

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

JANUARY 31 1980

Docket Nos. 50-259
50-260
and 50-296

Mr. Hugh G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500 A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 57, 52 and 30 to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3. These amendments are in response to your letter of January 24, 1980 (TVA BFNP TS 136).

On January 14, 1980 we issued Amendments Nos. 56, 51 and 29 to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 to permit operation of Unit No. 3 while Unit No. 1 is down for refueling by providing a temporary second off-site power source to the Unit No. 3 4kv shutdown boards through the 4kv bus tie board. In the Safety Evaluation related to these amendments, we stated that upon completion of the new overhead line installation from the cooling tower transformers to the Unit No. 3 4kv system, the Technical Specifications will be changed to be exactly identical to the Technical Specifications as they existed immediately prior to the changes effected by Amendments Nos. 56, 51 and 29.

The subject Amendments Nos. , and , change the Technical Specifications to make the limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements the same as existed prior to issuance of Amendments Nos. 56, 51 and 29 on January 14, 1980.

OFFICE						
SURNAME						
DATE						

Mr. Hugh G. Parris

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Copies of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
T. A. Ippolito

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. to DPR-33
- 2. Amendment No. to DPR-52
- 3. Amendment No. to DPR-68
- 4. Safety Evaluation
- 5. Notice

cc w/enclosures:
see next page

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*No local office has to
 review notices and amendments.
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OFFICE	ORB#3	ORB#3	OELD	ORB#3	AD/ORP/DOR
SURNAME	SSheppard	RClark	WICHIN	Tippolito	WGammill
DATE	1/29/80	1/29/80	P 30 /80	1/29/80	1/29/80

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Mr. Hugh G. Parris
Tennessee Valley Authority

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cc:

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General Counsel
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Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

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Agency
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Chairman, Limestone County Commission
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US EPA
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Arlington, Virginia 20460



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-259

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 57
License No. DPR-33

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendments by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated January 24, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-33 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 57, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 31, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 57

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

DOCKET NO. 50-259

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages:

292/293
294/295
296/297
298/299

The underlined pages are those being changed; marginal lines on these pages indicate the area being revised. Overleaf pages are provided for convenience.

2. Delete the following page:

296a

3.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMApplicability

Applies to the auxiliary electrical power system.

Objective

To assure an adequate supply of electrical power for operation of those systems required for safety.

Specification**A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment**

A reactor shall not be started up (made critical) from the cold condition unless four units 1 and 2 diesel generators are operable, both 161-kV transmission lines, two common station service transformers and one cooling tower transformer are operable, and the requirements of 3.9.A.4 through 3.9.A.7 are met.

A reactor shall not be started up (made critical) from the Hot Standby Condition unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. At least one off-site 161-kV transmission line and its common transformer are available and capable of automatically supplying auxiliary power to the shutdown boards.
2. Three units 1 and 2 diesel generators shall be operable.
3. An additional source of power consisting of one of the following:
 - a. A second 161-kV transmission line and its

4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMApplicability

Applies to the periodic testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical systems.

Objective

Verify the operability of the auxiliary electrical system.

Specification**A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment****1. Diesel Generators**

- a. Each diesel generator shall be manually started and loaded once each month to demonstrate operational readiness. The test shall continue for at least a one-hour period at 75% of rated load or greater.

During the monthly generator test the diesel generator starting air compressor shall be checked for operation and its ability to recharge air receivers. The operation of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps shall be demonstrated, and the diesel starting time to reach rated voltage and speed shall be logged.

- b. Once per operating cycle a test will be conducted to demonstrate the emergency diesel generators will start and accept emergency load within

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS****3.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment**

common transformer and cooling tower transformer capable of supplying power to the shutdown boards.

- b. A fourth operable units 1 and 2 diesel generator.
- 4. Buses and Boards Available
 - a. Start buses 1A and 1B are energized.
 - b. The units 1 and 2 4-kV shutdown boards are energized.
 - c. The 480-V shutdown boards associated with the unit are energized.
 - d. Undervoltage relays operable on start buses 1A and 1B and 4-kV shutdown boards, A, B, C, and D.
- 5. The 250-Volt unit and shutdown board batteries and a battery charger for each battery and associated battery boards are operable.
- 6. Logic Systems
 - a. Common accident signal logic system is operable.
 - b. 480-V load shedding logic system is operable.
- 7. There shall be a minimum of 103,000 gallons of diesel fuel in the standby diesel generator fuel tanks.

