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November 28, 1988

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50-259/260/296 Docket Nos.

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr. Senior Vice President, Nuclear Group Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

SUBJECT: REACTOR WATER LEVELS (TAC 00083, 00084, 00085) (TS 241) - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 160, 157, and 131 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated June 24, 1988. The amendments replace all water level references to the top of active fuel with the corresponding reference to vessel zero.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

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MSimms TMeek (12)

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects

Enclosures: Amendment No. 160 to 1. License No. DPR-33

- Amendment No. 157 to 2. License No. DPR-52
- 3. Amendment No. 131 to License No. DPR-68
- Safety Evaluation 4.

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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Mr. Oliver J. Kingsley, Jr.

cc:

General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive E11 B33 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Mr. R. L. Gridley Tennessee Valley Authority 5N 157B Lookout Place Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Mr. C. Mason Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602

Mr. P. Carier Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602

Mr. D. L. Williams Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive W10 B85 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Chairman, Limestone County Commission P.O. Box 188 Athens, Alabama 35611

Claude Earl Fox, M.D. State Health Officer State Department of Public Health State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36130 -2- Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Resident Inspector/Browns Ferry NP U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611

Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Tennessee Valley Authority Rockville Office 11921 Rockville Pike Suite 402 Rockville, Maryland 20852



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-259

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 160 License No. DPR-33

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated June 24, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2 -
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-33 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. $_{160}$, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Suzanne Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 28, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 160

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

DOCKET NO. 50-259

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
1.1/2.1-5	1.1/2.1-5
1.1/2.1-10	1.1/2.1-10
1.1/2.1-11*	1.1/2.1-11*
1.1/2.1-14	1.1/2.1-14*
1.1/2.1-15	1.1/2.1-15
3.2/4.2-65	3.2/4.2-65
3.2/4.2-66	3.2/4.2-66

SAFETY LIMIT

1.1.B. <u>Power Transient</u>

To ensure that the Safety Limits established in Specification 1.1.A are not exceeded, each required scram shall be initiated by its expected scram signal. The Safety Limit shall be assumed to be exceeded when scram is accomplished by means other than the expected scram signal.

C. <u>Reactor Vessel Water Level</u>

Whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, the water level shall be greater than or equal to 378 inches above vessel zero.

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING

- 2.1.B. Power Transient Trip Settings
 - Scram and isola- ≥ 538 in. tion (PCIS groups above 2,3,6) reactor vessel low water level zero
 - 2. Scram--turbine ≤ 10 perstop valve cent valve closure closure
 - 3. Scram--turbine ≥ 550 psig control valve fast closure or turbine trip
 - 4. (Deleted)
 - 5. Scram--main ≤ 10 percent steam line valve isolation closure
 - 6. Main steam ≥ 825 psig isolation valve closure --nuclear system low pressure

C. <u>Water Level Trip Settings</u>

- Core spray and ≥ 378 in. LPCI actuation-- above reactor low vessel water level zero
- 2. HPCI and RCIC ≥ 470 in. actuation-- above reactor low vessel water level zero
- 3. Main steam ≥ 378 in. isolation above valve closure--- vessel reactor low zero water level

1.1/2.1-5

Amendment No. 160

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1.1 BASES (LONT'A)

The safety limit has been established at 378 inches above vessel zero to provide a point which can be monitored and also provide adequate margin to assure sufficient cooling. This point is the lower reactor low water level trip.

REFERENCE

 General Electric BWR Thermal Analysis Basis (GETAB) Data, Correlation and Design Application, NEDO 10958 and NEDE 10938.

BFN Unit 1 1.1/2.1-10

Amendment No. 160

2.1 <u>BASES: LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS RELATED TO FUEL CLADDING</u> INTEGRITY

The abnormal operational transients applicable to operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant have been analyzed throughout the spectrum of planned operating conditions up to the design thermal power condition of 3440 MWt. The analyses were based upon plant operation in accordance with the operating map given in Figure 3.7-1 of the FSAR. In addition, 3293 MWt is the licensed maximum power level of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, and this represents the maximum steady-state power which shall not knowingly be exceeded.

Conservatism is incorporated in the transient analyses in estimating the controlling factors, such as void reactivity coefficient, control rod scram worth, scram delay time, peaking factors, and axial power shapes. These factors are selected conservatively with respect to their effect on the applicable transient results as determined by the current analysis model. This transient model, evolved over many years, has been substantiated in operation as a conservative tool for evaluating reactor dynamic performance. Results obtained from a General Electric boiling water reactor have been compared with predictions made by the model. The comparisons and results are summarized in References 1, 2, and 3.

