

August 20, 1996

Mr. T. F. Plunkett
President, Nuclear Division
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RELOCATION (TAC NOS. M93340 AND M93341)

Dear Mr. Plunkett:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 147 and 86 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated August 16, 1995.

These amendments revise the St. Lucie TS to relocate selected TS related to instrumentation to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, in accordance with the Commission's Final Policy Statement on TS Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, 58 FR 39132, July 22, 1993. The amendments also relocate the review requirements related to the Emergency Plan and the Security Plan from the TS to the respective plans themselves, utilizing the guidance in Generic Letter 93-07, "Modification of the Technical Specification Administrative Requirements for Emergency and Security Plans."

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original signed by
L. A. Wiens

Leonard A. Wiens, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 147 to DPR-67
2. Amendment No. 86 to NPF-16
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

DF01/1

Distribution

Docket File	PUBLIC	PDII-3 Reading	S. Varga, 0-14 E4
OGC	G. Hill, (4) T-5 C3	C. Grimes, 0-13 H15	ACRS
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DATE	8/1/96	8/1/96	7/30/96	8/2/96	
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St. Lucie Plant

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.147
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al. (the licensee), dated August 16, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.147 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 20, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 147

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

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The next page is 3/4 3-33.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

by the individual channels; and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.3.2 Deleted

3/4.3.3.3 Deleted

3/4.3.3.4 Deleted

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.

- i. Not Used.
- j. Not Used.
- k. Review of every unplanned on-site release of radioactive material to the environs including the preparation of reports covering evaluation, recommendations and disposition of the corrective action to prevent recurrence and the forwarding of these reports to the President-Nuclear Division and to the Company Nuclear Review Board.
- l. Review of changes to the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL and RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS.
- m. Review and documentation of judgment concerning prolonged operation in bypass, channel trip, and/or repair of defective protection channels of process variables placed in bypass since the last FRG meeting.
- n. Review of the Fire Protection Program and implementing procedures and submittal of recommended changes to the Company Nuclear Review Board.

AUTHORITY

- 6.5.1.7 The Facility Review Board shall:
- a. Recommend in writing to the Plant General Manager, approval or disapproval of items considered under Specifications 6.5.1.6.a through d above.
 - b. Render determinations in writing with regard to whether or not each item considered under Specifications 6.5.1.6.a, b, d, and e above constitutes an unreviewed safety question.
 - c. Provide written notification within 24 hours to the President-Nuclear Division and the Company Nuclear Review Board of disagreement between the FRG and the Plant General Manager; however, the Plant General Manager shall have responsibility for resolution of such disagreements pursuant to Specification 6.1.1 above.

RECORDS

- 6.5.1.8 The Facility Review Group shall maintain written minutes of each FRG meeting that, at a minimum, document the results of all FRG activities performed under the responsibility and authority provisions of these Technical Specifications. Copies shall be provided to the President-Nuclear Division and the Chairman of the Company Nuclear Review Board.

6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

- c. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the Commission, the CNRB, and the President-Nuclear Division within 14 days of the violation.
- d. Critical operation of the unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS

- 6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities referenced below:
- a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, and those required for implementing the requirements of NUREG 0737.
 - b. Refueling operations.
 - c. Surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
 - d. Not Used.
 - e. Not Used.
 - f. Fire Protection Program implementation.
 - g. PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM implementation.
 - h. OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL implementation.
 - i. Quality Control Program for effluent monitoring, using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.21, Revision 1, June 1974.
 - j. Quality Control Program for environmental monitoring using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.1, Revision 1, April 1975.
- 6.8.2 Each procedure of Specification 6.8.1a through i. above, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed by the FRG and shall be approved by the Plant General Manager prior to implementation and shall be reviewed periodically as set forth in administrative procedures.
- 6.8.3 Temporary changes to procedures of Specification 6.8.1a through i. above may be made provided:
- a. The intent of the original procedure is not altered.
 - b. The change is approved by two members of the plant management staff, at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operator's License on the unit affected.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF
THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA
AND
FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY
DOCKET NO. 50-389
ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.86
License No. NPF-16

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al. (the licensee), dated August 16, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.2 to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 86, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance:

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 86

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16

DOCKET NO. 50-389

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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Pages 3/4 3-33 through 3/4 3-37 have been DELETED.

