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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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Posted
Am-59 to
DPR-52

December 2, 1980

Docket Nos. 50-259
50-260
and 50-296

Mr. Hugh G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 63, 59 and 35 to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2, and 3. These amendments are in response to your letter of August 6, 1980 (TVA BFNP TS 142).

The amendments change the Technical Specifications to resolve ambiguities which exist in Section 3.9 on the auxiliary electrical system.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 63 to DPR-33
2. Amendment No. 59 to DPR-52
3. Amendment No. 35 to DPR-68
4. Safety Evaluation
5. Notice

cc w/enclosures: See next page

cc:

H. S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire
General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
400 Commerce Avenue
E 11B 33C
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Mr. Ron Rogers
Tennessee Valley Authority
400 Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Mr. Charles R. Christopher
Chairman, Limestone County Commission
P. O. Box 188
Athens, Alabama 35611

Ira L. Myers, M.D.
State Health Officer
State Department of Public Health
State Office Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36104

Mr. H. N. Culver
249A HBD
400 Commerce Avenue
Tennessee Valley Authority
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Athens Public Library
South and Forrest
Athens, Alabama 35611

Director, Office of Urban & Federal Affairs
108 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Way
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

Director, Criteria and Standards Division
Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IV Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
345 Courtland Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Mr. Robert F. Sullivan
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 1863
Decatur, Alabama 35602

Mr. John F. Cox
Tennessee Valley Authority
W9-D 207C
400 Commerce Avenue
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Mr. Herbert Abercrombie
Tennessee Valley Authority
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 59
License No. DPR-52

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendments by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated August 6, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 59, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 2, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 59

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages:

291/292
293/294
295/296
297/298
299/300

2. The underlined pages are those being changed; marginal lines on these pages indicate the area being revised. Overleaf pages are provided for convenience.

3.8.C/4.8.C Mechanical Vacuum Pump

The purpose of isolating the mechanical vacuum pump line is to limit the release of activity from the main condenser. During an accident, fission products would be transported from the reactor through the main steam lines to the condenser. The fission product radioactivity would be sensed by the main steam line radioactivity monitors which initiate isolation.

4.8.A and 4.8.B BASES

The surveillance requirements given under Specification 4.8.A and 4.8.B provide assurance that liquid and gaseous wastes are properly controlled and monitored during any release of radioactive materials in the liquid and gaseous effluents. These surveillance requirements provide the data for the licensee and the Commission to evaluate the station's performance relative to radioactive wastes released to the environment. Reports on the quantities of radioactive materials released in effluents shall be furnished to the Commission on the basis of Section 6 of these technical specifications. On the basis of such reports and any additional information the Commission may obtain from the licensee or others, the Commission may from time to time require the licensee to take such actions as the Commission deems appropriate.

3.8.D and 4.8.D BASES

The objective of this specification is to assure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear radioactive material sources does not exceed allowable limits.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to all the auxiliary electrical power system.

Objective

To assure an adequate supply of electrical power for operation of those systems required for safety.

Specification

A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

A reactor shall not be started up (made critical) from the cold condition unless four units 1 and 2 diesel generators are operable, both 161-kV transmission lines, two common station service transformers

and the requirements of 3.9.A.4 through 3.9.A.7 are met.

A reactor shall not be started up (made critical) from the Hot Standby Condition unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. At least one off-site 161-kV transmission line and its common transformer are available and capable of automatically supplying auxiliary power to the shutdown boards.

2. Three units 1 and 2 diesel generators shall be operable.

3. An additional source of power consisting of one of the following:

   a. A second 161-kV transmission line and its

4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to the periodic testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical systems.

Objective

Verify the operability of the auxiliary electrical system.

Specification

A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

1. Diesel Generators

   a. Each diesel generator shall be manually started and loaded once each month to demonstrate operational readiness. The test shall continue for at least a one-hour period at 75% of rated load or greater.

