

February 6, 1991

Docket No. 50-260

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.  
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
6N 38A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING REACTOR WATER CLEANUP TEMPERATURE DEVICES (TAC NO. 76901) (TS 289)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 189, to Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2. This amendment is in response to your application dated June 4, 1990, regarding the replacement of temperature switches in the reactor water cleanup system of BFN, Unit 2, with analog trip units and resistance temperature detectors.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely

*Thierry M. Ross*  
Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-4  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 189 to License No. DPR-52
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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*CP/ub*

AMENDMENT NO. 189 FOR BROWNS FERRY UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-260  
DATED: February 6, 1991

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 189  
License No. DPR-52

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated June 4, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.189, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director  
Project Directorate II-4, NRR  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 6, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 189

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf\* and spillover pages\*\* are provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
3.2/4.2-7	3.2/4.2-7*
3.2/4.2-8	3.2/4.2-8
3.2/4.2-11	3.2/4.2-11*
-	3.2/4.2-11a
3.2/4.2-12	3.2/4.2-12*
3.2/4.2-13	3.2/4.2-13
3.2/4.2-42	3.2/4.2-42*
3.2/4.2-43	3.2/4.2-43
3.2/4.2-67	3.2/4.2-67
3.2/4.2-68	3.2/4.2-68*
3.7/4.7-30	3.7/4.7-30
3.7/4.7-31	3.7/4.7-31**

TABLE 3.2.A  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum No. Instrument Channels Operable Per Trip Sys(1)(11)	Function	Trip Level Setting	Action (1)	Remarks
2	Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level(6) (LIS-3-203 A-D)	$\geq 538''$ above vessel zero	A or (B and E)	1. Below trip setting does the following: a. Initiates Reactor Building Isolation b. Initiates Primary Containment Isolation c. Initiates SGTS
1	Instrument Channel - Reactor High Pressure (PS-68-93 and -94)	$100 \pm 15$ psig	D	1. Above trip setting isolates the shutdown cooling suction valves of the RHR system.
2	Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-3-56A-D)	$\geq 398''$ above vessel zero	A	1. Below trip setting initiates Main Steam Line Isolation
2	Instrument Channel - High Drywell Pressure (6) (PIS-64-56A-D)	$\leq 2.5$ psig	A or (B and E)	1. Above trip setting does the following: a. Initiates Reactor Building Isolation b. Initiates Primary Containment Isolation c. Initiates SGTS

BFN  
Unit 2

3.2/4.2-7

AMENDMENT NO. 183

TABLE 3.2.A (Continued)  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum No. Instrument Channels Operable Per Trip Sys(1)(11)	Function	Trip Level Setting	Action (1)	Remarks
2	Instrument Channel - High Radiation Main Steam Line Tunnel (6)	$\leq 3$ times normal rated full power background	B	1. Above trip setting initiates Main Steam Line Isolation
2	Instrument Channel - Low Pressure Main Steam Line (PIS-1-72, 76, 82, 86)	$\geq 825$ psig (4)	B	1. Below trip setting initiates Main Steam Line Isolation
2(3)	Instrument Channel - High Flow Main Steam Line (PdIS-1-13A-D, 25A-D, 36A-D, 50A-D)	$\leq 140\%$ of rated steam flow	B	1. Above trip setting initiates Main Steam Line Isolation
2(12)	Instrument Channel - Main Steam Line Tunnel High Temperature	$\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$	B	1. Above trip setting initiates Main Steam Line Isolation.
1	Instrument Channel - Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation - Reactor Zone	$\leq 100$ mr/hr or downscale	G	1. 1 upscale or 2 downscale will a. Initiate SGTS. b. Isolate reactor zone and refueling floor. c. Close atmosphere control system.

