

Exelon Generation Company, LLC www.exeloncorp.com LaSalle County Station **2601** North 21'tRoad Marseilles, IL 61341-9757

November 29, 2001 10 CFR 50.4

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

> LaSalle County Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-1 **1**  NRC Docket No. 50-373

Subject: Unit 1 Cycle 9 Core Operating Limits Report

Exelon Generation Company (EGC), LLC, in a letter dated, September 21, 2001, notified the NRC that the refueling outage for Unit 1 had been changed to January 10, 2002. The change in the refueling outage has resulted in a need to revise the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). The COLR revision incorporates new operating limits for operation beyond the current analyzed exposure and an update to a name change in the fuel manufacturer. Other administrative changes have also been incorporated. Refer to Section 1, page i, for a summary of changes.

In accordance with Technical Specification Section 5.6.5, "Core Operating Limits Report," and 10 CFR 50.4, "Written Communications," LaSalle County Station is submitting this revision to the COLR to the NRC.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. William Riffer, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,

harles G. Pardee Site Vice President LaSalle County Station

Attachment

cc: Regional Administrator - NRC Region **III**  NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station

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Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I

# Section **1**

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9

Core Operating Limits Report

November 2001

## Issuance of Changes Summary



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#### References

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- **1.** Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate **(3.2.1)** 
	- 1.1 Tech Spec Reference: Tech Spec 3.2.1
	- 1.2 Description:
		- 1.2.1 GE Fuel

The MAPLHGR Limit is determined using the applicable Lattice-Type MAPLHGR limits from Tables 1.2-1, 1.2-2, 1.2-3, and 1.2-4. For Single Reactor Recirculation Loop Operation, the MAPLHGR limits in Tables 1.2-1, 1.2-2, 1.2-3, and 1.2-4 are multiplied by the MAPFAC multipliers provided in Figures 1.2-1 and 1.2-2.



#### 1.2.2 Framatome-ANP (FANP is formerly known as SPC) Fuel

The MAPLHGR Limit is the- Lattice-Type MAPLHGR Limit. The Lattice-Type Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR) limits are determined from the table given below:



For single loop operation (or Abnormal Idle Loop Startup, UFSAR 15.4.4), the MAPLHGR multiplier for Framatome-ANP (FANP is formerly known as SPC) fuel is 0.90. (References 4, 6 and 7)

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#### Table 1.2-1

# Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR)

#### vs.

#### Average Planar Exposure for Fuel Type GE9B-P8CWB322-11GZ-100M-150-T (References 11 and 24)



## Table 1.2-2

## Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR)

vs.

#### Average Planar Exposure for Fuel Type GE9B-P8CWB320-9GZ-100M-150-T (References 11 and 24)



## Table 1.2-3

# Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR)

vs.

#### Average Planar Exposure for Fuel Type GE9B-P8CWB343-12GZ-80M-150-T (References 10 and 24)



## Table 1.2-4

# Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR)

#### vs.

#### Average Planar Exposure for Fuel Type GE9B-P8CWB342-10GZ-80M-150-T (References 10 and 24)





Figure 1.2-1 Power-Dependent **SLO** and Abnormal Idle Loop Startup MAPLHGR Multipliers for **GE** Fuel, **MAPFACP** 

Core Thermal Power **(%** Rated)

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Figure 1.2-2 Flow-Dependent **SLO** and Abnormal Idle Loop Startup MAPLHGR Multiplier for GE Fuel, MAPFAC<sub>F</sub>

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9

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#### 2. Minimum Critical Power Ratio **(3.2.2)**   $2.$

2.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec 3.2.2.

#### 2.2 Description:

Prior to initial scram time testing for an operating cycle, the MCPR operating limit is to be based on the Technical Specification Scram Times. For Technical Specification requirements refer to Technical Specification table 3.1.4-1.

TIP symmetry Chi-squared testing shall be performed prior to reaching 500 MWd/MTU to validate the MCPR calculation.

MCPR limits from BOC to Coastdown are applicable up to a core average exposure of 29,439 MWd/MTU (which is the licensing basis exposure used by Framatome-ANP). (Reference 4)

MCPR limits from Coastdown to EOL are applicable from a core average exposure of 29,439 MWd/MTU to a core average exposure of 31,062 MWd/MTU. (Reference 56)

2.2.1 Manual Flow Control MCPR Limits

The Governing MCPR Operating Limit while in Manual Flow Control is either determined from 2.2.1.1 or 2.2.1.2, whichever is greater at any given power, flow condition.

- 2.2.1.1 Power-Dependent MCPR (MCPRp)\* (Reference 3, 4, 23, and 56)
	- 2.2.1.1.1 GE Fuel

Table 2-1 gives the MCPRp limit as a function of core thermal power for Tech Spec Scram Speeds.

2.2.1.1.2 Framatome-ANP (formerly known as Siemens or SPC) Fuel Table 2-2 gives the MCPRp limit as a function of core thermal power for Tech Spec Scram Speeds.

> Note that the 10B rods are defined by the control cell locations 14-39, 22-15, 46-23, 38-47, 14-23, 38-15, 46-39, and 22-47.

- 2.2.1.2 Flow-Dependent MCPR (MCPRF) (Reference 4) Table 2-3 gives the MCPR $_F$  limit as a function of flow.
- 2.2.2 Automatic Flow Control MCPR Limits Automatic Flow Control MCPR Limits are not provided for L1C9.

\* For thermal limit monitoring cases at greater than 100%P, the 100% power MCPRp limits should be applied.

## Table 2-1

## MCPR<sub>p</sub> for GE Fuel

(References 3, 4, 5 54, and 56)

#### Operation from BOC to Coastdown



#### Coastdown Operation



#### Percent Core Thermal Power\*

Values are interpolated between relevant power levels. For operation at exactly 25% or 80% CTP, the more limiting value is used. 3489 MWt is rated power.

\*\* Allowable EOOS conditions are listed in Section 5. Other EOOS conditions are not covered.

1 For coastdown operation the NO EOOS option includes final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) and /or feedwater heaters out of service up to 100 °F.

## Table 2-2

## MCPR<sub>p</sub> for Framatome-ANP Fuel

(References 3, 4, 5, 23, 54 and 56)

#### For Operation at exposures from **11000** MWD/MTU to Coastdown

All Framatome-ANP (formerly known as SPC) fuel except fuel type 36 in 10B cell locations and fuel type 46 and 47 in **Al** cell locations



Percent Core Thermal Power\*

Framatome-ANP fuel that is fuel type 36 in 10B cell locations and fuel type 46 and 47 in **Al** cell locations



Percent Core Thermal Power\*

#### Coastdown Operation

All Framatome-ANP (formerly known as SPC) fuel except fuel type 36 in 10B cell locations



Framatome-ANP fuel that is fuel type 36 in 10B cell locations



#### Percent Core Thermal Power\*

\* Values are interpolated between relevant power levels. For operation at exactly 25% and 80% CTP, the more limiting value is used. 3489 MWt is rated power.

- \*\* Allowable EOOS conditions are listed in Section 5. Other EOOS conditions are not covered.
- t For coastdown operation the NO EOOS option includes final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) and /or feedwater heaters out of service up to 100 °F.

## Table 2-3

# MCPR<sub>F</sub> for GE and Framatome-ANP Fuel<br>References 4 & 5)

#### MCPRf limits for 105% Maximum Attainable Core Flow



The MCPRf limits are applicable from BOC through coastdown and in all EOOS scenarios.

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# **3.** Linear Heat Generation Rate **(3.2.3)**

**3.1** Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec 3.2.3.

- 3.2 Description:
	- 3.2.1 GE Fuel

a. The LHGR Limit is the product of the LHGR Limit in the following tables and the minimum of either the power dependent LHGR Factor\*, LHGRFAC<sub>P</sub> or the flow dependent LHGR Factor, LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub>. The LHGR Factors (LHGRFAC<sub>P</sub> and LHGRFACF) for the GE fuel is determined from Figures 3.2-1 through 3.2-3. The following LHGR limits apply for the entire cycle exposure range: (References 9, 14 and 24)

1. GE9B-P8CWB322-11GZ-100M-150-T (bundle 3861 in Reference 24)



2. GE9B-P8CWB320-9GZ-100M-150-T (bundle 3860 in Reference 24)



3. GE9B-P8CWB343-12GZ-80M-150-T (bundle 3866 in Reference 24)



4. GE9B-P8CWB342-10GZ-80M-150-T (bundle 3867 in Reference 24)



#### 3.2.2 Framatome-ANP (formerly known as SPC or Siemens) Fuel

The LHGR Limit is the product of the Steady-State LHGR Limit and the minimum of either the power dependent LHGR Factor\*, LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> or the flow dependent LHGR Factor, LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub>. The Steady-State LHGR limits are given below (Reference 4). LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> is determined from Table 3-1. LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub> is determined from Table 3-2. FANP LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers in this COLR for BOC to coastdown are applicable up to a core average exposure of 29,439 MWd/MTU (Reference 4). FANP LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers in this COLR for coastdown operation are applicable up to a core average exposure of 31,062 MWd/MTU (Reference 56).

Framatome-ANP Fuel Steady-State LHGR Limits for the following fuel types:

- 1. SPCA9-393B-16GZ-100M
- 2. SPCA9-396B-12GZB-100M
- 3. SPCA9-384B- **1** GZ6-80M
- 4. SPCA9-396 *B-* 12GZC- 100M

#### LHGR limits for all Framatome-ANP fuel from **BOC** through **Coastdown**

(excluding fuel type 36 in **1** OB locations from rod pattern targeted for approximately 9000 MWD/MTU to rod pattern targeted approximately for 12,000MWD/IMTU)



#### LHGR limits for Framatome-ANP fuel type **36** in 10B locations

(from rod pattern targeted at approximately 9000 MWD/MTU to rod pattern targeted at approximately 12,000 MWD/MT)



Note that the **1OB** rods are defined by the control cell locations 14-39, 22-15, 46-23, 38-47, 14-23, 38-15, 46-39, and 22-47.

\* For thermal limit monitoring cases at greater than 100%P, the 100% power LHGRFACp limits should be applied.



Figure 3.2-1 Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for GE fuel (formerly MAPFACp)



#### Figure **3.2-2** Power-Dependent LHGR Multiplier for **GE** Fuel (TCV(s) Slow Closure) (formerly **MAPFACp)**  (Reference **15** and 24)

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle **9**



Figure 3.2-3 Flow-Dependent LHGR Multiplier for GE Fuel (formerly MAPFACF)

(Reference **9** and **17,** 22, and 24)

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#### Table 3-1

#### LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> for Framatome-ANP Fuel (References 4, 5, 54 and 56)

#### Operation from **BOC** to Coastdown



#### Coastdown Operation



\* Values are interpolated between relevant power levels. For operation at exactly 25% or 80% CTP, the more limiting value is used.

\*\* Allowable EOOS conditions are listed in Section 5.

t For coastdown operation the NO EOOS option includes final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) and /or feedwater heaters out of service up to 100  $\degree$ F.

## Table 3-2

# LHGRFACF for Framatome-ANP Fuel (References 4 **& 5)**

Values Applicable for up to 105% Maximum Attainable Core Flow



These **LHGRFACf** multipliers apply from BOC through coastdown and in all **EOOS** scenarios.

#### 4. Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation **(3.3.2.1)**

4.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec Table 3.3.2.1-1.

4.2 Description:

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The Rod Block Monitor Upscale Instrumentation Setpoints are determined from the relationships shown below:



- $\star$ This setpoint may be lower/higher and will still comply with the RWE Analysis, because RWE is analyzed unblocked.
- $\star\star$ Clamped, with an allowable value not to exceed the allowable value for recirculation loop flow (W) of **100%.**

#### **5.** Allowed Modes of Operation (B **3.2.2,** B **3.2.3)**

The Allowed Modes of Operation with combinations of Equipment Out-of-Service are as described below: -------.OPERATING REGION **-....--**



TCV Stuck Closed<sup>6</sup> (Reference 16) No **Yes** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No

- 1. Each EOOS condition may be combined with one SRV **OOS,** up to two TIP Machines **OOS** or the equivalent number of TIP channels (100% available at startup from a refuel outage), a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (without Feedwater Heaters considered **OOS),** cycle startup with uncalibrated LPRMs (BOC to 500 MWd/MTU), and/or up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service.
- 2. Up to **1** 00°F Reduction in Feedwater Temperature Allowed with Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service or in combination with FFTR during coastdown. Feedwater Heaters **OOS** may be an actual **OOS**  condition, or an intentionally entered mode of operation to extend the cycle energy. As long as this condition is met, this is not an EOOS for coastdown.
- 3. If operating with Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service, operation in MELLLA is supported by current transient analyses, but administratively prohibited due to core stability concerns.
- 4. EOC Recirculation Pump Trip OOS/Feedwater Heaters **OOS** is allowed during coastdown/non coastdown operation using the TCV Slow Closure/EOC Recirculation Pump Trip OOS/Feedwater Heaters **OOS** operating limits.
- 5. Only when operating in coastdown, otherwise this combination is not allowed. This is not applicable.
- 6. Operation is only allowed when less than 10.5 million Ibm/hr steam flow and when average position of 3 open TCVs is less than 50% open, with FCL <103%, and the MCFL setpoint ≥ 120%. TCV Stuck Closed may be in combination with any EOOS except TBVOOS or TCV Slow Closure. If in combination with other EOOS(s), thermal limits may require adjustment for the other EOOS(s) as designated in Sections 1, 2, and 3.
- 7. Increased Core Flow (ICF) is analyzed for up to 105% core flow.
- 8. The SLO boundary was not moved up with the incorporation of MELLLA. The flow boundary for SLO at uprated conditions remains the ELLLA boundary for pre-uprate conditions. (Reference 25)
- 9. Coastdown is defined to begin at a core average exposure of 29,439 MWd/MTU (which is the licensing basis exposure used by Framatome-ANP) (Reference 4) and applicable to a core average exposure of 31,062 MWd/MTU (Reference 56).
- 10. Single Loop Operation is allowed with any of the EOOS options listed in this table.

#### 6. Traversing In-Core Probe System **(3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3)**

#### 6.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 for thermal limits require the TIP system for recalibration of the LPRM detectors and monitoring thermal limits.

#### 6.2 Description:

When the traversing in-core probe (TIP) system (for the required measurement locations) is used for recalibration of the LPRM detectors and monitoring thermal limits, the TIP system shall be operable with the following:

- 1. movable detectors, drives and readout equipment to map the core in the required measurement locations, and
- 2. indexing equipment to allow all required detectors to be calibrated in a common location.

For BOC to BOC + 500 MWD/MT, cycle analyses support thermal limit monitoring without the use of the TIPs.

Following the first TIP set (required prior to BOC + 500 MWD/IMT), the following applies for use of the SUBTIP methodology:

With one or more TIP measurement locations inoperable, the TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from a 3-dimensional BWR core monitoring software system adjusted using the previously calculated uncertainties, provided the following conditions are met:

- 1. All TIP traces have previously been obtained at least once in the current operating cycle when the reactor core was operating above 20% power, (References 18, 52 and 53) and
- 2. The total number of simulated channels (measurement locations) does not exceed 42% (18 channels).

Otherwise, with the TIP system inoperable, suspend use of the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

#### 6.3 Bases:

The operability of the TIP system with the above specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The normalization of the required detectors is performed internal to the core monitoring software system.

Substitute TIP data, if needed, is 3-dimensional BWR core monitoring software calculated data which is adjusted based on axial and radial factors calculated from previous TIP sets. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and adjustment process, a maximum of 18 channels may be simulated to ensure that the uncertainties assumed in the substitution process methodology remain valid.

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I

# Section 2

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9

Reload Transient Analysis Results

November 2001

## Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I **L1C9** Reload Transient Analysis Results

## Table of Contents



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Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LI C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 1

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9

Neutronics Licensing Report

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#### Licensing Basis

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This document, in conjunction with References 1, 3 and 4 in Section VIII, provides the licensing basis for LaSalle County Station Unit **I** Reload 8, Cycle 9.

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#### I. Nuclear Design

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#### 1.1 New Reload Fuel Assembly Nuclear Design

#### 1.1.1 Assembly Average Enrichment



#### 1.1.2 Axial Enrichment and Burnable Poison Distribution



#### 1.1.3 Radial Enrichment and Burnable Poison Distribution



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#### 1.2 Core Nuclear Design

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#### 1.2.1 Core Configuration and Licensing Exposure Limits





Cycle 9 (Cycle N) neutronics analyses are valid for EOC 8 (Cycle N-i) exposures greater than 12000 MWD/MT. The exposure window that validates the pressurization transients can be found in the LIC9 reload analysis document (Reference 3).



The Cycle 9 incremental exposure to LFPC is 18000.0 MWD/MT (incremental energy to LFPC of 2418.0 GMD) based on a nominal EOC 8.

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#### 1.2.2 Core Reactivity Characteristics

All values reported below are with zero xenon and are for 68°F moderator temperature. The MICROBURN-B cold BOC K-effective bias is 1.0050 (Reference 11). The shutdown margin calculations are based on the short cycle **8**  exposure given in Section 1.2.1.



Note that the SLCS analysis results credit a B-10 enrichment of 45% at LaSalle.

#### II. Control Rod Withdrawal Error

Analysis was performed at a core power of 3489 MWt, 100% core flow (108.5 Mlbm/hr), unblocked (R.BM not credited) conditions only. Figure 15 is the initial rod pattern for the case that set the limit for the ATRIUM-9B fuel in the core. Figure 16 is initial rod pattern for the case that set the limit for the GE9B fuel in the core. These results bound operation with 3323 MWt as the rated power for the core.



The design complies with the SPC 1% plastic strain criteria via conformance to the PAPT (Protection Against Power Transient) LHGR limits. The design complies with the GE centerline melt criteria via conformance to the GE thermal overpower protection (TOP) criteria. The design complies with the GE 1% plastic strain criteria via conformance to updated GE mechanical overpower protection (MOP) criteria during a control rod withdrawal error event.

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#### III. Fuel Loading Error

The fuel loading error, including fuel mislocation and misorientation, is classified as an accident. By demonstrating that the fuel loading error meets the more stringent Anticipated Operational. Occurrence (AOO) requirements, the offsite dose requirement is assured to be met. Because the events listed below result in a ACPR value that is less than that of the limiting transient, the **AOO**  requirements and hence the off-site dose requirements are met for the fuel loading error.