4.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

the specified time sequence.

- c. Once a month the quantity of diesel fuel available shall be logged.
- d. Each diesel generator shall be given an annual inspection in accordance with instructions based on the manufacturer's recommendations.
- e. Once a month a sample of diesel fuel shall be checked for quality. The quality shall be within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of the latest revision to ASTM D975 and logged.
- 2. D.C. Power System - Unit Batteries (250-Volt) Diesel Generator Batteries (175-Volt) and Shutdown Board Batteries (250-Volt)
 - a. Every week the specific gravity and the voltage of the pilot cell, and temperature of an adjacent cell and overall battery voltage shall be measured and logged.
 - b. Every three months the measurements shall be made of voltage of each cell to nearest 0.1 volt, specific gravity of each cell, and temperature of every fifth cell. These measurements shall be logged.
 - c. A battery rated discharge (capacity) test shall be performed and the voltage, time, and output current measurements shall be logged at intervals not to exceed 24 months.

1.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment**4.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment****3. Logic Systems**

- a. Both divisions of the common accident signal logic system shall be tested every 6 months to demonstrate that it will function on actuation of the core spray system of each reactor to provide an automatic start signal to all 4 units 1 and 2 diesel generators.
- b. Once every 6 months, the condition under which the 480-Volt load shedding logic system is required shall be simulated using pendant test switches and/or pushbutton test switches to demonstrate that the load shedding logic system would initiate load shedding signals on the diesel auxiliary boards, reactor MOV boards, and the 480-Volt shutdown boards.

4. Undervoltage Relays

- a. Once every 6 months, the condition under which the undervoltage relays are required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on start buses 1A and 1B to demonstrate that the diesel generators will start.
- b. Once every 6 months, the conditions under which the undervoltage relays are required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on each shutdown board to demonstrate that the associated diesel generator will start.
- c. The undervoltage relays which start the diesel generators from start buses 1A and 1B and the 4-kV shutdown boards, shall be calibrated annually for trip and reset and the measurements logged.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS****3.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment**

Whenever a reactor is in Startup mode or Run mode and not in a cold condition, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in 3.9.A, except as specified herein.

1. From and after the date that one 161-kV line or one common station transformer and its parallel cooling tower transformer and 4 kV bus tie board or one start bus becomes inoperable, reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days.
2. When one of the units 1 and 2 diesel generator is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 days, provided that both off-site 161-kV transmission lines and both common station transformers or one common transformer and one cooling tower transformer (not parallel with the energized common transformer) are available, and all of the CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and the remaining three units 1 and 2 diesel generators are operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and both reactors shall be shutdown and in the cold condition within 24 hours.

4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment

1. When one 161-kV line or one common station transformer and its parallel cooling tower transformer and 4 kv bus tie board or one start bus is found to be inoperable, all units 1 and 2 diesel generators and associated boards must be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
2. When one of the units 1 and 2 diesel generator is found to be inoperable, all of the CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems and the remaining diesel generators and associated boards shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

3.9.A Operation with Inoperable Equipment

3. When one units 1 and 2 4-kV shutdown board is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible for a period not to exceed 5 days, provided that both off-site 161-kV transmission lines and both common station transformers or one common transformer and one cooling tower transformer and 4-kV bus tie board are available and the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and all 480 V emergency power boards are operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and both reactors shall be shutdown and in the cold condition within 24 hours.
4. From and after the date that one of the three 250-Volt unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding seven days. Except for routine surveillance testing the NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.
5. From and after the date that one of the four 250-volt shutdown

4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment

3. When one 4-kV shutdown board is found to be inoperable, all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS and RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplies by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards shall be demonstrated to be operable, immediately and daily thereafter.

3.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment

board batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding five days in accordance with 3.9.B.4.

6. When one division of the Logic System is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days, provided the CSCS requirements listed in specification 3.9.B.2 are satisfied. The NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.

4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment

3.9.C Operation in Cold Shutdown

Whenever both reactors are in cold shutdown condition with irradiated fuel in either reactor, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in section 3.9.A except as specified herein.

1. At least two units 1 and 2 diesel generators and their associated 4-kV shutdown boards shall be operable.
2. An additional source of power consisting of at least one of the following:
 - a. One 161-kV transmission line and its associated common station transformer either cooling tower transformer and a 4 V bus tie board capable of supplying power to the Units 1 and 2 shutdown boards.
 - b. A third operable diesel generator.
3. At least one 480-V shutdown board for each unit must be operable.

3.9 BASES

The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the plant during shutdown, and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available, namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the nuclear generating units, and the diesel generators.

The 161-kV offsite power supply consists of two lines which are fed from different sections of the TVA 161-kV grid. In the normal mode of operation, the 161-kV system is operating and four diesel generators are operational. If one diesel generator is out of service, there normally remain the 161-kV sources, the nuclear generating units, and the other three diesel generators. For a diesel generator to be considered operable its associated 125 V battery must be operable.

The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for 7 days of full load operation of 3 diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.

Auxiliary power for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is supplied from two sources; either the unit station transformers or from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station transformers or the cooling tower transformers. If a common station transformer is lost, the units can continue to operate since the unit station transformers are in service, the other common station transformer and the cooling tower transformers are available, and four diesel generators are operational.

A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, providing all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators CS, RHR, (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480 V power boards are operable.

There are eight 250-volt d-c battery systems each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, operative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-volt a-c unit preferred motor-generator set. One 250-volt d-c system provides power for common plant and transmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-volt a-c plant preferred motor-generator set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The four remaining systems deliver control power to the 4160-volt shutdown boards.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 52
License No. DPR- 52

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendments by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated January 24, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 52, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 31, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 52

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages:

291/292
293/294
295/296
297/298
299/300

The underlined pages are those being changed; marginal lines on these pages indicate the area being revised. Overleaf pages are provided for convenience.

2. Delete the following page:

296a

3.8.C/4.8.C Mechanical Vacuum Pump

The purpose of isolating the mechanical vacuum pump line is to limit the release of activity from the main condenser. During an accident, fission products would be transported from the reactor through the main steam lines to the condenser. The fission product radioactivity would be sensed by the main steam line radioactivity monitors which initiate isolation.

4.8.A and 4.8.B BASES

The surveillance requirements given under Specification 4.8.A and 4.8.B provide assurance that liquid and gaseous wastes are properly controlled and monitored during any release of radioactive materials in the liquid and gaseous effluents. These surveillance requirements provide the data for the licensee and the Commission to evaluate the station's performance relative to radioactive wastes released to the environment. Reports on the quantities of radioactive materials released in effluents shall be furnished to the Commission on the basis of Section 6 of these technical specifications. On the basis of such reports and any additional information the Commission may obtain from the licensee or others, the Commission may from time to time require the licensee to take such actions as the Commission deems appropriate.

3.8.D and 4.8.D BASES

The objective of this specification is to assure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear radioactive material sources does not exceed allowable limits.

3.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM**Applicability**

Applies to the auxiliary electrical power system.

Objective

To assure an adequate supply of electrical power for operation of those systems required for safety.

Specification**A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment**

A reactor shall not be started up (made critical) from the cold condition unless four units 1 and 2 diesel generators are operable, both 161-kV transmission lines, two common station service transformers and one cooling tower transformer are operable, and the requirements of 3.9.A.4 through 3.9.A.7 are met.

A reactor shall not be started up (made critical) from the Hot Standby Condition unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. At least one off-site 161-kV transmission line and its common transformer are available and capable of automatically supplying auxiliary power to the shutdown boards.
2. Three units 1 and 2 diesel generators shall be operable.
3. An additional source of power consisting of one of the following:
 - a. A second 161-kV transmission line and its

4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM**Applicability**

Applies to the periodic testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical systems.

Objective

Verify the operability of the auxiliary electrical system.

Specification**A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment****1. Diesel Generators**

- a. Each diesel generator shall be manually started and loaded once each month to demonstrate operational readiness. The test shall continue for at least a one hour period at 75% rated load or greater.

During the monthly generator test the diesel generator starting air compressor shall be checked for operation and its ability to recharge air receivers. The operation of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps shall be demonstrated, and the diesel starting time to reach rated voltage and speed shall be logged.

- b. Once per operating cycle a test will be conducted to demonstrate the emergency diesel generators will start and accept emergency load within

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

common transformer and cooling tower transformer capable of supplying power to the shutdown boards.

- b. A fourth operable units 1 and 2 diesel generator.

4. Buses and Boards Available

- a. Start buses 1A and 1B are energized.
- b. The units 1 and 2 4-kV shutdown boards are energized.
- c. The 480-V shutdown boards associated with the unit are energized.
- d. Undervoltage relays operable on start buses 1A and 1B and 4-kV shutdown boards, A, B, C, and D.

- 5. The 250-Volt unit and shutdown board batteries and a battery charger for each battery and associated battery boards are operable.

6. Logic Systems

- a. Common accident signal logic system is operable.
- b. 480-V load shedding logic system is operable.

- 7. There shall be a minimum of 100,000 gallons of diesel fuel in the standby diesel generator fuel tanks.

4.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

the specified time sequence.

- c. Once a month the quantity of diesel fuel available shall be logged.

- d. Each diesel generator shall be given an annual inspection in accordance with instructions based on the manufacturer's recommendations.

- e. Once a month a sample of diesel fuel shall be checked for quality. The quality shall be within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of the latest revision to ASTM D975 and logged.

2. D.C. Power System - Unit Batteries (250-Volt) Diesel Generator Batteries (175-Volt) and Shutdown Board Batteries (250-Volt)

- a. Every week the specific gravity and the voltage of the pilot cell, and temperature of an adjacent cell and overall battery voltage shall be measured and logged.
- b. Every three months the measurements shall be made of voltage of each cell to nearest 0.1 volt, specific gravity of each cell, and temperature of every fifth cell. These measurements shall be logged.
- c. A battery rated discharge (capacity) test shall be performed and the voltage, time, and output current measurements shall be logged at intervals not to exceed 24 months.

6.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment6.9.A Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

3. Logic Systems

- a. Both divisions of the common accident signal logic system shall be tested every 6 months to demonstrate that it will function on actuation of the core spray system of each reactor to provide an automatic start signal to all 4 units 1 and 2 diesel generators.
- b. Once every 6 months, the condition under which the 480-Volt load shedding logic system is required shall be simulated using pendant test switches and/or pushbutton test switches to demonstrate that the load shedding logic system would initiate load shedding signals on the diesel auxiliary boards, reactor MOV boards, and the 480-Volt shutdown boards.

4. Undervoltage Relays

- a. Once every 6 months, the condition under which the undervoltage relays are required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on start buses 1A and 1B to demonstrate that the diesel generators will start.
- b. Once every 6 months, the conditions under which the undervoltage relays are required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on each shutdown board to demonstrate that the associated diesel generator will start.
- c. The undervoltage relays which start the diesel generators from start buses 1A and 1B and the 4-kV shutdown boards, shall be calibrated annually for trip and reset and the measurements logged.

3.9.8 Operation with Inoperable Equipment

Whenever a reactor is in Startup mode or Run mode and not in a cold condition, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in 3.9.A, except as specified herein.

1. From and after the date that one 161-kV line or one common station transformer and its parallel cooling tower transformer and 4 kV bus tie board or one start bus becomes inoperable, reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days.
2. When one of the units 1 and 2 diesel generator is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 days, provided that both off-site 161-kV transmission lines and both common station transformers or one common transformer and one cooling tower transformer (not parallel with the energized common transformer) are available, and all of the CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and the remaining three units 1 and 2 diesel generators are operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and both reactors shall be shutdown and in the cold condition within 24 hours.

4.9.8 Operation with Inoperable Equipment

1. When one 161-kV line or one common station transformer and its parallel cooling tower transformer and 4 kV bus tie board or one start bus is found to be inoperable, all units 1 and 2 diesel generators and associated boards must be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
2. When one of the units 1 and 2 diesel generator is found to be inoperable, all of the CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems and the remaining diesel generators and associated boards shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.9.2 Operation with Inoperable Equipment

3. When one units 1 and 2 4-kV shutdown board is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible for a period not to exceed 5 days, provided that both off-site 161-kV transmission lines and both common station transformers or one common transformer and one cooling tower transformer and 4-kV bus tie board are available and the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and all 480 V emergency power boards are operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and both reactors shall be shutdown and in the cold condition within 24 hours.
4. From and after the date that one of the three 250-volt unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding seven days. Except for routine surveillance testing the NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.
5. From and after the date that one of the four 250-volt shutdown

4.9.2 Operation with Inoperable Equipment

3. When one 4-kV shutdown board is found to be inoperable, all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS and RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplies by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards shall be demonstrated to be operable, immediately and daily thereafter.

3.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment

board batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding five days in accordance with 3.9.B.4.

6. When one division of the Logic System is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days, provided the CSCS requirements listed in specification 3.9.B.2 are satisfied. The NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.

4.9.B Operation with Inoperable Equipment

3.9.C Operation in Cold Shutdown

Whenever both reactors are in cold shutdown condition with irradiated fuel in either reactor, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in section 3.9.A except as specified herein.

1. At least two units 1 and 2 diesel generators and their associated 4-kV shutdown boards shall be operable.
2. An additional source of power consisting of at least one of the following:
 - a. One 161-kV transmission line and its associated common station transformer either cooling tower transformer and a 4 kV bus tie board capable of supplying power to the Units 1 and 2 shutdown boards.
 - b. A third operable diesel generator
3. At least one 480-V shutdown board for each unit must be operable.

The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the plant during shut-down and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available, namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the nuclear generating units, and the diesel generators.

The 161-kV offsite power supply consists of two lines which are fed from different sections of the TVA 161-kV grid. In the normal mode of operation, the 161-kV system is operating and four diesel generators are operational. If one diesel generator is out of service, there normally remain the 161-kV sources, the nuclear generating units, and the other three diesel generators. For a diesel generator to be considered operable its associated 125 V battery must be operable.

The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for 7 days of full load operation of 3 diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.

Auxiliary power for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is supplied from two sources; either the unit station transformers or from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station transformers or the cooling tower transformers. If a common station transformer is lost, the units can continue to operate since the unit station transformers are in service, the other common station transformer and the cooling tower transformers are available, and four diesel generators are operational.

A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, providing all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators CS, RHR, (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480 V power boards are operable.

There are eight 250-volt d-c battery systems each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, cooperative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-volt a-c unit preferred motor-generator set. One 250-volt d-c system provides power for common plant and transmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-volt a-c plant preferred motor-generator set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The four remaining systems deliver control power to the 4160-volt shutdown boards.

3.9 BASES

Each 250-volt d-c shutdown board control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger. The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system. Zero resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply. Each power supply is located in the reactor building near the shutdown board it supplies. Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.

The 250-volt d-c system is so arranged, and the batteries sized such, that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit. Loss of control power to any engineered safeguards control circuit is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected. The loss of one 250-volt shutdown board battery affects normal control power only for the 4160-volt shutdown board which it supplies. The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system. This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-296

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 30
License No. DPR-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendments by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated January 24, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 30, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 31, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 30

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

DOCKET NO. 50-296

Revise Appendix A as follows:

1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages:

324

325

327

2. Marginal lines on the above pages indicate revised area.

3.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

3. When one unit 3 4-kV shutdown board is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible for a period not to exceed 5 days, provided that both offsite 161-kV transmission lines and both cooling tower transformers are available and the remaining unit 3 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems, and all unit 3 480-V emergency power boards are operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shutdown and in the cold condition within 24 hours.

4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

3. When one unit 3 4-kV shutdown board is found to be inoperable, all remaining unit 3 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS and RHR (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards shall be demonstrated to be operable, immediately and daily thereafter.

