

January 15, 1986

Docket Nos. 50-335

Mr. C. O. Woody  
Group Vice President  
Nuclear Energy  
Florida Power & Light Company  
P. O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, Florida 33408

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Docket File	LFMB
NRC PDR	LTremper
L PDR	OPA
PBB#8 Rdg	ACRS-10
FMiraglia	WRegan
PMKreutzer-3	WJones
DSells	ATHadani
JPartlow	EJordan
LJHarmon	OELD
St. Lucie File +4	

Dear Mr. Woody:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.71 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated July 19, 1985.

This amendment revises the Technical Specifications to permit continued operation at rated thermal power for a specified time following a dropped control element assembly and reformulates the Action statements of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/S/

Donald E. Sells, Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate #8  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

**Enclosures:**

1. Amendment No. 71 to DPR-67
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

8601230538 860115  
PDR ADDCK 05000334  
P PDR

PBD#8  
PMKreutzer  
1/16/86

*DS*  
PBD#8  
DSells  
1/16/86

*DS*  
PBD#8  
for ATHadani  
1/16/86

OELD  
1/16/86

*12/15/86  
McGowan*

Mr. C. O. Woody  
Florida Power & Light Company

St. Lucie Plant

cc:

Mr. Jack Shreve  
Office of the Public Counsel  
Room 4, Holland Building  
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Resident Inspector  
c/o U.S. NRC  
7585 S. Hwy A1A  
Jensen Beach, Florida 33457

State Planning & Development  
Clearinghouse  
Office of Planning & Budget  
Executive Office of the Governor  
The Capitol Building  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Harold F. Reis, Esq.  
Newman & Holtzinger  
1615 L Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036

Norman A. Coll, Esq.  
McCarthy, Steel, Hector and Davis  
14th Floor, First National Bank Building  
Miami, Florida 33131

Administrator  
Department of Environmental Regulation  
Power Plant Siting Section  
State of Florida  
2600 Blair Stone Road  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Mr. Weldon B. Lewis, County  
Administrator  
St. Lucie County  
2300 Virginia Avenue, Room 104  
Fort Pierce, Florida 33450

Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager  
Washington - Nuclear Operations  
Combustion Engineering, Inc.  
7910 Woodmont Avenue  
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Mr. Allan Schubert, Manager  
Public Health Physicist  
Department of Health and  
Rehabilitative Services  
1323 Winewood Blvd.  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Regional Administrator, Region II  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Executive Director for Operations  
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 71  
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, (the licensee) dated July 19, 1985, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

8601230541 860115  
PDR ADOCK 05000335  
P PDR


2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 71, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Ashok C. Thadani, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #8  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 15, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 71  
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67  
DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3/4 1-20	3/4 1-20
3/4 1-21	3/4 1-21
3/4 1-22	3/4 1-22
3/4 1-23	3/4 1-23
B 3/4 1-3	B 3/4 1-3
B 3/4 1-4	B 3/4 1-4
B 3/4 1-5	B 3/4 1-5 (repositioned)

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Verifying the water level in each water source, and
3. Verifying the boric acid makeup tank solution temperature.
  - b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWT temperature.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

#### FULL LENGTH CEA POSITION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.1 The CEA Block Circuit and all full length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7.5 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more full length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With the CEA Block Circuit inoperable, within 6 hours either:
  1. With one CEA position indicator per group inoperable, take action per Specification 3.1.3.3, or
  2. With the group overlap and/or sequencing interlocks inoperable, maintain CEAs in groups 3, 4, 5 and 6 fully withdrawn and withdraw the CEAs in group 7 to less than 5% insertion and place and maintain the CEA drive system mode switch in either the "Manual" or "Off" position, or
  3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY.
- c. With one full length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by Action a above, but within its above specified alignment requirements and either fully withdrawn or within the long term steady state insertion limits if in CEA group 7, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue.
- d. With one or more full length CEAs misaligned from any other CEAs in its group by more than 7.5 inches but less than 15 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that within one hour the misaligned CEA(s) is either:
  1. Restored to OPERABLE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.5.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### FULL LENGTH CEA POSITION (Continued)

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

2. Declared inoperable and satisfy SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1. After declaring the CEA inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 for up to 7 days per occurrence with a total accumulated time of  $\leq$  14 days per calendar year provided all of the following conditions are met:
  - a) Within 1 hour, the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7.5 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
  - b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- e. With one full length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by 15 or more inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue provided that the misaligned CEA is positioned within 7.5 inches of other CEAs in its group in accordance with the time constraints shown in Figure 3.1-1a.
- f. With one full-length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by 15 or more inches beyond the time constraints shown in Figure 3.1-1a, reduce power to  $\leq$  70% of RATED THERMAL POWER prior to completing ACTION f.1 or f.2.
  1. Restore the CEA to OPERABLE status within its specified alignment requirements, or
  2. Declare the CEA inoperable and satisfy the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1. After declaring the CEA inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 provided:
    - a) Within 1 hour the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7.5 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.



## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### FULL LENGTH CEA POSITION (Continued)

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

- b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours.
- g. With more than one full length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by 15 inches (indicated position) or more, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- h. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a above, and inserted beyond the long term steady state insertion limits but within its above specified alignment requirements, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full length CEA shall be determined to be within 7.5 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the Deviation Circuit and/or CEA Block Circuit are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full length CEA not fully inserted shall be determined to be OPERABLE by inserting it at least 7.5 inches at least once per 31 days.

4.1.3.1.3 The CEA Block Circuit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by a functional test which verifies that the circuit prevents any CEA from being misaligned from all other CEAs in its group by more than 7.5 inches (indicated position).

4.1.3.1.4 The CEA Block Circuit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by a functional test which verifies that the circuit maintains the CEA group overlap and sequencing requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 and that the circuit prevents the regulating CEAs from being inserted beyond the Power Dependent Insertion Limit of Figure 3.1-2:

- \*a. Prior to each entry into MODE 2 from MODE 3, except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 31 days, and
- b. At least once per 6 months.

\*The licensee shall be excepted from compliance during the startup test program for an entry into MODE 2 from MODE 3 made in association with a measurement of power defect.




Figure 3.1-1a Allowable Time to Realign CEA vs. Initial  $F_T$

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.3 All shutdown and regulating CEA reed switch position indicator channels and CEA pulse counting position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the absolute CEA positions within + 2.25 inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. Deleted.
- b. With a maximum of one reed switch position indicator channel per group or one (except as permitted by ACTION item d. below) pulse counting position indicator channel per group inoperable and the CEA(s) with the inoperable position indicator channel partially inserted, within 6 hours either:
  1. Restore the inoperable position indicator channel to OPERABLE status, or
  2. Be in HOT STANDBY, or
  3. Reduce THERMAL POWER to  $< 70\%$  of the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination; if negative reactivity insertion is required to reduce THERMAL POWER, boration shall be used. Operation at or below this reduced THERMAL POWER level may continue provided that within the next 4 hours either:
    - a) The CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator is fully withdrawn while maintaining the withdrawal sequence required by Specification 3.1.3.6 and when this CEA group reaches its fully withdrawn position, the "Full Out" limit of the CEA with the inoperable position indicator is actuated and verifies this CEA to be fully withdrawn. Subsequent to fully withdrawing this CEA group(s), the THERMAL POWER level may be returned to a level consistent with all other applicable specifications; or

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

---

#### 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron addition capability after the plant has been placed in MODES 5 and 6 requires either 1660 gallons of 8% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 1630 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank to makeup for contraction of the primary coolant that could occur if the temperature is lowered from 200°F to 140°F.

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to an immovable or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment ( $> 15$  inches) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a stuck or untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

For small misalignments ( $< 15$  inches) of the CEAs, there is 1) a small degradation in the peaking factors relative to those assumed in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 2) a small effect on the time dependent long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 3) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and 4) a small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the small misalignment of a CEA permits a one hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment requirements prior to initiating a reduction in THERMAL POWER. The one hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes of a misaligned CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs, and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

Overpower margin is provided to protect the core in the event of a large misalignment ( $> 15$  inches) of a CEA. However, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. This distribution may, in turn, have a significant effect on (1) the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, (2) the time-dependent long-term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints, and (3) the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the large misalignment of the CEA requires a prompt realignment of the misaligned CEA.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The ACTION statements applicable to misaligned or inoperable CEAs include requirements to align the OPERABLE CEAs in a given group with the inoperable CEA. Conformance with these alignment requirements brings the core, within a short period of time, to a configuration consistent with that assumed in generating LCO and LSSS setpoints. However, extended operation with CEAs significantly inserted in the core may lead to perturbations in 1) local burnup, 2) peaking factors, and 3) available shutdown margin which are more adverse than the conditions assumed to exist in the safety analyses and LCO and LSSS setpoints determination. Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

The requirement to reduce power in certain time limits, depending upon the previous  $F_r^t$ , is to eliminate a potential nonconservatism for situations when a CEA has been declared inoperable. A worst case analysis has shown that a DNBR SAFDL violation may occur during the second hour after the CEA misalignment if this requirement is not met. This potential DNBR SAFDL violation is eliminated by limiting the time operation is permitted at FULL POWER before power reductions are required. These reductions will be necessary once the deviated CEA has been declared inoperable. The time allowed to continue operation at a reduced power level can be permitted for the following reasons:

1. The margin calculations that support the Technical Specifications are based on a steady-state radial peak of  $F_r^t > 1.70$ .
2. When the actual  $F_r^t \leq 1.70$ , significant additional margin exists.
3. This additional margin can be credited to offset the increase in  $F_r^t$  with time that can occur following a CEA misalignment.
4. This increase in  $F_r^t$  is caused by xenon redistribution.
5. The present analysis can support allowing a misalignment to exist for up to 60 minutes without correction, if the initial  $F_r^t \leq 1.67$ .