The values reported below bound all fuel types found in the core.



The design complies with the SPC 1% plastic strain and centerline melt criteria via conformance to the PAPT (Protection Against Power Transient) LHGR limits.

#### **IV.** Control Rod Drop Accident

LaSalle is a Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) plant. In order to allow the site the option of shutting down the reactor by inserting control rods using the simplified control rod sequences-shown in Table 1, the control rod drop accident analysis was performed for the simplified sequence. The results from this simplified seqiuence anaiysis bound those where BPWS guidelines are followed. The results demonstrate that the 280 cal/g Technical Specification limit for a control rod drop accident is not exceeded. Note that the 0.32%Ak adder mentioned below is included in this analysis to account for possible rod mispositioning errors as well as clumping effects.



Note that thc limit on maximum deposited fuel rod enthalpy is 280 cal/gm and the (conservative) limit on the number of rods greater that 170 cal/gm (failed rods) is 770.



#### V. Loss of Feedwater Heating

The loss of feedwater heating event is analyzed at a core power of 3489 MWt for 81%, 100% and 105% rated flow with an assumed inlet temperature decrease of 1457F. These results bound operation with 3323 MWt as the rated power for the core.



The design complies with the SPC 1% plastic strain and centerline melt criteria via conformance to the PAPT (Protection Against Power Transient) LHGR limits. The design complies with the GE 1% plastic strain criteria via conformance to the mechanical overpower protection (MOP) limit. The design complies with the GE centerline melt criteria via conformance to the thermal overpower protection (TOP) limits. The analyses did not take credit for the thermal power scram function at the site.

### VI. Maximum Exposure Limit Compliance

Note that the exposures listed below are based on the nominal Cycle 8 (Cycle N-I) exposure, 12511 MWD/MT, and the licensing basis (Reference 3) Cycle 9 (Cycle N) core average exposure of 29439 MWD/MT.



- \* The ATRIUM-9B exposure limits identified are not applicable until document EMF-85-74 is added to the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs). Until this document is added to the Tech Specs, the ATRIUM-9B exposure limits are 48.0 GWD/MT for Peak Fuel Assembly (no change), 50.0 GWD/MT for Peak Fuel Rod and 60.0 GWD/MT for Peak Fuel Pellet.
- \*\* There is no peak fuel assembly exposure limit for GE9B fuel. The limit reported above is based on the maximum channel exposure assumption used in developing the safety limit MCPR for LaSalle **I**  Cycle 9.

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#### VII. Spent Fuel Pool and Fresh Fuel Vault Criticality Compliance

For the LIC9 reload, there are three new SPC ATRIUM-9B assembly types consisting of 10 unique enriched lattices as well as one SPC ATRJUM-9B assembly type with 2 unique enriched lattices which was initially manufactured for use in L2C8. These four (total) assembly and twelve (total) enriched lattice types are identified in 1.1 New Reload Fuel Assembly Nuclear Design. For the purpose of the following sections all four assembly types will be referred to as "new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies".

#### VII.1 Fresh Fuel Vault Criticality Compliance

The fuel storage vault criticality analysis that is detailed in Reference 6 remains valid for the above lattices. All the new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies comply with the fresh fuel vault criticality limits, i.e., all lattices have an enrichment of less than 5.00 wt % U-235 and a gadolinia content that is greater than 6 rods at 3.0 wt% Gd<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>.

#### VII.2 LI Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Compliance

The LaSalle Unit I spent fuel pool criticality analysis that is detailed in Reference 7 remains valid for the above lattices. All the new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies comply with the spent fuel pool criticality limits, i.e., all lattices have an enrichment of less than 4.60 wt % U-235 and a gadolinia content that is greater than 8 rods at 3.0 wt%  $Gd_2O_3$ .

#### VII.3.L2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Compliance

The LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel pool criticality analysis that is detailed in Reference **8**  remains valid for the above lattices. As shown below, all the new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies comply with the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel pool criticality limit of  $k$ -eff < 0.95.



\* From 68 \*F, uncontrollcd CASMO-3G results.

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# Table 1

# LaSalle 1 Cycle 9 Simplified Shutdown Sequences

# Shutdown From an **Al** Sequence



# Shutdown from an A2 Sequence



\* The standard BPWS rules concerning out-of-service rods apply to the shutdown sequences.

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Figure 1

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### LlC9 ATRIUM-9B Assembly Axial Designs (1OOM Channels)

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SPCA9-384B-11GZ6-80M



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**LIC9** ATRIUM-9B Assembly Axial Designs (80M Channels)

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Figure 3 SPCA9-4.56L-12G8.0/4G3.0-1OOM (19A) Enrichment Distribution

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**I** Rods (4) 2 Rods (12) 3 Rods (8) 4 Rods (36) **GI** Rods (4) G2 Rods (8)

3.00 w/o U-235 4.00 wv/o U-235 4.70 w/o U-235 4.95 w/o **U-235**  4.70 w/o U-235+8.0 w/o **Gd203**  4.20 w/o U-235+8.0 w/o Gd203

Figure 4 SPCAg-4.56L-12G8.0-100M (19A) Enrichment Distribution

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Figure 5 SPCA9-3.91L-12G8.0-100M (19A) Enrichment Distribution

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Figure 6 SPCA9-3.90L-8G5.0-IOOM (19A) Enrichment Distribution

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Figure 7 SPCA9-4.59L-12G8.0-100M (19B) Enrichment Distribution

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Figure 8 SPCAg-4.59L-12G7.0-100M (19B) Enrichment Distribution

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4.20 w/o U-235+7.0 w/o **Gd203**

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Figure 9 SPCA9-3.96L-8G7.0/4G8.0-100M (19B)

Enrichment Distribution  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\int_{\frac{1}{\sqrt{6}}\sqrt{9}}^{2\sqrt{99}}$ 





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**I** Rods (4) 2 Rods (12) 3 Rods (8) 4 Rods (40) **GI** Rods (8) 2.60 sy/o U-235 3.40 w/o U-235 3.80 wv/o U-235 4.40 *w/o*  U-235 3.40 *w/o* U-235+5.0 *w/o* Gd203

Figure 10 SPCA9-3.96L-8G5.0-IOOM (19B and 19C)

Enrichment Distribution . **. 20149**<br>TKW 10/6/99







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Figure 11 SPCA9-4.58L-8G6.0/4G3.0-100M (19C) Enrichment Distribution  $\pi$ <sub>1</sub>  $\pi$ <sup>2/20</sup>/99<br> $\pi$ , *E*/20<sup>/99</sup>





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I Rods (4) 2 Rods (12) 3 Rods (8) 4 Rods (40) **GI** Rods **(8)**

3.00 w/o U-235 4.00 wlo U-235 4.70 w/o U-235 4.95 w/o U-235 4.20 w/o U-235+6.0 w/o **Gd203**

Figure 12 SPCA9-4.58L-8G6.0-10OM(19C) Enrichment Distribution

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Rods (4) Rods ( **8)**  Rods (16) Rods (33) Rods (11) **1**  2 3 4 G

2.72 w/o U-235 **3.53** w/o U-235

3.94 *wlo* U-235

4.53 w/o U-235

3.69 wlo U-235+6.0 w/o **Gd203**

Figure 13 SPCA9-4.06L-11G6.0-80M (28B) Enrichment Distribution

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1 Rods (4)<br>2 Rods (8) Rods (8) 3 Rods **(16)**  4 Rods (34)<br>G Rods (10) Rods (10)

3.78 w/o U-235 4.19 w/o U-235

2.72 w/o U-235

4.78 *wlo* U-235

4.19 *wlo* U-235+6.0 w/o **Gd203**

Figure 14

SPCA9-4.34L-10G6.0-80M (28B)

Enrichment Distribution

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Cycle 9 Exposure 13000.0 MWd/MTU Core Average Exposure 23961.4 MWd/MTU 1746.3 GWd



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### Figure 15 Initial RWE Rod Pattern for Limiting ATRIUM-9B Case Error Rod is 34-43

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Cycle 9 Exposure .0 MWd/MTU

.0 GWd

Core Average Exposure 10961.0 MWd/MTU



Figure 16 Initial RWE Rod Pattern for Limiting GE9B Case Error Rod is 30-39

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Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LI **C9** Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 2

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LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9

Reload Analysis

 $NDIT7 VFM9900205$ 

# **SIEMENS**

EMF-2276 Revision 1

# LaSalle Unit **I** Cycle **9**  Reload Analysis

October 1999



Nuclear Division

Siemens Power Corporation

ISSUED **IN** SPC **ON-LINE**  DOCUMENT SYSTEM DATE:  $\angle Q$ 

EMF-2276<br>Revision 1

### LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Date

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Date

**Date** 

Date

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# Nature of Changes

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The changed items are further identified by a vertical line **(I** ) in the right-hand margin.

