

January 8, 2002

Mr. J. A. Price  
Vice President - Nuclear Technical Services - Millstone  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
c/o Mr. David A. Smith  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: ELIMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-  
ACCIDENT SAMPLING (TAC NO. MB2718)

Dear Mr. Price:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 262 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated July 31, 2001.

The amendment deletes Technical Specifications Section 6.18, "PASS [Post-Accident Sampling System]/Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents," for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 and thereby eliminates the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling program.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

John T. Harrison, Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 262 to DPR-65  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

January 8, 2002

Mr. J. A. Price  
Vice President - Nuclear Technical Services - Millstone  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
c/o Mr. David A. Smith  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: ELIMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-  
ACCIDENT SAMPLING (TAC NO. MB2718)

Dear Mr. Price:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 262 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated July 31, 2001.

The amendment deletes Technical Specifications Section 6.18, "PASS [Post-Accident Sampling System]/Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents," for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 and thereby eliminates the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling program.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,  
**/RA/**  
John T. Harrison, Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 262 to DPR-65  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

**DISTRIBUTION:**

TClark      EAdensam      PUBLIC      JClifford      WReckley  
OGC      CCowgill, RI      ACRS      WBeckner  
PDI-2 R/F      GHill (2)      JHarrison

Accession Number: ML013520216

\*See previous concurrence

OFFICE	CLIP/LPM*	PDI-2/PM	PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/SC
NAME	WReckley	JHarrison	SLittle for TClark	REnnis for JClifford
DATE	9/12/01	1/3/02	1/2/02	1/8/02

Official Record Copy

Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 2

cc:

Ms. L. M. Cuoco  
Senior Nuclear Counsel  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Edward L. Wilds, Jr., Ph.D.  
Director, Division of Radiation  
Department of Environmental Protection  
79 Elm Street  
Hartford, CT 06106-5127

Regional Administrator, Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

First Selectmen  
Town of Waterford  
15 Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Charles Brinkman, Manager  
Washington Nuclear Operations  
ABB Combustion Engineering  
12300 Twinbrook Pkwy, Suite 330  
Rockville, MD 20852

Senior Resident Inspector  
Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
P.O. Box 513  
Niantic, CT 06357

Mr. W. R. Matthews  
Vice President and Senior Nuclear  
Executive - Millstone  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Ernest C. Hadley, Esquire  
P.O. Box 1104  
West Falmouth, MA 02574-1104

Mr. P. J. Parulis  
Process Owner - Oversight  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. D. A. Christian  
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations  
and Chief Nuclear Officer  
Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW  
5000 Dominion Boulevard  
Glen Allen, VA 23060

Mr. C. J. Schwarz  
Master Process Owner - Operate the Asset  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. John Markowicz  
Co-Chair  
Nuclear Energy Advisory Council  
9 Susan Terrace  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. Evan W. Woollacott  
Co-Chair  
Nuclear Energy Advisory Council  
128 Terry's Plain Road  
Simsbury, CT 06070

Mr. D. A. Smith  
Process Owner - Regulatory Affairs  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Ms. Nancy Burton  
147 Cross Highway  
Redding Ridge, CT 00870

Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 2

cc:

Mr. G. D. Hicks  
Master Process Owner - Training  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

R. P. Necci  
Vice President - Nuclear Operations - Millstone  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 262  
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the applicant dated July 31, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 262, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*/RA REnnis for/*

James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 8, 2002

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 262

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

XVII  
6-25

Insert

XVII  
6-25

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 262

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 31, 2001, the Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would delete TS Section 6.18, "PASS [Post Accident Sampling System]/Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents," for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling program.

In the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) imposed requirements on licensees for commercial nuclear power plants to install and maintain the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. The desired capabilities of the PASS were described in NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." The NRC issued orders to licensees with plants operating at the time of the TMI accident to confirm the installation of PASS capabilities (generally as they had been described in NUREG-0737). A requirement for PASS and related administrative controls was added to the TSs of the operating plants and was included in the initial TSs for plants licensed during the 1980s and 1990s. Additional expectations regarding PASS capabilities were included in Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident."

Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant operations and developing better strategies for managing the response to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights about plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have led the NRC staff to conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be revised without reducing the ability of licensees to respond to severe accidents. The NRC's efforts to oversee the risks associated with nuclear technology more effectively and to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens on licensees have prompted the NRC to consider eliminating the requirements for PASS in the TSs and other parts of the licensing bases of operating reactors.

