plant structures/systems	NOTE: Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to	minutes OR
	within the Protected Area Boundary	satisfy these conditions.	2. KEOWEE HYDRO DAM FAILURE (BD 76) A.1.2 Potential for uncontrolled
D.	Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals (CONTINUED)	 B.1.1 Visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit OR B.1.2 Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance 2. RELEASE OF TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES JEOPARDIZING SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR ESTABLISH MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 71) OPERATING MODE: All A. Report/detection of toxic gases in concentrations that will be life-threatening to plant personnel B. Report/detection of flammable gases in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant: Reactor Building Auxiliary Building 	OPERATING MODE: All A. Imminent/actual dam failure includes any of the following: • Keowee Hydro Dam • Little River Dam • Dikes A, B, C, or D • Intake Canal Dike (END) 3. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT DECLARATION OF SITE AREA EMERGENCY (BD 77) OPERATING MODE: All A. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment (END)
SEE	IAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY IFY 1, 2, 3, 4	Control Room (CONTINUED) INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

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Encle 94.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and O. Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

RP/0/B// Page 2 of

.	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
2.	NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING KEOWEE HYDRO (BD 66)	3. TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD (BD 72)		<u>A TABLER AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND</u>
	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: All A. Turbine Building flood requiring use of		
Α.	Reservoir elevation \geq 807 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise	 AP/1,2,3/A/1700/10, (Uncontrolled Flooding Of Turbine Building) 4. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS 		
В.	Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particles	<u>BEEN INITIATED (BD 73)</u> OPERATING MODE: All		
с	New area of seepage or wetness, with large amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments	A.1 Evacuation of Control Room <u>AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:</u>		
D.	Slide or other movement of the dam or abutments which could develop into a failure	AND		
E.	Developing failure involving the powerhouse or appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable	 A.1.1 Plant control IS established from the Aux shutdown Panel or the SSF <u>OR</u> A.1.2 Plant control IS BEING established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or SSF 		
3.	RELEASE OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES DEEMED DETRIMENTAL TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT (BD 67)	5. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT CLASSIFICATION OF AN ALERT (BD 74)		
	OPERATING MODE: All	OPERATING MODE: All		
Α.	Report/detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect normal operation of	A.1 Emergency Coordinator judgment indicates that:		
В.	the plant Report by local, county, state officials for	A.1.1 Plant safety may be degraded		
2.	potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event	A.1.2 Increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted (END)		
	(CONTINUED)	()		
SEE	IAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY IFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4	INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
4	OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT (BD 68)			
	OPERATING MODE: All			
А.	Emergency Coordinator determines potential degradation of level of safety has occurred			
	(END)			
INIT SEE	IAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY			
NOT	IFY 1, 2, 3, 4			

Encl. e 4.8	
Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification	

 $\frac{\text{Rp/0/B}}{\text{Page 1 of 1}} \quad \text{J01}$

NOTE:IFActual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes.THENThe valid monitor reading should be used for Emergency Classification.

All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO

HOURS SINCE	RIA 57 R/hr		RIA 58	R/hr*
REACTOR TRIPPED	Site Area Emergency	General Emergency	Site Area Emergency	General Emergency
0.0 - < 0.5	5.9E+003	5.9E+004	2.6E+003	2.6E+004
0.5 - < 1.0	2.6E+003	2.6E+004	1.1E+003	1.1E+004
1.0 - < 1.5	1.9E+003	1.9E+004	8.6E+002	8.6E+003
1.5 - < 2.0	1.9E+003	1.9E+004	8.5E+002	8.5E+003
2.0 - < 2.5	1.4E+003	1.4E+004	6.3E+002	6.3E+003
2.5 - < 3.0	1.2E+003	1.2E+004	5.7E+002	5.7E+003
3.0 - < 3.5	1.1E+003	1.1E+004	5.2E+002	5.2E+003
3.5 - < 4.0	1.0E+003	1.0E+004	4.8E+002	4.8E+003
4.0 - < 8.0	1.0E+003	1.0E+004	4.4E+002	4.4E+003

* RIA 58 is partially shielded

Assumptions used for calculation of high range in-containment monitors RIA 57 and 58:

- 1. Average annual meteorology $(7.308 \text{ E}^{-6} \text{ sec/m}^3)$
- 2. Design basis leakage $(5.6 \text{ E}^6 \text{ ml/hr})$
- 3. One hour release duration
- 4. General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; Site Area Emergency determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs
- 5. Calculations for monitor readings are based on CDE because thyroid dose is limiting
- 6. No credit is taken for filtration
- 7. LOCA conditions are limiting and provide the more conservative reading

Enck e 4.9 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings

RP/0/B/ Page 1 of 1 J**0**1

NOTE: This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.; incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).