The next page is 3/4 3-38.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

individual channels; and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.3.2 DELETED

3/4.3.3.3 DELETED

3/4.3.3.4. DELETED

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown. The remote shutdown system instrumentation, control circuits, and transfer switches are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor. This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG 0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

3/4.3.3.7 DELETED

3/4.3.3.8. DELETED

MEETING FREQUENCY

6.5.1.4 The FRG shall meet at least once per calendar month and as convened by the FRG Chairman or his designated alternate.

QUORUM

6.5.1.5 The quorum of the FRG necessary for the performance of the FRG responsibility and authority provisions of these Technical Specifications shall consist of the Chairman or his designated alternate and four members including alternates.

RESPONSIBILITIES

- 6.5.1.6 The Facility Review Group shall be responsible for:
- a. Review of (1) all procedures required by Specification 6.8 and changes thereto, (2) all programs required by Specification 6.8 and changes thereto, and (3) any other proposed procedures or changes thereto as determined by the Plant General Manager to affect nuclear safety.
 - b. Review of all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety.
 - c. Review of all proposed changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications.
 - d. Review of all proposed changes or modifications to unit systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety.
 - e. Investigation of all violations of the Technical Specifications, including the preparation and forwarding of reports covering evaluation and recommendations to prevent recurrence to the President-Nuclear Division and to the Chairman of the Company Nuclear Review Board.
 - f. Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS.
 - g. Review of unit operations to detect potential nuclear safety hazards.
 - h. Performance of special reviews, investigations or analyses and reports thereon as requested by the Plant General Manager or the Company Nuclear Review Board.
 - i. Not Used.
 - j. Not Used.

6.6 REPORTABLE EVENTS ACTION

- 6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:
- a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and
 - b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the FRG, and the results of this review shall be submitted to the CNRB, and the President-Nuclear Division.

6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION

- 6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a Safety Limit is violated:
- a. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour. The President-Nuclear Division and the CNRB shall be notified within 24 hours.
 - b. A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared. The report shall be reviewed by the FRG. This report shall describe (1) applicable circumstances preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon facility components, systems or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to prevent recurrence.
 - c. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the Commission, the CNRB, and the President-Nuclear Division within 14 days of the violation.
 - d. Critical operation of the unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS

- 6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities referenced below:
- a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, and those required for implementing the requirements of NUREG 0737.
 - b. Refueling operations.
 - c. Surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
 - d. Not Used.
 - e. Not Used.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 147 AND 86

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 AND NO. NPF-16

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, ET AL.

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 16, 1995, Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the St. Lucie Technical Specifications (TS). The requested amendments would relocate selected TS requirements related to instrumentation from the TS to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The relocated requirements include the limiting conditions for operation and related surveillance requirements for:

TS 3/4.3 3.4 Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation

TS 3/4.3.3.8 Loose-Part Detection System, Unit 2

TS 3/4.3.3.10 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation

TS 3/4..3.4 Turbine Overspeed Protection

The licensee has stated that the next update of the UFSAR will include discussions of the relocated requirements. The NRC provided guidance to all holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors on the proposed TS changes in Generic Letter 95-10, "Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation," dated December 15, 1995.

The licensee also proposes to delete TS 6.5.1.6i, 6.5.1.6j, 6.8.1.d, and 6.8.1e related to the review requirements and implementation procedures of the Emergency Plan and Security Plan from the TS, and to relocate their requirements to the Emergency Plan and Security Plan. These changes were reviewed in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 93-07, "Modification of Technical Specification Administrative Requirements for Emergency and Security Plans."

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2.0 BACKGROUND

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the "Act") requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to include TS as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS.

The Commission has provided guidance for the contents of TS in its "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" ("Final Policy Statement"), 58 FR 39132 (July 22, 1993), in which the Commission indicated that compliance with the Final Policy Statement satisfies Section 182a of the Act. In particular, the Commission indicated that certain items could be relocated from the TS to licensee-controlled documents, consistent with the standard enunciated in *Portland General Electric Co.* (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979). In that case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board indicated that "technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety."

Consistent with this approach, the Final Policy Statement identified four criteria to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS. These criteria were subsequently incorporated into the regulations by an amendment to 10 CFR 50.36 (60 FR 36953, July 19, 1995). The criteria incorporated into the rule are as follows:

- (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
- (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;
- (3) A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;
- (4) A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

As a result, existing TS requirements which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria must be retained in the TS, while those TS requirements which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other, licensee-controlled documents.

In addition to the proposed amendments related to instrumentation, the licensee requested changes in the TS pertaining to the Emergency and Security Plans. Guidance for the review of these amendments is provided in Generic Letter 93-07.

3.0 EVALUATION

3/4.3.3.4 Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation

The meteorological monitoring instrumentation is used to measure environmental parameters (wind direction, speed, and air temperature differences) which may affect the distribution of radioactive effluents following a release of radioactive material. In 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency Plans," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," the Commission requires power plant licensees to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Timely access to accurate local meteorological data is important for estimating potential radiation doses to the public and for determining appropriate protective measures. In 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2), the Commission requires nuclear power plant licensees to submit annual reports specifying the quantity of each of the principal radionuclides released to unrestricted areas in liquid and airborne effluents and such other information as may be required by the NRC to estimate maximum potential annual radiation doses to the public. A knowledge of meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the reactor is important in providing a basis for estimating annual radiation doses resulting from radioactive materials released in airborne effluents. Accordingly, the meteorological monitoring instrumentation serves a useful function in estimating radiation doses to the public from either routine or accidental releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. The licensee has proposed to relocate these provisions to the UFSAR such that future changes to the operation and surveillance of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation could be changed under 10 CFR 50.59.

Although the meteorological monitoring instrumentation serves a useful function as described above, it does not serve a primary protective function so as to warrant inclusion in the TS in accordance with the criteria of the final policy statement. The instrumentation does not serve to ensure that the plant is operated within the bounds of initial conditions assumed in design basis accident and transient analyses or that the plant will be operated to preclude transients or accidents. Likewise, the meteorological instrumentation does not serve as part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis used to demonstrate that the consequences of these events are within the appropriate acceptance criteria.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the requirements for meteorological monitoring instrumentation do not meet the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria, so they may be removed from the TS and relocated to the UFSAR. The limiting conditions

for operation and surveillance requirements for meteorological monitoring instrumentation were not included in the Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specifications (STS).

3/4.3.3.8 Loose-Part Detection System, Unit 2

The loose-part detection system identifies the existence of possible loose parts in the reactor coolant system. Early detection can provide operators time to take corrective actions and avoid or mitigate damage to or malfunctions of primary system components. However, the loose-part detection system does not function to detect significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The loose-part detection system does not serve as an active design feature for establishing initial conditions or mitigation of design basis accidents or transients. The licensee has proposed to relocate these provisions to the UFSAR such that future changes to the operation and surveillance of the loose-part detection system could be changed under 10 CFR 50.59.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the requirements for the loose-part detection system do not meet the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and may be relocated to the UFSAR. The limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the loose-part detection system were not included in the Combustion Engineering STS.

3/4.3.3.10 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation

The relocation of most of the instrumentation related to radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring was addressed in Generic Letter 89-01, "Implementation of Programmatic Controls for Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications [RETS] in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications and the Relocation of Procedural Details of RETS to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual or the Process Control Program." Relocation of the requirements for explosive gas monitoring instrumentation was not addressed in the guidance provided by Generic Letter 89-01. The staff positions regarding the monitoring of explosive gases within the radioactive waste management systems are outlined in SRP Section 11.3 and Branch Technical Position ETSB-11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure." The licensee has proposed to relocate these provisions to the UFSAR such that future changes to the operation and surveillance of the explosive gas monitoring instrumentation could be changed under 10 CFR 50.59.

The Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation monitors the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the Gaseous Radwaste System. The explosive gas monitoring instrumentation requirements address detection of possible precursors to the failure of a waste gas system but do not prevent or mitigate design basis accidents or transients which assume a failure of or present a challenge to a fission product barrier. Acceptable concentrations of explosive gases are actually controlled by the limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements of TS 3.11.2.5, Explosive Gas Mixture.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the requirements for explosive gas monitoring instrumentation do not meet the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria for retention

in the TS, and may be relocated to the UFSAR. The limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for explosive gas monitoring instrumentation were not included in the Combustion Engineering STS.

