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APR 16 1976

Docket No. 50-335

Florida Power & Light Company
ATTN: Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Nuclear and General Engineering
Post Office Box 3100
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 4 to Facility License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant Unit 1. The amendment consists of a revision in Enclosure 1 to License No. DPR-67 and changes in the Technical Specifications in response to your request dated April 16, 1976. Your proposed amendment has been modified and these modifications have been discussed with representatives of your staff.

The amendment: (1) deletes Section A of Enclosure 1 to License No. DPR-67, which identifies items to be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission prior to achieving initial criticality. (this item has been completed and therefore is no longer relevant), (2) adds a requirement to Enclosure 1 to require repair or replacement of Control Element Drive Mechanism 44 at the next reactor shutdown which would be expected to last at least two weeks, and (3) deletes from the Technical Specifications a special test exemption which permitted reactor criticality for low temperature physics tests.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice also are enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:
Dennis L. Ziemann

Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 4 to License No. DPR-67
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

OFFICE	OR:ORB #2	OR:ORB #2	OELD	OR:ORB #2		
SURNAME	RMDiggs	RDSilver:ro	W.D. Paton	DLZiemann		
DATE	4/16/76	4/16/76	4/16/76	4/16/76		

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-526-166

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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 4
License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Florida Power & Light Company (the licensee) dated April 16, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. An environmental statement or negative declaration need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Enclosure 1 to the license is hereby amended as follows:

   A. Delete Section A in its entirety, and

   B. Add a new Section J to read:

      "J. Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) 44 shall be repaired or replaced at the next extended reactor shutdown expected to last at least two weeks."

OFFICE ➤						
SURNAME ➤						
DATE ➤						

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original Signed by:
Dennis L. Ziemann

Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: APR 16 1976

OFFICE ➤						
SURNAME ➤						
DATE ➤						

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 4

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67

DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace the existing pages of the Appendix A portion of the Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The changed area on the revised pages are identified by a marginal line.

Pages Index p. VIII and XII
3/4 1-7
3/4 4-21
3/4 10-3 (delete)
B3/4 10-1

Corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.5 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) shall be $\geq$ 515°F when the reactor is critical.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2#.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) < 515°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.5 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be $\geq$ 515°F.

a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) is < 525°F.

With $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

a. A flow path from the boric acid makeup tank via either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection and charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid makeup tank in Specification 3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE, or

b. The flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Cycling each testable power operated or automatic valve in the flow path required for boron injection through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and

2. Verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1 when a flow path from the boric acid makeup tanks is used.

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any one hour period,

b. A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any one hour period, and

c. A maximum temperature change of 5°F in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an analysis to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T_{avg} and pressure to less than 200°F and 500 psia, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.1

a. The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

b. The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure conditions shall be determined to be to the right of the criticality limit line within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality.

c. The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, at the intervals shown in Table 4.4-5. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figure 3.4-2.

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION - REACTOR CRITICALITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.3 This specification deleted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.3 This specification deleted.

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

PHYSICS TESTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.4 The limitations of Specification 3.4.1 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set at $\leq$ 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: During PHYSICS TESTS and Thermal-Hydraulic Tests.

ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER > 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately trip the reactor.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.4.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be $\leq$ 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.4.2 Each wide range logarithmic and power level neutron flux monitoring channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

BASES

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

This special test exception provides that a minimum amount of CEA worth is immediately available for reactivity control when tests are performed for CEAs worth measurement. This special test exception is required to permit the periodic verification of the actual versus predicted core reactivity condition occurring as a result of fuel burnup or fuel cycling operations.

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

This special test exception permits individual CEAs to be positioned outside of their normal group heights and insertion limits during the performance of such PHYSICS TESTS as those required to 1) measure CEA worth and 2) determine the reactor stability index and damping factor under xenon oscillation conditions.

3/4.10.3 This specification deleted

3/4.10.4 PHYSICS TESTS

This special test exception permits PHYSICS TESTS and Thermal-Hydraulic Tests to be performed at less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER and is required to verify the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation and the natural circulation capability of the reactor coolant system at low THERMAL POWER levels. This special test exception also permits the performance of CEA drop testing, reactor coolant flow measurements and flow coastdown testing described in Chapter 14.0 of the FSAR, and other special plant testing authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, with no reactor coolant pumps in operation.