·	UNITS 1, 2, 3			
MONITOR NUMBER	UNUSUAL EVENT 1000x	ALERT		
	NORMAL LEVELS mRAD/HR	mRAD/HR		
RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop				
Elevation 796	150	≥ 5000		
RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab				
Elevation 796	4200	≥ 5000		
RIA 10, Primary Sample Hood				
Elevation 796	830	≥ 5000		
RIA 11, Change Room				
Elevation 796	210	≥ 5000		
RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank				
Elevation 783	800	≥ 5000		
RIA 13, Waste Disposal Sink				
Elevation 771	650	≥ 5000		
RIA 15, HPI Room				
Elevation 758	NOTE*	≥ 5000		

NOTE: RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis. Applying 1000x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an *Unusual Event*. For this reason, an *Unusual Event* will **NOT** be declared for a reading less than 5000 mRad/hr.

1. List of Definitions and Acronyms

NOTE:	Definitions are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition.
1.1	ALERT - Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
1.2	BOMB - A fused explosive device
1.3	CONDITION A - Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred - A failure at the dam has occurred or is about to occur and minutes to days may be allowed to respond dependent upon the proximity to the dam.
1.4	CONDITION B - Potentially Hazardous Situation is Developing - A situation where failure may develop, but preplanned actions taken during certain events (such as major floods, earthquakes, evidence of piping) may prevent or mitigate failure.
1.5	CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of ten (10) or more people <i>violent</i> ly protesting station operations or activities at the site.
1.6	CREDIBLE THREAT - The determination of what is a credible threat to the site will be the responsibility of Security Manager/designee in consultation with the OSM. The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the Oconee Nuclear Station Safeguards Contingency Plan and Security implementing procedures.
1.7	EXPLOSION - A rapid, <i>violent</i> , unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components. A sudden failure of a pressurized pipe/line could fit this definition. This definition includes MS line rupture and FW line ruptures.
1.8	EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
1.9	FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke, such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment, do NOT constitute <i>fires</i> . Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
1.10	GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels outside the Exclusion Area Boundary.

- 1.11 **HOSTAGE** A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.
- 1.12 **INTRUSION/INTRUDER** Suspected hostile individual present in a *Protected Area* without authorization.
- 1.13 **INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR** Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are NOT readily available to the operator.
- 1.14 LOSS OF POWER Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. Ex. If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160v switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.
- 1.15 **PROTECTED AREA** Encompasses all Owner Controlled Areas within the security perimeter fence.
- 1.16 **REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE** RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13.
- 1.17 **RUPTURED** (As relates to Steam Generator) Existence of Primary to Secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
- 1.18 **SABOTAGE** Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
- 1.19 SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AREA Any area within the *Protected area* which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
- 1.20 **SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT** An *unplanned* event involving one or more of the following:
 - (1) Automatic turbine runback>25% thermal reactor power
 - (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load
 - (3) Reactor Trip
 - (4) Safety Injection System Activation
- 1.21 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Exclusion Area Boundary.
- 1.22 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT (SLC) -Chapter 16 of the FSAR

Enclosure 4.10 Definitions/Acronyms

- 1.23 **SITE BOUNDARY** That area, including the *Protected Area*, in which DPC has the authority to control all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property (1 mile radius from the center of Unit 2).
- 1.24 **TOXIC GAS** A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.; Chlorine).
- 1.25 UNCONTROLLED Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.
- 1.26 UNPLANNED An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
- 1.27 UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
- 1.28 **VALID** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1) an instrument channel check; or, (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation; or, (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit with this definition is the need for timely assessment.
- 1.29 **VIOLENT** Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.
- 1.30 **VISIBLE DAMAGE** Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture.

Enclosure 4.11

RP/**0**/B/1000/001 Page 1 of 1

Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications

MODES

MODE	TITLE	REACTIVITY CONDITION (K _{eff})	% RATED THERMAL POWER (a)	AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE (°F)
1	Power Operation	≥0.99	> 5	NA
2	Startup	<u>≥</u> 0.99	≤5	NA
3	Hot Standby	<0.99	NA	<u>≥</u> 250
4	Hot Shutdown (b)	< 0.99	NA	250 > T > 200
5	Cold Shutdown (b)	< 0.99	NA	≤ 200
6	Refueling (c)	NA	NA	NA

(a) Excluding decay heat.

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- (b) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.
- (c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1

1. Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 – Fission Product Barrier Matrix

- 1.1 If the unit was at Hot S/D or above, (Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4) and one or more fission product barriers have been affected, refer to Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and review the criteria listed to determine if the event should be classified.
 - 1.1.1 For each Fission Product Barrier, review the associated EALs to determine if there is a Loss or Potential Loss of that barrier. Circle any that apply.
- **NOTE:** An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss thresholds is imminent (i.e. within 1-3 hours). In this situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.
 - 1.2 Three possible outcomes exist for each barrier. No challenge, potential loss, or loss. Use the worst case for each barrier and the classification table at the bottom of the page to determine appropriate classification.
 - 1.3 The numbers in parentheses out beside the label for each column can be used to assist in determining the classification. If no EAL is met for a given barrier, that barrier will have 0 points. The points for the columns are as follows:

Barrier	<u>Failure</u>	<u>Points</u>	
RCS	Potential Loss	4	
	Loss	5	
Fuel Clad	Potential Loss	4	
	Loss	5	
Containment	Potential Loss	1	
	Loss	3	

- 1.3.1 To determine the classification, add the highest point value for each barrier to determine a total for all barriers. Compare this total point value with the numbers in parentheses beside each classification to see which one applies.
- 1.3.2 Finally as a verification of your decision, look below the Emergency Classification you selected. The loss and/or potential loss EALs selected for each barrier should be described by one of the bullet statements.

Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1

EXAMPLE: Failure to properly isolate a 'B' MS Line Rupture outside containment, results in extremely severe overcooling.

PTS entry conditions were satisfied.

Stresses on the 'B' S/G resulted in failure of multiple S/G tubes.

RCS leakage through the S/G exceeds available makeup capacity as indicated by loss of subcooling margin.

Barrier	EAL	Failure	Points
RCS	SGTR > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in normal makeup mode with letdown isolated	Potential Loss	4
	Entry into PTS operating range	Potential Loss	4
	RCS leak rate > available makeup capacity as indicated by a loss of subcooling	Loss	5
	No EALs met and no justification for	No	0
	classification on judgment	Challenge	
Containment	Failure of secondary side of SG results in a direct opening to the environment	Loss	3

 $RCS_5 + Fuel_0 + Containment_3 = Total_8$

- A. Even though two Potential Loss EALs and one Loss EAL are met for the RCS barrier, credit is only taken for the worst case (highest point value) EAL, so the points from this barrier equal 5.
- B. No EAL is satisfied for the Fuel Clad Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 0.
- C. One Loss EAL is met for the Containment Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 3.
- D. When the total points are calculated the result is 8, therefore the classification would be a *Site Area Emergency*.
- E. Look in the box below "*Site Area Emergency*". You have identified a loss of two barriers. This agrees with one of the bullet statements. The classification is correct.

INFORMATION ONLY

ONS Human Resources Procedure

Approved: Approval Date:

ONS Human Resources Emergency Plan

1.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this procedure is to delineate the role that the Oconee HR Group fulfills in support of the ONS Emergency Plan.

NOTE: The Emergency Preparedness Section must review revisions to this procedure and receive a control copy within seven (7) working days of approval.

2.0 APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to the Oconee Human Resources (OHR) Group (i.e., Core HR, Medical) and applicable vendor/contract personnel.

3.0 **DESCRIPTION**

This procedure broadly defines the role of the Oconee Human Resource (OHR) Group during an emergency/drill. Each HR section shall develop a mechanism to fulfill requirements identified by this procedure (e.g., training/guidelines/procedure). Additional implementation guidance may be included as part of other documents (e.g., Response Procedures, Site Directives).

The guidance in this procedure shall not prevent any member of the HR group from taking actions deemed necessary to contend with urgent circumstances.

4.0 **PROCEDURE**

4.1 ACCOUNTABILITY of PERSONNEL

All HR personnel shall assemble at their designated assembly location.

Core HR personnel who are **inside** the protected area during a site assembly <u>and</u> whose designated assembly point is **inside** the protected area, should:

- 1. proceed to designated assembly point,
- 2. swipe security badge at the nearest security badge card reader (badge reader locations can be found in NSD-114),
- 3. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes, and
- 4. remain at designated assembly location and await further instructions.

Core HR personnel who are **inside** the protected area during a site assembly <u>and</u> whose designated assembly point is **outside** the protected area, should:

- 1. exit the protected area,
- 2. proceed to the HR Manager's office,
- 3. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes,
- 4. remain in the HR Manager's office and await further instructions.

Core HR personnel (non-ERO) who are **outside** the protected area during a site assembly <u>and</u> whose designated assembly point is **inside** the protected area, should:

1. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes,

2. remain where they are and await further instructions.