The absolute value of the void reactivity coefficient used in the analysis is conservatively estimated to be about 25 percent greater than the nominal maximum value expected to occur during the core lifetime. The scram worth used has been derated to be equivalent to approximately 80 percent of the total scram worth of the control rods. The scram delay time and rate of rod insertion allowed by the analyses are conservatively set equal to the longest delay and slowest insertion rate acceptable by Technical Specifications as further described in Reference 4. The effect of scram worth, scram delay time and rod insertion rate, all conservatively applied, are of greatest significance in the early portion of the negative reactivity insertion. The rapid insertion of negative reactivity is assured by the time requirements for 5 percent and 20 percent insertion. By the time the rods are 60 percent inserted, approximately four dollars of negative reactivity has been inserted which strongly turns the transient, and accomplishes the desired effect. The times for 50 percent and 90 percent insertion are given to assure proper completion of the expected performance in the earlier portion of the transient, and to establish the ultimate fully shutdown steady-state condition.

For analyses of the thermal consequences of the transients a MCPR > limits specified in Specification 3.5.K is conservatively assumed to exist prior to initiation of the transients. This choice of using conservative values of controlling parameters and initiating transients at the design power level, produces more pessimistic answers than would result by using expected values of control parameters and analyzing at higher power levels.

1.1/2.1-11

IRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Continued)

Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the scram setting is also ranged up. A scram at 120 divisions on the IRM instruments remains in effect as long as the reactor is in the startup mode. In addition, the APRM 15 percent scram prevents higher power operation without being in the RUN mode. The IRM scram provides protection for changes which occur both locally and over the entire core. The most significant sources of reactivity change during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux, and an IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any safety limit is exceeded. For the case of a single control rod withdrawal error, a range of rod withdrawal accidents was analyzed. This analysis included starting the accident at various power levels. The most severe case involves an initial condition in which the reactor is just subcritical and the IRM system is not yet on scale. This condition exists at quarter rod density. Quarter rod density is illustrated in paragraph 7.5.5 of the FSAR. Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming that the IRM channel closest to the withdrawn rod is bypassed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is scrammed and peak power limited to one percent of rated power, thus maintaining MCPR above 1.07. Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence.

4. Fixed High Neutron Flux Scram Trip

The average power range monitoring (APRM) system, which is calibrated using heat balance data taken during steady-state conditions, reads in percent of rated power (3,293 MWt). The APRM system responds directly to neutron flux. Licensing analyses have demonstrated that with a neutron flux scram of 120 percent of rated power, none of the abnormal operational transients analyzed violate the fuel safety limit and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage.

APRM Control Rod Block Β.

Reactor power level may be varied by moving control rods or by varying the recirculation flow rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent rod withdrawal beyond a given point at constant recirculation flow rate and thus to protect against the condition of a MCPR less than 1.07. This rod block trip setting, which is automatically varied with recirculation loop flow rate, prevents an increase in the reactor power level to excess values due to control rod withdrawal. The flow variable trip setting provides substantial margin from fuel damage, assuming a steady-state operation at the trip setting, over the entire recirculation flow range. The margin to the Safety Limit increases as the flow

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2.1 BASES (Cont'd)

decreases for the specified trip setting versus flow relationship; therefore, the worst case MCPR which could occur during steady-state operation is at 108 percent of rated thermal power because of the APRM rod block trip setting. The actual power distribution in the core is established by specified control rod sequences and is monitored continuously by the in-core LPRM system.

C. Reactor Water Low Level Scram and Isolation (Except Main Steam Lines)

The setpoint for the low level scram is above the bottom of the separator skirt. This level has been used in transient analyses dealing with coolant inventory decrease. The results reported in FSAR subsection 14.5 show that scram and isolation of all process lines (except main steam) at this level adequately protects the fuel and the pressure barrier, because MCPR is greater than 1.07 in all cases, and system pressure does not reach the safety valve settings. The scram setting is sufficiently below normal operating range to avoid spurious scrams.

D. <u>Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram</u>

The turbine stop valve closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux and heat flux increases that would result from closure of the stop valves. With a trip setting of 10 percent of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in heat flux is such that adequate thermal margins are maintained even during the worst case transient that assumes the turbine bypass valves remain closed. (Reference 2)

E. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure or Turbine Trip Scram

Turbine control valve fast closure or turbine trip scram anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from control valve fast closure due to load rejection or control valve closure due to turbine trip; each without bypass valve capability. The reactor protection system initiates a scram in less than 30 milliseconds after the start of control valve fast closure due to load rejection or control valve closure due to turbine trip. This scram is achieved by rapidly reducing hydraulic control oil pressure at the main turbine control valve actuator disc dump valves. This loss of pressure is sensed by pressure switches whose contacts form the one-out-of-two-twice logic input to the reactor protection system. This trip setting, a nominally 50 percent greater closure time and a different valve characteristic from that of the turbine stop valve, combine to produce transients very similar to that for the stop valve. No significant change in MCPR occurs. Relevant transient analyses are discussed in References 2 and 3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30 percent of rated, as measured by turbine first state pressure.