Operability of the CEA position indicators (Specification 3.1.3.3) is required to determine CEA positions and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits and ensures proper operation of the rod block circuit. The CEA "Full In" and "Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position indicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the "Full In" or "Full Out" limits.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

---

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

The maximum CEA drop time permitted by Specification 3.1.3.4 is the assumed CEA drop time of 3.1 seconds used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg} \geq 515^{\circ}\text{F}$  and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

The LSSS setpoints and the power distribution LCOs were generated based upon a core burnup which would be achieved with the core operating in an essentially unrodded configuration. Therefore, the CEA insertion limit specifications require that during MODES 1 and 2, the full length CEAs be nearly fully withdrawn. The amount of CEA insertion permitted by the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6 will not have a significant effect upon the unrodded burnup assumption but will still provide sufficient reactivity control. The Power Dependent Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6 are provided to ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels; however, long term operation at these insertion limits could have adverse effects on core power distribution during subsequent operation in an unrodded configuration.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 71

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-335

INTRODUCTION

Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L), by letter from J. W. Williams, Jr. (FP&L) to H. L. Thompson (NRC) dated July 19, 1985, has requested two revisions to St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1 Technical Specification 3/4.1.3, "Movable Control Assemblies." The first revision would permit full power operation for a specified period of time following an inadvertent single dropped control element assembly (CEA). This specified amount of time depends on the initial pre-drop value of the integrated radial peaking factor ( $F_R$ ), which is measured at the plant during normal power distribution surveillances. The present Technical Specifications require a prompt and significant reduction in thermal power prior to attempting realignment of the dropped CEA. The second revision is merely a reformulation of existing Action Statement C into two separate action statements, C and H, to more clearly associate any required operator action with the applicable analysis assumptions requiring that action.

SAFETY EVALUATION

In order to allow continued full power operation for a specified period of time in the event of a single dropped CEA, the licensee performed analyses to determine the increase in assembly peak  $F_R$  values following a dropped CEA event. The CEA drop initially causes a decrease in reactor power with a resulting decrease in average reactor coolant temperature.

The reactor protection system inhibits automatic CEA withdrawal during the event. However, because of the negative value of the moderator temperature coefficient at end of cycle, this temperature decrease may cause the reactor power level to return to its initial power level. The presence of the dropped CEA would then result in a distorted core power distribution and increased power peaking factors.

8601230545 860115  
PDR ADDCK 05000335  
P PDR

For St. Lucie 1, margin was designed into the departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) limiting condition of operation (LCO) by selecting a 10% greater input value (1.87) of  $F_p$ , including uncertainties, than the maximum allowed Technical Specification limit of 1.70. Even using the input value of 1.87 in the thermal margin analysis, the resulting DNBR values were greater than the DNB specified acceptable fuel design limits (SAFDL). Therefore, the margin between the permissible normal operation limit of 1.70 and the 1.87 thermal margin input value can be utilized as available overpower margin for the single CEA drop analysis.

The results of the dropped CEA analyses show that the increase in assembly peak  $F_p$  values following a dropped CEA event is a function of the reactivity worth of the dropped CEA and the assembly's distance from the dropped CEA. Because of this, an assembly other than the one with the initial core maximum  $F_p$  can have a larger percent increase than the core maximum  $F_p$  assembly. The licensee has shown that the maximum  $F_p$  increase anywhere in the core immediately following a CEA drop would be less than 10% for cycles 5 or 6, thereby meeting the available overpower margin. One hour following a CEA drop, the maximum increase in  $F_p$  anywhere in the core could be as high as 11.7%. This means that an initial  $F_p$  of no greater than 1.67 would be required in order to meet the 1.87 thermal margin input value mentioned above.

The licensee has proposed to incorporate the attached Figure 3.1-1a into the St. Lucie 1 Technical Specifications showing the allowable time to realign a dropped CEA as a function of the initial value of  $F_p$ . The figure permits only 15 minutes of full power operation when the pre-drop value of  $F_p$  equals 1.70 even though the analyses show that at least 1 hour would be permissible. As the pre-drop value of  $F_p$  decreases to 1.67, operation at full power for up to 1 hour is allowed. Based on the CEA drop analyses mentioned previously, the staff finds this acceptable.

The second proposed change reformulates the present action statement in Technical Specification 3/4.1.3 into two separate action statements; one with applicability when CEAs are above the long term insertion limit (LTIL) and a separate one when CEAs are inserted beyond the LTIL. Since this reformulation will aid the reactor operators to better understand the underlying technical basis of each specification and action statement and will also tend to standardize the specifications between St. Lucie 1 and 2, the staff finds it acceptable.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly,



the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR §51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: January 15, 1986

Principal Contributors:

L. Kopp  
D. Sells