

September 4, 1984

Docket Nos. 50-259/260/296

Mr. Hugh G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401


Dear Mr. Parris:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 111, 105 and 79 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3. These amendments are in response to your application dated November 5, 1982 (TVA BFNP TS 180).

The amendments change the Technical Specifications to increase the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) surveillance test interval.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.

Sincerely,



Richard J. Clark, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 111 to License No. DPR-33
2. Amendment No. 105 to License No. DPR-52
3. Amendment No. 79 to License No. DPR-68
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Mr. Hugh G. Parris
Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-259

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 111
License No. DPR-33

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated November 5, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-33 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 111, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Handwritten Signature]
Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 4, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 111

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

DOCKET NO. 50-259

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages.
37, 38, 39, 85, 110
2. The marginal lines on these pages denote the area being changed.

TABLE 4.1.A
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL TESTS
MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCIES FOR SAFETY INSTR. AND CONTROL CIRCUITS

	<u>Group (2)</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Minimum Frequency (3)</u>
Mode Switch in Shutdown	A	Place Mode Switch in Shutdown	Each Refueling Outage
Manual Scram	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
IRH			
High Flux	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (4)	Once Per Week During Refueling and Before Each Startup
Inoperative	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (4)	Once Per Week During Refueling and Before Each Startup
APRH			
High Flux (15% scram)	C	Trip Output Relays (4)	Before Each Startup and Weekly When Required to be Operable
High Flux (Flow Biased)	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
High Flux (Fixed Trip)	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
Inoperative	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
Downscale	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
Flow Bias	B	(6)	(6)
High Reactor Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
High Drywell Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
Reactor Low Water Level (5)	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Tank			
Float Switches (LS-85-45C-F)	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Tank			
Electronic Level Switches (LS-85-45A, B, G, H)	B	Trip Channel and Alarm (7)	Once/Month
Turbine Condenser Low Vacuum	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
Main Steam Line High Radiation	B	Trip Channel and Alarm (4)	Once/3 Months (8)

TABLE 4.1.A (Continued)

	<u>Group (2)</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Minimum Frequency (1)</u>
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/3 Months (8)
Turbine Control Valve Past Closure or turbine trip	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive (PT-1-81A and B, PT-1-91A and B)	B	Trip Channel and Alarm (7)	Every 3 Months
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)

NOTES FOR TABLE 4.1.A

1. Initially the minimum frequency for the indicated tests shall be once per month.
2. A description of the three groups is included in the Bases of this specification.
3. Functional tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are operating (i.e., already tripped). If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status.
4. This instrumentation is exempted from the instrument channel test definition. This instrument channel functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channels.
5. The water level in the reactor vessel will be perturbed and the corresponding level indicator changes will be monitored. This perturbation test will be performed every month after completion of the monthly functional test program.
6. The functional test of the flow bias network is performed in accordance with Table 4.2.C.
7. Functional test consists of the injection of a simulated signal into the electronic trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip end alarm functions.
8. The functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.16.

TABLE 4.2.A
 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Function	Functional Test	Calibration Frequency	Instrument Check
Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-1-203A-D, SW 2-3)	(1)	(5)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Reactor High Pressure	(1)	once/3 months	none
Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-1-56A-D, SW 61)	(1)	once/3 month	once/day
Instrument Channel - High Drywell Pressure (PS-64-56A-D)	(1)	(5)	N/A
Instrument Channel - High Radiation Main Steam Line Tunnel	once/3 months (27)	(5)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Low Pressure Main Steam Line (PT-1-72, -76, -82, -86)	once/3 months (27)	Once/operating cycle (28)	none
Instrument Channel - High Flow Main Steam Line (dPT-1-13A-D, -25A-D, -36A-D, -50A-D)	once/3 months (27)	Once/operating cycle (28)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Main Steam Line Tunnel High Temperature	once/3 months (27)	once/operating cycle	none
Instrument Channel - Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation - Reactor Zone	(1) (14) (22)	once/3 months	once/day (9)

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NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2.A THROUGH 4.2.H (Continued)