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# Contents

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# Tables

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# Figures

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### Nomenclature

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### 1.0 Introduction

This report provides the results of the analysis performed by Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) as part of the reload analysis in support of the Cycle 9 reload for LaSalle Unit 1. This report is intended to be used in conjunction with the SPC topical Report XN-NF-8O-19(P)(A), Volume 4, Revision 1, *Application of the ENC Methodology to BWR Reloads,* which describes the analyses performed in support of this reload, identifies the methodology used for those analyses, and provides a generic reference list. Section numbers in this report are the same as corresponding section numbers in XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), Volume 4, Revision 1. Methodology used in this report-which supersedes XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), Volume 4, Revision 1, is referenced in Section 8.0. The NRC Technical Limitations presented in the methodology documents, including the documents referenced in Section 8.0, have been satisfied by these analyses.

Analyses performed by Commonwealth Edison Company (CornEd) are described elsewhere. This document alone does not necessarily identify the limiting events or the appropriate operating limits for Cycle 9. The limiting events and operating limits must be determined in conjunction with results from ComEd analyses.

The Cycle 9 core consists of a total of 764 fuel assemblies, including 372 unirradiated ATRIUM'<sup>T</sup>m-9B assemblies and 392 irradiated GE9 assemblies. The reference core configuration is described in Section 4.2.

The design and safety analyses reported in this document were based on the design and operational assumptions in effect for LaSalle Unit 1 during the previous operating cycle. The effects of channel bow are explicitly accounted for in the safety limit analysis. The extended operating domain (EOD) and equipment out of service (EOOS) conditions presented in Table 1.1 are supported.

Analyses were performed to support end-of-cycle (EOC) operating limits. This report provides limits for both pre-power uprate (3323 MWt) and power uprate (3489 MWt) conditions. The analyses upon which the operating limits are based were performed such that both the pre power uprate and power uprate limits are applicable for all of Cycle 9.

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Revision 1**<br>Reload Analysis Page 1-2 Reload Analysis

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### Table 1.1 EOD and EOOS Operating Conditions

Extended Operating Domain (EOD) Conditions

Increased Core Flow

Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (MELLLA)

Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Conditions\*

Feedwater Heaters Out of Service (FHOOS)

Single-Loop Operation (SLO) - Recirculation Loop Out of Service

Turbine Bypass Valves Out of Service (TBVOOS)

Recirculation Pump Trip Out of Service (No RPT)

Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Slow Closure and/or No RPT

-Safety-Relief Valve Out-of Service (SRVOOS)

Up to 2 TIP Machine(s) Out of Service (or the equivalent number of TIP channels)

Up to 50% of the LPRMs Out of Service

TCV Slow Closure, FHOOS and/or No RPT

EOOS conditions are supported for EOD conditions as well as the standard operating domain. Each EOOS condition combined with **I** SRVOOS, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels) and/or up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service is supported.

### 2.0 Fuel Mechanical Design Analysis

Applicable SPC Fuel Design Reports References 9.1 & 9.2

To assure that the power history for the ATRIUM-9B fuel to be irradiated during Cycle 9 of LaSalle Unit 1 is bounded by the assumed power history in the fuel mechanical design analysis, LHGR operating limits have been specified in Section 7.2.3. In addition, LHGR limits for ... Anticipated Operational Occurrences have been specified in Reference 9.1 and are presented in Section 7.2.3 as Figure 7.1.

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- 3.0 Thermal-Hydraulic Design Analysis
- 3.2 *Hydraulic Characterization*
- 3.2.1 Hydraulic Compatibility

Component hydraulic resistances for the fuel types in the LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 core have been determined in single-phase flow tests of full-scale assemblies. The hydraulic demand curves for SPC ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel in the LaSalle Unit 1 core are provided in Reference 9.1. Figure 4.2.

### 3.2.3 Fuel Centerline Temperature

Applicable Report<br>ATRIUM-9B

Reference 9.1, Figure 3.3

# 3.2.5 Bypass Flow



Includes the effects of channel bow, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), a 2000 EFPH LPRM calibration interval, and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service.



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# 3.3.2 Desion Basis Radial Power Distribution

Figure 3.1 shows the radial power distribution used in the MCPR Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit analysis.

# 3.3.3 Desion Basis Local Power Distribution

Figures 3.2. 3.3 and 3.4 show the local power peaking factors used in the MCPR Fuel Cladding  $\ddotsc$ Integrity Safety Limit analysis.



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# Control Rod Corner

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Figure 3.2 LaSalle Unit **I** Cycle 9 Safety Limit Local Peaking Factors SPCA9-393B-16GZ-1OOM With Channel Bow

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Figure 3.3 LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Safety Limit Local Peaking Factors SPCA9-396B-1 2GZB-1 0DM and SPCAg-396B-1 2GZC-1 0DM With Channel Bow  $\cdot$   $\sim$ 

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Figure 3.4 LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Safety Limit Local Peaking Factors SPCA9-384B-1 **1** GZ-80M With Channel Bow

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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The LSA-1 Reload Batch fuel designs meet the fuel design limitations defined in Table 2.1 of Reference 9.4 and therefore can be safely stored in the vault.

LaSalle Unit 1 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (BORAL Racks) Reference 9.5

The LSA-1 Reload Batch fuel designs meet the fuel design limitations defined in Table 2.1 of Reference 9.5 and therefore can be safely stored in the pool.  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{max}}$ 



# LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool **Reference 9.6**

The LSA-1 Reload Batch fuel designs can be safely stored as long as the fuel assembly reactivity limitations defined in Reference 9.6 are met.

<ComEd has responsibility to confirm that fuel meets reactivity limitations. **>** 

### 4.2 Core *Nuclear Design Analysis*



NOTE: Analyses in this report are applicable to a core exposure of 29,439 MWdIMTU.

< Cycle 9 short window exposure to be determined by ComEd. >

### 4.2.2 Core Reactivity Characteristics

**<** This data is to be furnished by CornEd. **>**

#### Core Hydrodynamic Stability **Reference 8.7** 4.2.4

LaSalle Unit **1** utilizes the BWROG Interim Corrective Actions (ICAs) to address thermal hydraulic instability issues. This is in response to Generic Letter 94-02. When the long term solution OPRM is fully implemented, the ICAs will remain as a backup to the OPRM system.

In order to support the ICAs and remain cognizant of the relative stability of one cycle compared with previous cycles, decay ratios are calculated at various points on the power to flow map and at various points in the cycle. This satisfies the following functions.

- 1. Provides trending information to qualitatively compare the stability from cycle to cycle.
- 2. Provides decay ratio sensitivities to rod line and flow changes near the ICA regions.



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3. Allows CornEd to review this information to determine if any administrative conservatisms are appropriate beyond the existing requirements.

The NRC approved STAIF computer code was used in the core hydrodynamic stability analysis performed in support of LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9. The power/flow state points used for this analysis were chosen to assist ComEd in performing the three functions described above. The Cycle 9 licensing basis control rod step-through projection was used to establish expected core depletion conditions. For each power/flow point, decay ratios were calculated at multiple cycle exposures to determine the highest expected decay ratio throughout the cycle. The results from this analysis are shown below.



For reactor operation under conditions of power coastdown, single-loop operation, final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) and/or operation with feedwater heaters out of service, it is possible that higher decay ratios could be achieved than are shown for normal operation.

NOTE: % power is based on 3489 MWt as rated. % flow is based on 108.5 Mlb/hr as rated.

<sup>1</sup> NOTE: Decay ratios greater than 1.1 are outside the range of the STAIF methodology applicability. These points should be considered unstable without quantitative comparison.





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The water gap thicknesses presented are based on 80/1 00-mil channels for ATRIUM-9B fuel.

The control rod data represents original equipment control blades at LaSalle and were used in the neutronic calculations. **I**

#### LaSalle Unit **I** Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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EMF-2276 Revision 1 Page 4-5



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Axial Location In Assembly

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# Figure 4.1 SPCA9-4.56L-12G8.0/4G3.0-1OOM .Eurichment Distribution

# LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9.<br>Reload Analysis

Reload Analysis

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Figure 4.2 SPCA9-4.56L-12G8.0-100M " **-** Enrichment Distribution

### LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis



# Axial Location In Assembly

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### Figure 4.3 SPCA9-3.91L-12G8.0-100M Enrichment Distribution

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Axial Location In Assembly



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# Figure 4.4 SPCA9-3.90L-8G5.0-I0OM Enrichment Distribution

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Pellet Type<br>U<sup>23</sup><br>Gd<sub>7</sub>O<sub>3</sub>



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Figure 4.5 SPCA9-4.59L-12G8.0-100M **Enrichment Distribution** 

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Figure 4.6 SPCA9-4.59L-12G7.0-1O0M Enrichment Distribution

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# Axial Location In Assembly

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Figure 4.7 SPCA9-3.96L-8G7.014G8.0-100M Enrichment Distribution

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Axial Location In Assembly

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Figure 4.8 SPCA9-3.96L-8G5.0-1OOM . Enrichment Distribution

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Axial Location In Assembly

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Figure 4.9 SPCAS-4.58L-8G6.0/4G3.0-1 OM Enrichment Distribution

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Pelet Type<br>U<sup>23</sup><br>Gd-O<sub>3</sub>



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Figure 4.10 SPCA9-4.58L-8G6.0-100M s 4.10 Or SAS-4.002 000.<br>Enrichment Distribution