3/4.10.5 CENTER CEA MISALIGNMENT

This special test exception permits the center CEA to be misaligned during PHYSICS TESTS required to determine the isothermal temperature coefficient and power coefficient.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-67

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-335

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 16, 1976, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) requested an amendment to Facility License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 1. The amendment would:

1. Delete, in its entirety, Section A of Enclosure 1 to License No. DPR-67 which identifies items to be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission prior to achieving initial criticality.

2. Add a requirement to Enclosure 1 to require repair or replacement of a Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) 44 at the next reactor shutdown which would be expected to last at least two weeks.

3. Delete from the Technical Specifications a special test exemption which permitted reactor criticality for low temperature physics tests.

The amendment proposed by FPL has been modified and these modifications have been discussed with representatives of the FPL staff.

DISCUSSION

Section A of Enclosure 1 to License No. DPR-67 identifies items to be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission prior to achieving criticality. The Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement has verified that five of the six items, A.1, A.2, A.4, A.5 and A.6 have been satisfactorily completed. Item A.3, the performance of appropriate cold control rod drop time tests, has been essentially completed.

Supplement No. 2 to the Safety Evaluation of the St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 1, issued by the Commission on March 1, 1976, states: "With regard to the cold rod drop time measurements, the plant technical specifications allow the reactor to be made critical while cold, during low temperature physics testing. The applicant has indicated that, although such tests are permitted, none are planned, and the low temperature rod drop time measurements are therefore unnecessary. We believe that it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that the plant will not be in a cold critical condition at times during its expected service lifetime. Therefore, to preclude the reactor being made critical under conditions which have not first been tested for rod drop times, we will condition the operating license to require that prior to initial criticality, appropriate cold rod drop time measurements must be conducted."

The Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement has reviewed the cold rod drop time measurements and has verified that the drop time for all rods is within the limits of the Technical Specifications. However, the control rod drop time test procedure specifies that the two fastest control rods be tested several times at various flow conditions. In the course of performing these tests, FPL experienced difficulty in withdrawing the second fastest Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) 44. Discussions with the FPL staff indicated that the difficulty was not experienced at hot operating conditions.

Although CEDM 44 meets the requirements of the Technical Specifications, we consider it prudent to establish additional limitations until such time as the CEDM is repaired or replaced and the difficulty is clearly understood. After discussion with the Commission staff, FPL proposed by letter dated April 16, 1976, to delete the license authorization to bring the reactor critical at temperatures below 515°F. Since critical operation with the reactor below 515°F is not required by NRC and since the problem appears to be limited to lower temperatures, we consider deletion of the low temperature criticality authorization to be a sufficiently prudent response to the difficulty experienced.

To obtain the data desired by Item A.3 of Enclosure 1, FPL has performed the more extensive testing in the third fastest control rod. We consider the data obtained from testing of this control rod to be of equivalent value to the data which would have been obtained from testing the second fastest control rod.

In addition, after discussion with the NRC staff, FPL proposed to perform ten additional drop time tests on CEDM 44 under hot, full flow conditions to provide additional assurance of acceptable operation of this rod during normal operations. The Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement has verified that the additional tests on the third fastest rod and the additional tests on CEDM 44 have been successfully completed.

Although tests have indicated that CEDM 44 will perform satisfactorily during hot operating condition, inoperable control rods were considered in the Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specifications include limitations to assure appropriate actions if a control rod is determined to be inoperable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: APR 16 1976

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-335

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67, issued to Florida Power & Light Company (the licensee), which revised the license and its appended Technical Specifications for operation of the St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in St. Lucie County, Florida. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

This amendment (1) deletes Section A of Enclosure 1 to License No. DPR-67, which identifies items to be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission prior to achieving initial criticality, (2) adds a requirement to Enclosure 1 to require repair or replacement of Control Element Drive Mechanism 44 at the next reactor shutdown which would be expected to last at least two weeks, and (3) deletes from the Technical Specifications a special test exemption which permitted reactor criticality for low temperature physics tests.

The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

OFFICE ➤						
SURNAME ➤						
DATE ➤						

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated April 16, 1976, (2) Amendment No. 4 to License No. DPR-67, and (3) the Commission's concurrently issued Safety Evaluation. Both of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Indian River Junior College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this APR 16 1976

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original Signed by:
Dennis L. Ziemann

Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

OFFICE ➤						
SURNAME ➤						
DATE ➤						