JUL 3 1975

Docket Nos. 50-259
and 50-260

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Mr. James E. Watson
Manager of Power
818 Power Building
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37201

Gentlemen:

Attached are pages which were numbered incorrectly when issued with Amendments No. 10 and 7 (Change No. 11) to Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR-33 and DPR-52 dated June 13, 1975. Please remove pages 260, 261, 263, 264, 270A and 270B and replace with the attached corrected pages.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:
Robert A. Purple

Robert A. Purple, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosure:
Corrected pages

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 10 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-33

AND LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-52

(CHANGE NO. 11 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS)

DOCKET NOS. 50-259 AND 50-260

These page changes refer to pages of the "Technical Specifications and Bases for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, effective prior to May 9, 1975.

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert New Pages
8 through 26	8, 15
27 through 30	27, 28
31 through 49	31, 33, 42
50 through 106	50, 54, 59, 81, 99, 100
107 through 121	108, 109, 115
122 through 129	122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128
130 through 150b	130, 131, 131a, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149
151 through 174	151, 152, 166, 167, 168
175 through 216	175, 176, 176a, 206
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240 through 260	240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 254a, 255, 256, 256a, 257, 258, 259, 260, 260a, 260b, 260c, 260d, 260e, 260f
285	285, 285a

C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Conditions (Continued)

an indication of abnormal conditions and the presence of unusual materials in the water. The chloride limit is specified to prevent stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel and is based on established relationships between stress corrosion, chloride concentrations, and dissolved oxygen.

When conductivity is in its normal range, pH and chloride and other impurities affecting conductivity must also be within their normal range. Chloride measurements are made to determine whether or not they are also out of their normal operating values because conductivity could be high due to the presence of a neutral salt which would not have an effect on pH or chloride.

No additives are used in the fuel pool water and near neutral pH is maintained, therefore conductivity provides a very good measure of the quality of the water. Significant changes therein provide the operator with a warning mechanism so he can investigate and remedy the condition causing the change before limiting conditions, with respect to variables affecting the boundaries of the fuel pool, are exceeded.

Methods available for correcting off-standard conditions include using the fuel pool filter demineralizer, halting fuel or equipment movements, or using the condensate demineralizers. The samples of the fuel pool water which are taken daily are considered adequate to detect long-term changes in the chloride ion content. Fuel pool sampling frequency is increased to once per eight hour shift when the fuel pool clean up system is inoperable.

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D. Reactor Building Crane

The reactor building crane and 125-ton hoist are required to be operable for handling of the spent fuel in the reactor building. The controls for the 125-ton hoist are located in the crane cab. The 5-ton has both cab and pendant controls.

A visual inspection of the load-bearing hoist wire rope assures detection of signs of distress or wear so that corrections can be promptly made if needed.

The testing of the various limits and interlocks assures their proper operation when the crane is used.

Assignment of a person to monitor crane activities and who has authority to direct crane operations assures close, safety monitoring and compliance with crane handling requirements. The placement of the bridge limit switches in their respective drive control circuits and the installation of the rail stops on the trolley rails assures that crane movements cannot be inadvertently made over spent fuel pools with fuel in them. Crane bridge and trolley tie down when the crane is unattended prevents their motion in the case of a natural event, such as an earthquake.

E. Spent Fuel Cask

The spent fuel cask design incorporates removable lifting trunnions. The visual inspection of the trunnions and fasteners prior to attachment to the cask assures that no visual damage has occurred during prior handling. The trunnions must be properly attached to the cask for lifting of the cask and the visual inspection assures correct installation.

F. Restoration Work

Requiring completion of fuel storage and installation of gates and blocks places the fuel in a maximum security condition prior to the restoration activities.

F. Spent Fuel Cask Handling - Refueling Floor

Although single failure protection has been provided in the design of the 125-ton hoist drum shaft, wire ropes, hook and lower block assembly on the reactor building crane, the limiting of lift height of a spent fuel cask controls the amount of energy available in a dropped cask accident when the cask is over the refueling floor.

An analysis has been made which shows that the floor and support members in the area of cask entry into the decontamination facility can satisfactorily sustain a dropped cask from a height of three feet.

The yoke safety cables provide single failure ptotection for the hook and lower block assembly and limit cask rotation. Cask rotation is necessary for decontamination and the safety ropes are removed during decontamination.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.11 UNIT 3/UNIT 1 AND 2 INTERACTIONS	
Applicability	
Applies to construction activities of unit 3.	
Objective	
To assure that unit 3 construction activities do not adversely affect the safety of either unit 1 or 2.	
Specification	
All operations, tests, and other activities associated with the construction of unit 3 that can affect any system or component required to be functional by these Interim Technical Specifications are prohibited until (1) an interation analysis is performed which shows that an activity associated with the construction and testing of unit 3 will not adversely affect the safety of units 1 and 2, and (2) the interaction analysis is approved by NRC.	

3.11 BASES: UNIT 3/UNIT 1 AND 2 INTERACTIONS

Since there are shared systems among Units 1, 2, and 3 an interaction analysis is performed which shows that an activity associated with construction of Unit 3 will not adversely affect the safety of unit 1 or unit 2.