

April 11, 1996

Mr. Thomas F. Plunkett
President - Nuclear Division
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: FLOOD PROTECTION (TAC NOS. M88319 AND M88320)

Dear Mr. Plunkett:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 142 and 82 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated October 25, 1993 as supplemented August 31, 1994 and October 5, 1995.

These amendments modify the surveillance requirements related to dune survey and mangrove swamp monitoring and relocate them to the Final Safety Analysis Report.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Jan A. Norris, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335
and 50-389

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 142 to DPR-67
2. Amendment No. 82 to NPF-16
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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NAME	EDunnington <i>ED</i>	JNorris	<i>M. Z. ...</i>	EImbro	
DATE	04/4/96	04/4/96	04/9/96	04/11/96	
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 11, 1996

Mr. Thomas F. Plunkett
President - Nuclear Division
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jan A. Norris".

Jan A. Norris, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335
and 50-389

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cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Mr. T. F. Plunkett
Florida Power and Light Company

St. Lucie Plant

cc:

Jack Shreve, Public Counsel
Office of the Public Counsel
c/o The Florida Legislature
111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400

Regional Administrator,
Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Senior Resident Inspector
St. Lucie Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7585 S. Hwy A1A
Jensen Beach, Florida 34957

H. N. Paduano, Manager
Licensing & Special Programs
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

Joe Myers, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
Department of Community Affairs
2740 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

W. H. Bohlke, Site Vice President
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 128
Ft. Pierce, Florida 34954-0128

J. R. Newman
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

J. Scarola
Plant General Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 128
Ft. Pierce, Florida 34954-0128

John T. Butler, Esquire
Steel, Hector and Davis
4000 Southeast Financial Center
Miami, Florida 33131-2398

Mr. Kerry Landis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-0199

Mr. Thomas R.L. Kindred
County Administrator
St. Lucie County
2300 Virginia Avenue
Fort Pierce, Florida 34982

E. J. Weinkam
Licensing Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 128
Fort Pierce, Florida 34954-0128

Mr. Charles Brinkman, Manager
Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering, Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Mr. Bill Passeti
Office of Radiation Control
Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services
1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

DATED: April 11, 1996

AMENDMENT NO. 142 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 - ST. LUCIE, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT NO. 82 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16 - ST. LUCIE, UNIT 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 142
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al. (the licensee), dated October 25, 1993, as supplemented August 31, 1994 and October 5, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.2 to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 142, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

for 
Eugene V. Imbro, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 11, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 142

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7.1 The control room emergency ventilation system shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Two booster fans,
- b. Two isolation valves in each outside air intake duct,
- c. Two isolation valves in the toilet area air exhaust duct,
- d. One filter train, and
- e. At least two air conditioning units.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one booster fan inoperable, restore the inoperable fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one isolation valve per air duct inoperable, operation may continue provided the other isolation valve in the same duct is maintained closed; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the filter train inoperable, restore the filter train to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. With only one air conditioning unit OPERABLE, restore at least two air conditioning units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.6 SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY

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3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of 50°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.4 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the intake cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either 1) provide normal cooldown of the facility, or 2) to mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitation on minimum water level is based on providing an adequate cooling water supply to safety related equipment until cooling water can be supplied from Big Mud Creek.

Cooling capacity calculations are based on an ultimate heat sink temperature of 95°F. It has been demonstrated by a temperature survey conducted from March 1976 to May 1981 that the Atlantic Ocean has never risen higher than 86°F. Based on this conservatism, no ultimate heat sink temperature limitation is specified.

3/4.7.6 DELETED

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency ventilation system ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable.

5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

5.1 SITE

EXCLUSION AREA

5.1.1 The exclusion area is shown on Figure 5.1-1.

LOW POPULATION ZONE

5.1.2 The low population zone is shown on Figure 5.1-1.

5.2 CONTAINMENT

CONFIGURATION

5.2.1 The containment structure is comprised of a steel containment vessel, having the shape of a right circular cylinder with a hemispherical dome and ellipsoidal bottom, surrounded by a reinforced concrete shield building. The radius of the shield building is at least 4 feet greater than the radius of circular cylinder portion of the containment vessel at any point.

5.2.1.1. CONTAINMENT VESSEL

- a. Nominal inside diameter = 140 feet.
- b. Nominal inside height = 232 feet.
- c. Net free volume = 2.5×10^6 cubic feet.
- d. Nominal thickness of vessel walls = 2 inches.
- e. Nominal thickness of vessel dome = 1 inch.
- f. Nominal thickness of vessel bottom = 2 inches.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF
THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA

AND

FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY

DOCKET NO. 50-389

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 82
License No. NPF-16

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al. (the licensee), dated October 25, 1993, as supplemented August 31, 1994 and October 5, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.2 to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 82, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Eugene V. Imbro, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 11, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 82
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16
DOCKET NO. 50-389

Replace the following page of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf page is also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Page

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Insert Page

3/4 7-16

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5.1 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Cooling water from the Atlantic Ocean providing a water level above -10.5 feet elevation, Mean Low Water, at the plant intake structure, and
- b. Two OPERABLE valves in the barrier dam between Big Mud Creek and the intake structure.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With the water level requirement of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and provide cooling water from Big Mud Creek within the next 12 hours.
- b. With one isolation valve in the barrier dam between Big Mud Creek and the intake structure inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or within the next 24 hours, install a temporary flow barrier and open the barrier dam isolation valve. The availability of the onsite equipment capable of removing the barrier shall be verified at least once per 7 days thereafter.
- c. With both of the isolation valves in the barrier dam between the intake structure and Big Mud Creek inoperable, within 24 hours, either:
 1. Install both temporary flow barriers and manually open both barrier dam isolation valves. The availability of the onsite equipment capable of removing the barriers shall be verified at least once per 7 days thereafter, or
 2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5.1.1 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by verifying the average water level to be within limits.

4.7.5.1.2 The isolation valves in the barrier dam between the intake structure and Big Mud Creek shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months by cycling each valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.7.6.1 Flood protection shall be provided for the facility site via stoplogs which shall be installed on the southside of the RAB and the southernmost door on east wall whenever a hurricane warning for the plant is posted.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With a Hurricane Watch issued for the facility site, ensure the stoplogs are removed from storage and are prepared for installation. The stoplogs shall be installed anytime a Hurricane Warning is posted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7.6.1 Meteorological forecasts shall be obtained from the National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida at least once per 6 hours during either a Hurricane Watch or a Hurricane Warning.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 142 AND 82

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 AND NO. NPF-16

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, ET AL.

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The St. Lucie plant licensee, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL, Licensee), requested an amendment of the plant operating license to remove the plant Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance requirements for beach dune survey and mangrove swamp monitoring from the plant TS of both Units 1 and 2 (Ref. 1). In response to a staff request of June 1, 1994 the licensee furnished additional information on August 31, 1994 (Ref. 2). Based on subsequent telephone discussions, the licensee furnished an alternative proposal to modify the relevant surveillance requirements and relocate them to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs) (Ref. 3). The staff's evaluation of FPL's proposal addresses first the relocation issue, then the modification issue.

The August 31, 1994, and October 5, 1995 letters contained supplemental information only and did not change the staff's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION

2.1 RELOCATION

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the Act) requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to state TS to be included as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.

The Commission provided guidance for the contents of TS in its "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (Final Policy Statement) published in the Federal Register (58 FR 39132) on July 22, 1993, in which the Commission indicated that compliance with the Final Policy Statement satisfies Section 182a of the Act. In particular, the Commission indicated that certain items could be relocated from the TS to licensee-controlled documents, consistent with the standard enunciated in

Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979). In that case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board indicated that "technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety."

The Commission's final policy statement on technical specifications improvements defines the scope of the technical specifications and provides a criterion for technical design items to be included in, or relocated out of the TS document.

On July 19, 1995 (60 FR 36953), the NRC published the final rule governing the implementation of this policy via a revision of 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications," which became effective August 18, 1995.

The Commission provided guidance for the contents of TS in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). In particular, the Commission indicated that certain items could be relocated from the TS to licensee-controlled documents. With respect to limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), the revised 10 CFR 50.36 identified four criteria to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS, as follows: (1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. As a result, existing LCOs which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria must be retained in the TS, while those LCOs which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria, may be relocated to other, licensee-controlled documents.

In addition, surveillance requirements that relate to tests, calibrations, or inspections to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that the facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met are required to be in the TS.

Since the surveillance requirements for beach dune survey and mangrove swamp monitoring do not meet the above description, the staff finds the licensee's proposal to relocate them from the TS to the UFSAR acceptable.

2.2 MODIFICATION

The TS 3/4.7.6, Flood Protection, for both Units 1 and 2 includes surveillance requirements related to annual beach dune surveys and mangrove swamp

monitoring. However, there are some differences between the TS related to flood protection for the two Units: (1) the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Unit 2 has an Action item related to installation of stoplogs anytime a hurricane warning is posted, whereas the TS for Unit 1 does not have such an Action item (Ref. 1); and (2) only the Unit 1 TS has a Design Feature 5.1.3 related to the flood control provisions (dune and slope protection).

In its original submittal (Ref. 1), FPL proposed to delete the surveillance requirements from the TS of both Units and the associated Design Feature 5.1.3 from Unit 1 TS. Under the original submittal, however, the Action item under TS 3/4.7.6 of Unit 2 related to stoplogs will remain in the TS. In support of its proposal to remove the TS surveillance requirements, the licensee stated that no credit was taken (by the licensee) in its original flooding analysis for either the beach dunes or the mangroves, and, therefore, the burden of performing this surveillance was not warranted. A review of the St. Lucie Unit 2 safety evaluation report (SER) Section 2.4.2.5 (Ref. 4) indicates that due credit was given to the existence of the beach dunes and the mangrove swamps by the staff. The SER clearly states that FPL's erosion analysis is considered to be conservative provided that the State SR-A1A embankment and sufficient beach material east of the embankment exist at the start of the storm in order to limit the heights of breaking waves to those used in the "stalled hurricane" erosion analysis.

After discussion with the licensee during a teleconference, the licensee proposed an alternative monitoring program consisting of a visual inspection by a qualified engineer following the passage of a hurricane (Ref. 3). If the visual inspection finds the beach dune and the old beach road to have been breached, the inspection would be expanded to include an evaluation of the mangrove swamp and SR-A1A embankment adjacent to the site. The licensee has further committed in Ref.3 that it will conduct, at a minimum, a visual inspection every 5 years if there has been no hurricane in that period. FPL has also committed to report to the NRC any storm damage that meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 ("Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors") and 10 CFR 50.73 ("Licensee Event Report System") in accordance with these regulations. If the expanded visual inspection finds significant erosion requiring repair of the SR-A1A roadbed or embankment, then FPL will consider the effects of the storm damage as part of the hurricane recovery activities (Ref. 3). Although FPL had simply proposed, in Ref. 1, to delete the surveillance requirements related to the dune survey and mangrove monitoring from the TS, it has committed, in Ref. 3, to include the alternative monitoring program in the next revisions of the UFSAR for each unit.

The modified surveillance requirements will consist of visual inspection by a qualified engineer after every hurricane and at a minimum a visual inspection every 5 years if there has been no hurricane in that period. FPL committed to include in the Unit 1 UFSAR the associated Design Feature 5.1.3 related to flood control provisions, when it deletes it from the TS. The Action item related to the installation of stoplogs shall remain under the LCO of TS 3/4.7.6 for Unit 2, as originally proposed by FPL (Ref.1).

The staff finds the proposed modified surveillance requirements equivalent to the original requirements in their ability to identify any storm-related degradation of the dune and mangrove swamp in a timely manner and, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendments, the Florida State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 67844). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from D.A. Sager, FPL, to USNRC dated October 25, 1993. Subject: St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 Proposed License Amendments - Flood Protection.
2. Letter from D.A. Sager, FPL, to USNRC dated August 31, 1994. Subject: St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 Proposed License Amendments - Flood Protection - Request for Additional Information
3. Letter from D.A. Sager, FPL, to USNRC dated October 5, 1995. Subject: St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 Proposed License Amendment - Flood Protection Supplemental Information.
4. NUREG-0843, October 1981, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Related to the Operation of St. Lucie Unit 2, SER Section 2.4.2.5: "Wave Induced Erosion."

5. Letter from T.E. Murley, NRC, to W.S. Wilgus, B&W Owners Group, dated May 9, 1988.

Principal Contributors: R. Pichumani and J. Norris

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