14. Upscale trip is functionally tested during functional test time as required by section 4.7.3.1.a and 4.7.C.1.c.
15. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
16. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
17. This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.
18. Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.
19. Functional test is limited to the time where the SGTs is required to meet the requirements of section 4.7.C.1.a.
20. Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scrambling the reactor. This calibration can only be performed during an outage.
21. Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.
22. One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours for functional testing and calibration.
23. The Reactor Cleanup System Space Temperature monitors are RTD's that feed a temperature switch in the control room. The temperature switch may be tested monthly by using a simulated signal. The RTD itself is a highly reliable instrument and less frequent testing is necessary.
24. This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
25. During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated. This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.
26. This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
27. The functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 105
License No. DPR-52


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated November 5, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 105, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 4, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 105

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages.

37, 38, 39, 85, 110

2. The marginal lines on these pages denote the area being changed.

TABLE 4.1.A
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL TESTS
MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCIES FOR SAFETY INSTR. AND CONTROL CIRCUITS

	<u>GROUP (2)</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Minimum Frequency (3)</u>
Mode Switch in Shutdown	A	Place Mode Switch in Shutdown	Each Refueling Outage
Manual Scram	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
IRI/			
High Flux	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (4)	Once Per Week During Refueling and Before Each Startup
Inoperative	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (4)	Once Per Week During Refueling and Before Each Startup
AFRM			
ST High Flux (LSI scram)	C	Trip Output Relays (4)	Before Each Startup and Weekly When Required to be Operable
High Flux (Flow Biased)	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
High Flux (Fixed Trip)	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
Inoperative	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
Downscale	B	Trip Output Relays (4)	Once/Week
Flow Bias	B	(6)	(6)
High Reactor Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
High Drywell Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
Reactor Low Water Level (5)	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Tank Float Switches	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/month
Differential Pressure Switches	B	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/month (7)
Turbine Condenser Low Vacuum	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/month (1)
Main Steam Line High Radiation	B	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/3 Months (8)

TABLE 4.1.A (Continued)

	<u>Group (2)</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Minimum Frequency (3)</u>
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/3 Months (8)
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure or Turbine Trip	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)

NOTES FOR TABLE 4.1.A

1. Initially the minimum frequency for the indicated tests shall be once per month.
2. A description of the three groups is included in the Bases of this specification.
3. Functional tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are operating (i.e., already tripped). If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status.
4. This instrumentation is exempted from the instrument channel test definition. This instrument channel functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channels.
5. The water level in the reactor vessel will be perturbed and the corresponding level indicator changes will be monitored. This perturbation test will be performed every month after completion of the monthly functional test program.
6. The functional test of the flow bias network is performed in accordance with Table 4.2.C.
7. Calibration of master/slave trip units only.
8. The functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.16.

TABLE 4.2.A
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Function	Functional Test	Calibration Frequency	Instrument Check
Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-3-203A-D, SW 2-3)	(1)	(5)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Reactor High Pressure	(1)	once/3 months	none
Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-3-56A-D, SW #1)	(1)	once/3 month	once/day
Instrument Channel - High Drywell Pressure (PS-6A-56A-D)	(1)	(5)	N/A
Instrument Channel - High Radiation Main Steam Line Tunnel	once/3 months (27)	(5)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Low Pressure Main Steam Line	once/3 months (27)	once/3 months	none
Instrument Channel - High Flow Main Steam Line	once/3 months (27)	once/3 months	once/day
Instrument Channel - Main Steam Line Tunnel High Temperature	once/3 months (27)	once/operating cycle	none
Instrument Channel - Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation - Reactor Zone	(1) (14) (22)	once/3 months	once/day (8)

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NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2.A THROUGH 4.2.H (Continued)

14. Upscale trip is functionally tested during functional test time as required by section 4.7.B.1.a and 4.7.C.1.c.
15. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
16. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
17. This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.
18. Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.
19. Functional test is limited to the time where the SGTs is required to meet the requirements of section 4.7.C.1.a.
20. Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scrambling the reactor. This calibration can only be performed during an outage.
21. Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.
22. One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours for functional testing and calibration.
23. The Reactor Cleanup System Space Temperature Monitors are RTD's that feed a temperature switch in the control room. The temperature switch may be tested monthly by using a simulated signal. The RTD itself is a highly reliable instrument and less frequent testing is necessary.
24. This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
25. During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated. This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.
26. This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
27. The functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-296

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 79
License No. DPR-68


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated November 5, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 79, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 4, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 79

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

DOCKET NO. 50-296

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages.
37, 38, 88, 107
2. The marginal lines on these pages denote the area being changed.

TABLE 4.1.A
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL TESTS
MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCIES FOR SAFETY INSTR. AND CONTROL CIRCUITS

	<u>Group (2)</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Minimum Frequency (3)</u>
Main Steam Line High Radiation	B	Trip Channel and Alarm (*)	Once/ 3 months (8)
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/3 Months (8)
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure or Turbine Trip	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)
Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Once/Month (1)

37

NOTES FOR TABLE 4.1.A

1. Initially the minimum frequency for the indicated tests shall be once per month.
2. A description of the three groups is included in the Bases of this specification.
3. Functional tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are operating (i.e., already tripped). If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status.
4. This instrumentation is exempted from the instrument channel test definition. This instrument channel functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channels.
5. The water level in the reactor vessel will be perturbed and the corresponding level indicator changes will be monitored. This perturbation test will be performed every month after completion of the monthly functional test program.
6. The functional test of the flow bias network is performed in accordance with Table 4.2.C.
7. Functional test consists of the injection of a simulated signal into the electronic trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip end alarm functions.
8. Functional test frequency decreased to once/ 3 months to reduce the challenges to relief valves per NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.16.

**TABLE 4.2.A
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION**

Function	Functional Test	Calibration Frequency	Instrument Check
Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-3-203A-D, SW 2-3)	(1)	(5)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Reactor High Pressure	(1)	once/3 months	none
Instrument Channel - Reactor Low Water Level (LIS-3-116A-D, SW 01)	(1)	once/3 month	once/day
Instrument Channel - High Drywell Pressure (PS-64-56A-D)	(1)	(5)	N/A
Instrument Channel - High Radiation Main Steam Line Tunnel	once/3 months (27)	(5)	once/day
Instrument Channel - Low Pressure Main Steam Line	once/3 months (27)	once/3 months	none
Instrument Channel - High Flow Main Steam Line	once/3 months (27)	once/3 months	once/day
Instrument Channel - Main Steam Line Tunnel High Temperature	once/3 months (27)	once/operating cycle	none
Instrument Channel - Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation - Reactor Zone	(1) (14) (22)	once/3 months	once/day (8)

NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2.A THROUGH 4.2.H (Continued)

14. Upscale trip is functionally tested during functional test time as required by section 4.7.B.1.a and 4.7.C.1.c.
15. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
16. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
17. This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.
18. Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.
19. Functional test is limited to the time where the SCTS is required to meet the requirements of section 4.7.C.1.a.
20. Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scrambling the reactor. This calibration can only be performed during an outage.
21. Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.
22. One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours for functional testing and calibration.
23. The Reactor Cleanup System Space Temperature monitors are RTD's that feed a temperature switch in the control room. The temperature switch may be tested monthly by using a simulated signal. The RTD itself is a highly reliable instrument and less frequent testing is necessary.
24. This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
25. During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated. This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.
26. This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
27. Functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce the challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, item II.K.3.16.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 111 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33
AMENDMENT NO. 105 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52
AMENDMENT NO. 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3
DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

1.0 Introduction

The licensee, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in its submittal dated November 5, 1982 requested certain modifications to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3. These modifications resulted from a feasibility study that was recommended by NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," Item II.K.3.16. This item called for a comprehensive study to be performed to determine feasible means to reduce challenges to relief valves. The record of relief valve failures-to-close for all boiling water reactors (BWRs) in the past 3 years of plant operation is approximately 30 in 73 reactor years (0.41 failures per reactor year). This has demonstrated that the failure of a relief valve to close would be the most likely cause of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The high failure rate is the result of a high relief valve challenge rate and a relatively high failure rate per challenge (0.16 failures per challenge). Typically, five valves are challenged for each event. This results in an equivalent failure rate per challenge of 0.03. The challenge and failure rates can be reduced in several ways one of which is reducing the testing frequency of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

Item II.K.3.16 recommends that an investigation of the feasibility and contraindications of reducing challenges to the relief valves should be conducted. Other methods should also be included in the study. It further recommends that those changes which are shown to reduce relief valve challenges without compromising the performance of relief valves or other systems should be implemented.

2.0 Evaluation

A study was performed by the licensee to determine the feasibility of reducing the testing frequency of the MSIVs and associated instrumentation to reduce the challenges to the relief valves while still maintaining overall system reliability (no degradation of safety systems operational

capability). Information that the licensee provided showed that during a typical 12-month operating cycle on each unit at Browns Ferry, there are approximately 100 functional tests and 14 integrated calibrations performed on instrumentation associated with the main steam line isolation logic. From the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit Scram List, there have been approximately 41 inadvertent scrams or isolations in the history of Browns Ferry associated with the MSIVs and associated logic. Of these 33 (80 percent) have occurred while performing a surveillance instruction (SI).

Using conservative operating information it was shown that for Units 1, 2 and 3, there has been an average of 2.75 forced scrams/isolations each cycle as a result of a main steam line instrumentation SI. Therefore, reducing the number of functional tests performed during a cycle by over two-thirds will cause a reduction in the number of unnecessary scrams to less than one scram each cycle. As a result of this reduction, unnecessary challenges to relief valves and other safety systems will be proportionally reduced.

The licensee provided the following discussion to show that the reduced testing frequency would not impact system operability. The Browns Ferry Licensee Event Report (LER) list for Units 1, 2 and 3 indicates there have been ten LERs on minor setpoint deviations and only two LERs of any significance discovered during scheduled SIs. The two major LERs were results of failed sensors. To determine a new functional testing frequency using the Technical Specification 4.1 bases, the total number of operating hours and the total number of identical components were needed. Table 1 contains the information on each surveillance instruction required, the M value calculated (the factor M is the exposure hours and is equal to the number of sensors in a group times the elapsed time), and the recommended testing interval found from figure 4.1-1 of the Technical Specifications using the M value and the number of undetected failures. Using this information, it is shown that a test interval of greater than six months could be justified. However, the licensee proposed a required test frequency of once each three months to maintain conservatism.

3.0 Summary

Item II.K.3.16 of NUREG-0737 calls for a comprehensive study to determine feasible means to reduce the challenges to relief valves. One suggestion stated in item II.K.3.16 was to reduce the testing frequency of the main steam isolation valves.

The staff has concluded that this will produce a marked decrease in inadvertent reactor isolation events and scrams associated with testing. Besides reducing challenges to the relief valves by a significant and quantifiable factor, it follows that the general reduction in initiator events will have commensurate benefit in reducing challenges to other reactor protection and safeguard features.

TABLE 1

$n = nT$
 $T = 105120 \text{ hours}$

<u>Surveillance Instruction</u>	<u>Number of Identical Components(n)*</u>	<u>Number of Failures</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Interval**</u>
4.1.A-10	12	0	1.26×10^6	6 months 10^6
4.1.A-11	24	2	2.52×10^6	6 months 10^6
4.2.A-6	12	0	1.26×10^6	6 months 10^6
4.2.A-7	48	0	5.05×10^6	6 months 10^6
4.2.A-8	48	0	5.05×10^6	6 months 10^6

*Total number of components for all 3 units.

**Interval from figure 4.1-1 of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant technical specifications.

By reducing the MSIV isolation testing frequency from once each month to once each 3 months for main steam line isolation valve closure, main steam line low pressure, main steam line high flow, and main steam line high temperature, and from once each week to once each 3 months for main steam line high radiation, it still remains under the recommended frequency of six months as stated earlier and thus remains conservative. This indicates that testing frequency may be reduced without impacting overall system reliability. Therefore, the staff has concluded that the reduction of testing frequency will not reduce the margin of safety in detecting failed equipment below the recommended limit but will increase the overall margin of safety by reducing the challenges to the relief valves and other systems.

Therefore, we have concluded that the proposed Technical Specification revisions satisfy the recommendations of NUREG-0737 (Item II.K.3.16), permit the operation of the facility in a manner that is consistent with the licensing basis and accident analysis, and are, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 Environmental Considerations

The amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and a change in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: September 4, 1984