

May 1, 1998

Mr. T. F. Plunkett  
President - Nuclear Division  
Florida Power and Light Company  
P.O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO AMENDMENT NOS. 153 AND 91  
ST. LUCIE PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M99543, M99545)

Dear Mr. Plunkett:

On February 25, 1998, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 153 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67, and Amendment No. 91 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consisted of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated August 22, 1997, regarding the relocation of the inservice testing program requirements from TS Section 4.0.5 to the Administrative Controls Section in the Unit 1 and 2 TS.

Some of the amended TS pages sent by the licensee after the original application was submitted contained clerical errors, inadvertently incorporated during the retyping process, that were unrelated to the application. These errors did not appear in the licensee's original application, nor were they addressed in the Federal Register Notice dated, September 24, 1997 (62 FR 50006). Enclosed are the corrected TS pages. We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.

Sincerely,

/s/

William C. Gleaves, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389

Enclosures: 1. Corrected TS Pages, Unit 1  
2. Corrected TS Pages, Unit 2

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 1, 1998

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President - Nuclear Division  
Florida Power and Light Company  
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "William C. Gleaves".

William C. Gleaves, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389

Enclosures: 1. Corrected TS Pages, Unit 1  
2. Corrected TS Pages, Unit 2

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Mr. T. F. Plunkett  
Florida Power and Light Company

**ST. LUCIE PLANT**

cc:

Senior Resident Inspector  
St. Lucie Plant  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
7585 S. Hwy A1A  
Jensen Beach, Florida 34957

Regional Administrator  
Region II  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
61 Forsyth Street, SW., Suite 23T85  
Atlanta, GA 30303-3415

Joe Myers, Director  
Division of Emergency Preparedness  
Department of Community Affairs  
2740 Centerview Drive  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

H. N. Paduano, Manager  
Licensing & Special Programs  
Florida Power and Light Company  
P.O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

M. S. Ross, Attorney  
Florida Power & Light Company  
P.O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

J. A. Stall, Site Vice President  
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant  
6351 South Ocean Drive  
Jensen Beach, Florida 34957

John T. Butler, Esquire  
Steel, Hector and Davis  
4000 Southeast Financial Center  
Miami, Florida 33131-2398

Mr. J. Scarola  
Plant General Manager  
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant  
6351 South Ocean Drive  
Jensen Beach, Florida 34957

Mr. Douglas Anderson  
County Administrator  
St. Lucie County  
2300 Virginia Avenue  
Fort Pierce, Florida 34982

Mr. Robert P. Schin  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
61 Forsyth Street, SW., Suite 23T85  
Atlanta, GA 30303-3415

Mr. Bill Passeti  
Office of Radiation Control  
Department of Health and  
Rehabilitative Services  
1317 Winewood Blvd.  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

E. J. Weinkam  
Licensing Manager  
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant  
6351 South Ocean Drive  
Jensen Beach, Florida 34957

CORRECTED PAGES TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 153

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 0-2  
3/4 0-3  
3/4 1-12  
3/4 1-14  
3/4 1-15  
3/4 4-3  
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3/4 6-19  
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Insert Pages

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B 3/4 0-8  
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Enclosure 1

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## APPLICABILITY

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- 4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be applicable during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.
- 4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified surveillance interval with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the specified surveillance interval.
- 4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.2, shall constitute noncompliance with the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed for up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.
- 4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements.
- 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:
- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g) (6) (i).
  - b. deleted

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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4.0.5 (Continued)

- c. deleted
- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements .
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump\* in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump\* OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.3 At least one of the above required pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the charging pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm or the high pressure safety injection pump develops a total head of greater than or equal to 2571 ft. when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

\* The flow path from the RWT to the RCS via a single HPSI pump shall be established only if: (a) the RCS pressure boundary does not exist, or (b) RCS pressure boundary integrity exists and no charging pumps are operable. In the latter case: 1) all charging pumps shall be disabled; 2) heatup and cooldown rates shall be limited in accordance with Figure 3.1-1b; and 3) at RCS temperatures below 115°F, any two of the following valves in the operable HPSI header shall be verified closed and have their power removed:

<u>High Pressure Header</u>	<u>Auxiliary Header</u>
HCV-3616	HCV-3617
HCV-3626	HCV-3627
HCV-3636	HCV-3637
HCV-3646	HCV-3647

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORIC ACID PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

- 3.1.2.5 At least one boric acid pump shall be OPERABLE if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.1a above, is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no boric acid pump OPERABLE as required to complete the flow path of Specification 3.1.2.1a, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one boric acid pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

- 4.1.2.5 The above required boric acid pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of  $\geq 75$  psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.



## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORIC ACID PUMPS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

- 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid pump(s) in the boron injection flow path(s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be OPERABLE if the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.2a is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid pump required for the boron injection flow path(s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a inoperable, restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

- 4.1.2.6 The above required boric acid pump(s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of  $\geq 75$  psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.3 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA  $\pm 1\%$ .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
  - 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
  - 2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal;
    - a. High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
    - b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
  - 3. Verifying on a Sump Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and the recirculation valve to the refueling water tank closed.
  
- f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the specified total developed head on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.
  - 1. High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 2571 ft.
  - 2. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 350 ft.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

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- 4.6.3.1.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:
- a. Verifying that on a Containment Isolation test signal, and/or SIAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
- 4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limits when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- MODE 1 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
- MODES 2 and 3 - With one or both main steam isolation valve(s) inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve(s) is (are) maintained closed. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve that is open shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6.0 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

## APPLICABILITY

### BASES

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Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTION requirements define the remedial measures that apply. However, the Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate that inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.

- 4.0.4 This specification establishes the requirement that all applicable surveillances must be met before entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other condition or operation specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that system and component OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met before entry into a MODE or condition for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the facility. This provision applies to changes in OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions associated with plant shutdown as well as startup.

Under the provisions of this specification, the applicable Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the specified surveillance interval to ensure that the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met during initial plant startup or following a plant outage.

When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 do not apply because this would delay placing the facility in a lower MODE of operation.

- 4.0.5 This specification ensures that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. Relief from any of the above requirements has been provided in writing by the Commission and is not a part of these Technical Specifications.

BASES

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3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

A steam bubble in the pressurizer ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accommodating pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve against water relief. The power operated relief valve and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients. Operation of the power operated relief valve in conjunction with a reactor trip on a Pressurizer-Pressure-High signal minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. The required pressurizer heater capacity is capable of maintaining natural circulation sub-cooling. Operability of the heaters, which are powered by a diesel generator bus, ensures ability to maintain pressure control even with loss of offsite power.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

One OPERABLE steam generator provides sufficient heat removal capability to remove decay heat after a reactor shutdown. The requirement for two steam generators capable of removing decay heat, combined with the requirements of Specifications 3.7.1.1, 3.7.1.2 and 3.7.1.3 ensures adequate decay heat removal capabilities for RCS temperatures greater than 325°F if one steam generator becomes inoperable due to single failure considerations. Below 325°F, decay heat is removed by the shutdown cooling system.

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or in-service conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of Steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.2 do not apply to test frequencies in the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

i. Inservice Testing Program

This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components (pumps and valves). The program shall include the following:

- a. Testing frequencies specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code\* and applicable addenda as follows:

<u>ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice testing activities</u>	<u>Required Frequencies for performing inservice testing activities</u>
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days
Biennially or every 2 years	At least once per 731 days

- b. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice testing activities;
- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities; and
- d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code\* shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any technical specification.

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\* Where ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is referenced it also refers to the applicable portions of ASME/ANSI OM-Code, "Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," with applicable addenda, to the extent it is referenced in the Code.

6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

ROUTINE REPORTS

- 6.9.1 In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following reports shall be submitted to the NRC.

STARTUP REPORT

- 6.9.1.1 A summary report of plant startup and power escalation testing shall be submitted following (1) receipt of an operating license, (2) amendment to the license involving a planned increase in power level, (3) installation of fuel that has a different design or has been manufactured by a different fuel supplier, and (4) modifications that may have significantly altered the nuclear, thermal or hydraulic performance of the plant.