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3.2/4.2-8

Amendment 189



TABLE 3.2.A (Continued)  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum No. Instrument Channels Operable Per Trip Sys(1)(11)	Function	Trip Level Setting	Action (1)	Remarks
1	Reactor Building Isolation (refueling floor) Logic	N/A	H or F	
1	Reactor Building Isolation (reactor zone) Logic	N/A	H or G or A	
1(7) (8)	SGTS Train A Logic	N/A	L or (A and F)	
1(7) (8)	SGTS Train B Logic	N/A	L or (A and F)	
1(7) (8)	SGTS Train C Logic	N/A	L or (A and F)	

Refer to Table 3.2.B for RCIC and HPCI functions including Groups 4, 5, and 7 valves.

TABLE 3.2.A (Continued)  
 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum No. Instrument Channels Operable Per Trip Sys(1)(11)	Function	Trip Level Setting	Action (1)	Remarks
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Main Steam Valve Vault (TIS-069-834A-D)	≤ 201.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pipe Trench (TIS-069-835A-D)	≤ 135.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2A (TIS-069-836A-D)	≤ 152.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2B (TIS-069-837A-D)	≤ 152.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Room (TIS-069-838A-D)	≤ 143.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor

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Unit 2

3.2/4.2-11a

Amendment 189

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.A

1. Whenever the respective functions are required to be OPERABLE there shall be two OPERABLE or tripped trip systems for each function. If the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system or logic for that function shall be tripped (or the appropriate action listed below shall be taken). If the column cannot be met for all trip systems, the appropriate action listed below shall be taken.
  - A. Initiate an orderly shutdown and have the reactor in Cold Shutdown in 24 hours.
  - B. Initiate an orderly load reduction and have Main Steam Lines isolated within eight hours.
  - C. Isolate Reactor Water Cleanup System.
  - D. Administratively control the affected system isolation valves in the closed position within one hour and then declare the affected system inoperable.
  - E. Initiate primary containment isolation within 24 hours.
  - F. The handling of spent fuel will be prohibited and all operations over spent fuels and open reactor wells shall be prohibited.
  - G. Isolate the reactor building and start the standby gas treatment system.
  - H. Immediately perform a logic system functional test on the logic in the other trip systems and daily thereafter not to exceed 7 days.
  - I. Deleted
  - J. Withdraw TIP.
  - K. Manually isolate the affected lines. Refer to Section 4.2.E for the requirements of an inoperable system.
  - L. If one SGTS train is inoperable take actions H or A and F. If two SGTS trains are inoperable take actions A and F.
2. When it is determined that a channel is failed in the unsafe condition, the other channels that monitor the same variable shall be functionally tested immediately before the trip system or logic for that function is tripped. The trip system or the logic for that function may remain untripped for short periods of time to allow functional testing of the other trip system or logic for that function.
3. There are four sensors per steam line of which at least one sensor per trip system must be OPERABLE.

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2 (Cont'd)

4. Only required in RUN MODE (interlocked with Mode Switch).
5. Not required in RUN MODE (bypassed by Mode Switch).
6. Channel shared by RPS and Primary Containment & Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System. A channel failure may be a channel failure in each system.
7. A train is considered a trip system.
8. Two out of three SGTS trains required. A failure of more than one will require actions A and F.
9. Deleted
10. Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of Isolation Valve Groups and their initiating signals.
11. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to four hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
12. A channel contains four sensors, all of which must be OPERABLE for the channel to be OPERABLE.

Power operations permitted for up to 30 days with 15 of the 16 temperature switches OPERABLE.

In the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunnel, the high temperature channels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours. During periods when normal ventilation is not available, such as during the performance of secondary containment leak rate tests, the control room indicators of the affected space temperatures shall be monitored for indications of small steam leaks. In the event of rapid increases in temperature (indicative of steam line break), the operator shall promptly close the main steam line isolation valves.

13. The nominal setpoints for alarm and reactor trip (1.5 and 3.0 times background, respectively) are established based on the normal background at full power. The allowable setpoints for alarm and reactor trip are 1.2-1.8 and 2.4-3.6 times background, respectively.

TABLE 4.2.A (Cont'd)  
 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>Function</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Calibration Frequency</u>	<u>Instrument Check</u>
Group 1 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.(11)	N/A	N/A
Group 1 (Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (RHR Isolation-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 8 (Tip-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (Drywell Sump Drains-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (Reactor Building and Refueling floor, and Drywell Vent and Purge-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 3 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.	N/A	N/A
Group 3 (Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A

BFN  
Unit 2

3.2/4.2-42

TABLE 4.2.A (Cont'd)  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>Function</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Calibration Frequency</u>	<u>Instrument Check</u>
Group 6 Logic	Once/operating cycle (18)	N/A	N/A
Group 8 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.	N/A	N/A
Reactor Building Isolation (refueling floor) Logic	Once/6 months (18)	(6)	N/A
Reactor Building Isolation (reactor zone) Logic	Once/6 months (18)	(6)	N/A
SGTS Train A Logic	Once/6 months (19)	N/A	N/A
SGTS Train B Logic	Once/6 months (19)	N/A	N/A
SGTS Train C Logic	Once/6 months (19)	N/A	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Main Steam Valve Vault (TIS-069-834A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Pipe Trench (TIS-069-835A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2A (TIS-069-836A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2B (TIS-069-837A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Room (TIS-069-838A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A

### 3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

flow instrumentation is a backup to the temperature instrumentation. In the event of a loss of the reactor building ventilation system, radiant heating in the vicinity of the main steam lines raises the ambient temperature above 200°F. The temperature increases can cause an unnecessary main steam line isolation and reactor scram. Permission is provided to bypass the temperature trip for four hours to avoid an unnecessary plant transient and allow performance of the secondary containment leak rate test or make repairs necessary to regain normal ventilation.

High radiation monitors in the main steam line tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With the established nominal setting of three times normal background and main steam line isolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident. Reference Section 14.6.2 FSAR. An alarm with a nominal setpoint of 1.5 x normal full-power background is provided also.

Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valves in RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below 825 psig.

The HPCI high flow and temperature instrumentation are provided to detect a break in the HPCI steam piping. Tripping of this instrumentation results in actuation of HPCI isolation valves. Tripping logic for the high flow is a 1-out-of-2 logic, and all sensors are required to be OPERABLE.

High temperature in the vicinity of the HPCI equipment is sensed by four sets of four bimetallic temperature switches. The 16 temperature switches are arranged in two trip systems with eight temperature switches in each trip system. Each trip system consists of two elements. Each channel contains one temperature switch located in the pump room and three temperature switches located in the torus area. The RCIC high flow and high area temperature sensing instrument channels are arranged in the same manner as the HPCI system.

The HPCI high steam flow trip setting of 90 psid and the RCIC high steam flow trip setting of 450" H<sub>2</sub>O have been selected such that the trip setting is high enough to prevent spurious tripping during pump startup but low enough to prevent core uncovery and maintain fission product releases within 10 CFR 100 limits.

The HPCI and RCIC steam line space temperature switch trip settings are high enough to prevent spurious isolation due to normal temperature excursions in the vicinity of the steam supply piping. Additionally, these trip settings ensure that the primary containment isolation steam supply valves isolate a break within an acceptable time period to prevent core uncovery and maintain fission product releases within 10 CFR 100 limits.

High temperature at the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System in the main steam valve vault, RWCU pump room 2A, RWCU pump room 2B, RWCU heat exchanger room or in the space near the pipe trench containing RWCU piping could indicate a break in the cleanup system. When high temperature occurs, the cleanup system is isolated.

### 3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The instrumentation which initiates CSCS action is arranged in a dual bus system. As for other vital instrumentation arranged in this fashion, the specification preserves the effectiveness of the system even during periods when maintenance or testing is being performed. An exception to this is when logic functional testing is being performed.

The control rod block functions are provided to prevent excessive control rod withdrawal so that MCPR does not decrease to 1.07. The trip logic for this function is 1-out-of-n: e.g., any trip on one of six APRMs, eight IRMs, or four SRMs will result in a rod block.