(Note: ERO personnel will respond according to their ERO responsibilities.)

Core HR personnel who are **outside** the protected area during a site assembly <u>and</u> whose designated assembly point is **outside** the protected area, should:

- 1. proceed to designated site assembly point
- 2. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes, and
- 3. remain at designated assembly location and await further instructions.

Personnel shall remain at their assembly locations until released by the Emergency Coordinator/designee. In the event special instructions are necessary (e.g., site evacuation), information will be provided through the TSC/supervisory process at assembly locations.

4.1.1 Site Assembly - Normal Work Hours (Monday - Thursday)

Designated site assembly contacts (reference Enclosure 5.1) shall be responsible for ensuring that their section accountability status is reported per the following:

- 1) Medical personnel should report accountability to Core HR Site Assembly Contact within 10 minutes.
- 2) Core HR Site Assembly Contact should report accountability for **both** Core HR and Medical to extension 5050 within 15 minutes. Site assembly contact is responsible for following the instructions given on the phone mail message when extension 5050 is called.

4.1.2 Site Assembly - Backshifts, Weekends, and Holidays

If present, the supervisor/designee shall report accountability status for their employees to extension 5050 within 15 minutes, and await further instructions.

If a supervisor/designee is not present, each individual is responsible for calling extension 5050 to report their accountability status.

Site assembly contacts are responsible for following the instructions given on the phone mail message when extension 5050 is called.

4.2 TECHNICAL/OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC/OSC)

4.2.1 Locations

- a. <u>Primary</u>
 - TSC: Unit 1&2 Control Room
 - OSC: Unit 3 Control Room

b. Alternate

- TSC: Oconee Office Building Room 316
- OSC: Oconee Office Building Room 316A

4.2.2 Staffing

4.2.2.1 Technical Support Center

No routine staffing requirements exist for Oconee Human Resource (OHR) personnel in the Technical Support Center. However, circumstances may dictate that OHR personnel fulfill certain roles/duties within the TSC (as required by the Emergency Coordinator/designee).

4.2.3 Notification of Activation

a. Normal Work Hours

Notification of TSC/OSC/EOF activation will normally occur over the site public address system. Designated TSC/OSC/EOF personnel shall respond as required.

b. Off-Normal Work Hours

During backshift, weekends, and holidays TSC/OSC/EOF response personnel shall be notified as described in their applicable section procedures and guidelines. Fitness for Duty (FFD) considerations are applicable for TSC/OSC/EOF call-outs.

4.3 CONTROL of SITE INGRESS/EGRESS

During a Site Assembly/Event, Security personnel shall be responsible for:

- 1. controlling site owner controlled area access via electronic/mechanical access control systems or by posting of security personnel, and
- 2. assisting in the orderly evacuation of personnel from the site as necessary.

4.4 SITE EVACUATION or RELOCATION

The position of Human Resource Group Evacuation Coordinator is fulfilled by designated OHR Managers as listed in Enclosure 5.1. The Oconee HR Manager will oversee the following actions once an evacuation is announced over the PA System:

- (1) determine essential personnel who should remain on-site,
- (2) provide continuous (24 hour) coverage for essential functions,
- (3) convey preliminary evacuation instructions to each OHR Section Manager/Assembly Point Contact; and
- (4) coordinate evacuation/relocation of OHR personnel.

Evacuation/relocation instructions will be provided to assembly point contacts by the OHR Group Evacuation Coordinator. Evacuation instructions may also be provided to site personnel: (1) over the Site public address system by the Emergency Coordinator/designee; and (2) on-line using the "Evacuation Plan" icon (shown below) located in the Oconee Information Library".



Evacuation Plan icon is located in the Oconee Information Library

4.5 DRILL TEAM SCENARIO TEAM REPRESENTATIVES

As needed, support from Human Resource Personnel may be necessary to assist in scenario development/drills.

5.0 ENCLOSURES

Enclosure 5.1 - "OHR Site Assembly Contacts and Group Evacuation Coordinators"

Enclosure 5.1

OHR Site Assembly Contacts and Group Evacuation Coordinators

• SITE ASSEMBLY SECTION CONTACTS

Core Human Resources (HR)......Human Resource Personnel Medical Personnel

- Primary Contact......Gail Porter (4135)
- ♦ Alternate Contact.....Donna Hellams (3366)

(<u>Note</u>: This person is responsible for reporting **both** Core HR and Medical accountability to extension 5050.)

• HR GROUP EVACUATION COORDINATORS

- ♦ Alternate Contact......Don Karns (4070)