

IP2 Lessons-Learned Task Group
June, 26, 2000, Discussion with Tim Collins and Richard Barrett, DSSA

Task Group Members: Joe Donoghue, Alan Rubin

Tim and Rich were asked to provide their perspectives on risk insights that could be derived from the IP2 event. They each had the opportunity to review the proposed outline for the risk insights section of the planned lessons-learned report.

After outlining the areas that the task group would consider, we discussed the state of the SG tubes at IP2 and their structural integrity following the 1997 inspection.

Rich asked whether IP2 followed NEI 97-06 guidance. He indicated that proper application of NEI 97-06 and applicable guidance would infer that risk of SGTR was sufficiently addressed at a plant.

We discussed how the tube failure may have been related to the 1997 inspection and that there may have been deficiencies in that inspection, as highlighted in the 3/16/00 RES memo. Rich observed that a condition existed at IP2 that had not been detected during the 1997 inspection which is outside the normal expectations for SGs. This changes the risk perspective for IP2 during the time interval that this condition existed. Rich stated that our current assessment of the risk due to this condition was contained in his memo to Randy Blough (dated May 4, 2000). Rich discussed SGTR risk scenarios, including induced failures from a main steam line break or from high temperatures resulting from a core damage event. Rich also stated that the two parameters most significant to controlling risk from SG tube failures are structural strength (e.g., 3-delta P) and accident leakage (e.g., 1 gpm). Rich agreed that there is not a direct relationship between the tube structural criteria (e.g., 3-delta P) and tube integrity under severe accident conditions because tube conditions under severe accident conditions are at much higher temperatures than during testing at 3-delta P. We made it clear that severe accidents were outside of the scope of areas that the TG would consider.

Rich suggested rewording item A in the Areas of Consideration for the Risk Insights portion of the report outline to ask, "How does information derived from the IP2 event change the risk perspective of SGTR at IP2?"

Rich also cited a paper written by Steve Long in SPSB that gave Steve's perspective on risk considerations connected with SG tube degradation.

J/99