

Indian Point 2 (IP2) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Failure
Lessons-Learned Task Group
(TAC No. MA9163)

Task Group Notes - Discussion with Mike Mayfield, RES on 8/9/00

Task Group Attendees: Scott Newberry, Alan Rubin, Joe Donoghue

Mike had the following observations/comments:

1. We will still have SGTRs in the future, but we want to keep the frequency low. Although SGTRs are within the design basis, these events have risk implications and therefore, should not be ignored.
2. In general, when a SGTR occurs, something led to the event which was missed. Mike felt there were missed opportunities at IP2 just as there were at other events.
3. Mike felt there were no surprises (i.e., technical issues) from the IP2 event. PWSCC was well known by the industry as a SG tube degradation mechanism. Also, probes were available to find the problems at IP2. Mike questioned why Con Ed didn't look at the high frequency data that were available during the 1997 inspection - the data were there.
4. Con Ed and the industry should learn lessons from the IP2 event. Most of industry is doing well in this area, but Con Ed was an outlier and needs improvement. Con Ed was also weak in other areas besides SGs.
5. NRC reviewers should not be reluctant to ask the right tough questions during their reviews. Safety evaluations should be written consistent with the information that was provided by the licensee and with what was relied on when doing the review. (This point was reflected in the March 16, 2000, memo from RES on RES's independent technical review of NRR's SE.)
6. NRR's request in Feb 2000 for RES to perform an independent technical review of the staff's SE for the SG tube inspection interval was atypical. During RES's review, NRR provided all the necessary input to RES. The fact that this was an unusual process within the agency, and given RES's conclusions, the perception from outside the agency was that NRC was "not a well oiled machine." Mike felt that the way information in the response was handled could have been better. If this is something NRR might do in the future, we should develop a process for handling the request and response. He commented that it is not normally RES's role to review NRR's SEs.
7. If we want effective SG reviews, NRR reviewers and regional inspectors should have a certain level of specific experience/expertise in this area. Mike's impression is that expertise in the regions is sporadic. He feels that if the agency wants a core group of SG experts, they should be at headquarters and would be available to support the regions.
8. RES used to hold periodic meeting with the regions (including RES contractors with SG expertise) similar to NRR's former counterpart meetings. These meetings provided a

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mechanism to transfer current knowledge to the regions. RES stopped holding these meetings several years ago because of reduction in resources.

9. When asked about C. Dodd's experience, Mike said he has the highest regard/esteem for Dodd's SG expertise.
10. Mike mentioned that RES is looking into the possibility of getting SG tubes from either ANO-2 or IP2 after the SGs are replaced. This could be an opportunity to learn more in this area.