

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385



DEC 19 2001

Docket No. 50-423
B18523

RE: 10 CFR 50.59

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Change to Technical Specifications Bases

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) is providing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff with changes to Millstone Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications Bases, Section 3/4.7.4 for information only. The proposed change to the Bases Section was made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The change was reviewed and approved by the Site Operations Review Committee.


Attachment 1 provides the retyped Millstone Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications Bases page.

There are no regulatory commitments contained within this letter.

If you should have any questions on the above, please contact Mr. Ravi Joshi at (860) 440-2080.

Very truly yours,

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.



J. Alan Price, Vice President
Nuclear Technical Services - Millstone

Attachment (1)

cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator
V. Nerses, NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3
NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3

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Attachment 1

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3

Change to Technical Specifications Bases
Retyped Page for Millstone Unit No. 3

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.3 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

An OPERABLE service water loop requires one OPERABLE service water pump and associated strainer. Two OPERABLE service water loops, with one OPERABLE service water pump and associated strainer per loop, will provide sufficient core (and containment) decay heat removal during a design basis accident coincident with a loss of offsite power and a single failure.