      During the monthly generator test the diesel generator starting air compressor shall be checked for operation and its ability to recharge air receivers. The operation of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps shall be demonstrated, and the diesel starting time to reach rated voltage and speed shall be logged.

   b. Once per operating cycle a test will be conducted to demonstrate the emergency diesel generators will start and accept emergency load within

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment	4.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment
common transformer capable of supplying power to the shutdown boards. b. A fourth operable units 1 and 2 diesel generator. 4. Buses and Boards Available a. Start buses 1A and 1B are energized. b. The units 1 and 2 4-kV shutdown boards are energized. c. The 480-kV shutdown boards associated with the unit are energized. d. The Units 1 & 2 Diesel Aux Boards are energized e. Undervoltage relays operable on start buses 1A and 1B and 4-kV shutdown boards, A, B, C, and D. f. Shutdown Buses 1 and 2 energized 5. The 250-Volt unit and shutdown board batteries and a battery charger for each battery boards are operable. 6. Logic Systems a. Common accident signal logic system is operable. b. 480-V load shedding logic system is operable. 7. There shall be a minimum of 103,300 gallons of diesel fuel in the standby diesel generator fuel tanks.	the specified time sequence. c. Once a month the quantity of diesel fuel available shall be logged. d. Each diesel generator shall be given an annual inspection in accordance with instructions based on the manufacturer's recommendations. e. Once a month a sample of diesel fuel shall be checked for quality. The quality shall be within acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of the latest revision to ASTM D975 and logged. 2. D. C Power System - Unit Batteries (250-Volt) Diesel Generator Batteries (125-Volt) and Shutdown Board Batteries (250-Volt) a. Every week the specific gravity and the voltage of the pilot cell, and temperature of an adjacent cell and overall battery voltage shall be measured and logged. b. Every three months the measurements shall be made of voltage of each cell to nearest 0.1 volt, specific gravity of each cell, and temperature of every fifth cell. These measurements shall be logged. c. A battery rated discharge (capacity) test shall be performed and the voltage, time, and output current measurements shall be logged at intervals not to exceed 24 months.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment	4.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment
	3. Logic System a. Both divisions of the common accident signal logic system shall be tested every 6 months to demonstrate that it will function on actuation of the core spray system of each reactor to provide an automatic start signal to all 4 units 1 and 2 diesel generators. b. Once every 6 months, the condition under which the 480-Volt load shedding logic system is required shall be simulated using pendant test switches and/or pushbutton test switches to demonstrate that the load shedding logic system would initiate load shedding signals on the diesel auxiliary boards, reactor MOV boards, and the 480-Volt shutdown boards.
	4. Undervoltage Relays a. Once every 6 months, the condition under which the undervoltage relays are required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on start buses 1A and 1B to demonstrate that the diesel generators will start. b. Once every 6 months, the conditions under which the undervoltage relays are required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on each shutdown board to demonstrate that the associated diesel generator will start. c. The undervoltage relays which start the diesel generators from start buses 1A and 1B and the 4-kV shutdown boards, shall be calibrated annually for trip and reset and the measurements logged.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment	4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment
Whenever a reactor is in Startup mode or Run mode and not in a cold condition, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in 3.9.A, except as specified herein.	
1. From and after the date that one 161-kV line or one common station transformer or one start bus becomes inoperable, reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days.	1. When one 161-kV line or one common station transformer or one start bus is found to be inoperable, all units 1 and 2 diesel generators and associated boards must be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
2. From and after the date that the 4kV bus tie board becomes inoperable, reactor operation is permissible for 30 days provided both common station service transformers are energized.	2. When the 4kV bus tie board is inoperable both common station service transformers shall be shown to be energized daily.
3. When one of the units 1 and 2 diesel generator is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 days provided that both offsite 161-kV transmission lines and both common station transformers or one common transformer and one cooling tower transformer (not parallel with the energized common transformer) and bus tie board are available, and all of the CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and the remaining three units 1 and 2 diesel generators are operable.	3. When one of the units 1 and 2 diesel generator is found to be inoperable, all of the CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems and the remaining diesel generators and associated boards shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment	4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment
4. When one units 1 and 2 4-kV shutdown board is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible for a period not to exceed 5 days, provided that both off-site 161-kV transmission lines and both common station transformers or one common transformer and one cooling tower transformer and 4-kV bus tie board are available and the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and all 480 V emergency power boards are operable.	4. When one 4-kV shutdown board is found to be inoperable, all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS and RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards shall be demonstrated to be operable, immediately and daily thereafter.
5. When one of the shutdown buses is inoperable reactor operation is permissible for a period of 7 days.	5. When one shutdown bus is found to be inoperable all 1 & 2 diesel generators shall be proven operable immediately and daily thereafter.
6. When one of the 480V diesel Aux. boards becomes inoperable reactor operation is permissible for a period of 5 days	
7. From and after the date that one of the three 250-Volt unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding seven days. Except for routine surveillance testing the NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.	
8. From and after the date that one of the four 250-volt shutdown	