3.2 BASES

In addition to reactor protection instrumentation which initiates a reactor scram, protective instrumentation has been provided which initiates action to mitigate the consequences of accidents which are beyond the operator's ability to control, or terminates operator errors before they result in serious consequences. This set of specifications provides the limiting conditions of operation for the primary system isolation function, initiation of the core cooling systems, control rod block and standby gas treatment systems. The objectives of the Specifications are (i) to assure the effectiveness of the protective instrumentation when required by preserving its capability to tolerate a single failure of any component of such systems even during periods when portions of such systems are out of service for maintenance, and (ii) to prescribe the trip settings required to assure adequate performance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.

Some of the settings on the instrumentation that initiate or control core and containment cooling have tolerances explicitly stated where the high and low values are both critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are chosen at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the safety system involved and exposure to abnormal situations.

Actuation of primary containment valves is initiated by protective instrumentation shown in Table 3.2.A which senses the conditions for which isolation is required. Such instrumentation must be available whenever primary containment integrity is required.

The instrumentation which initiates primary system isolation is connected in a dual bus arrangement.

The low water level instrumentation set to trip at 538 inches above vessel zero closes isolation valves in the RHR System, Drywell and Suppression Chamber exhausts and drains and Reactor Water Cleanup Lines (Groups 2 and 3 isolation valves). The low reactor water level instrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is 470 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) trips the recirculation pumps and initiates the RCIC and HPCI systems. The RCIC and HPCI system initiation opens the turbine steam supply valve which in turn initiates closure of the respective drain valves (Group 7).

The low water level instrumentation set to trip at 378 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) closes the Main Steam Isolation Valves, the Main Steam Line Drain Valves, and the Reactor Water Sample Valves (Group 1). Details of valve grouping and required closing times are given in Specification 3.7. These trip settings are adequate to prevent core uncovery in the case of a break in the largest line assuming the maximum closing time.

3.2 BASES (CONT a)

The low reactor water level instrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is 378 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) initiates the LPCI, Core Spray Pumps, contributes to ADS initiation, and starts the diesel generators. These trip setting levels were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operation so that postaccident cooling can be accomplished and the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 will not be violated. For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation is initiated in time to meet the above criteria.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal to the water level instrumentation and, in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Groups 2 and 8 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will initiate CSCS operation at about the same time as the low water level instrumentation; thus, the results given above are applicable here also.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 140 percent of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel cladding temperatures remain below 1000°F, and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 GFR 100 guidelines. Reference Section 14.6.5 FSAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line tunnel to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves. The setting of 200°F for the main steam line tunnel detector is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 15 gpm; thus, it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the temperature instrumentation. In the event of a loss of the reactor building ventilation system, radiant heating in the vicinity of the main steam lines raises the ambient temperature above 200°F. The temperature increases can cause an unnecessary main steam line isolation and reactor scram. Permission is provided to bypass the temperature trip for four hours to avoid an unnecessary plant transient and allow performance of the secondary containment leak rate test or make repairs necessary to regain normal ventilation.

High radiation monitors in the main steam line tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With the established nominal setting of three times normal background and main

3.2/4.2-66 Amendment No. 160



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.157 License No. DPR-52

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated June 24, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 157, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Suzanne Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 28, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 157

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT		
1.1/2.1-5	1.1/2.1-5		
1.1/2.1-10	1.1/2.1-10		
1.1/2.1-11*	1.1/2.1-11*		
1.1/2.1-14	1.1/2.1-14*		
1.1/2.1-15	1.1/2.1-15		
3.2/4.2-65	3.2/4.2-65		
3.2/4.2-66	3.2/4.2-66		

1.1/2.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

SAFETY LIMIT

1.1.B. Power Transient

To ensure that the Safety Limits established in Specification 1.1.A are not exceeded, each required scram shall be initiated by its expected scram signal. The Safety Limit shall be assumed to be exceeded when scram is accomplished by means other than the expected scram signal.

C. <u>Reactor Vessel Water Level</u>

Whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, the water level shall be greater than or equal to 378 inches above vessel zero.

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING

- 2.1.B. Power Transient Trip Settings
 - Scram and isola- ≥ 538 in. tion (PCIS groups above 2,3,6) reactor vessel low water level zero
 - 2. Scram--turbine ≤ 10 perstop valve cent valve closure closure
 - 3. Scram--turbine ≥ 550 psig control valve fast closure or turbine trip
 - 4. (Deleted)
 - 5. Scram--main ≤ 10 percent steam line valve isolation closure
 - 6. Main steam ≥ 825 psig isolation valve closure --nuclear system low pressure

C. <u>Water Level Trip Settings</u>

- Core spray and ≥ 378 in. LPCI actuation--- above reactor low vessel water level zero
- 2. HPCI and RCIC ≥ 470 in. actuation— above reactor low vessel water level zero
- 3. Main steam ≥ 378 in. isolation above valve closure-- vessel reactor low zero water level

1.1/2.1-5

Amendment No. 157

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The safety limit has been established at 378 inches above vessel zero to provide a point which can be monitored and also provide adequate margin to assure sufficient cooling. This point is the lower reactor low water level trip.

REFERENCE

1. General Electric BWR Thermal Analysis Basis (GETAB) Data, Correlation and Design Application, NEDO 10958 and NEDE 10938.

BFN Unit 2 1.1/2.1-10

Amendment No. 157

INTEGRITY

The abnormal operational transients applicable to operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant have been analyzed throughout the spectrum of planned operating conditions up to the design thermal power condition of 3,440 MWt. The analyses were based upon plant operation in accordance with the operating map given in Figure 3.7-1 of the FSAR. In addition, 3,293 MWt is the licensed maximum power level of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, and this represents the maximum steady-state power which shall not knowingly be exceeded.

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Conservatism is incorporated in the transient analyses in estimating the controlling factors, such as void reactivity coefficient, control rod scram worth, scram delay time, peaking factors, and axial power shapes. These factors are selected conservatively with respect to their effect on the applicable transient results as determined by the current analysis model. This transient model, evolved over many years, has been substantiated in operation as a conservative tool for evaluating reactor dynamic performance. Results obtained from a General Electric boiling water reactor have been compared with predictions made by the model. The comparisons and results are summarized in Reference 1.

The void reactivity coefficient and the scram worth are described in detail in Reference 1.

The scram delay time and rate of rod insertion allowed by the analyses are conservatively set equal to the longest delay and slowest insertion rate acceptable by Technical Specifications as further described in Reference 1. The effect of scram worth, scram delay time and rod insertion rate, all conservatively applied, are of greatest significance in the early portion of the negative reactivity insertion. The rapid insertion of negative reactivity is assured by the time requirements for 5 percent and 20 percent insertion. By the time the rods are 60 percent inserted, approximately four dollars of negative reactivity has been inserted which strongly turns the transient, and accomplishes the desized effect. The times for 50 percent and 90 percent insertion are given to assure proper completion of the expected performance in the earlier portion of the transient, and to establish the ultimate fully shutdown steady-state condition.

For analyses of the thermal consequences of the transients a MCPR > limits specified in Specification 3.5.k is conservatively assumed to exist prior to initiation of the transients. This choice of using conservative values of controlling parameters and initiating transients at the design power level, produces more pessimistic answers than would result by using expected values of control parameters and analyzing at higher power levels.

IRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Continued)

Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the scram setting is also ranged up. A scram at 120 divisions on the IRM instruments remains in effect as long as the reactor is in the startup mode. In addition, the APRM 15 percent scram prevents higher power operation without being in the RUN mode. The IRM scram provides protection for changes which occur both locally and over the entire core. The most significant sources of reactivity change during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux, and an IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any safety limit is exceeded. For the case of a single control rod withdrawal error, a range of rod withdrawal accidents was analyzed. This analysis included starting the accident at various power levels. The most severe case involves an initial condition in which the reactor is just subcritical and the IRM system is not yet on scale. This condition exists at quarter rod density. Quarter rod density is illustrated in paragraph 7.5.5 of the FSAR. Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming that the IRM channel closest to the withdrawn rod is bypassed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is scrammed and peak power limited to one percent of rated power, thus maintaining MCPR above 1.07. Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence.

4. Fixed High Neutron Flux Scram Trip

The average power range monitoring (APRM) system, which is calibrated using heat balance data taken during steady-state conditions, reads in percent of rated power (3,293 MWt). The APRM system responds directly to neutron flux. Licensing analyses have demonstrated that with a neutron flux scram of 120 percent of rated power, none of the abnormal operational transients analyzed violate the fuel safety limit and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage.

