Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Power Station
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vaterford, CT 06385



DEC 19 2001

Docket No. 50-245 B18552

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1
Submittal of Change to Technical Specifications' Bases Page B 3.1-1

On November 16, 2001,<sup>(1)</sup> Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) submitted a change to the Millstone Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications' Bases page B 3.1-1 which was implemented on March 18, 2001, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. This Millstone Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications' Bases page has been superceded by another change implemented on December 14, 2001, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. This change eliminates the reference to the Millstone Unit No. 1 Central Monitoring Station, because the Millstone Unit No. 1 control and monitoring function was moved to the Millstone Unit No. 2 Control Room.

For your convenience, Attachments 1 and 2 contain a marked-up and retyped version of the Millstone Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications' Bases page B 3.1-1.

If there are any questions or comments regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Ravi Joshi at (860) 440-2080.

Very truly yours,

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

Raymond P. Necci, Vice President Nuclear Operations - Millstone

Attachments (2)

cc: See next page

<sup>(1)</sup> R. P. Necci letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Partial Withdrawal of Changes to Technical Specifications and Submittal of Change to Bases Page B 3.1-1," dated November 16, 2001.

# .clear Regulatory Commission 2/Page 2

H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator

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Director
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CC:

## Attachment 1

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1

Revised Mark-up of the Technical Specifications' Bases

### **B 3.1 DEFUELED SYSTEMS**

### B 3.1.1 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level

#### **BASES**

### **BACKGROUND**

The minimum water level in the spent fuel storage pool meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. A general description of the spent fuel storage pool design is found in Chapter 3 of the DSAR, (Ref. 1). The assumptions of the fuel handling accident are found in Chapter 5 of the DSAR (Ref. 2).

# APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS

Although the unit is permanently shutdown and defueled, fuel handling accidents in the fuel storage pool are still possible.

A bounding calculation of the radiological consequences of such an accident in the spent fuel pool was performed, based on the following:

- Actual source term radioactive decay since shutdown credited
- Failure of four assemblies 248 fuel rods in four 8 x 8 assemblies
- Unfiltered ground release no credit for secondary containment or standby gas treatment

The analysis concluded that 1) calculated doses at the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone are within 10CFR100 limits; and 2) calculated doses to the operating units Control Rooms and Unit 1 Central Monitoring Station are within the limits set in GDC -19.

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Millstone Units

2 and 3

# Attachment 2

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1

Retyped Technical Specifications' Bases

### **B 3.1 DEFUELED SYSTEMS**

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## APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS

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A bounding calculation of the radiological consequences of such an accident in the spent fuel pool was performed, based on the following:

- Actual source term radioactive decay since shutdown credited
- Failure of four assemblies 248 fuel rods in four 8 x 8 assemblies
- Unfiltered ground release no credit for secondary containment or standby gas treatment

The analysis concluded that 1) calculated doses at the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone are within 10CFR100 limits; and 2) calculated doses to the Millstone Units 2 and 3 Control Rooms are within the limits set in GDC -19.

(continued)