CORRECTED PAGES TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 91

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16

DOCKET NO. 50-389

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

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3/4 1-12  
3/4 4-7  
3/4 4-36  
3/4 6-17  
3/4 6-26  
3/4 7-1  
3/4 7-9  
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B 3/4 4-2  
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Insert Pages

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6-15c

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

- 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

- 4.1.2.3 At least the above required pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the charging pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm or the high pressure safety injection pump develops a total head of greater than or equal to 2854 ft. when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

- 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid makeup pump(s) in the boron injection flow path(s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if the flow path through the boric acid pump(s) in Specification 3.1.2.2 is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid makeup pump required for the boron injection flow path(s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2 inoperable, restore the boric acid makeup pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3000 pcm at 200°F; restore the above required boric acid makeup pump(s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- 4.1.2.6 The above required boric acid makeup pump(s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump(s) develop a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psig when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

#### SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

- 3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 psia  $\pm$  1%. \*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE shutdown cooling loop into operation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

- 4.4.2.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

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\* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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##### ACTION (Continued):

- c. In the event either the PORVs, SDCRVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, SDCRVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

##### 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. In addition to the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program, operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel at least once per 18 months.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM (IRS)

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

- 3.6.2.2 The Iodine Removal System shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. A hydrazine storage tank containing a minimum volume of 675 gallons of  $\geq 25.4\%$  by weight  $N_2H_4$  (Hydrazine) solution, and
  - b. Two iodine removal pumps each capable of adding  $N_2H_4$  solution from the hydrazine storage tank to a containment spray system pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3\*.

ACTION:

With the Iodine Removal System inoperable restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Iodine Removal System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

- 4.6.2.2 The Iodine Removal System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
  - b. The above required iodine removal pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying a flow rate of between 0.71 gpm and 0.82 gpm when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.
  - c. At least once per 6 months by:
    1. Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
    2. Verifying the concentration of the  $N_2H_4$  solution by chemical analysis.
  - d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CSAS test signal.

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\* Applicable only when pressurizer pressure is  $\geq 1750$  psia.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.5 The primary containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valves shall be OPERABLE with an actuation setpoint of  $9.85 \pm 0.35$  inches water gauge.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one primary containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valve inoperable, restore the valve to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.5 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.

## 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

#### SAFETY VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.1 All main steam line code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings and orifice sizes as shown in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With both reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided that, within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Level-High trip setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the Inservice Testing Program.



PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

MODE 1 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

MODES 2, 3- and 4 With one or both main steam line isolation valve(s) inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2, 3 or 4 may proceed provided the isolation valve(s) is (are) maintained closed. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6.75 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:\* MODES 1, 2 and 3, except when the MFIV is closed and deactivated.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one MFIV inoperable in one or more main feedwater lines, OPERATION may continue provided each inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status, closed, or isolated within 72 hours. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With two MFIVs inoperable in the same flowpath, restore at least one of the inoperable MFIVs to OPERABLE status or close one of the inoperable valves within 4 hours. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- 4.7.1.6.a Each MFIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5.15 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
- 4.7.1.6.b For each inoperable MFIV, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

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\* Each MFIV shall be treated independently.

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the system pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the Reactor Coolant System during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control, remain covered with water to prevent failure, which could occur if the heaters were energized uncovered. The maximum water level in the pressurizer ensures that this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in the safety analysis. The maximum water level also ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will be provided to accommodate pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves against water relief. The requirement to verify that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss of offsite power the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources is to ensure that the non-Class 1E heaters do not reduce the reliability of or overload the emergency power source. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria:

- a. Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is  $\leq 1.0 L_a$ . During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are  $< 0.60 L_a$  for the Type B and C tests,  $\leq 0.75 L_a$  for Type A tests, and  $\leq 0.12 L_a$  for secondary containment bypass leakage paths.
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
  - 1. Overall air lock leakage rate is  $\leq 0.05 L_a$  when tested at  $\geq P_a$ .
  - 2. For each door seal, leakage rate is  $< 0.01 L_a$  when pressurized to  $\geq P_a$ .

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.2 do not apply to test frequencies in the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of T.S. 4.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

i. Inservice Testing Program

This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components (pumps and valves). The program shall include the following:

- a. Testing frequencies specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code\* and applicable addenda as follows:

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code* and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice testing activities	Required Frequencies for performing inservice testing activities
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days
Biennially or every 2 years	At least once per 731 days

- b. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice testing activities;
- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities; and
- d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code\* shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any technical specification.

\* Where ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is referenced it also refers to the applicable portions of ASME/ANSI OM-Code, "Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," with applicable addenda, to the extent it is referenced in the Code.