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment	4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment
board batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding five days in accordance with 3.9.B.7.	6. When one units 1 & 2 diesel Aux board is found to be inoperable the remaining diesel Aux board and each unit 1 & 2 diesel generator shall be proven operable immediately and daily thereafter.
9. When one division of the Logic System is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days, provided the CSCS requirements listed in specification 3.9.B.3 are satisfied. The NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.	
10. Undervoltage relays on 1A or 1B start bus may be inoperable for a period of 7 days provided the other start bus and undervoltage relay are operable (within surveillance schedule of 4.9.A.4a).	
11. Undervoltage relays on a shutdown board may be inoperable 5 days provided the other shutdown boards and undervoltage relays are operable (within surveillance schedule of 4.9.A.4.b)	
12. When one 480 volt shutdown board is found to be inoperable the reactor will be placed in hot standby within 12 hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours.	
13. If the requirements for operating in the conditions specified by 3.9.B.1 through 3.9.B12 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shutdown and in the cold condition within 24 hours.	

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.9.C Operation in Cold Shutdown

Whenever both reactors are in cold shutdown condition with irradiated fuel in either reactor, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in section 3.9.A except as specified herein.

1. At least two units 1 and 2 diesel generators and their associated 4-kV shutdown boards shall be operable.

2. An additional source of power consisting of at least one of the following:

   a. One 161-kV transmission line and its associated common station transformer or either cooling tower transformer and a 4-kv bus tie board capable of supplying power to the Units 1 and 2 shutdown boards.

   b. A third operable diesel generator.

3. At least one 480-V shutdown board for each unit must be operable.

3.9 BASES

The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the plant during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available, namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the nuclear generating units, and the diesel generators.

The 161-kV offsite power supply consists of two lines which are fed from different sections of the TVA 161-kV grid. In the normal mode of operation, the 161-kV system is operating and four diesel generators are operational. If one diesel generator is out of service, there normally remain the 161-kV sources, the nuclear generating units, and the other three diesel generators. For a diesel generator to be considered operable its associated 125 V battery must be operable.

The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for 7 days of full load operation of 3 diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.

Auxiliary power for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is supplied from two sources; either the unit station transformers or from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station transformers or the cooling tower transformers. If a common station transformer is lost, the units can continue to operate since the unit station transformers are in service, the other common station transformer and the cooling tower transformers are available, and four diesel generators are operational.

If a common station service transformer is out of service the shutdown buses can be fed through a cooling tower transformer and bus tie board. Both cooling tower transformers or 4kV bus tie board may remain out of service for 30 days as long as both common transformers are in service. This is allowed due to the standby service required of the cooling tower transformers and bus tie board and the high reliability of the offsite power circuits. The shutdown buses distribute power to the shutdown boards and allow for flexibility of access to the offsite circuits. A 480V diesel Aux board is allowed to be out of service for short periods of time for tests and maintenance.

A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, providing all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators CS, RHR, (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480 V power boards are operable.

There are eight 250-volt d-c battery systems each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, operative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-volt a-c unit preferred motor-generator set. One 250-volt d-c system provides power for common plant and transmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-volt a-c plant preferred motor-generator set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The four remaining systems deliver control power to the 4160-volt shutdown boards.

3.9 BASES

Each 250-volt d-c shutdown board control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger. The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system. Zero resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply. Each power supply is located in the reactor building near the shutdown board it supplies. Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.

The 250-volt d-c system is so arranged, and the batteries sized such, that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit. Loss of control power to any engineered safeguards control circuit is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected. The loss of one 250-volt shutdown board battery affects normal control power only for the 4160-volt shutdown board which it supplies. The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system. This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.63 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 33

AMENDMENT NO.59 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

AMENDMENT NO.35 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated August 6, 1980, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee or TVA) requested amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The proposed amendments resolve ambiguities which exist in the auxiliary electrical system technical specifications.

2.0 Discussion

The Browns Ferry Plant is connected into the TVA system network by six 500-kV lines. Normal station power is from station service transformers connected to the generator leads of each unit. Startup power is from the TVA 161-kV system network through 161- to 4.16-kV stepdown transformers. The 161-kV switchyard is supplied by two transmission lines from the 161-kV system network. One line comes in from the northeast from the Athens substation; the other line comes in from the south across Wheeler Reservoir from the Trinity substation. The 500-kV system is interconnected with the 161-kV system at various points, including two lines to the Trinity substation. The standby source of auxiliary power is from eight diesel-driven generators.

Auxiliary power is supplied from two sources: either the unit station transformers or from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station transformers or the cooling tower transformers.

The normal power source for unit auxiliaries is the 20.7- to 4.16-kV unit station service transformer, which is connected to each unit generator's output leads. The startup and alternate power source for unit auxiliaries is either of two 161- to 4.16-kV common station service transformers which are fed from the TVA 161-kV system.

The normal power source for station common auxiliaries is either or both of the two common station service transformers. Two of the unit station

service transformers also serve as alternate sources for station common auxiliaries. The alternate sources to the shutdown auxiliary power system buses are the 161- to 4.16-kV common station service and cooling tower transformers. Any of the three 20.7- to 4.16-kV unit station service transformers may also serve the shutdown auxiliary power system buses, and two of these unit transformers will serve as normal sources to these buses. The diesel generators serve as backup sources to the shutdown auxiliary power system boards.

Both common station service transformers in service are capable of continuously carrying the load consisting of the station common auxiliaries, plus all auxiliaries of one generating unit operating at full load without its unit station service transformer, plus all auxiliaries of another unit either in the starting mode, the shutdown mode, or the accident mode. Only one common station service transformer in service is capable of continuously carrying the load consisting of the station common auxiliaries, plus either (1) all auxiliaries of one generating unit in the starting mode or (2) all auxiliaries of one generating unit in the accident mode and two generating units in the shutdown mode.

In May 1978, TVA made various modifications to the inplant electrical systems to improve inplant voltages including a) installation of capacitor banks at the Browns Ferry terminal ends of the two 161-kV transmission lines to improve the power factor and b) rearranging the 4160-volt loads of Unit 3 to reduce the voltage drop due to high impedance in the common station service transformers. The latter included cutting Unit 3 boards 3A, 3B and 3C off the start bus 1A and 1B and supplying them from cooling tower transformers 1 and 2. These electrical modifications were approved by Amendments No. 39, 37, and 13 to Licenses DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68, respectively. The staff's safety evaluation for these amendments discusses these modifications; since these modifications are pertinent to the administrative changes requested by TVA's letter of August 6, 1980, the safety evaluation related to Amendments 39, 37 and 13 is incorporated herein by reference.

3.0 Evaluation

TVA's stated purpose in requesting the proposed changes is to resolve ambiguities which exist in the auxiliary electrical system technical specifications. The Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements on the Auxiliary Electrical System are covered in Sections 3.9 and 4.9 of the Technical Specifications. Each of the proposed changes and our evaluation thereof is discussed separately below.

a. For Units 1 and 2, TVA proposes to delete from Section 3.9.A (p. 292) the words: "and one cooling tower transformer" from the list of equipment that must be operable before either Units 1 or 2 can be started up. Only Unit 3 is fed from the cooling tower transformers. This requirement was added when the same wording was used for all three units with Amendment Nos. 39, 37, and 13. The cooling tower transformers are not needed for Unit 1 and 2 operation except in

degraded conditions and the deletion from the Unit 1 and 2 requirements is acceptable.

b. For Units 1 and 2, TVA proposes to add to Section 3.9.A.4 (p. 293) the requirements that the Units 1 and 2 Diesel Auxiliary Boards and Shutdown Buses 1 and 2 are energized prior to startup of the units. Shutdown buses and diesel auxiliary boards are necessary for operation of the onsite and offsite power system. We conclude the additional requirements are desirable and acceptable.

c. For Units 1 and 2, TVA proposes to delete the requirement from Section 3.9.B.1 (p. 295) that a cooling tower transformer and its 4-kV bus tie board be operable when Unit 1 or 2 are in the startup or run mode for the same reason as in a, above. TVA is proposing to add a requirement that if the 4-kV bus tie board becomes inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible for 30 days provided both common station service transformers are energized and checked daily. The bus tie board is needed primarily in the event a common transformer is removed from service. We find the proposed changes acceptable. Because of the added requirement, the numbering on former LCO and Surveillance Requirements 3.9.B.2 and 3.9.B.3 is changed to 3.9.B.3 and 3.9.B.4, respectively.

d. For Units 1 and 2, TVA is proposing to add requirements to Section 3.9.B (p. 296) to specify a limit for how long reactor operation is permissible (i.e., 7 and 5 days, respectively), when one of the 4-kV shutdown buses is inoperable or one of the 480-V diesel auxiliary boards becomes inoperable, provided all diesel generators are proven operable immediately and daily thereafter and the remaining diesel auxiliary board is demonstrated to be operable. The times specified are considered reasonable for maintenance and testing of the equipment. We conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable. Because of the added requirements, there is a renumbering of the remaining LCOs and Surveillance Requirements.

e. For Units 1 and 2, TVA is proposing to add requirements to Section 3.9.B (p. 297) to specify that reactor operation is permissible for a period of 7 and 5 days, respectively, if the undervoltage relays on the 1A or 1B start bus become inoperable or if the undervoltage relays on a shutdown board become inoperable, provided the other start bus and shutdown boards and associated undervoltage relays are operable. We find the proposed changes acceptable.

f. For Unit 3, Section 3.9.A.4.a (p. 320) of the present Technical Specifications requires that start buses 1A and 1B be energized for the reactor to be brought critical. There are four start buses - 1A 1B, 2A and 2B. The normal souce of power to the A buses is common station service transformer A; the normal source of power to the B buses is common station service transformer B. However, alternatively, either set of buses may also be fed from the other transformer. TVA proposes to change this requirement to read "Both start buses to

Unit 3 be energized" rather than just 1A and 1B. Since two start buses are adequate and these two could be 2A and 2B as well as 1A and 1B, we find the proposed change acceptable.

g. For Unit 3, TVA is proposing to add a requirement to Section 3.9.A.4 that the 480-V diesel auxiliary boards are energized prior to startup of the unit. Since the diesel auxiliary boards are necessary for operation of the onsite and offsite power system, the proposed change is desirable and acceptable.

h. For Unit 3, TVA is proposing to add a provision that the 4-kV bus tie or a Unit 3 start bus may be inoperable for 7 days, provided both 161-kV lines, both cooling tower transformers and the Unit 3 diesel generator are demonstrated to be operable. The 4-kV bus tie board provides the shutdown boards with backup access to the offsite power system through either cooling tower transformer. The cooling tower transformers supply more than the bus tie board; they also supply power to the unit boards. We conclude that the proposed change is acceptable.

i. For Unit 3, TVA is proposing to add a new requirement (Section 3.9.B.5, p. 324) specifying a limit of 5 days that one of the diesel auxiliary boards may be out of service for maintenance and testing, provided the remaining diesel auxiliary board and each Unit 3 diesel are verified to be operable. This is the same as proposed for Units 1 and 2 in d, above, and is acceptable.

j. For Unit 3, TVA is proposing to add two requirements (Section 3.9.B.8 and 3.9.B.9, p. 325a) similar to the proposed changes for Units 1 and 2 in e, above, specifying a limit on the time the undervoltage relays may be inoperable for maintenance and testing and specifying the backup equipment that must be available. We conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

In summary, we have reviewed the proposed changes to the auxiliary electrical system technical specifications both individually and collectively and conclude they are acceptable.

4.0 Environmental Considerations

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: December 2, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260, AND 50-296

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 63 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-33, Amendment No. 59 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-52, and Amendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2, and 3, located in Limestone County, Alabama. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments change the Technical Specifications to resolve ambiguities which exist in Section 3.9 on the auxiliary electrical system.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration

and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated August 6, 1980, (2) Amendment No. 63 to License No. DPR-33, Amendment No. 59 to License No. DPR-52, and Amendment No. 35 to License No. DPR-68, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C. and at the Athens Public Library, South and Forrest, Athens, Alabama 35611. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 2nd day of December, 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing