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MAY 3 1983

Docket No. 50-335

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology
Florida Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 529100
Juno Beach, Florida 33408

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Dear Dr. Uhrig:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 57 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 9, 1983.

The amendment provides for the removal of the chlorine detectors from the control room air intakes because the main source of chlorine at the site no longer exists.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

~~Donald E. Sells~~

Donald E. Sells, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 57 to DPR-67
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DO NOT REMOVE

May 3, 1983

Posted
Amdt. 57
to DPR-67

Docket No. 50-335

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology
Florida Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 529100
Juno Beach, Florida 33408


Dear Dr. Uhrig:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 57 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 9, 1983.

The amendment provides for the removal of the chlorine detectors from the control room air intakes because the main source of chlorine at the site no longer exists.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,


Donald E. Sells, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

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cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Florida Power & Light Company

cc:

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ATTN: Regional Radiation
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
DOCKET NO. 50-335
ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 57
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, (the licensee) dated March 9, 1983, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the Attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C(2) to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 57, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Clark
for Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 3, 1983

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 57
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67
DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- e. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is < 4.15 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of $2000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$.
 2. Verifying that on a containment isolation signal the system automatically isolates the control room within 35 seconds and switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.
 3. Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of $\geq 1/8$ inch W.G. relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation with ≤ 450 cfm outside air intake.
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove $\geq 99\%$ of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of $2000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$.
- g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove $\geq 99\%$ of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of $2000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.8 ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.8.1 Two independent ECCS area exhaust air filter trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one ECCS area exhaust air filter train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.8.1 Each ECCS area exhaust air filter train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that the train operates for at least 15 minutes.
- b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
 1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove $\geq 99\%$ of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 30,000 cfm $\pm 10\%$.
 2. Verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove $\geq 99\%$ of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 30,000 cfm $\pm 10\%$.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.6 DELETED

3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 10 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR 50.

3/4.7.8 ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ECCS area ventilation system ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on sealed source removable contamination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits in the event of ingestion or inhalation of the probable leakage from the source material. The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. Quantities of interest to this specification which are exempt from the leakage testing are consistent with the criteria of 10 CFR Parts 30.11-20 and 70.19. Leakage from sources excluded from the requirements of this specification is not likely to represent more than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source material is inhaled or ingested.

3/4.7.10 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection. Inspections performed

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubber that may be generically susceptible and verified by inservice functional testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber by visual inspection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration.

When a snubber is found inoperable, an evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at 18 month intervals. Observed failures of these sample snubbers shall require functional testing of additional units.

In cases where the cause of failure has been identified, additional snubbers having a high probability for the same type failure or that are being used in the same application that caused the failure shall be tested. This requirement increases the probability of locating inoperable snubbers without testing 100% of the snubbers.

Hydraulic snubbers and mechanical snubbers may each be treated as a different entity for the above surveillance programs.

The service life of a snubber is evaluated via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc. ...). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. The requirements for the maintenance of records and the snubber service life review are not intended to affect plant operation.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 57 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ST. LUCIE UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Introduction and Summary

By letter dated March 9, 1983 Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) submitted a proposed license amendment to remove the chlorine detection system from the control room air intakes at St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1. The staff has reviewed the submittal and its supporting documents and concludes that the chlorine detectors in the air intakes of the control room are no longer required for safe operation and therefore the requested amendment is acceptable.

Evaluation Criteria

The criteria used by the staff is contained in Regulatory Guide 1.78, which establishes a toxicity limit of 15 ppm, and Regulatory Guide 1.95.

Proposed Changes and Discussion

Prior to the installation of a sodium hypochlorite generator, the source of chlorine used in the treatment of the plant circulating water was one-ton cylinders of liquefied chlorine. These cylinders were stored at the chlorination facility located within the plant perimeter. In order to provide control room occupants protection against an accidental chlorine release, seismic Category 1 chlorine detectors were installed at the control room outside air intakes.

Although this source of chlorine, for which adequate protection was provided, no longer exists, there remains a smaller quantity of chlorine stored offsite near the sewage treatment facility and the city water storage tanks. This chlorine, stored in 150-lb. cylinders, is used in the evaluation of the consequences of a postulated accidental release on the St. Lucie Unit 1 control room habitability.

In the evaluation it is assumed that 25 percent (38 lb.) of the content of the closest 150-lb. cylinder is released instantaneously. The size and diffusion of the cloud are modeled based on the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.78. No credit is taken for the presence of the chlorine detectors and consequently, the normal air exchange between the outside environs and the control room continues.

The results of the evaluation show that the maximum chlorine concentration in the control room is 4.9 ppm whereas the Regulatory Guide 1.78 toxicity limit is 15 ppm. Given the conservative nature of the evaluation and the relatively small peak control room concentration, the 150-lb. chlorine cylinders do not constitute a source that would require having qualified detectors at the control room air intakes.

Conclusions

Since the 1-ton cylinders of chlorine on-site have been replaced by a sodium hypochlorite generator, the only chlorine in the vicinity of the site is stored in two 150# cylinders. One of the cylinders is located near the city storage tanks approximately 500 ft. from the control room, the other cylinder is near the sewage treatment facility about 600 ft. from the control room. The staff's evaluation of the situation indicates that the potential hazard from the large quantity of chlorine formerly stored at the site is no longer a problem, and because of the distances involved the 150# cylinders used in the water treatment process, based on Regulatory Guide 1.95, do not pose a threat to the facility. It is, therefore, concluded that chlorine detectors are not required in the control room air intakes for the safe operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1 and the changes to the technical specifications are acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: May 3, 1983

Principal Contributors:

Al Brauner, DE

Don Sells, DI

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-335FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 57 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67, issued to Florida Power & Light Company (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1 (the facility), located in St. Lucie County, Florida. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment provides for the removal of the chlorine detectors from the control room air intakes because the main source of chlorine at the site no longer exists.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since this amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.


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The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 9, 1983, (2) Amendment No. 57 to License No. DPR-67 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Indian River Junior College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Ft. Pierce, Florida. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 3rd day of May, 1983.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Charles M. Trammell, Acting Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing