

50-275/1923

1 MANUELLA HANCOCK, Bar No. 193003
PERKINS COIE LLP
2 180 Townsend Street, 3rd Floor
San Francisco, California 94107-1909
3 (415) 344-7000

4 STEVEN M. HEDBERG (*Application to appear pro hac vice pending*)
PacWest Center, Suite 1500
5 1211 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204-3715
6 Telephone: (503) 727-2000

7 Attorneys for Creditor
Bank of Montreal

8 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
9
10 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

12 In re:
13 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,
a California corporation,
14 Debtor.
15
16
17

CASE NO. 01-30923 DFM 11
**BANK OF MONTREAL'S OBJECTION
TO DEBTOR'S DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT**

Date: December 19, 2001
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Place: 235 Pine Street, 22nd Floor
San Francisco, CA
Judge: Hon. Dennis Montali

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Foot Add: R. d's Gge Mail Center

CONTENTS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

- I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1
- II. PLAN TREATMENT OF BANK OF MONTREAL’S CLAIM..... 2
- III. ARGUMENT 3
 - A. The Disclosure Statement Does Not Contain Adequate Information. 3
 - 1. Inadequate Disclosure of Financial Information. 4
 - 2. Inadequate discussion of feasibility..... 5
 - 3. There is no meaningful discussion of the Debtor’s postpetition operations. 5
 - 4. The Disclosure Statement fails to adequately disclose the circumstances surrounding the disposition of surplus property and property rights. 5
 - 5. Filing of a Plan Supplement 10 days before Plan voting is insufficient..... 6
 - B. The Plan of Reorganization Cannot be Confirmed. 6
 - 1. The purported “modification” treatment of Reimbursement Agreements with Class 4f creditors is unconfirmable on its face. 6
 - a) The Reimbursement Agreement is not an executory contract and cannot be assumed. 6
 - b) Even if the Reimbursement Agreement is an executory contract, it cannot be assumed because the Reimbursement Agreement is a financial accommodation and the Debtor has not cured its default under the Reimbursement Agreement. 7
 - c) Even if the Reimbursement Agreement were assumable, it cannot be modified. 9
 - 2. The Plan impermissibly classifies and treats Prior Bond Claims differently than other general unsecured claims..... 9
 - 3. There are a significant number of conditions precedent required to both confirmation of the Plan and the Effective Date of the Plan..... 9
- IV. CONCLUSION 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Cases

In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1996) 9

In re Boston Post Road Limited Partnership, 21 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994) 9

In re Cardinal Congregate I, 121 B.R. 760 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) 6

In re Johnston, 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994) 9

In re Main Street AC, Inc., 234 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 1999) 6

In re Metrocraft Publishing Services, Inc., 39 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984)..... 3

In re Orgell, 117 B.R. 574 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1990)..... 9

In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980) 7

In re Spectrum Inf. Tech., Inc., 190 B.R. 741 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) 7

In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991) 7

In re Texscan Corp., 976 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992) 7

NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 n.6, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984) 6

Statutes

11 U.S.C. §365(f)(3)..... 9

11 U.S.C. Section 365(b)(1)..... 8

11 U.S.C. Section 365(c)(2)..... 7

Section 1125(a)(1)..... 3

Section 1125(b) 3

1 TO THE HONORABLE DENNIS MONTALI, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
2 JUDGE, AND ALL PARTIES IN INTEREST:

3 Bank of Montreal, by and through its attorneys, Perkins Coie LLP, objects to the adequacy
4 of the Disclosure Statement for Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
5 (the "Disclosure Statement") and the accompanying Plan of Reorganization (the "Plan") proposed
6 by Pacific Gas & Electric Company ("PG&E" or the "Debtor") and its parent company, PG&E
7 Corporation (together the "Proponents") and respectfully states as follows¹:

8 **I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

9 PG&E entered into a Reimbursement Agreement (Series D), dated as of May 1, 1996 (the
10 "Reimbursement Agreement"²) with Bank of Montreal, Union Bank of Switzerland, New York
11 Branch ("UBS"), and The Sumitomo Bank Limited ("Sumitomo") (collectively, the "Banks").
12 UBS, on behalf of, and in its capacity as Administrative Agent, for, the Banks is the Issuing Agent
13 and Administrative Agent under the Reimbursement Agreement.³ On or about May 23, 1996,
14 UBS issued irrevocable transferable letter of credit number SBY504295 (the "Letter of Credit"),
15 which provided credit and liquidity support for California Pollution Control Financing Authority
16 Pollution Control Refunding Revenue Bonds (Pacific Gas & Electric Company) 1996 Series D
17 (the "Bonds") that were issued pursuant to a May 1, 1996 Indenture of Trust between the
18 California Pollution Control Financing Authority and Bankers Trust Company, as Trustee. After
19 issuance of the Letter of Credit, the Trustee was authorized to draw upon the Letter of Credit in an
20 aggregate amount not to exceed \$105,068,494 with respect to payment of the unpaid principal of,
21 and interest on the Bonds.

22
23
24 ¹ Bank of Montreal reserves the right to make further objections to both the Disclosure
25 Statement and the Proponents' Plan of Reorganization (the "Plan").

26 ² A copy of the Reimbursement Agreement is attached to the Affidavit of Thomas E.
27 McGraw concurrently filed in support of this objection.

28 ³ It is Bank of Montreal's understanding that UBS has sold its position on a participation
and/or an assignment basis.

1 After the Petition Date⁴, the Bonds were redeemed and the Letter of Credit was drawn.
2 Pursuant to the terms of the Reimbursement Agreement, on May 4, 2001 and again on May 7,
3 2001, Bank of Montreal funded letter of credit obligations totaling \$19,146,075.47 as required
4 under the Reimbursement Agreement.⁵ All of the Prior Bonds were redeemed in whole and no
5 principal or interest remains outstanding with respect thereto. As such, the Banks have no
6 remaining performance obligations under the Reimbursement Agreement.⁶ Bank of Montreal's
7 claim in respect of amounts drawn under the Letter of Credit, inclusive of unpaid fees accrued
8 through April 6, 2001, is \$19,146,075.47 and continues to accrue interest, fees, and expenses.⁷

9 II. PLAN TREATMENT OF BANK OF MONTREAL'S CLAIM

10 Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Bank of Montreal's claim was placed in "Class 4f—Prior
11 Bond Claims"⁸ rather than with the other general unsecured creditors' claims in "Class 5—General
12 Unsecured Claims." Bank of Montreal objects to the classification of its claim as anything but a
13 general unsecured claim and believes that its claim should be accorded the same treatment as that
14 of all other general unsecured creditors in Class 5. The Debtor does not state why Prior Bond
15 Claims are accorded different treatment under the Plan than that of General Unsecured Claims.

16 Under the Plan, Prior Bond Claims are to receive the following, patently unconfirmable treatment:

17 (i) cash representing sixty percent of the outstanding Reimbursement Obligation plus accrued and
18

19
20 ⁴ Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Plan
and/or Disclosure Statement.

21 ⁵ See Affidavit of Thomas E. McGraw, ¶ 2.

22 ⁶ Id. ¶ 4. The draw on the Letter of Credit and associated redemption of the Prior Bonds
23 terminated the Letter of Credit according to its terms. See Letter of Credit p. 1. Upon this termination, the
24 Banks ceased to have any further performance obligations under the Letter of Credit and Reimbursement
Agreement.

25 ⁷ Bank of Montreal timely filed a general unsecured proof of claim in this case for such
26 sum. See Affidavit of Thomas E. McGraw, ¶ 3.

27 ⁸ The Disclosure Statement states that "[t]he 96B Bonds, 96D Bonds, 97A Bonds and the
28 97C Bonds, together with any series of 96C Bonds, 96E Bonds, 96F Bonds and/or 97B Bonds that have
been redeemed in whole, but not in part, as of the Voting Record Date or the Effective Date, as applicable,
are defined collectively in the Plan as the 'Prior Bonds.'" See Disclosure Statement, at 156.

1 unpaid interest together with all other amounts under the Reimbursement Obligation and (ii) a
2 modification of the Reimbursement Agreement to provide that the Reorganized Debtor shall
3 remain solely liable thereunder for the remaining forty percent of the Reimbursement Obligation
4 which shall be payable in ten years bearing interest at the same rate as the Reorganized Debtor's
5 notes with a ten year maturity.⁹

6 III. ARGUMENT

7 A. The Disclosure Statement Does Not Contain Adequate Information.

8 Section 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an acceptance or rejection of a plan
9 cannot be solicited prior to the transmittal of a "written disclosure statement approved, after notice
10 and a hearing, by the court as containing adequate information." "Adequate information" is
11 defined in Section 1125(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code as

12 information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably
13 practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition
14 of the debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical
15 reasonable investor typical of the holders of claims or interests of the
relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan.

16 Case law has developed a number of factors that a court should examine in ruling upon the
17 adequacy of information in a disclosure statement. One such case is In re Metrocraft Publishing
18 Services, Inc., 39 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). Metrocraft identified the following 19 factors
19 as potentially being relevant to the adequacy analysis:

20 (1) the events which led to the filing of a bankruptcy petition; (2) a
21 description of the available assets and their value; (3) the anticipated future
22 of the company; (4) the source of information stated in the disclosure
23 statement; (5) a disclaimer; (6) the present condition of the debtor while in
24 Chapter 11; (7) the scheduled claims; (8) the estimated return to creditors
25 under a Chapter 7 liquidation; (9) the accounting method utilized to produce
26 financial information and the name of the accountants responsible for such
27 information; (10) the future management of the debtor; (11) the Chapter 11
28 plan or a summary thereof; (12) the estimated administrative expenses,
including attorneys' and accountants' fees; (13) the collectibility of accounts
receivable; (14) financial information, data, valuations or projections

9 See Plan, Section 4.12(b) at 35.

1 relevant to the creditor's decision to accept or reject the Chapter 11 plan;
2 (15) information relevant to the risks posed to creditors under the plan; (16)
3 the actual or projected realizable value for recovery of preferential or
4 otherwise violable transfers; (17) litigation likely to arise in a
nonbankruptcy context; (18) tax attributes of the debtor; and (19) the
relationship of the debtor with affiliates.

5 Id. at 568. The Disclosure Statement in this case is deficient in respect of many of these
6 requirements. Accordingly, Bank of Montreal is unable to evaluate and make an informed
7 judgment of the credit risk regarding the Plan's proposed treatment of Prior Bond Claims.

8 **1. Inadequate Disclosure of Financial Information.**

9 Not only does the Disclosure Statement fail to adequately identify all of Debtor's assets,
10 their fair market value and the methodology utilized in determining those values, but the
11 Disclosure Statement also fails to identify which assets will be transferred to each newly
12 established entity, the value of those assets or the methodology in determining the value.¹⁰
13 Although the Disclosure Statement generally states that assets related to the function of each entity
14 would generally follow that subsidiary, it is impossible to determine which specific assets those
15 would be, or how they affect the ability to pay the obligations under the Plan. For example,
16 Section X.B.4 of the Disclosure Statement states that "as of the Effective Date, many of such
17 arrangements [contracts] will be unwound and the assets related to each business line will be
18 identified, separated and transferred to a newly formed company." As a result, it appears that the
19 assets to be transferred would not even be identified until after confirmation of the Plan. This will,
20 of course, make it essentially impossible to assess the viability of payment of the Debtor's
21 obligations, and, of course, would impact the Debtor's ability to raise new funds. Accordingly, the
22 inadequate disclosure of essential financial information makes it impossible for Bank of Montreal
23 to make an informed judgment of the Plan's treatment of its claim.¹¹

24
25
26 ¹⁰ The Plan and Disclosure Statement contemplate that Debtor will "disaggregate and
restructure its business by creating new limited liability companies and transferring certain assets of the
business lines to each of the entities." See Disclosure Statement at 65.

27
28 ¹¹ Additionally, no liquidation analysis has been provided by the Proponents. The Disclosure
Statement simply states that "a liquidation under Chapter 11 is a much less attractive alternative to

1 **2. Inadequate discussion of feasibility.**

2 Although the Disclosure Statement does generally describe what will happen following
3 confirmation, it does not adequately describe how it will happen or the resulting economic
4 ramifications. The pro forma financial statements are high level and vague. Furthermore, there is
5 no discussion of how these costs will actually be funded, and which entities will get the benefit of
6 the funding. Although Exhibit C to the Disclosure Statement and Plan discusses the Debtor's
7 prospective ability to meet its obligations, they are summary and do not allow a creditor to test the
8 proposed sources and uses of funds. Finally, the financial projections appear to be more favorable
9 than the Debtor's recent operating history, as well as its postpetition operating history.

10 **3. There is no meaningful discussion of the Debtor's postpetition**
11 **operations.**

12 As discussed briefly above, the Disclosure Statement should describe the effect of the
13 bankruptcy case on its postpetition operations. The postpetition, preconfirmation performance of
14 the Debtor is a significant baseline from which to test projections.

15 **4. The Disclosure Statement fails to adequately disclose the circumstances**
16 **surrounding the disposition of surplus property and property rights.**

17 The Disclosure Statement refers to certain land parcels and property rights deemed "not
18 essential" to the Reorganized Debtor's operations. The Disclosure Statement suggests that these
19 will be sold, netting approximately \$75 million after taxes. The Disclosure Statement does not
20 address the disposition of the funds, the methodology for valuing the property, or which (if any)
21 entity will get the benefit of the proceeds.¹²

22
23 creditors because a greater return to creditors is provided for in the Plan." See Disclosure Statement, at
24 175. This statement is self-serving and, at the very least, fails to take into account the fact that a creditor
25 may prefer to realize on a smaller dividend now as opposed to waiting up to ten years for the potential of a
26 larger dividend. Moreover, the Plan Proponents make no attempt to discuss the alternatives of selling the
27 Companies as a single going concern or broken up into separate entities and resold.

28 ¹² See Attachment 4, Section VII.I. of Disclosure Statement. The sale of surplus property and
property rights is also mentioned in Attachment 5, Article VII.5.a. of the Plan. The sale is to be free of all
liens and encumbrances; however, it is unclear if this property is the same as that referred to in the
Disclosure Statement.

1 **5. Filing of a Plan Supplement 10 days before Plan voting is insufficient.**

2 The Disclosure Statement states that a Plan Supplement shall be filed at least ten days prior
3 to the last day upon which holders of Claims may vote to accept or reject the Plan. Even assuming
4 the Plan Supplement provides the necessary “adequate information” not disclosed in the
5 Disclosure Statement, the filing of this information ten days prior to the day on which creditors
6 may vote on the Plan is by definition not a court-approved solicitation, nor does it provide
7 sufficient time to allow creditors to adequately review and evaluate this information.
8 Consequently, creditors will be unable to make an informed decision accepting or rejecting the
9 Plan.

10 **B. The Plan of Reorganization Cannot be Confirmed.**

11 If it is apparent that the plan of reorganization described by the disclosure statement cannot
12 be confirmed by the Court, then the disclosure statement should not be approved and the further
13 expense and delay attendant to a hearing on confirmation of the plan should not be incurred. In re
14 Main Street AC, Inc., 234 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 1999); In re Cardinal Congregate I, 121
15 B.R. 760 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990). The Debtor’s Plan is so fatally flawed that absent consent by
16 most classes it cannot be confirmed.

17 **1. The purported “modification” treatment of Reimbursement**
18 **Agreements with Class 4f creditors is unconfirmable on its face.**

19 **a) The Reimbursement Agreement is not an executory contract and**
20 **cannot be assumed.**

21 An executory contract is one on which performance remains due to some extent on both
22 sides. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 n.6, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984); In re
23 Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980) (an executory contract is one “under which
24 the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that
25 the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
26 performance of the other”) (citation omitted); In re Texscan Corp., 976 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir.
27 1992). Here, performance does not remain due on both sides of the Reimbursement Agreement.
28 The Banks have no remaining obligations under the Reimbursement Agreement. The draw on the

1 Letter of Credit and associated redemption of the Prior Bonds terminated the Letter of Credit
2 according to its terms.¹³ Upon this termination, the Banks ceased to have any further obligations
3 under the Letter of Credit and Reimbursement Agreement. A contract is not executory where the
4 only remaining obligation is the payment of money. In re Spectrum Inf. Tech., Inc., 190 B.R. 741,
5 747 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996). Accordingly, the Reimbursement Agreement is not an executory
6 contract because the only obligation remaining is the Debtor's reimbursement of the respective
7 Prior Letter of Credit Issuing Banks for, among other things, the amount drawn under the related
8 Prior Letters of Credit.

9 **b) Even if the Reimbursement Agreement is an executory contract,**
10 **it cannot be assumed because the Reimbursement Agreement is**
11 **a financial accommodation and the Debtor has not cured its**
12 **default under the Reimbursement Agreement.**

13 11 U.S.C. Section 365(c)(2) provides that a debtor may not assume an executory contract if
14 “such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial
15 accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security for the debtor.” In re Sun
16 Runner Marine, Inc., 945 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 365(c)(2) unambiguously
17 prohibits the assumption of financial accommodation contracts, regardless of the consent of the
18 non-debtor party.”) The accompanying legislative history to Section 365(c)(2) illustrates that
19 “under this provision, contracts such as loan commitments and letters of credit are nonassignable,
20 and may not be assumed by the [debtor.]” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (1977).
21 Proponents’ Plan proposes to do exactly that which Section 365(c)(2) prohibits. According to the
22 Plan, the Reimbursement Agreement shall be modified to provide that the Reorganized Debtor
23 shall remain solely liable thereunder for the remaining forty percent of the Reimbursement
24 Obligation which shall be payable in ten years, “unless and until Refunding Bonds are issued with

25 ¹³ The Proponents state that:

26 [a]ll of the Prior Bonds have been redeemed in whole and no principal or interest remains
27 outstanding with respect thereto. With respect to each series of Prior Bonds, under the terms of the
28 respective Prior Reimbursement Agreement the Debtor is obligated to reimburse the respective Prior Letter
of Credit Issuing Bank for, among other things, the amount drawn under the related Prior Letter of Credit
which was applied to the payment of the redemption price of the Prior Bonds. See Disclosure Statement,
at 161.

1 respect thereto secured by, among other things, a new letter of credit issued by such Prior Letter of
2 Credit Issuing Bank.” See Plan § 4.12(b) at 35. These Plan provisions violate Section 365(c)(2)
3 and improperly require holders of Prior Bond Claims to involuntarily finance Debtor’s
4 reorganization.

5 11 U.S.C. Section 365(b)(1) provides that a debtor may not assume an executory contract
6 unless, at the time of assumption of such contract, the debtor—

7 (a) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure
8 such default;

9 (b) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
10 promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease,
11 for any pecuniary loss to such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss
12 to such party resulting from such default; and

13 (c) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract
14 or lease.

15 Even if it were executory and not a financial accommodation contract, the Debtor cannot
16 assume the Reimbursement Agreement until it cures or provides adequate assurance that it will
17 promptly cure the outstanding obligations due and owing under the Reimbursement Agreement.
18 The Proponents’ Plan does neither. For example, the Disclosure Statement acknowledges
19 Debtor’s outstanding obligation under the Prior Reimbursement Agreement, but provides for
20 repayment “in ten years.” See Disclosure Statement at 161. Not only is ten years not a prompt
21 cure of the default, but repayment depends upon the uncertain future prospects of the Reorganized
22 Debtor.

23 **c) Even if the Reimbursement Agreement were assumable, it
24 cannot be modified.**

25 Executory contracts may only be assumed with the benefits and burdens agreed to by the
26 parties when they entered into the contract. In re Orgell, 117 B.R. 574, 576 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
27 1990). The Debtor proposes to force “a modification of the Reimbursement Agreement” without
28 each affected creditor’s consent. Section 365 does not modify contracts. Id. at 577, 11 U.S.C.
§365(f)(3). The proposed treatment cannot stand.

1 **2. The Plan impermissibly classifies and treats Prior Bond Claims**
2 **differently than other general unsecured claims.**

3 The Plan impermissibly classifies the Prior Bond Claims separately from that of other
4 general unsecured creditors and then proposes to discriminate unfairly against the holders of Prior
5 Bond Claims. Separate classification of similar claims is only be permitted when there are
6 legitimate business reasons for separately classifying claims. In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir.
7 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1312 (1997); In re Johnston, 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
8 Boston Post Road Limited Partnership, 21 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 897
9 (1995). The Prior Bond Claims appear to have been separately classified solely to force the
10 holders of such claims to issue new letters of credit upon terms and conditions satisfactory to the
11 Reorganized Debtor with respect to the Bonds while the rest of the Debtor's general unsecured
12 creditors receive liquid notes. Such disparate treatment constitutes unfair discrimination that
13 prevents confirmation under section 1129(b)(1).

14 **3. There are a significant number of conditions precedent required to**
15 **both confirmation of the Plan and the Effective Date of the Plan.**

16 These conditions both set forth the essence of the Proponents' Plan and demonstrate that
17 there are no meaningful creditor protections. The more significant conditions precedent to
18 Confirmation include:

- 19 i. an order that the Debtor, the Parent and its affiliates are not liable for any DWR contracts
20 (except DWR Claims) or purchases of power by the DWR;
- 21 ii. an order prohibiting reassumption of the Net Open Position (the "NOP") unless (a) the
22 Reorganized Debtor establishes and maintains an investment grade credit rating from S&P
23 and Moody's, (b) the Reorganized Debtor receives assurances from S&P and Moody's that
24 its credit rating will not be downgraded as a result of the reassumption of the NOP, (c) an
25 objective retail rate recovery mechanism is put in place, and (d) objective standards regarding
26 procurement transactions are established¹⁴;

27
28 ¹⁴ See Attachment 7, Article VII.5.f. of Plan.

- 1 iii. the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") approves ETrans joining a FERC-
2 approved Regional Transmission Organization; and
3 iv. state and local regulatory approval of the Plan Proponents' restructuring of the Debtor is
4 obtained.

5 Significant Conditions Precedent to the Effective Date include S&P and Moody's
6 establishing credit ratings for the securities to be issued by ETrans, GTrans, Gen and the
7 Reorganized Debtor which are acceptable to the Plan Proponents as well as the consummation of
8 the sale of the New Money Notes by each of the companies.¹⁵ On their face, these conditions
9 appear to provide creditors some comfort that their economic interest will be protected by
10 limitations on the Debtor's ability to change the Plan and a market that will provide liquidity.

11 Notwithstanding all of the above conditions, Section 8.4 of the Plan allows the Proponents
12 to waive, without obtaining approval from either the court or creditors, one or more of the
13 conditions precedent to Effectiveness and Confirmation. The result of the Proponents' right to
14 waive any conditions is that there are no meaningful safeguards that creditors will receive their
15 stated treatment under the Plan.

16 IV. CONCLUSION

17 For the foregoing reasons, both the Disclosure Statement and the Plan fall short of the
18 requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the Court should enter an order denying
19 approval of the Disclosure Statement.

20 DATED: November 26, 2001.

21 PERKINS COIE LLP

22 By 

23 Manuella Hancock

24 Attorneys for Creditor
25 Bank of Montreal

26
27
28 ¹⁵ For a complete list of the Conditions Precedent to Effectiveness, see Attachment 6,
Article VIII.2. of Plan.