

February 23, 1993

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see attached sheet

Mr. J. H. Goldberg  
President - Nuclear Division  
Florida Power and Light Company  
P.O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

Dear Mr. Goldberg:

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: CONTAINMENT  
PENETRATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TAC NO. M85791)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 119 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated February 16, 1993.

This amendment excludes penetrations that are inside containment from the surveillance requirement of Technical Specification 4.6.1.1.a.1 for the balance of fuel cycle 11.

In response to the Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) request of February 12, 1993, the NRC verbally granted on the same date a Temporary Waiver of Compliance with respect to the above-requested change. By letter dated February 16, 1993, the NRC documented the verbal authorization and granted the change until such time as the NRC acts on the proposed amendment. On February 16, 1993, FPL requested that the amendment request be reviewed on an emergency basis.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,  
(Original Signed By)

Jan A. Norris, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

- Enclosures:  
1. Amendment No. 119 to DPR-67  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page \*Previously Concurred

OFC	:LA:PDII-2	:PM:PDII-2	:D:PDII-2	:ADR2	:SCSB*	:OGC*
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DATE	:2/23/93	:2/23/93	:2/23/93	:2/23/93	:02/22/93	:02/22/93

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Document Name: STM85791.AMD

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DATED: February 23, 1993

AMENDMENT NO. 119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 - ST. LUCIE, UNIT 1

Docket File

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St. Lucie Plant

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 119  
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, (the licensee) dated February 16, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 119, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Region II Reactors  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 23, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 119

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following page of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf page is also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pages

3/4 6-1

Insert Pages

3/4 6-1

### 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL

##### CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:
  1. All containment vessel penetrations\* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1, and
  2. All containment vessel equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
- b. By verifying that each containment vessel air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

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\* Not required for penetrations inside containment during fuel cycle 11.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:
  1.  $< L_a$ , 0.50 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at  $P_a$ , (39.6 psig), or
  2.  $< L_t$ , 0.32 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of  $P_t$ , (19.8 psig).
- b. A combined leakage rate of  $< 0.60 L_a$  for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests as identified in Table 3.6-1 when pressurized to  $P_a$ .
- c. A combined leakage rate of  $< 0.27 L_a$  for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as secondary containment bypass leakage paths when pressurized to  $P_a$ .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding  $0.75 L_a$  or  $0.75 L_t$ , as applicable, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding  $0.60 L_a$ , or (c) with the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding  $0.27 L_a$ , restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50:

- a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at  $40 \pm 10$  month intervals during shutdown at either  $P_a$  (39.6 psig) or at  $P_t$  (19.8 psig) during each 10-year



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 119

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-335

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 16, 1993, the Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) proposed to modify St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.a.1, Containment Integrity Surveillance Requirements, by excluding penetrations located inside containment from the verification that is required at least once per 31 days. This emergency TS change will only apply to Unit 1 operation during the balance of fuel cycle 11 which ends with the shutdown for the spring 1993 refueling outage.

TS 4.6.1.1.a.1. requires that the containment vessel integrity be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that all containment vessel penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1.

The number of elements subject to that surveillance requirement recently increased as the result of a new interpretation of the definition of which penetration elements constitute containment isolation devices and need be verified periodically to assure containment integrity. A Notice of Violation (NOV) in Inspection Report Nos. 50-335/92-21 and 50-389/92-21 dated December 23, 1992 and the FPL response to the NOV dated January 20, 1993, provide further details of those circumstances. Since this situation came about while St. Lucie Unit 1 was at power, FPL was not able to perform the required 31-day verification of the now larger population of containment isolation devices because some of them are either inaccessible or are in high radiation areas during power operation. Full compliance with the provision of TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 could be obtained only by either subjecting some plant

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personnel to high radiation doses or shutting the plant down to perform the surveillance. Since neither the licensee nor the NRC staff deems those options prudent or necessary under the circumstances, an emergency TS change was requested.