B. APRM Control Rod Block

Reactor power level may be varied by moving control rods or by varying the recirculation flow rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent rod withdrawal beyond a given point at constant recirculation flow rate and thus to protect against the condition of a MCPR less than 1.07. This rod block trip setting, which is automatically varied with recirculation loop flow rate, prevents an increase in the reactor power level to excess values due to control rod withdrawal. The flow variable trip setting provides substantial margin from fuel damage, assuming a steady-state operation at the trip setting, over the entire recirculation flow range. The margin to the Safety Limit increases as the flow

1.1/2.1-14

2.1 BASES (LOLL U)

decreases for the specified trip setting versus flow relationship; therefore, the worst case MCPR which could occur during steady-state operation is at 108 percent of rated thermal power because of the APRM rod block trip setting. The actual power distribution in the core is established by specified control rod sequences and is monitored continuously by the in-core LPRM system.

C. <u>Reactor Water Low Level Scram and Isolation (Except Main Steam Lines)</u>

The setpoint for the low level scram is above the bottom of the separator skirt. This level has been used in transient analyses dealing with coolant inventory decrease. The results reported in FSAR subsection 14.5 show that scram and isolation of all process lines (except main steam) at this level adequately protects the fuel and the pressure barrier, because MCPR is greater than 1.07 in all cases, and system pressure does not reach the safety valve settings. The scram setting is sufficiently below normal operating range to avoid spurious scrams.

D. <u>Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram</u>

The turbine stop valve closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux and heat flux increases that would result from closure of the stop valves. With a trip setting of 10 percent of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in heat flux is such that adequate thermal margins are maintained even during the worst case transient that assumes the turbine bypass valves remain closed. (Reference 2)

E. <u>Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure or Turbine Trip Scram</u>

Turbine control valve fast closure or turbine trip scram anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from control valve fast closure due to load rejection or control valve closure due to turbine trip; each without bypass valve capability. The reactor protection system initiates a scram in less than 30 milliseconds after the start of control valve fast closure due to load rejection or control valve closure due to turbine trip. This scram is achieved by rapidly reducing hydraulic control oil pressure at the main turbine control valve actuator disc dump valves. This loss of pressure is sensed by pressure switches whose contacts form the one-out-of-two-twice logic input to the reactor protection system. This trip setting, a nominally 50 percent greater closure time and a different valve characteristic from that of the turbine stop valve, combine to produce transients very similar to that for the stop valve. No significant change in MCPR occurs. Relevant transient analyses are discussed in References 2 and 3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30 percent of rated, as measured by turbine first state pressure.

1.1/2.1-15 Amendment No. 157

3.2 BASES

In addition to reactor protection instrumentation which initiates a reactor scram, protective instrumentation has been provided which initiates action to mitigate the consequences of accidents which are beyond the operator's ability to control, or terminates operator errors before they result in serious consequences. This set of specifications provides the limiting conditions of operation for the primary system isolation function, initiation of the core cooling systems, control rod block and standby gas treatment systems. The objectives of the Specifications are (i) to assure the effectiveness of the protective instrumentation when required by preserving its capability to tolerate a single failure of any component of such systems even during periods when portions of such systems are out of service for maintenance, and (ii) to prescribe the trip settings required to assure adequate performance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.

Some of the settings on the instrumentation that initiate or control core and containment cooling have tolerances explicitly stated where the high and low values are both critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are chosen at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the safety system involved and exposure to abnormal situations.

Actuation of primary containment valves is initiated by protective instrumentation shown in Table 3.2.A which senses the conditions for which isolation is required. Such instrumentation must be available whenever primary containment integrity is required.

The instrumentation which initiates primary system isolation is connected in a dual bus arrangement.

The low water level instrumentation set to trip at 538 inches above vessel zero closes isolation valves in the RHR System, Drywell and Suppression Chamber exhausts and drains and Reactor Water Cleanup Lines (Groups 2 and 3 isolation valves). The low reactor water level instrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is 470 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) trips the recirculation pumps and initiates the RCIC and HPCI systems. The RCIC and HPCI system initiation opens the turbine steam supply valve which in turn initiates closure of the respective drain valves (Group 7).

The low water level instrumentation set to trip at 378 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) closes the Main Steam Isolation Valves, the Main Steam Line Drain Valves, and the Reactor Water Sample Valves (Group 1). Details of valve grouping and required closing times are given in Specification 3.7. These trip settings are adequate to prevent core uncovery in the case of a break in the largest line assuming the maximum closing time.

3.2/4.2–65 Amendment No. 157

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The low reactor water level instrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is 378 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) initiates the LPCI, Gore Spray Pumps, contributes to ADS initiation, and starts the diesel generators. These trip setting levels were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operation so that postaccident cooling can be accomplished and the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 will not be violated. For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation is initiated in time to meet the above criteria.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal to the water level instrumentation and, in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Groups 2 and 8 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will initiate CSCS operation at about the same time as the low water level instrumentation; thus, the results given above are applicable here also.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 140 percent of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel cladding temperatures remain below 1000°F, and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100 guidelines. Reference Section 14.6.5 FSAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line tunnel to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves. The setting of 200°F for the main steam line tunnel detector is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 15 gpm; thus, it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the temperature instrumentation. In the event of a loss of the reactor building ventilation system, radiant heating in the vicinity of the main steam lines raises the ambient temperature above 200°F. The temperature increases can cause an unnecessary main steam line isolation and reactor scram. Permission is provided to bypass the temperature trip for four hours to avoid an unnecessary plant transient and allow performance of the secondary containment leak rate test or make repairs necessary to regain normal ventilation.

High radiation monitors in the main steam line tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With the established nominal setting of three times normal background and main

3.2/4.2-66 Amendment No. 157



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-296

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 131 License No. DPR-68

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated June 24, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 131, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Suzanne Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 28, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 131

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

DOCKET NO. 50-296

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT		
1.1/2.1-5	1.1/2.1-5		
1.1/2.1-10	1.1/2.1-10		
1.1/2.1-11*	1.1/2.1-11*		
1.1/2.1-14	1.1/2.1-14*		
1.1/2.1-15	1.1/2.1-15		
3.2/4.2-65	3.2/4.2-65		
3.2/4.2-66	3.2/4.2-66		

1.1/2.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

SAFETY LIMIT

1.1.B. Power Transient

To ensure that the Safety Limits established in Specification 1.1.A are not exceeded, each required scram shall be initiated by its expected scram signal. The Safety Limit shall be assumed to be exceeded when scram is accomplished by means other than the expected scram signal.

C. Reactor Vessel Water Level

Whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, the water level shall be greater than or equal to 378 inches above vessel zero. LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING

- 2.1.B. Power Transient Trip Settings
 - Scram and isola- ≥ 538 in. tion (PCIS groups above 2,3,6) reactor vessel low water level zero
 - 2. Scram--turbine ≤ 10 perstop valve cent valve closure closure
 - 3. Scram--turbine ≥ 550 psig control valve fast closure or turbine trip

4. (Deleted)

- 5. Scram--main ≤ 10 percent steam line valve isolation closure
- 6. Main steam ≥ 825 psig isolation valve closure --nuclear system low pressure

C. <u>Water Level Trip Settings</u>

- Core spray and ≥ 378 in. LPCI actuation— above reactor low vessel water level zero
- 2. HPCI and RCIC ≥ 470 in. actuation--- above reactor low vessel water level zero
- 3. Main steam ≥ 378 in. isolation above valve closure-- vessel reactor low zero water level

BFN Unit 3

: 3

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1.1 BASES (Cont'd) \smile

The safety limit has been established at 378 inches above vessel zero to provide a point which can be monitored and also provide adequate margin to assure sufficient cooling. This point is the lower reactor low water level trip.

REFERENCE

1. General Electric BWR Thermal Analysis Basis (GETAB) Data, Correlation and Design Application, NEDO 10958 and NEDE 10938.

BFN Unit 3 1.1/2.1-10

Amendment No. 131

2.1 <u>BASES: LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS RELATED TO F. CLADDING</u> INTEGRITY

The abnormal operational transients applicable to operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant have been analyzed throughout the spectrum of planned operating conditions up to the design thermal power condition of 3440 MWt. The analyses were based upon plant operation in accordance with the operating map given in Figure 3.7-1 of the FSAR. In addition, 3293 MWt is the licensed maximum power level of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, and this represents the maximum steady-state power which shall not knowingly be exceeded.

Conservatism is incorporated in the transient analyses in estimating the controlling factors, such as void reactivity coefficient, control rod scram worth, scram delay time, peaking factors, and axial power shapes. These factors are selected conservatively with respect to their effect on the applicable transient results as determined by the current analysis model. This transient model, evolved over many years, has been substantiated in operation as a conservative tool for evaluating reactor dynamic performance. Results obtained from a General Electric boiling water reactor have been compared with predictions made by the model. The comparisons and results are summarized in Reference 1.

The void reactivity coefficient and the scram worth are described in detail in Reference 1.