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# Figure 4.11 SPCA9-4.06L-11G6.0-80M Enrichment Distribution

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#### LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 **Reload Analys**i

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Figure 4.12 SPCA9-4.34L-1OG6.0-BOM Enrichment Distribution

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Page 4-17 LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Labalic Unit TV<br>Polosd Anslysis Reload **A**

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Figure 4.13 ATRIUM-9B LSA-1 **19A** Assembly Design

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SPCA9-393B-16GZ-100M ROD ROD ROD<br>2 ROD  $ROD$ ROD **\_6** ROD **3**  10  $11$ 12 E2 E<sub>2</sub> E2  $E2$ E2 E2 E2 E3 E5 **E5**  E5 E9 **E15**  E6  $E8$ E8 l, **El0**  E4 **El0**  E14 **E17**E16 E18 L. **Ell**  E2 E2 E2  $E2$  $E2$ E2 E2 Lattice Lattice Index Enrichment + Gd  $E$ 11 4.00 wt% U-235 + 3.0 wt% Gd<sub>2</sub>0<sub>3</sub> E12 4.20 wt% U-235 + 6.0 wt%  $Gd_2O_3$ 





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LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 ReIo *ad Ana ys -*

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# SPCA9-396B-12GZB-100M

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Figure 4.14 ATRIUM-9B LSA-1 19B Assembly Design

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Figure 4.14 ATRIUM-9B LSA-1 **19B** Assembly Design (continued)

**E10** 4.00wt% U-235

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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#### SPCA9-396B-12GZC-100M

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Natural Uranium

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Figure 4.15 ATRIUM-9B LSA-1 19C Assembly Design

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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# SPCA9-384B-11 GZ-80M



# Figure 4.16 ATRIUM-9B SPCA9-384B-11GZ-80M Assembly Design

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#### SPCA9-384B-11GZ-80M



Figure 4.16 ATRIUM-9B SPCA9-384B-11GZ-BOM Assembly Design  $\overline{a}$  (continued)



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Figure 4.17 LaSalle Unit **I** Cycle 9 Reference Loading Map

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### 5.0 Anticipated Operational Occurrences

Applicable Disposition of Events

Reference 9.7

#### 5.1 *Analysis of Plant Transients at Rated Conditions*

Reference 9.3

Limiting Transients:

Load Rejection No Bypass (LRNB) Feedwater Controller Failure (FWCF) Loss of Feedwater Heating (LFWH)



#### **5.2** *Analysis for Reduced Flow Operation*

Reference 9.3

Limiting Transient: Slow Flow Excursion

MCPR, Manual Flow Control - ATRIUM-9B and GE9 Fuel  $L$ HGRFAC $I$  - ATRIUM-9B Fuel  $MAPFAC_f$  - GE9 Fuel

Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2

MCPR<sub>I</sub> and LHGRFAC<sub>I</sub> results are applicable at all Cycle 9 exposures and in all EOD and EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. MCPR, limits are provided for maximum core flows of 102.5% and 105% of rated. The LHGRFAC, multipliers provided in Figure 5.2 are applicable for maximum core flows of 102.5% and 105% of rated.

Based on 100%P/81%F conditions.

 $\ddot{\mathbf{t}}$ This data to be furnished by ComEd.

 $\bullet$ Based on 100%P/105%F conditions.

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis **EMF-2276**  Revision **1**  Page **5-2**



**<** This data is to be furnished by CornEd. **>** 

#### 5.6 *Fuel Loading Error*

**<** This data is to be furnished by ComEd. >

#### 5.7 *Determith-tion of Thermal Margins*

The results of the analyses presented in Sections 5.1-5.3 are used for the determination of the operating limit. Section 5.1 provides the results of analyses at rated conditions. Section 5.2 provides for the determination of the MCPR and LHGR limits at reduced flow (MCPR<sub>I</sub>, Figure

LHGRFAC, values presented are applicable to SPC fuel. GE MAPFAC, limits will continue to be applied to **GE9** fuel at off-rated power.



5.1; LHGRFACf, Figure 5.2). Section 5.3 provides for the determination of the MCPR and LHGR limits at conditions of reduced power (Figures 5.3-5.6, Tables 5.1-5.4). Limits are presented for base case operation and the EOD and EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. The results presented are based on the analyses performed by SPC. As indicated above, the final Cycle 9 MCPR operating limits need to be established in conjunction with the results from ComEd analyses.



# Table 5.1 EOC Base Case and EOOS MCPR, Limits and LHGRFAC, Multipliers for TSSS Insertion Times for Prepower Uprate Conditions (3323 MWt Rated Power)

Limits support operation with any combination of one SRVOOS, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), up to a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (except for conditions with FHOOS), and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service in the standard, ICF and MELLLA regions of the power/flow map.

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### Table 5.1 EOC Base Case and EOOS MCPR<sub>p</sub> Limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> Multipliers for TSSS Insertion Times for Prepower Uprate Conditions (3323 MWt Rated Power) (continued)

GE9 Fuel ATRIUM-9B Fuel EOOS/EOD Power LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> MCPR, **Condition** MCPR. (% Rated)  $\ddot{\bullet}$ 2.70 0 2.70 0.66 Recirculation Pump 2.22 0.66 2.22 25 Trip Out of Service 2.12 0.66 2.07 (No RPT) 25 1.63 1.60 **0.86**  63 1.56 **0.86**  100 1.51 2.70 0.66 Turbine Control 2.70  $\Omega$ 0.66 2.22 Valve (TCV) Slow 25. 2.22 2.16 0.66 Closure and/or 25 2.16 1.69 1.65 0.86 84 No RPT 1.67 0.86 84 1.63 0.86 1.60 1.56 100 **2.85**  2.85 0.63 TCV Slow Closure/ 0 2.38 0.63 FHOOS and/or 25 2.38 0.63 2.38 2.38 No RPT 25 1.69 0.86 84 1.65 1.67 84 1.63 0.86 1.60 1.56 **0.86**  100 0.40 2.54 0 2.54 Idle Loop 2.54 0.40 25 2.54 **Startup** 2.54 25 2.54 0.40 2.54 2.54 0.40 63 0.40 2.54 2.54 100

Limits support operation with any combination of one SRVOOS, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), up to a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (except for conditions with FHOOS), and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service in the standard, ICF and MELLLA regions of the power/flow map.



# Table 5.2 Base Case MCPR<sub>p</sub> Limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> Multipliers for NSS Insertion Times for Prepower Uprate (3323 MWt Rated Power)

Limits support operation with any combination of one SRVOOS, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), up to a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (except for conditions with FHOOS), and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service in the standard, ICF and MELLLA regions for the power/flow map.



# Table 5.3 EOC Base Case and EOOS MCPR<sub>p</sub> Limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> for Multipliers for TSSS Insertion Times for Power Uprate Conditions (3489 MWt Rated Power)\*

Limits support operation with any combination of one SRVOOS. up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), up to a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (except for conditions with FHOOS), and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service in the standard, ICF and MELLLA regions of the power/flow map.

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Limits support operation with any combination of one SRVOOS, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), up to a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (except for conditions with FHOOS), and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service in the-standard, ICF and MELLLA regions of the power/flow map.

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#### <code>Table 5.4 EOC</code> MCPR $_{\sf p}$  Limits and <code>LHGRFAC</code> , Multipliers for <code>NSS</code> Insertion Times for Power Uprate Conditions (3489 MWt Rated Power)

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Limits support operation with any combination of one SRVOOS, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), up to a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (except for conditions with FHOOS), and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service in the standard, ICF and MELLLA regions of the power/flow map.

LaSalie Unit 1 Cycle 9<br>Reload Analysis

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Figure 5.1 Flow Dependent MCPR Limits for<br>Manual Flow Control Mode

LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Reload Analysis



Figure 5.2 Flow Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Reload Analysis** 





Figure 5.3 Base Case Power Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel - TSSS Insertion Times

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Reload Analysis** 





Figure 5.4 Base Case Power Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel - TSSS Insertion Times

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Figure 5.5 Base Case Power Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel - NSS Insertion Times







Figure 5.6 Base Case Power Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel - NSS Insertion Times

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**<** This data is to be furnished by ComEd.>

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Figure 5.7 Starting Control Rod Pattern for Control Rod Withdrawal Analysis

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The MAPLHGR limits presented in Reference 9.9 are valid for LaSalle Unit **1** ATRIUM-9B (LSA-1) fuel for Cycle 9 operation.

Limiting Break:  $1.1 \text{ ft}^2$  Break Recirculation Pump Discharge Line High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Single Failure

Peak clad temperature and peak local metal water reaction results for the Cycle 9 ATRIUM-9B reload fuel are 1795°F and 0.72% respectively. These results are bounded by the results presented in Reference 9.11, which support the Reference 9.9 MAPLHGR limits. The maximum core-wide metal-water reaction for Cycle 9 remains less than 0.16%. LOCA/heatup analysis results for LaSalle ATRIUM-9B are presented below (from Reference 9.11):



The maximum core wide metal-water reaction is < 0.16%.

#### 6.2 *Control Rod Drop Accident*

**<** This data is to be furnished by CornEd. **>** 

### 6.3 *Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accident*

The radiological consequences of a spent fuel cask drop accident have been evaluated for SPC ATRIUM fuel designs in conformance with the analysis described in the LSCS UFSAR Section

The peak local metal water reaction result is consistent with the limiting PCT analysis results reported in Reference 9.11.