By letter dated February 12, 1993, FPL requested a Temporary Waiver of Compliance from the provision of TS 4.6.1.1.a.1. The Temporary Waiver of Compliance was granted by telephone at 2:00 p.m. on February 12, 1993 and was confirmed by NRC letter dated February 16, 1993. This was then followed by the February 16, 1993, request for an emergency TS change.

## 2.0 SAFETY EVALUATION

On February 12, 1993, FPL initiated two compensatory measures: (1) inform all station operators via the night orders of the need to maintain strict and absolute control over entries into the containment and (2) brief all Unit 1 containment entry teams prior to entry concerning the importance of ensuring that containment penetration isolation valves are left in their required position.

The FPL letters of February 12 and 16, 1993, explain the licensee's bases for confidence that containment integrity exists on Unit 1. Following Unit 1's last refueling, during cold shutdown, all valves, flanges and capped test connections were verified to be closed or installed prior to entry into Mode 4 where containment integrity is required. These conditions were verified using system valve lineup procedures, local leak rate post-test valve lineups and the containment integrity surveillance valve lineup which existed at that time. Additionally, a recent visual inspection was conducted of all accessible containment vessel penetrations. Many of the systems contained therein are flooded or high energy systems which, if breached, would be detected either through instrumentation showing fluid leakage into the containment or increased radiation levels. Neither of these conditions exists. The staff finds the compensatory measures and the above explanation satisfactory.

In addition, the corresponding TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 for Unit 2 does not require the containment isolation valves inside containment to be tested every 31 days. FPL committed to submit an additional request to change Unit 1 TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 to read like the Unit 2 TS in time to have it issued before Unit 1 starts up after the spring 1993 refueling outage. Also, NUREG-1432 "Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specifications" page B 3.6-29, states that it is appropriate not to perform a surveillance of isolation valves inside containment every 31 days "since these valves and blind flanges are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low."

Based on the above evaluation the staff finds the proposed change to TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 acceptable for the remainder of the fuel cycle 11.

### 3.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) of the Commission's regulations provides the necessary requirements for issuing an amendment when the Commission finds that an emergency situation exists in that failure to act in a timely way would result in shutdown of a plant. The Commission expects its licensees to: apply for license amendments in a timely fashion; not to abuse the emergency provisions by failing to make a timely application for the amendment and thus itself creating the emergency; and provide an explanation as to why the emergency situation occurred and why it could not be avoided.

As mentioned in the introduction, the number of elements subject to the surveillance requirement recently increased as the result of a new interpretation of the definition of which penetration elements constitute containment isolation devices and need be verified periodically to assure containment integrity. This new definition results from a Notice of Violation (NOV) in Inspection Report Nos. 50-335/92-21 and 50-389/92-21 dated December 23, 1992 and the FPL response to the NOV dated January 20, 1993. Since this situation arose while St. Lucie Unit 1 was at power, FPL was not able to perform the required 31-day verification of the now larger population of containment isolation devices because some of them are either inaccessible or are in high radiation areas during power operation. Therefore, this situation could not have been avoided. The provision of TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 could be met only by shutting the plant down to perform the surveillance.

Based on the above, the Commission has determined that the licensee has not abused the emergency provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), and that failure of the Commission to act on the licensee's request would result in shutting the plant down. Therefore, the request should be processed under the emergency provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5).

### 4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The Commission has determined that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration per 10 CFR 50.92, based on the licensee's analysis provided in its February 16, 1993 letter and presented below:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, a determination may be made that a proposed license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Each standard is discussed as follows:

- (1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The compensatory measures associated with strict control of containment entries and the assurance of current valve position described in the supporting safety analysis for the proposed amendment provide assurance that containment integrity is preserved. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

- (2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This amendment does not result in any change to the physical plant or in the mode of operation of the plant. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

- (3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The penetration components inside containment are operated under administration control and entries into containment are restricted. Compensatory measures associated with the briefing of containment entry teams ensure that the probability of misalignment is low. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the discussion presented above and on the supporting safety analysis, FPL has concluded that this proposed license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, concludes that the analysis demonstrates that the applicable criteria are met. Accordingly, the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

#### 5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendment, the Florida State official has no comments.

## 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to this amendment. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

## 7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Norris

Date: February 23, 1993