3.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

4. From and after the date that the 250-Volt Shutdown board batteries or one of the three 250-Volt unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding seven days. Except for routine surveillance testing, the NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.
5. When one division of the Logic System is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days, provided the CSCS requirements listed in Specification 3.9.B.2 are satisfied. The NRC shall be notified within 24 hours of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period and the plans to return the failed component to an operable state.

4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

3.9 BASES

The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the unit during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available, namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the nuclear generating units, and the diesel generators.

The 161-kV offsite power supply consists of two lines which are fed from different sections of the TVA 161-kV grid. In the normal mode of operation, the 161-kV system is operating and four diesel generators are operational. If one diesel generator is out of service, there normally remain the 161-kV sources, and the other three diesel generators. For a diesel generator to be considered operable its associated 125 V battery must be operable.

The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for 7 days of full load operation of 3 diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.

Offsite auxiliary power for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 is supplied from two sources: the unit station transformers from the main generator or the 161-kV transmission system through the cooling tower transformers. If a cooling tower transformer is lost, the unit can continue to operate since the station transformer is in service, the other cooling tower transformer is available, and four diesel generators are operational.

A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, providing all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators CS, RHR, (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Systems supplied to the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480 V power boards are operable.

There are five 250-volt d-c battery systems each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, operative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-volt a-c unit preferred motor-generator set. One 250-volt d-c system provides power for common plant and transmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-volt a-c plant preferred motor-generator set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The fifth battery system delivers control power to a 4-kV shutdown board.

The 250-Volt dc system is so arranged, and the batteries sized such, that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit. Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 57 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33
AMENDMENT NO. 52 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52
AMENDMENT NO. 30 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated January 24, 1980, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee or TVA) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A) appended to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The proposed amendments would change the Technical Specifications to be exactly identical to the Technical Specifications that existed immediately prior to the changes effected by Amendment Nos. 56, 51 and 29.

On January 14, 1980, in response to TVA's request of the same date, we issued Amendment Nos. 56, 51 and 29 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68. These amendments permitted operation of Browns Ferry Unit No. 3 (BF-3) while Unit No. 1 is down for refueling by providing a temporary second off-site power source to the Unit No. 3 4 kv shutdown boards through the 4 kv bus tie board. In the Safety Evaluation related to these Amendments - which is incorporated in this Safety Evaluation by reference - we stated that upon completion of the new overhead line installation from the cooling tower transformers to the Unit No. 3 4kv system, the Technical Specifications will be changed to revert to the Technical Specifications that existed immediately prior to the changes effected by Amendments Nos. 56, 51 and 29.

2.0 Evaluation

TVA has completed rerouting of the cables from the cooling tower transformers into Unit No. 3. As TVA stated in their submittal of January 14, 1980, the cooling tower connection to the bus tie board has been physically removed until repairs are completed. TVA is awaiting approval of this amendment to restore this connection to the cooling tower

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transformers and to restore the interlocks circuitry between the Units 1 and 2 shutdown boards and the Unit 3 bus tie board. TVA has reaffirmed their commitments to: 1) verify, by test, the operability of the restored system, 2) restore the interlocks circuitry to that which existed immediately prior to January 14, 1980, 3) revise the operating and emergency procedures to reflect the restored system, and 4) reinstruct the operating and maintenance personnel on the restored system.

We had previously evaluated the Browns Ferry inplant electrical system and had concluded that it was designed to maintain adequate inplant electrical system voltages under all postulated modes of normal and abnormal operation of the three Browns Ferry units. We have rereviewed the system as a result of the temporary modifications made on January 14, 1980 and reaffirmed our previous conclusions. The system must be restored to the configuration that existed immediately prior to January 14, 1980 before Unit No. 1 is authorized to resume operation; the refueling outage of Unit 1 is scheduled to be completed by February 21, 1980.

3.0 Environmental Considerations

We have determined that these amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that these amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: January 31, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 57 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-33, Amendment No. 52 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 and Amendment No. 30 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3, located in Limestone County, Alabama. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments change the Technical Specifications to make them exactly identical to the Technical Specifications that were in effect immediately prior to the changes authorized by Amendments Nos. 56, 51 and 29 issued January 14, 1980 which provided for a temporary second off-site power source to the Unit No. 3 4kv shutdown boards through the Units Nos. 1 and 2 bus tie board.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated January 24, 1980, (2) Amendment No. 57 to License No. DPR-33, Amendment No. 52 to License No. DPR-52, and Amendment No. 30 to License No. DPR-68, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Athens Public Library, South and Forrest, Athens, Alabama 35611. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 31 day of January 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

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FEB 11 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Ippolito, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #3,
Division of Operating Reactors

FROM: G. Lainas, Chief, Plant Systems Branch, Division
of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REGARDING LOW PRESSURE
COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI) SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS -
BROWNS FERRY, UNITS 1 & 2 (TACS 12330 and 12331)

In accordance with your request per TACS 12330 and 12331, we have reviewed the Tennessee Valley Authority's proposed changes to the Technical Specifications for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, regarding the removal of the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) loop selection logic. Since the logic has been removed, there is no longer the need for surveillance requirements relating to this logic nor the need to limit the variation in recirculation pump speeds for purposes associated with this logic. However, during our review, the RSB has advised us that there may be other factors which require limits placed on the variation of recirculation pump speeds such as unbalanced core flow and core and pump vibration. Further investigation into this area may be warranted.

Based on our review, we find the Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control aspects of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications to be acceptable. Our Safety evaluation is enclosed.

ISI

G. Lainas, Chief
Plant Systems Branch
Division of Operating Reactors

Contact:
R. Kendall, X28218

Enclosure:
Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
D. Eisenhut
R. Tedesco
G. Lainas
R. Clark
D. Tondi
M. Chiramal

OFFICE	R. Kendall	DOR:PSB <i>PK</i>	DOR:PSB/SL	DOR:PSB/BC
SURNAME		RKendall:sh	DTondi <i>M</i>	GLainas
DATE		2/16/80	2/17/80	2/18/80

SAFETY EVALUATION
ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
ASPECTS OF THE BROWNS FERRY, UNITS 1 & 2
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REGARDING
LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI)
SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 11, 1979, NRC issued Amendment Nos. 51 and 45 to Facility License Nos. DPR-33 and DPR-52 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. These amendments authorized the licensee to change the power supply for certain low pressure coolant injection valves and are related to earlier amendments (Nos. 27 to License DPR-33 and 24 to License DPR-52) which dealt with the elimination of the LPCI system's recirculation loop selection logic.

The licensee (TVA) committed, by letter dated June 15, 1977, to submit the proposed Technical Specification changes concerning the LPCI modifications with the reload amendment request for each unit. This request was submitted by TVA letter dated October 4, 1979.

EVALUATION

We have reviewed these proposed changes to pages 97, 111, 112, 182, and 221 of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications for Unit Nos. 1 and 2, which are as follows:

1. The change to Table 4.2.B (Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS) removes the surveillance requirements on four reactor pressure sensors (PS-3-186A&B, and PS-3-187A&B) whose sole function was that of a permissive in the LPCI recirculation loop selection logic.
2. The changes to pages 111 and 112 remove the low reactor water level instrumentation as the source of a LPCI loop selection logic initiation signal.
3. The changes to Section 3.6.F (Limiting Conditions for Operation) and the corresponding bases removes the limitations placed on variation in speed between the recirculation pumps. The purpose of this limitation was to prevent the LPCI loop selection logic from selecting the wrong loop for injection which was possible for certain low probability accidents with the recirculation loop operating at large speed differences.

Since the LPCI loop selection logic has been removed from the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, there is no longer the need for surveillance requirements relating to this logic nor the need to limit the variation of recirculation pump speed for purposes associated with this logic.

CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we conclude that the Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control (EI&C) aspects of the proposed Technical Specification changes for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, are consistent with our safety evaluation of May 8, 1978 (enclosure to memo from W. Butler to G. Lear) regarding this subject and since the LPCI loop selection logic has been removed, we find the proposed Technical Specification changes acceptable.