15.7.5. The analysis is assumed to occur 360 days following shutdown of the reactor, and it is assumed that all 32 fuel assemblies in the cask completely fail as a result of the accident.

Because the accident is assumed not to occur sooner than 360 days following shutdown of the reactor, the source term for the accident will be very low due to fission product decay. Hence, the commensurate radiological whole-body and thyroid doses will be very low. The results of this analysis demonstrate that spent fuel cask drop accidents involving SPC"ATRIUM fuel will not exceed the established radiological whole-body and thyroid dose limits which-are a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limits for radiological exposures.



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Includes the effects of channel bow, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels), a  $\ddot{\phantom{0}}$ 2000 EFPH LPRM calibration interval and up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service.

This data is to be furnished by ComEd.  $\mathbf{t}$ 

LaSalle Unit **I** Cycle 9 Reload Analysis

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Limits



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The protection against power transient (PAPT) linear heat generation rate curve for ATRIUM-9B fuel is identified in Reference 9.1 and is presented here as Figure 7.1 for convenience. LHGRFAC<sub>1</sub> and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers are applied directly to the steady-state LHGR limits at reduced power, reduced flow and/or **EOD/EOOS** conditions to ensure the PAPT LHGR limits are not violated during an AOO. Comparison of the Cycle 9 nodal power histories for the rated power pressurization transients with the approved bounding curves to show compliance with the 1% strain criteria for GE9 fuel is discussed in Reference 9.10.

LHGRFAC Multipliers for Off-Rated Conditions - ATRIUM-9B Fuel:



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Page 7-3<br>
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#### Figure 7.1 Protection Against Power Transient LHGR Limit for ATRIUM-9B Fuel  $\ddot{\phantom{0}}$

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#### 8.0 Methodology References

See XN-NF-80-19(P)(A) Volume 4 Revision 1 for a complete bibliography.

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### 9.0 Additional References

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Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LI C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 3

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9

Plant Transient Analysis (Excerpts)

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Figure 1.1 LaSalle County Nuclear Station Power / Flow Map

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Page 2-10 Plant Transient Analysis



Figure 2.2 Flow-Dependent LHGRFAC Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page 3-9

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### Table 3.1 LaSalle Unit 1 Plant Conditions at Rated Power and Flow

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Includes water channel flow.

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## Table 3.2 Scram Speed Insertion Times

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As indicated in Reference 8, the delay between scram signal and control rod motion is conservatively modeled. Sensitivity analyses indicate that using no delay provides conservative results.

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle **9**  Plant Transient Analysis

#### Table 3.3 EOC Base Case LRNB Transient Results



Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).

The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The  $\Delta \textsf{CPR}$  and  $\textsf{LHGRFAC}_\textsf{P}$ results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

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### Table 3.4 EOC Base Case FWCF Transient Results

Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).  $\bullet$ 

**"4** The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The ACPR and LHGRFACp results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page 3-13

## Table 3.5 Input for MCPR Safety Limit Analysis

*Fuel Related Uncertainties*



*Nominal Values and Plant Measurement Uncertainties*



Additive constant uncertainties values are used.

<sup>•</sup> Feedwater flow rate and core power were increased above design values to attain desired core MCPR for safety limit evaluation consistent with Reference 5 methodology.

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# Table 3.6 Flow-Dependent MCPR Results

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Figure 3.1 EOC Load Rejection No Bypass at 100/81 - TSSS Key Parameters





Figure 3.2 EOC Load Rejection No Bypass at 100/81 - TSSS Vessel Water Level

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9<br>Plant Transient Analysis

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Figure 3.3 EOC Load Rejection No Bypass  $\Rightarrow$ at 100/81 - TSSS Dome Pressure

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Figure 3.4 EOC Feedwater Controller Failure at 100/105 - TSSS Key Parameters

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis **EMF-2277** Revision 1 Page 3-19



 $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ Figure 3.5 EOC Feedwater Controller Failure at 100/105 - TSSS Vessel Water Level







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Figure 3.7 Radial Power Distribution for SLMCPR Determination

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Page 3-22 LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9  $Plan$  Transient Analysis

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-> Figure 3.8 LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Safety Limit Local Peaking Factors SPCA9-393B-16GZ-1 0DM With Channel Bow (Assembly Exposure of 22,500 MWd/MTU)

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Control Rod Corner



**-** Figure 3.9 LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Safety Limit Local Peaking Factors SPCA9-396B-12GZB-1OOM and SPCA9-396B-1 2GZC-1 OOM With Channel Bow (Assembly Exposure of 25,000 MWd/MTU)

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Revision 1 Revision 1 Revision 1 Revision 1 Revision 1 Revision 1 Plant Transient Analysis

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Control Rod Corner



Figure 3.10 LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9  $\mathcal{L}$ Safety Limit Local Peaking Factors SPCA9-384B-1 **1** GZ6-80M With Channel Bow (Assembly Exposure of 20,000 MWdMTU)

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Figure 3.11 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-98 Fuel - **TSSS** Insertion Times  $\ddot{\phantom{a}}$
LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle **9**  Plant Transient Analysis





## Figure 3.12 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel - TSSS Insertion Times

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Figure 3.13 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel - NSS Insertion Times

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Figure 3.15 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel - TSSS Insertion Times

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Plant Transient Analysis** 

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## Figure 3.16 **EDC** Base Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel - NSS Insertion Times

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#### Table 5.1 EOC Feedwater Heater Out-of-Service Analysis Results



Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).

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<sup>\*\*</sup> The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The  $\triangle CPR$  and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

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#### Table 5.2 Abnormal Recirculation Loop Startup Analysis Results

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Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).

<sup>6</sup>CPR results for ATRIUM-9B fuel are conservatively applicable for **GE9** fuel.

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Plant Tr~n~ip~nt** Analysis Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page 5-7





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Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).

\*\* The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The ACPR and LHGRFAC<sub>P</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page 5-8

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#### Table 5.4 EOC Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Analysis Results

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Power presentod rolativo to uprated power (3489 MWth)  $\bullet$ 

The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The ACPR and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub>  $\bullet$   $\bullet$ results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Plant Transient Analysis** 

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## Table 5.5 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure Analysis Results

Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).

\*\* Scram initiated by high neutron flux.

**<sup>I</sup>**Scram initiated by high dome pressure.

<sup>1</sup>The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The  $\triangle$ CPR and LHGRFAC<sub>P</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.





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#### Table 5.6 EOC Recirculation Pump Trip and Feedwater Heater Out-of-Service Analysis Results

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Power presented relative to uprated power (3489 MWth).

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\*\* The analysis results presented are from an earlier cycle exposure. The ACPR and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

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Figure 5.1 EOC Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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# Figure 5.2 EOC Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel







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Figure 5.3 EOC Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel

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Figure 5.4 Abnormal Idle Recirculation Loop Startup Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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Figure 5.5 Abnormal Idle Recirculation Loop Startup Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-SB Fuel

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Figure 5.6 Abnormal Idle Recirculation Loop Startup Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel  $\mathbf{L}=\frac{1}{2}$  .

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Figure 5.7 EOC Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-SB Fuel

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Figure 5.8 EOC Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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Figure **5.9** EOC Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for **GE9** Fuel

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Figure 5.10 EOC Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel







Figure 5.11 **EOC** Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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Figure 5.12 EOC Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 **Plant Transient Analysis** 

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Figure 5.13 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel







Figure 5.14 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel  $\ddot{\phantom{a}}$ 

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Figure 5.15 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel  $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ 

LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Paqe 5-26





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Figure 5.16 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip and Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel







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Figure 5.17 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip and Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel





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Figure 5.18 EOC Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip and Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel



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#### Table 7.1 ASME Overpressurization Analysis Results 102%P/105%F



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 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1}{N_i}\sum_{i=1}^N\frac{1$ 

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÷, Figure 7.1 Overpressurization Event at 102/105 -MSIV Closure Key Parameters

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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page 7-4.



Figure 7.2 Overpressurization Event at 102/105 MSIV Closure Vessel Water Level





LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle **9**  Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page 7-6





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LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2277 Revision 1 Page **7-7**



Figure 7.5 Overpressurization Event at 102/105 -MSIV Closure Safety/Relief Valve Flow Rates

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LI **C9** Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 4

ARTS Improvement Program Analysis, Supplement **1** (Excerpts)

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# Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LIC9 Reload Transient Analysis Results

# TOP/MOP and MAPFAC<sub>P</sub> Requirements



(a) Based on the **GE9/10** LHGR Improvement Report, the MAPFACs are applied to LHGR (Reference 24)

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Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LI **C9** Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 5

TCV Slow Closure Analysis (Excerpts)

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# Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I L1C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results



Table **4.-** TOP and MOP Values for the Off-rated Transient Events

Note: (a) Based on Figure 3.2-2 in COLR.

