

May 3, 1993

Docket No. 50-335

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See attached sheet

Mr. J. H. Goldberg  
President - Nuclear Division  
Florida Power and Light Company  
P.O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

Dear Mr. Goldberg:

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: CONTAINMENT  
PENETRATIONS SURVEILLANCE (TAC NO. M85926)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 122 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 4, 1993.

This amendment excludes penetrations inside containment from the 31-day surveillance requirement of Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.a.1. and is consistent with similar provisions contained in NUREG-1432, Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering plants.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

(Original Signed By)

Jan A. Norris, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 122 to DPR-67
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

OFC	:LA:PDII-2	:PM:PDII-2	:D:PDII-2	:OGC	:	:
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DATE	:4/14/93	:4/14/93	:4/14/93	:4/16/93	:	:

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Mr. J. H. Goldberg  
Florida Power and Light Company

St. Lucie Plant

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DATED: May 3, 1993

AMENDMENT NO. 122 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 - ST. LUCIE, UNIT 1

Docket File

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 122  
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, (the licensee) dated March 4, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;  
and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 122, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 3, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 122

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following page of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contain vertical line indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf page is also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Page

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Insert Page

3/4 6-1

### 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL

##### CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

1. All containment vessel penetrations\* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1, and
2. All containment vessel equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

b. By verifying that each containment vessel air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

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\*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:
  1.  $< L_a$ , 0.50 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at  $P_a$ , (39.6 psig), or
  2.  $< L_t$ , 0.32 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of  $P_t$ , (19.8 psig).
- b. A combined leakage rate of  $< 0.60 L_a$  for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests as identified in Table 3.6-1 when pressurized to  $P_a$ .
- c. A combined leakage rate of  $< 0.27 L_a$  for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as secondary containment bypass leakage paths when pressurized to  $P_a$ .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding  $0.75 L_a$  or  $0.75 L_t$ , as applicable, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding  $0.60 L_a$ , or (c) with the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding  $0.27 L_a$ , restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50:

- a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 + 10 month intervals during shutdown at either  $P_a$  (39.6 psig) or at  $P_t$  (19.8 psig) during each 10-year



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 122

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-335

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 4, 1993, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) proposed to modify St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.a.1, Containment Integrity Surveillance Requirements, by excluding penetrations inside containment from the integrity verification that is required at least once per 31 days. In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, TS 4.6.1.1.a requires, in part, that Containment Vessel Integrity shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that: "1. All containment vessel penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1."

Some of these components inside containment are inaccessible or are in areas of high radiation fields. A TS change is necessary to avoid radiation dose to those employees who would be required to check these components inside containment. Accordingly, the proposed amendment will exclude valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their closed positions from the 31-day surveillance of containment penetrations.

2.0 DISCUSSION

The licensee committed that the corrective actions for Unit 1 delineated in FPL's revised response (FPL letter L-93-046) to a Notice of Violation (Inspection Report 92-21) will be completed by the end of the 1993 spring Refueling Outage. These actions include installation of locking devices and other measures, as appropriate, on penetration components inside containment to satisfy the condition of being secured in their proper positions.

FPL also committed that during plant startup from cold shutdown, all containment vessel penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during

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accident conditions will be verified closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves which are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their proper positions prior to entry into Mode 4 where containment integrity is required. These conditions will be verified using approved system valve lineup procedures, local leak rate post-test valve lineups, and containment integrity surveillance valve lineups.

FPL stated that containment access during reactor operation is restricted physically by locked hatches which are annunciated in the control room when any containment hatch is opened. Administrative controls restrict entries into Unit 1 containment to anomaly inspections, typically 2 per month, that inspect the accessible areas of containment for any unusual conditions. Work that may require containment access during unplanned, short notice outages is normally limited in scope. Since configuration control on all plant systems is achieved through approved plant procedures, the equipment clearance order procedure, and/or the locked valve deviation log, the anomaly inspections or the outage activities will not reduce the effectiveness of containment integrity.

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.1.1.a.1 involves only verification, through a system walkdown, that applicable components are secured in their correct positions. Since access to the containment is typically restricted during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons, FPL considers that the probability of misalignment of these components, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. The staff agrees.

For valves and blind flanges inside containment, FPL considers the proposed verification appropriate frequency of "during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days" since these valves and flanges are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. The staff also agrees.

The proposed amendment is identical to the provision that excludes verification of penetrations inside containment from the corresponding 31-day SR in the approved TS for St. Lucie Unit 2. This provision was found acceptable for Unit 2 as part of the licensing basis for that plant. The administrative controls and other factors contributing to the acceptability of the exclusion provision for Unit 2 are equally applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1.

### 3.0 TECHNICAL FINDING

Based on the above discussions, the staff considers that the probability of misalignment of penetration components located inside containment, once they have been verified to be properly aligned, is small. Moreover, the proposed amendment and associated bases are consistent with NUREG-1432, Rev. 0 (09/28/92), "Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants." Therefore, the staff concludes that operation of St. Lucie Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed amendment is acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendment, the Florida State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 16859). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Jan Norris

Date: May 3, 1993