3/4.3.4 Turbine Overspeed Protection

General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be appropriately protected from the effects of missiles that may result from equipment failures. The turbine is equipped with control valves and stop valves which control turbine speed during normal plant operation and protect it from overspeed during abnormal conditions. The turbine overspeed protection system consists of separate mechanical and electrical sensing mechanisms which are capable of initiating fast closure of the steam valves. Currently, TS 3/4.3.4 requires particular operability and surveillance requirements for these steam control and stop valves to minimize the potential for fragment missiles that might be generated as the result of a turbine overspeed event. The licensee has proposed to relocate these provisions to the UFSAR such that future changes to the operation and surveillance of the turbine overspeed features could be changed under 10 CFR 50.59.

Although the design basis accidents and transients include a variety of system failures and conditions which might result from turbine overspeed events and potential missiles striking various plant systems and equipment, the system failures and plant conditions are much more likely to be caused by events other than turbine failures. In view of the low likelihood of turbine missiles, assumptions related to the turbine overspeed protection system are not part of an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. The turbine overspeed protection system is not relied upon in the design basis accident or transient analyses as a primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate such events.

Probabilistic safety assessments and operating experience have demonstrated that proper maintenance of the turbine overspeed control valves is important to minimize the potential for overspeed events and turbine damage; however that experience has also demonstrated that there is low likelihood of significant risk to public health and safety because of turbine overspeed events. Further, the potential for and consequences of turbine overspeed events are diminished by the favorable orientation of the turbine, relative to the likely path of any turbine missiles, and the licensee's inservice inspection program, which must comply with 10 CFR 50.55(a), and a surveillance program for the turbine control and stop valves derived from the manufacturer's recommendations.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the requirements for turbine overspeed protection do not meet the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria for inclusion in the TS and may be relocated to the UFSAR, where future changes to the requirements may be made under 10 CFR 50.59. The limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for turbine overspeed protection were not included in the Combustion Engineering STS.

In summary, these specific instrumentation requirements are not required to be in the TS under 10 CFR 50.36 or Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act, and are not required to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to public health and safety. Further, they do not fall within any of the four criteria set forth in the Commission's Final Policy Statement and subsequently incorporated into 10 CFR 50.36. In addition, the Staff finds that sufficient regulatory controls exist under 10 CFR 50.59 to address future changes to these requirements. Accordingly, the staff has concluded that these requirements may be relocated from the TS to the licensee's UFSAR.

TS 6.5.1.6 and 6.8.1 - Emergency and Security Plans

The proposed amendments would delete TS 6.5.1.6i, 6.5.1.6j, 6.8.1d and 6.8.1e from the TS. These specifications assign to the Facility Review Group the responsibility to review the Security and Emergency Plans and their implementing procedures, and submit recommended changes to the Chairman of the Company Nuclear Review Board. The licensee proposes to relocate these review requirements and their implementing procedures to the St. Lucie Security and Emergency Plans, together with the procedures for making changes in the Plans.

The NRC issued Generic Letter 93-07, "Modification of the Technical Specification Administrative Control Requirements for Emergency and Security Plans," to provide guidance for removing the audit of the emergency and security plans and their implementing procedures from the list of responsibilities of the company nuclear audit and review group. Parts 50 and 73 of 10 CFR include provisions that are sufficient to address these requirements. Also, Generic Letter 93-07 allows TS changes to remove (1) the review of the emergency and security plans from the list of responsibilities of the unit review group and (2) the requirement for the unit review group to review procedures, and procedure changes, for the implementation of the emergency and security plans, provided the licensee relocates these requirements to the respective emergency and security plans. The licensee has committed to this relocation, upon approval of these proposed amendments by the NRC. Future changes to the plans are controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54p, 10 CFR 50.54q, 10 CFR 73.55 and 10 CFR 73.56.

The staff finds that the proposed amendments conform to the guidance of Generic Letter 93-07 and that sufficient regulatory controls of future changes to the security and emergency plans are provided under 10 CFR 50.54p and 10 CFR 50.54q. Further, these requirements are not required to be in the TS under 10 CFR 50.36 or Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, and are not required to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to public health and safety. The requirements for the review of the security and emergency plans by the Facility Review Group were not included in the Combustion Engineering STS. Therefore, the proposed amendments are acceptable and the review requirements may be relocated to the St. Lucie security and emergency plans.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendments, the Florida State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 49938). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: August 20, 1996