(b) Based on the **GE9/10** LHGR Improvement Report, the MAPFACs are applied to LHGR (Reference 24)



# Administrative Technical Requirements - Appendix A L1C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results



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LRNBP from Rated Power, One TCV Slow Closure(50%/second)/Three TCV Fast Closure, Flu> Figure 2. Scram, EOC-RPT OOS

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Administrative Technical Requirements - Appendix A **L1C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results** 

LRNBP from 50% Power, One TCV Slow Closure(50%/second)/Three TCV Fast Closure, Flt Figure 3. Scram



# Administrative Technical Requirements - Appendix A L1C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results

Figure 4. LRNBP from 50% Power, All TCV Closure at 19%/second, Pressure Scram

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Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I Li **C9** Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 6

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 Operating Limits For Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

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March 22, 2001 DEG:01:045

Dr. R. J. Chin Nuclear Fuel Services (Suite 400) Exelon Corporation 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515-5701

Dear Dr. Chin:

#### LaSalle Unit **I** Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity



- Ref: 2: EMF-2277 Revision 1, LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October **1999.**
- Ref: 3: EMF-2276 Revision 1, LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 Reload Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 1999.
- Ref: 4: Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit-1 Cycle 9 Base Case Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times," DEG:01:013, January 18,2001.
- Ref: 5: Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "Transmittal of Condition Report 9191," DEG:01:038, February 27, 2001.

Exelon has proposed replacing the current Technical Specifications (Reference 1) with Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) during LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 (LI C9) operation. The operating limits for L1C9 (References 2 and 3) were established consistent with the scram times presented in Reference **I** and are not consistent with the proposed ITS surveillance times. Exelon has requested that FRA-ANP perform analyses to address a mid-cycle transition to the ITS for base case operation and one equipment out-of-service (EOOS) scenario. Reference 4 describes the determination of analytical scram times consistent with the ITS and provided base case operating limits. Reference 5 identifies an error in the fuel thermal conductivity used in the transient analyses for LaSalle, including the analyses provided-in Reference 4.

#### Framatome ANP Richland, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, WA 99352 Tel: (509) 375-8100<br>Fax: (509) 375-8402 (509) 375-8402

Dr. R. J. Chin DEG:O1:045 March 22, 2001 **Page 2** 

The attachment provides the L1C9 base case and slow TCV closure/FHOOS and or no<br>RPT transient analysis results and operating limits using the analytical scram times and the<br>corrected fuel thermal conductivity. The base cas attachment supercede those transmitted in Reference 4.

Very truly yours,

David Garber Project Manager

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**Enclosure** 

cc: P. Kong

#### DEG:01:045 Attachment

Page **A-1** 

### LaSaile Unit I Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.3.3 of the current LaSalle Unit **1** Technical Specifications (Reference 1) specifies the average scram insertion times of all operable control rods. The average control rod insertion times must not exceed the scram times for the requirements of LCO 3.1.3.3 to be met. Exelon is planning to implement Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) for LaSalle Unit **1**  during Cycle 9. The scram surveillance times in the proposed ITS are slightly more restrictive than those presented in Reference **1.** Additionally, the surveillance requirement for the ITS is that each rod must meet the scram times. The LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 (L1C9) operating limits (References 2 and 3) are based on the average scram times presented in Reference 1. Therefore, the limiting base case and equipment out-of-service transient analyses used to set the operating limits provided in References 2 and 3 must be reanalyzed with revised scram times in order to support the mid-cycle implementation of the ITS.

FRA-ANP provided proposed ITS surveillance scram times to Exelon in Reference 4, Table 1. The Reference 4 analytical scram times are presented in Table **1** for completeness.

FRA-ANP informed Exelon of an error in the fuel thermal conductivity used in COTRANSA2 calculations (Reference 5). The analysis results presented in Tables 2 and 3 include the effect of the corrected fuel thermal conductivity.

Reference 9 provided a disposition of LOCA and UFSAR events for ITS scram times for LaSalle. The Reference 9 disposition remains applicable.

#### Base Case Operation

Reference 4 provided base case operating limits for the proposed ITS scram times. After Reference 4 was issued, FRA-ANP informed Exelon of an error in the fuel thermal conductivity used in COTRANSA2 calculations (Reference 5). The analyses provided in Reference 4 have been reanalyzed using the corrected fuel thermal conductivity. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Figures 1 and 2 present the revised base case MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits for the ATRIUM<sup>TM</sup>-9B<sup>\*</sup> and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L1C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 2) and the  $\triangle$ CPR results from Table 2 are also presented in Figures 1 and 2.

The Reference 2 base case LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers and the LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results from Table 2 are presented in Figure 3. Review of Figure 3 shows that all of the ATRIUM-9B LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results are above the LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers, and therefore, the Reference 2 base case LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers remain applicable for the proposed ITS scram times.

#### TCV Slow Closure/FHOOS and/or No RPT

Exelon requested that FRA-ANP provide operating limits for the most limiting equipment out-of service (EOOS) scenario provided in Reference 2. Review of the Reference 2 limits shows that the most limiting two-loop operation EOOS scenario is TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT.

The TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits consider transient analysis results from the following scenarios: TCV slow closure (up to all four valves), EOC RPT OOS, FHOOS, and a combination of FHOOS and **EOC** RPT **OOS.** (Note: TCV slow closure analyses with **FHOOS** are bound by TCV slow closure analyses at nominal feedwater temperature, and therefore, no specific analyses are required for this scenario.) In order to reduce the workscope required to establish new limits, only a subset of the analyses reported in Reference 2 have been reanalyzed. Review of Figures 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18 in Reference 2 show that the TCV slow closure analyses are limiting for all power levels above 25% power (872.25 MWt); the FWCF no RPT with FHOOS is limiting at 25% power. Additionally, these figures show that there is considerable margin between the analysis results and the limits at power levels of 40% (1395.6 MWt) and 60% (2093.4 MWt).

Table 5.5 of Reference 2 was reviewed to determine which specific TCV slow closure analyses required reanalysis to establish the limits. Tables 5.1 (FHOOS) and 5.4 (EOC RPT OOS) of Reference 2 were also reviewed since the limits are applicable for EOC RPT **OOS** or FHOOS only. Table 3 presents the analysis results required to adequately establish the slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits.

Figures 4 and 5 present the revised slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits for the ATRIUM-98 and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the LIC9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 2) and the  $\triangle$ CPR results from Table 3 are also presented in Figures 4 and 5.

**<sup>\*</sup>** ATRIUM is a trademark of Framatome ANP.

## DEG:01:045 Attachment

# Page A-3

The Reference 2 slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers and the LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results from Table 3 are presented in Figure 6. Review of Figure 6 shows that all of the ATRIUM-9B LHGRFAC, results are above the LHGRFAC, multipliers, and therefore, the Reference 2 slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers remain applicable.

The MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers provided in Figures 4-6 protect operation with up to four TCVs closing slowly, EOC RPT OOS, FHOOS and any combination of up to four TCVs closing slowly, EOC RPT **OOS** and FHOOS. The only equipment out-of-service scenarios provided in Reference 2 not explicitly protected by the slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits are single-loop operation (discussed below), turbine bypass valves OOS, and abnormal startup of an idle loop.

Comparison of turbine bypass valves **OOS** and the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits in Table 2.2 of Reference 3 shows the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits clearly bound the turbine bypass valves **OOS** limits. Consequently, applying the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits will protect operation with the turbine bypass OOS.

No analyses were. performed to address the abnormal startup of an idle loop limits with ITS scram times and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity.

#### Single-Loop Operation

Figures 1-3 provide the two-loop operation (TLO) MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers for base case operation. Reference 7 indicates that the consequences of base case pressurization transients in single-loop operation (SLO) are bound by the consequences of the same transient initiated from the same power/flow conditions in TLO and that the TLO base case  $\triangle$ CPRs and the LHGRFAC<sub>n</sub> multipliers remain applicable for **SLO.** Reference 2 indicates the LIC9 TLO safety limit MCPR is 1.11 and the SLO safety limit MCPR is 1.12. Since the TLO ACPR results are applicable to SLO, the SLO ATRIUM-9B and GE9 MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits can be determined by adding  $0.01$  to the base case operation MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits provided in Figures 1 and 2 to account for the increase in safety limit MCPR. The base case operation LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers presented in Figure 3 remain applicable for SLO.

The conclusion that TLO ACPR results generally bound SLO results has been demonstrated for both base case operation and some equipment out-of-service scenarios for other BWRs. Although specific LIC9 analyses for a combination of TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT in **SLO** have not been performed, FRA-ANP expects the TLO operation  $\triangle$ CPR results would remain applicable in

SLO for this scenario. Therefore, SLO MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits for TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT can be determined by adding 0.01 to the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits reported in Figures 4 and 5 to account for the increase in safety limit MCPR. The Figure 6 TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers remain applicable for SLO.

#### GE9 Mechanical Limits

Reference 6 provides an evaluation of the GE mechanical limits for LI C9. An evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits for the rated power analyses reported in Tables 2 and 3 was performed. It was demonstrated that the maximum nodal power ratio history curve for the analyses are bound by either the LIC9 or L2C8 curves. It is FRA-ANP's position that the GE mechanical limits criteria have been met for the implementation of ITS provided no GE9 LHGR set down was required for either LIC9 or L2C8; if an LHGR set down was required for the GE9 fuel for LIC9 or L2C8, further evaluation may be required.