The scram delay time and rate of rod insertion allowed by the analyses are conservatively set equal to the longest delay and slowest insertion rate acceptable by Technical Specifications as further described in Reference 1. The effect of scram worth, scram delay time and rod insertion rate, all conservatively applied, are of greatest significance in the early portion of the negative reactivity insertion. The rapid insertion of negative reactivity is assured by the time requirements for 5 percent and 20 percent insertion. By the time the rods are 60 percent inserted, approximately four dollars of negative reactivity has been inserted which strongly turns the transient, and accomplishes the desired effect. The times for 50 percent and 90 percent insertion are given to assure proper completion of the expected performance in the earlier portion of the transient, and to establish the ultimate fully shutdown steady-state condition.

For analyses of the thermal consequences of the transients a MCPR of *** is conservatively assumed to exist prior to initiation of the transients. This choice of using conservative values of controlling parameters and initiating transients at the design power level, produces more pessimistic answers than would result by using expected values of control parameters and analyzing at higher power levels.

***See Section 3.5.K

1.1/2.1-11

IRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Continued)

Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the scram setting is also ranged up. A scram at 120 divisions on the IRM instruments remains in effect as long as the reactor is in the startup mode. The APRM 15 percent scram will prevent higher power operation without being in the RUN mode. The IRM scram provides protection for changes which occur both locally and over the entire core. The most significant sources of reactivity change during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough, due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods, that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux and an IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any safety limit is exceeded. For the case of a single control rod withdrawal error, a range of rod withdrawal accidents was analyzed. This analysis included starting the accident at various power levels. The most severe case involves an initial condition in which the reactor is just subcritical and the IRM system is not yet on scale. This condition exists at quarter rod density. Quarter rod density is illustrated in paragraph 7.5.5.4 of the FSAR. Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming that the IRM channel closest to the withdrawn rod is bypassed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is scrammed and peak power limited to one percent of rated power, thus maintaining MCPR above 1.07. Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence.

4. Fixed High Neutron Flux Scram Trip

The average power range monitoring (APRM) system, which is calibrated using heat balance data taken during steady-state conditions, reads in percent of rated power (3,293 MWt). The APRM system responds directly to neutron flux. Licensing analyses have demonstrated that with a neutron flux scram of 120 percent of rated power, none of the abnormal operational transients analyzed violate the fuel safety limit and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage.

B. APRM Control Rod Block

Reactor power level may be varied by moving control rods or by varying the recirculation flow rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent rod withdrawal beyond a given point at constant recirculation flow rate, and thus to protect against the condition of a MCPR less than 1.07. This rod block trip setting, which is automatically varied with recirculation loop flow rate, prevents an increase in the reactor power level to excess values due to control rod withdrawal. The flow variable trip setting provides substantial margin from fuel damage, assuming a steady-state operation at the trip setting, over the entire recirculation flow range. The margin to the Safety Limit increases as the flow

2.1 BASES (Cont'd)

decreases for the specified trip setting versus flow relationship; therefore, the worst case MCPR which could occur during steady-state operation is at 108 percent of rated thermal power because of the APRM rod block trip setting. The actual power distribution in the core is established by specified control rod sequences and is monitored continuously by the in-core LPRM system.

C. <u>Reactor Water Low Level Scram and Isolation (Except Main Steam Lines)</u>

The setpoint for the low level scram is above the bottom of the separator skirt. This level has been used in transient analyses dealing with coolant inventory decrease. The results reported in FSAR subsection 14.5 show that scram and isolation of all process lines (except main steam) at this level adequately protects the fuel and the pressure barrier, because MCPR is greater than 1.07 in all cases, and system pressure does not reach the safety valve settings. The scram setting is sufficiently below normal operating range to avoid spurious scrams.

D. <u>Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram</u>

The turbine stop valve closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux and heat flux increases that would result from closure of the stop valves. With a trip setting of 10 percent of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in heat flux is such that adequate thermal margins are maintained even during the worst case transient that assumes the turbine bypass valves remain closed. (Reference 2)

E. <u>Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure or Turbine Trip Scram</u>

Turbine control valve fast closure or turbine trip scram anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from control valve fast closure due to load rejection or control valve closure due to turbine trip; each without bypass valve capability. The reactor protection system initiates a scram in less than 30 milliseconds after the start of control valve fast closure due to load rejection or control valve closure due to turbine trip. This scram is achieved by rapidly reducing hydraulic control oil pressure at the main turbine control valve actuator disc dump valves. This loss of pressure is sensed by pressure switches whose contacts form the one-out-of-two-twice logic input to the reactor protection system. This trip setting, a nominally 50 percent greater closure time and a different valve characteristic from that of the turbine stop valve, combine to produce transients very similar to that for the stop valve. No significant change in MCPR occurs. Relevant transient analyses are discussed in References 2 and 3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30 percent of rated, as measured by turbine first state pressure.