The minimum instrument channel requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure the single failure criteria is met. The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RBM may be reduced by one for maintenance, testing, or calibration. This does not significantly increase the risk of an inadvertent control rod withdrawal, as the other channel is available, and the RBM is a backup system to the written sequence for withdrawal of control rods.

The APRM rod block function is flow biased and prevents a significant reduction in MCPR, especially during operation at reduced flow. The APRM provides gross core protection; i.e., limits the gross core power increase from withdrawal of control rods in the normal withdrawal sequence. The trips are set so that MCPR is maintained greater than 1.07.

The RBM rod block function provides local protection of the core; i.e., the prevention of critical power in a local region of the core, for a single rod withdrawal error from a limiting control rod pattern.

If the IRM channels are in the worst condition of allowed bypass, the sealing arrangement is such that for unbypassed IRM channels, a rod block signal is generated before the detected neutrons flux has increased by more than a factor of 10.

A downscale indication is an indication the instrument has failed or the instrument is not sensitive enough. In either case the instrument will not respond to changes in control rod motion and thus, control rod motion is prevented.

The refueling interlocks also operate one logic channel, and are required for safety only when the mode switch is in the refueling position.

For effective emergency core cooling for small pipe breaks, the HPCI system must function since reactor pressure does not decrease rapid enough to allow either core spray or LPCI to operate in time. The automatic pressure relief function is provided as a backup to the HPCI in the event the HPCI does not operate. The arrangement of the tripping contacts is such as to provide this function when necessary and minimize spurious operation. The trip settings given in the specification are



NOTES FOR TABLE 3.7.A

Key: O = Open  
C = Closed  
SC = Stays Closed  
GC = Goes Closed

Note: Isolation groupings are as follows:

Group 1: The valves in Group 1 are actuated by any one of the following conditions:

1. Reactor Vessel Low Low Low Water Level ( $\geq$  398")
2. Main Steamline High Radiation
3. Main Steamline High Flow
4. Main Steamline Space High Temperature
5. Main Steamline Low Pressure

Group 2: The valves in Group 2 are actuated by any of the following conditions:

1. Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (538")
2. High Drywell Pressure

Group 3: The valves in Group 3 are actuated by any of the following conditions:

1. Reactor Low Water Level (538")
2. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System High Temperature in the main steam valve vault,
3. RWCU System High Temperature in RWCU pump room 2A,
4. RWCU System High Temperature in the RWCU pump room 2B,
5. RWCU System High Temperature in RWCU heat exchanger room,
6. RWCU System High Temperature in the space near the pipe trench containing RWCU piping.

Group 4: The valves in Group 4 are actuated by any of the following conditions:

1. HPCI Steamline Space High Temperature
2. HPCI Steamline High Flow
3. HPCI Steamline Low Pressure
4. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm High Pressure

Group 5: The valves in Group 5 are actuated by any of the following conditions:

1. RCIC Steamline Space High Temperature
2. RCIC Steamline High Flow
3. RCIC Steamline Low Pressure
4. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm High Pressure

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.7.A (Continued)

Group 6: The valves in Group 6 are actuated by any of the following conditions:

1. Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (538")
2. High Drywell Pressure
3. Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation

Group 7: The valves in Group 7 are automatically actuated by only the following condition:

1. The respective turbine steam supply valve not fully closed.

Group 8: The valves in Group 8 are automatically actuated by only the following conditions:

1. High Drywell Pressure
2. Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (538")



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ENCLOSURE 2

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 189 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-260

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 4, 1990, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) submitted a request to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2. The proposed TS amendment would replace the current Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system high temperature detection instruments in TS Tables 3.2.A, 4.2.A, and 3.7.A. with new temperature loops. The new temperature loops would consist of environmentally qualified resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) and IEEE class-IE qualified analog trip units (ATUs). In addition, the Bases Section 3.2 would be modified to describe the locations of the RTDs.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

The RWCU system functions to maintain high reactor water purity to limit chemical and corrosive action, thereby limiting fouling and deposition from occurring on heat transfer surfaces of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The system also removes corrosion products to limit impurities available for activation by neutron flux and the resulting radiation from deposition of corrosion products. The RWCU system provides continuous purification of a portion of the recirculation flow. The RWCU system also provides a means of removing reactor water during plant heatup operations.

Upon indication of high temperature in the RWCU system spaces, the RWCU system automatically isolates the reactor coolant pressure boundary by closure of two RWCU suction line isolation valves, and closure of the RWCU return line valve. Such isolation is needed to preclude a radioactive release in the case of a line break.

The licensee stated in its application for amendment dated June 4, 1990, that an analysis of High Energy Line Break (HELB) in the reactor building had identified certain pipe breaks which could not be automatically detected and isolated in a reasonable timeframe using the presently installed temperature switches. The breaks identified were RWCU pipe critical cracks in the main steam valve vault, as well as in RWCU pump rooms, RWCU pipe trench, and the RWCU heat exchanger room. The proposed changes to the TS reflect a plant modification aimed at replacing the existing non-environmentally qualified temperature switches with environmentally qualified temperature loops to improve timeliness of detection and isolation of line breaks.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The four existing temperature switches located in the floor drains in the backwash receiving room will be abandoned and replaced by four RTDs located in RWCU pump rooms A and B. The four temperature switches located in the RWCU pipe trench and the four located in the RWCU heat exchanger rooms are being replaced by the same number of RTDs at each location. Additionally, four RTDS are being added to the main steam valve vault, where no temperature switches were located previous to this modification.

The new RTD/ATU temperature loops were chosen by TVA to decrease the time needed to close the RWCU valves. The setpoints for the new RTD/ATU temperature loops are set above the maximum expected room temperature to avoid spurious actuation due to ambient conditions, and below the analytical limits for timeliness in detecting a pipe break. The logic arrangement does not change from that of the temperature switches, i.e., high temperature signals from one of two RTDS in each of two divisions in a given area are required to produce a RWCU primary isolation signal (one-out-of-two taken twice). With this logic the licensee states that the failure of a single RTD, ATU, or power feed will not prevent isolation nor produce a spurious isolation.

The licensee has stated in its amendment request that the new devices do not alter or affect the function or isolation of the valves. The modifications were made to ensure a quicker means of detecting RWCU pipe breaks and provide more accurate temperature measurement. The NRC has analyzed and approved designs at Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants with such ATUs (NEDO-21617, Analog Transmitter/Trip Unit System for Engineered Safeguard Sensor Trip Input.)

The changes to the TS proposed by the licensee are necessary to reflect the replacement of the temperature switches with the RTD/ATU loops. The requirements pertaining to the function and surveillance of these devices have not been changed. The NRC staff finds the TS changes acceptable. A summary of the individual changes with each basis for approval follows:

1. Replacement of the RWCU system temperature switches on TS Tables 3.2.A and 4.2.A by the new ATU instrumentation is acceptable. Such devices have been approved by the NRC in the past and perform the same function as the former temperature switches. Additionally, the new devices are environmentally and IEEE-qualified.
2. Deletion of Note 14 from Table 3.2.A is acceptable. The note applies to the temperature switches that are being deleted from the table.
3. Revision of Bases Section 3.2 is appropriate as described by the licensee. The revised Bases describe the locations of the RTDs.

4. The Notes on Table 3.7.A are being revised to indicate that the new RTD/ATU temperature loops actuate Group 3 primary containment isolation valves. The NRC staff agrees with the licensee's proposal to provide isolation in the event that high temperatures are indicated in the RWCU pump rooms 2A and 2B, the RWCU heat exchanger room, the main steam valve vault, or in the space near the pipe trench containing RWCU piping.

#### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (55 FR 30312) on July 25, 1990, and consulted with the State of Alabama. No public comments were received, and the State of Alabama did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: February 6, 1991