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#### -References



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#### **Table 1 Proposed ITS Scram Insertion Times**

The 0.20-second delay is considered a nominal value that cannot be verified by the plant. Therefore, the transient analysis calculations are performed to bound a range of no delay (linear insertion from start signal to notch 45) to a delay value just before notch 45. This is consistent with the information provided in Reference 8.

# Table 2 Base Case Transient Analysis Results With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity



The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to EOC. The  $\Delta$ CPR and LHGRFAC, results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

## Table 3 EOOS Transient Analysis Results With Proposed-ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity



 $\hat{\mathbf{r}}$ Scram initiated by high neutron flux.

t Scram initiated by high dome pressure.

ŧ The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to EOC. The  $\Delta \text{CPR}$  and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

Attachment Page A-8





Figure 1 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for<br>ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and<br>Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity





Figure 2 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for<br>GE9 Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and<br>Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

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Figure 3 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for<br>ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and<br>Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity





Figure 4 EOC Slow TCV Closure/FHOOS and/or No RPT Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity





Figure 5 EOC Slow TCV Closure/FHOOS and/or No RPT Power-Dependent<br>MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity



Figure 6 EOC Slow TCV Closure/FHOOS and/or No RPT Power-Dependent<br>LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and **Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity** 

# Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix I LI **C9** Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 7

LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 Operating Limits For Proposed Cycle Extension

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September 21, 2001 DEG:01:148

Mr. F. W. Trikur Exelon Nuclear Nuclear Fuel Management 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

Dear Mr. Trikur:

# LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed Cycle Extension

Ref: **1:** Contract for Fuel Fabrication and Related Components and Services dated as of October 24, 2000 between Siemens Power Corporation and Commonwealth Edison Company for LaSalle Nuclear Plant.

Exelon has proposed operating LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 beyond the currently licensed exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU. The attachment provides the operating limits to support the planned cycle extension.

Very truly yours,

David Garber Manager, Customer Projects

Enclosures

# Framatome **ANP,** Inc.

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2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, WA 99352

Tel: (509) 375-8100 Fax: (509) 375-8402

DEG:01:148 Attachment Page **A-1** 

## LaSalle Unit **1** Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed Cycle Extension

Exelon has informed FRA-ANP of plans to extend LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 9 (L1C9) beyond the current licensing core exposure of 29,439 MWd/MTU (page 4-2 of Reference 1, corresponding to a cycle exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU) by implementing a combined FFTR/coastdown. Exelon has requested that FRA-ANP provide operating limits for base case Technical Specification scram speed (TSSS) and slow TCV closure and/or no RPT operation for the cycle extension. This letter report summarizes the transient analysis results and operating limits required to support the L1C9 cycle extension.

#### Cycle Extension

LIC9 was originally licensed to a cycle exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU. The data provided-in Reference 2 indicates the L1C9 full-power capability is projected to continue to a cycle exposure of 18,800 MWd/MTU with a final coastdown exposure of 19,600 MWd/MTU using a coastdown rate of 14.9% power/1000 MWd/MTU. Per discussions with Exelon, the L1C9 coastdown will include a final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) of 100°F.

The approach used to model the L1C9 cycle extension is consistent with the L2C9 FFTR/coastdown extension described in Item **II.A** of Reference 3. FRA-ANP began with the latest projection-to the licensing EOC exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU which includes core follow data to a cycle exposure of 11,564.3 MWd/MTU (References 4 and 5). The cycle was increased by 24 EFPD to account for the full-power capability extension due to the FFTR which corresponds to a cycle exposure of 19,100 MWd/MTU. Operation was then assumed to continue at a coastdown rate of 10% power/1,000 MWd/MTU. In order to protect a 10% power increase due to a Xenon transient, an additional 1,000 MWd/MTU of full power capability is included. Based on this approach, LIC9 is conservatively modeled to operate at rated power to a cycle exposure of 20,100 MWd/MTU.

## Operating Limits

Reference 6 provided Li **C9** EOC (18,477 MWd/MTU) operating limits for base case TSSS and slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT scenarios to support the implementation of Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) and to correct an error in the fuel thermal conductivity. Tables 2 and 3 of Reference 6 list the transient analyses required to support the LIC9 **EOC** limits. A similar set of analyses is required to establish the L1C9 combined FFTR/coastdown limits. Analyses are only

required at 105% of core flow to support the combined FFTR/coastdown, consistent with the L2C9 analysis approach presented in Table 4 of Reference 3. FFTR/coastdown analyses at 105% flow protect operation for all flows within the power/flow map provided in Figure 1.1 of Reference 7.

In general, performing analyses at higher exposures produces higher results. As a result, analyses performed at coastdown exposures tend to be more conservative than those performed at EOC. The LIC9 extension includes a 100°F temperature reduction to extend the full-power capability by 24 EFPD, and therefore, FFTRlcoastdown exposures are higher than standard coastdown exposures. LRNB analyses tend to be more conservative for high feedwater temperatures (FWT) while low FWT produce higher results for FWCF analyses. It is obvious that FWCF analyses performed at the FFTR FWT and an FFTR/coastdown exposure bound all operation during the FFTR/coastdown. However, it is unclear if the combination of FFTR FWT and an FFTR/coastdown exposure would produce more conservative results than the upper bound FWT and a coastdown exposure-for LRNB analyses. Therefore, in order to protect any operating scenario during FFTR/coastdown, the LRNB analyses were performed with the upper bound FWT at the FFTR/coastdown exposure.

**All** L1C9 FFTR/coastdown analyses were performed at a cycle exposure of 20,100 MWd/MTU. The transient analyses were performed with the ITS scram times shown in Table 1 of Reference 6 and include the correct fuel thermal conductivity.

Table 1 presents the base case TSSS analysis results for the combined FFTR/coastdown. Figures 1 and 2 present the base case TSSS MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits for the ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the Ll C9 SLMCPR of 1.11 and the ACPR results from Table **1** are also presented in Figures 1 and 2. The FFTR/coastdown base case TSSS LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers and the LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results from Table 2 are presented in Figure 3.

Table 2 presents the slow TCV closure and no RPT analysis results for the combined FFTR /coastdown. Figures 4 and 5 present the slow TCV closure and/or no RPT MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits for the ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L1C9 SLMCPR of 1.11 and the ACPR results from Table 2 are also presented in Figures 4 and 5. The FFTRlcoastdown slow TCV closure and/or no RPT LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers and the LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results from Table 2 are presented in Figure 6.

**DEG:01:148** Attachment Page **A-3** 

#### Licensing Applicability

Reference 1 summarizes the LI **C9** licensing analyses and limits for which FRA-ANP was responsible to a cycle exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU. Licensing analyses performed by Exelon in support of LlC9 are presented elsewhere. In addition to the analyses listed in Tables **1** and 2, FRA-ANP has performed evaluations to determine the applicability of the Reference **1** analysis results and limits to the LI **C9** cycle extension. The evaluations demonstrated that the Reference 1 licensing analysis results and limits remain applicable for the L1C9 cycle extension with the exception of the MCPR<sub>p</sub> \_limits-and LHGlRFACpmultipliers provided-in.Figures\_ **1** through\_6.

Reference 2 describes the planned LIC9 FFTRlcoastdown as 14.9% power/1,000 MWd/MTU beginning at a cycle exposure of 18,800 MWd/MTU. The L1C9 operating limits provided in References 6 and 8 remain applicable to a cycle exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU (core exposure of 29,439 MWd/MTU). The MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers presented in Figures 1 through 6 must be used for operation beyond a cycle exposure of 18,477 MWd/MTU. In the event that the actual operation deviates significantly from the planned FFTR/coastdown, the following requirements must be met in order satisfy the coastdown analysis assumptions:

- Coastdown operation must begin prior to a cycle exposure of 19,100 MWd/MTU.
- Thermal power during FFTR/coastdown operation must be reduced at a rate faster than 10% power/1,000 MWd/MTU

The limits and multipliers presented in Figures 1 through 6 are applicable to a cycle exposure of 20,100 MWd/MTU. The MCPR<sub>p</sub> limits and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> multipliers are valid for any feedwater temperature within the bounds defined in Reference 7, Item 3.12.

Comparison of the Cycle 9 FFTRlcoastdown nodal power histories for the rated power pressurization transients with the approved bounding curves to show compliance with the 1% clad strain and centerline melt criteria for GE9 fuel is discussed in Reference 9.

#### References

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## Table **1** Base Case **TSSS** FFTR/Coastdown Transient Analysis Results



<sup>\*</sup> The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to 20,100 MWd/MTU. The ACPR and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

## Table 2 EOOS FFTR/Coastdown Transient Analysis Results



Scram initiated by high neutron flux. t

The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to 20,100 MWd/MTU. The ACPR and LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits. **\***

 $\ddagger$ Scram initiated by high dome pressure.

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Figure *1* FFTRlCoastdown Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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Figure 2 FFTR/Coastdown Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel





Figure 3 FFTR/Coastdown Base Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel





Figure 4 FFTR/Coastdown Slow TCV Closure and/or No RPT Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel

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Figure 5 FFTR/Coastdown Slow TCV Closure and/or No RPT Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel
DEG:01:148



## Figure 6 FFTR/Coastdown Slow TCV Closure and/or No RPT **Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers** for ATRIUM-9B Fuel