1.1/2.1-15 Amendment No. 131

3.2 BASES

In addition to reactor protection instrumentation which initiates a reactor scram, protective instrumentation has been provided which initiates action to mitigate the consequences of accidents which are beyond the operator's ability to control, or terminates operator errors before they result in serious consequences. This set of specifications provides the limiting conditions of operation for the primary system isolation function, initiation of the core cooling systems, control rod block and standby gas treatment systems. The objectives of the Specifications are (i) to assure the effectiveness of the protective instrumentation when required by preserving its capability to tolerate a single failure of any component of such systems even during periods when portions of such systems are out of service for maintenance, and (ii) to prescribe the trip settings required to assure adequate performance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.

Some of the settings on the instrumentation that initiate or control core and containment cooling have tolerances explicitly stated where the high and low values are both critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are chosen at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the safety system involved and exposure to abnormal situations.

Actuation of primary containment valves is initiated by protective instrumentation shown in Table 3.2.A which senses the conditions for which isolation is required. Such instrumentation must be available whenever primary containment integrity is required.

The instrumentation which initiates primary system isolation is connected in a dual bus arrangement.

The low water level instrumentation set to trip at 538 inches above vessel zero closes isolation valves in the RHR System, Drywell and Suppression Chamber exhausts and drains and Reactor Water Cleanup Lines (Groups 2 and 3 isolation valves). The low reactor water level instrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is 470 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) trips the recirculation pumps and initiates the RCIC and HPCI systems. The RCIC and HPCI system initiation opens the turbine steam supply valve which in turn initiates closure of the respective drain valves (Group 7).

The low water level instrumentation set to trip at 378 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) closes the Main Steam Isolation Valves, the Main Steam Line Drain Valves, and the Reactor Water Sample Valves (Group 1). Details of valve grouping and required closing times are given in Specification 3.7. These trip settings are adequate to prevent core uncovery in the case of a break in the largest line assuming the maximum closing time.

3.2/4.2–65 Amendment No. 131

3.2 BASES (CONT Q)

The low reactor water level instrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is 378 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.B) initiates the LPCI, Core Spray Pumps, contributes to ADS initiation, and starts the diesel generators. These trip setting levels were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operation so that postaccident cooling can be accomplished and the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 will not be violated. For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation is initiated in time to meet the above criteria.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal to the water level instrumentation and, in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Groups 2 and 8 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will initiate CSCS operation at about the same time as the low water level instrumentation; thus, the results given above are applicable here also.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 140 percent of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel cladding temperatures remain below 1000°F, and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100 guidelines. Reference Section 14.6.5 FSAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line tunnel to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves. The setting of 200°F for the main steam line tunnel detector is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 15 gpm; thus, it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the temperature instrumentation. In the event of a loss of the reactor building ventilation system, radiant heating in the vicinity of the main steam lines raises the ambient temperature above 200°F. The temperature increases can cause an unnecessary main steam line isolation and reactor scram. Permission is provided to bypass the temperature trip for four hours to avoid an unnecessary plant transient and allow performance of the secondary containment leak rate test or make repairs necessary to regain normal ventilation.

High radiation monitors in the main steam line tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With the established nominal setting of three times normal background and main

3.2/4.2–66 Amendment No. 131



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 160 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

AMENDMENT NO. 157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

AMENDMENT NO. 131 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKETS NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 24, 1988 (Reference 1) Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposed to change the technical specifications (TS) for Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3. The TS affected are those which deal with water level either directly or indirectly. The proposed amendment replaces all water level references to the top of active fuel with the corresponding reference to vessel zero. The specifications to be changed are concerned with fuel cladding integrity.

This amendment merely changes the reference point of the instrument indicating fluid level to make all instrument references identical.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed the following changes to the BFN TS:

In Section 1.1.C, Reactor Vessel Water Level, the safety limit is changed to reference vessel zero instead of the top of the normal active fuel zone. The safety limit and limiting safety system settings will now use the same reference point. The Bases Section, Fuel Cladding Integrity Limit, also now uses the same reference point. In Section 3.2, Bases, the low water level instrumentation trip setting will be stated in inches above vessel zero whereas, previously the trip setting was stated using both vessel zero and the top of the active fuel as reference point for the trip setting level. This redundancy, which appeared in four places in this section is eliminated and a standardized reference point will help eliminate operator confusion. These changes are acceptable because they do not involve a change to the safety limits or bases, and they eliminate inconsistencies and potential confusion.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the <u>Federal</u> <u>Register</u> (53 FR 32296) on August 24, 1988 and consulted with the State of Alabama. No public comments were received and the State of Alabama did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: David H. Moran

Dated: November 28, 1988