

February 25, 1998

Mr. T. F. Plunkett
President - Nuclear Division
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RELOCATING
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (TAC NOS. M99543 AND
M99545)

Dear Mr. Plunkett:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 153 and 91 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated August 22, 1997, regarding relocating the inservice testing program requirements from TS 4.0.5 to the Administrative Controls Section in the Unit 1 and 2 TS.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

L. A. Wiens, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No153 to DPR-67
- 2. Amendment No.91 to NPF-16
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 25, 1998

Mr. T. F. Plunkett
President - Nuclear Division
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

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Dear Mr. Plunkett:

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. A. Wiens".

L. A. Wiens, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 153 to DPR-67
2. Amendment No. 91 to NPF-16
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Mr. T. F. Plunkett
Florida Power and Light Company

ST. LUCIE PLANT

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 153
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, (the licensee), dated August 22, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

- (2) Technical Specifications

- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 153, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 25, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 153

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 0-2
3/4 0-3
3/4 1-12
3/4 1-13
3/4 1-14
3/4 1-15
3/4 4-2
3/4 4-3
3/4 5-5
3/4 6-15a
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-26
3/4 7-1
3/4 7-9
B 3/4 0-8
B 3/4 4-2
6-15c

Insert Pages

3/4 0-2
3/4 0-3
3/4 1-12
3/4 1-13
3/4 1-14
3/4 1-15
3/4 4-2
3/4 4-3
3/4 5-5
3/4 6-15a
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-26
3/4 7-1
3/4 7-9
B 3/4 0-8
B 3/4 4-2
6-15c

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be applicable during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.
- 4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified surveillance interval with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the specified surveillance interval.
- 4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.2, shall constitute noncompliance with the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed for up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.
- 4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements.
- 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:
- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g) (6) (i).
 - b. deleted
 - c. deleted

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.0.5 (Continued)

- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements .
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump* in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump* OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.3 At least one of the above required pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the charging pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm or the high pressure safety injection pump develops a total head of greater than or equal to 2571 ft. when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

* The flow path from the RWT to the RCS via a single HPSI pump shall be established only if: (a) the RCS pressure boundary does not exist, or (b) RCS pressure boundary integrity exists and no charging pumps are operable. In the latter case: 1) all charging pumps shall be disabled; 2) heatup and cooldown rates shall be limited in accordance with Figure 3.1-1b; and 3) at RCS temperatures below 115°F, any two of the following valves in the operable HPSI header shall be verified closed and have their power removed:

<u>High Pressure Header</u>	<u>Auxiliary Header</u>
HCV-3616	HCV-3617
HCV-3626	HCV-3627
HCV-3636	HCV-3637
HCV-3646	HCV-3647

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that each pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORIC ACID PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.1.2.5 At least one boric acid pump shall be OPERABLE if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.1a above, is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no boric acid pump OPERABLE as required to complete the flow path of Specification 3.1.2.1a, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one boric acid pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.2.5 The above required boric acid pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that on recirculating flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of ≥ 75 psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORIC ACID PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid pump(s) in the boron injection flow path(s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be OPERABLE if the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.2a is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid pump required for the boron injection flow path(s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a inoperable, restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.2.6 The above required boric acid pump(s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that on recirculating flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of ≥ 75 psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA \pm 1%.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE shutdown cooling loop into operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA $\pm 1\%$.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
 2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal;
 - a. High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
 - b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
 3. Verifying on a Sump Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and the recirculation valve to the refueling water tank closed.
- f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the specified total developed head on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.
1. High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 2571 ft.
 2. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 350 ft.

- 4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is positioned to take suction from the RWT on a Containment Pressure -- High High test signal.
 - b. By verifying that on recirculation flow, each spray pump develops a discharge pressure of ≥ 200 psig, when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 4.6.3.1.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:
- a. Verifying that on a Containment Isolation test signal, and/or SIAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
- 4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limits when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.1 The containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valves shall be OPERABLE with an actuation setpoint of 2.25 ± 0.25 inches Water Gauge differential.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valve inoperable, restore the valve to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program and at least once per 3 years verify that the vacuum relief valves open fully within 8 seconds at 2.25 ± 0.25 inches Water Gauge differential.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEM

3.4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam line code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 4.7-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With both reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Level-High trip setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- MODE 1 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
- MODE 2 - With one or both main steam isolation valve(s) inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve(s) is (are) maintained closed. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve that is open shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6.0 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

APPLICABILITY

BASES

Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTION requirements define the remedial measures that apply. However, the Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate that inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.

- 4.0.4 This specification establishes the requirement that all applicable surveillances must be met before entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other condition or operation specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that system and component OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met before entry into a MODE or condition for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the facility. This provision applies to changes in OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions associated with plant shutdown as well as startup.

Under the provisions of this specification, the applicable Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the specified surveillance interval to ensure that the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met during initial plant startup or following a plant outage.

When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 do not apply because this would delay placing the facility in a lower MODE of operation.

- 4.0.5 This specification ensures that inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. Relief from any of the above requirements has been provided in writing by the Commission and is not a part of these Technical Specifications.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

A steam bubble in the pressurizer ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accommodating pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve against water relief. The power operated relief valve and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients. Operation of the power operated relief valve in conjunction with a reactor trip on a Pressurizer-Pressure-High signal minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. The required pressurizer heater capacity is capable of maintaining natural circulation sub-cooling. Operability of the heaters, which are powered by a diesel generator bus, ensures ability to maintain pressure control even with loss of offsite power.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

One OPERABLE steam generator provides sufficient heat removal capability to remove decay heat after a reactor shutdown. The requirement for two steam generators capable of removing decay heat, combined with the requirements of Specifications 3.7.1.1, 3.7.1.2 and 3.7.1.3 ensures adequate decay heat removal capabilities for RCS temperatures greater than 325°F if one steam generator becomes inoperable due to signal failure considerations. Below 325°F, decay heat is removed by the shutdown cooling system.

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design manufacturing errors, or in-service conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of Steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.2 do not apply to test frequencies in the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

i. Inservice Testing Program

This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components (pumps and valves). The program shall include the following:

- a. Testing frequencies specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* and applicable addenda as follows:

<u>ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice testing activities</u>	<u>Required Frequencies for performing inservice testing activities</u>
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days
Biennially or every 2 years	At least once per 731 days

- b. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice testing activities;
- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities; and
- d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any technical specification.

* Where ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is referenced it also refers to the applicable portions of ASME/ANSI OM-Code, "Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants" with applicable addenda, to the extent it is referenced in the Code.

6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

ROUTINE REPORTS

- 6.9.1 In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following reports shall be submitted to the NRC.

STARTUP REPORT

- 6.9.1.1 A summary report of plant startup and power escalation testing shall be submitted following (1) receipt of an operating license, (2) amendment to the license involving a planned increase in power level, (3) installation of fuel that has a different design or has been manufactured by a different fuel supplier, and (4) modifications that may have significantly altered the nuclear, thermal or hydraulic performance of the plant.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF

THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA

AND

FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY

DOCKET NO. 50-389

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 91
License No. NPF-16

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al. (the licensee), dated August 22, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.2 to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 91 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 25, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.91

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16

DOCKET NO. 50-389

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

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3/4 0-3
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APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be applicable during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.
- 4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified surveillance interval with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the specified surveillance interval.
- 4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.2, shall constitute noncompliance with the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed for up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.
- 4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements.
- 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:
- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g) (6) (i).
 - b. deleted
 - c. deleted

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.0.5 (Continued)

- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements .
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.2.3 At least the above required pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the charging pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm or the high pressure safety injection pump develops a total head of greater than or equal to 2854 ft. when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3000 pcm at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.4.1 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that each pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

4.1.2.4.2 At least once per 18 months verify that each charging pump starts automatically on an SIAS test signal.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.1.2.5 At least one boric acid makeup pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.1a is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no boric acid makeup pump OPERABLE as required to complete the flow path of Specification 3.1.2.1a, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.2.5 The above required boric acid makeup pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid makeup pump(s) in the boron injection flow path(s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if the flow path through the boric acid pump(s) in Specification 3.1.2.2 is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid makeup pump required for the boron injection flow path(s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2 inoperable, restore the boric acid makeup pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3000 pcm at 200°F; restore the above required boric acid makeup pump(s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.2.6 The above required boric acid makeup pump(s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump(s) develop a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA \pm 1%. *

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE shutdown cooling loop into operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.2 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 psia $\pm 1\%$. *

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

- c. In the event either the PORVs, SDCRVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, SDCRVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. In addition to the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program, operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel at least once per 18 months.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
 3. Verifying that a minimum total of 173 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
 4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 70.5 ± 0.5 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 10.0 ± 0.1 gallons of $120 \pm 10^\circ\text{F}$ borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours.
- f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and/or RAS test signals.
 2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:
 - a. High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.
 - b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.
 3. Verifying that on a Sump Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and the recirculation valve to the refueling water tank closed.
- g. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the specified total developed head on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program:
1. High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 2854 ft.
 2. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump: greater than or equal to 374 ft.
- h. By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:
1. During valve stroking operation or following maintenance on the valve and prior to declaring the valve OPERABLE when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is positioned to take suction from the RWT on a Containment Pressure - - High-High test signal.
- b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 200 psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.
- c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CSAS test signal.
 2. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal (RAS), the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM (IRS)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.2 The Iodine Removal System shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A hydrazine storage tank containing a minimum volume of 675 gallons of $\geq 25.4\%$ by weight N_2H_4 (Hydrazine) solution, and
- b. Two iodine removal pumps each capable of adding N_2H_4 solution from the hydrazine storage tank to a containment spray system pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. *

ACTION:

With the Iodine Removal System inoperable restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Iodine Removal System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.2 The Iodine Removal System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. The above required iodine removal pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying a flow rate of between 0.71 gpm and 0.82 gpm when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.
- c. At least once per 6 months by:
 1. Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
 2. Verifying the concentration of the N_2H_4 solution by chemical analysis.
- d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CSAS test signal.

* Applicable only when pressurizer pressure is ≥ 1750 psia.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 4.6.3.2 Each automatic containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:
- a. Verifying that on a Containment Isolation test signal (CIAS) and/or a Safety Injection test signal (SIAS), each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
 - b. Verifying that on a Containment Radiation-High test signal, each containment purge valve actuates to its isolation position.
- 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5 The primary containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valves shall be OPERABLE with an actuation setpoint of less than or equal to 9.85 ± 0.35 inches water gauge.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one primary containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valve inoperable, restore the valve to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.2 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam line code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings and orifice sizes as shown in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With both reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided that, within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Level-High trip setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- MODE 1 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
- MODES 2 and 4 - With one or both main steam line isolation valve(s) inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2, 3 or 4 may proceed provided the isolation valve(s) is (are) maintained closed. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6.75 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION :

3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:* MODES 1, 2 and 3, except when the MFIV is closed and deactivated.

ACTION:

- a. With one MFIV inoperable in one or more main feedwater lines, OPERATION may continue provided each inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status, closed, or isolated within 72 hours. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With two MFIVs inoperable in the same flowpath, restore at least one of the inoperable MFIVs to OPERABLE status or close one of the inoperable valves within 4 hours. Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7.1.6.a Each MFIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5.15 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
- 4.7.1.6.b For each inoperable MFIV, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

* Each MFIV shall be treated independently.

4.0.4 This specification establishes the requirement that all applicable surveillances must be met before entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other condition of operation specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that system and component OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met before entry into a MODE or condition for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the facility. This provision applies to changes in OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions associated with plant shutdown as well as startup.

Under the provisions of this specification, the applicable Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the specified surveillance interval to ensure that the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met during initial plant startup or following a plant outage.

When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 do not apply because this would delay placing the facility in a lower MODE of operation.

4.0.5 This specification ensures that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. Relief from any of the above requirements has been provided in writing by the Commission and is not a part of these Technical Specifications.

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the system pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the Reactor Coolant System during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control, remain covered with water to prevent failure, which could occur if the heaters were energized uncovered. The maximum water level in the pressurizer ensures that this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in the safety analysis. The maximum water level also ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will be provided to accommodate pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves against water relief. The requirement to verify that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss of offsite power the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources is to ensure that the non-Class 1E heaters do not reduce the reliability of or overload the emergency power source. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria:

- a. Containment leakage rate acceptance is $\leq 1.0 L_n$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria is $< 0.60 L_n$ for the Type B and C tests, $\leq 0.75 L_n$ for Type A tests, and $\leq 0.12 L_n$ for secondary containment bypass leakage paths.
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
 - 1. Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_n$ when tested at $\geq P_n$.
 - 2. For each door seal, leakage rate is $< 0.01 L_n$ when pressurized to $\geq P_n$.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.2 do not apply to test frequencies in the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

i. Inservice Testing Program

This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components (pumps and valves). The program shall include the following:

- a. Testing frequencies specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* and applicable addenda as follows:

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice testing activities	Required Frequencies for performing inservice testing activities
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days
Biennially or every 2 years	At least once per 731 days

- b. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice testing activities;
- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities; and
- d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any technical specification.

* Where ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is referenced it also refers to the applicable portions of ASME/ANSI OM-Code, "Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants" with applicable addenda, to the extent it is referenced in the Code.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 153 AND 91

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 AND NPF-16

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, ET AL.

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 22, 1997, Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed changes would remove the requirements for inservice testing of pumps and valves from Specification 4.0.5 and replace it with an equivalent administrative requirement in Section 6 of the Technical Specifications (TS). The requirement for "specific written approval" of relief where Code requirements are impractical is eliminated in deference to the approval requirement stated in 10 CFR 50.55a. The proposed amendment also provides conforming changes to several Surveillance Requirements to change the reference from Specification 4.0.5 to the Inservice Testing Program. Changes to the Bases reflecting these changes were also submitted.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The April 7, 1995, revised version of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) (NUREG-1432), relocates the inservice testing requirements to the administrative controls section of the TS. NUREG-1482, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," Chapter 6, recommends that licensees revise their TS to incorporate the revised STS for inservice testing programs.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed to revise TS 4.0.5.a to delete reference to inservice testing of pumps and valves and relocate the requirement for an inservice testing program to TS 6.8.4.i. TS 4.0.5.b and c have been deleted and the requirements relocated to TS 6.8.4.i. These revisions were based on the guidance of NUREG-1482 and NUREG-1432, Revision 1. Section 5.5 of the revised STS contains the requirements for the inservice testing program. This TS provides, in part, the definition of surveillance intervals for inservice testing of pumps and valves and the applicability of TS 4.0.2 for surveillance interval extensions. This change to the licensee's TS is consistent with the revised STS and the intent of the regulatory guidance in NUREG-1482. The inservice testing requirements are given in 10 CFR 50.55a, which the licensee documents via its 10-year interval program requirements. This change is acceptable since the regulatory requirements are delineated in 10 CFR 50.55a, and the change eliminates inconsistencies between the TS and the regulations.

In the markup of the current TS pages, the licensee proposed to add the words "and testing" in TS 4.0.5.a and to the Bases for 4.0.5 to denote the inservice inspection program. The licensee's intent was to provide clarification that the inservice inspection program included system pressure testing. However, the NRC staff determined that the addition of the words "and testing" could lead to confusion with the inservice testing program, which was being relocated as described above. Therefore, the existing wording for the inservice inspection program was retained in TS 4.0.5.a and in the Bases for 4.0.5. The words "and testing" were also deleted from the first line of TS 4.0.5 and from TS 4.0.5.d to avoid similar confusion.

Revisions were proposed throughout Units 1 and 2 TS to change the reference for testing of pumps and valves from Specification 4.0.5 to the Inservice Testing Program. This revision is an administrative change and is necessary because inservice testing of pumps and valves will no longer be governed by TS 4.0.5 but by the Inservice Testing Program. Therefore these changes are acceptable.

Changes to the Bases to conform to these changes were also submitted. The NRC staff has no objection to the changes to these Bases.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendments, the Florida State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a surveillance requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 50006). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: L. Wiens

Date: February 25, 1998