The NRC staff has completed its review of the topical reports submitted by the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) and the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) that proposed the elimination of PASS. The justifications for the proposed elimination of PASS requirements center on evaluations of the various radiological and chemical sampling and their potential usefulness in responding to a severe reactor accident or making decisions regarding actions to protect the public from possible releases of radioactive materials. As explained in more detail in the staff's safety evaluations for the two topical reports, the staff has reviewed the available sources of information for use by decision-makers in developing protective action recommendations and assessing core damage. Based on this review, the staff found that the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with the owners groups that licensees can remove the TS requirements for PASS, revise (as necessary) other elements of the licensing bases, and pursue possible design changes to alter or remove existing PASS equipment.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND

In a letter dated May 5, 1999 (as supplemented by letter dated April 14, 2000), the CEOG submitted Topical Report CE NPSD-1157, Revision 1, "Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post-Accident Sampling System From the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for CEOG Utilities." The report provided evaluations of the information obtained from PASS samples to determine the contribution of the information to plant safety and accident recovery. The report considered the progression and consequences of core damage accidents and assessed the accident progression with respect to plant abnormal and emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidance, and emergency plans. The report provided the owners group's technical justification for the elimination for the various PASS sampling requirements. The specific samples and the staff's findings are described in the following evaluation.

The NRC staff prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) relating to the elimination of requirements on post accident sampling and solicited public comment (65 FR 49271) in accordance with the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIP). The use of the CLIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the PASS requirements from the TSs. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this model apply were informed (65 FR 65018) that they could request amendments confirming the applicability of the SE to their reactors and providing the requested plant-specific verifications and commitments.

## 3.0 EVALUATION

The technical evaluation for the elimination of PASS sampling requirements for Combustion Engineering nuclear steam supply system plants is provided in the SE dated May 16, 2000, for the CEOG Topical Report CE NPSD-1157. The NRC staff's SE approving the topical report is located in the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) (Accession Number ML003715250).

The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for PASS were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that were operating at the time of the TMI accident are likely to have been the

subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the PASS functions described in NUREG-0737 as obligations. The issuance of plant-specific amendments to adopt this change, which would remove PASS and related administrative controls from the TSs, supersede the PASS specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.

As described in its SE for the topical report, the staff finds that the following PASS sampling requirements may be eliminated for plants of Combustion Engineering designs:

1. reactor coolant dissolved gases
2. reactor coolant hydrogen
3. reactor coolant oxygen
4. reactor coolant pH
5. reactor coolant chlorides
6. reactor coolant boron
7. reactor coolant conductivity
8. reactor coolant radionuclides
9. containment atmosphere hydrogen concentration
10. containment oxygen
11. containment atmosphere radionuclides
12. containment sump pH
13. containment sump chlorides
14. containment sump boron
15. containment sump radionuclides

The staff agrees that sampling of radionuclides is not required to support emergency response decision making during the initial phases of an accident because the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. Therefore, it is not necessary to have dedicated equipment to obtain this sample in a prompt manner.

The staff does, however, believe that there could be significant benefits to having information about the radionuclides existing post-accident in order to address public concerns and plan for long-term recovery operations. As stated in the SE for the topical report, the staff has found that licensees could satisfy this function by developing contingency plans to describe existing sampling capabilities and what actions (e.g., assembling temporary shielding) may be necessary to obtain and analyze highly radioactive samples from the reactor coolant system (RCS), containment sump, and containment atmosphere. (See item 4.1 under Verifications and Commitments.) These contingency plans must be available to be used by a licensee during an accident; however, these contingency plans do not have to be carried out in emergency plan drills or exercises. The contingency plans for obtaining samples from the RCS, containment sump, and containment atmosphere may also enable a licensee to derive information on parameters such as hydrogen concentrations in containment and boron concentration and pH of water in the containment sump. The staff considers the sampling of the containment sump to be potentially useful in confirming calculations of pH and boron concentrations and confirming that potentially unaccounted for acid sources have been sufficiently neutralized. The use of the contingency plans for obtaining samples would depend on the plant conditions and the need for information by the decision-makers responsible for responding to the accident.

In addition, the staff considers radionuclide sampling information to be useful in classifying certain types of events (such as a reactivity excursion or mechanical damage) that could cause fuel damage without having an indication of overheating on core exit thermocouples. However, the staff agrees with the topical report's contentions that other indicators of failed fuel, such as letdown radiation monitors (or normal sampling system), can be correlated to the degree of failed fuel. (See item 4.2 under Verifications and Commitments.)

In lieu of the information that would have been obtained from PASS, the staff believes that licensees should maintain or develop the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. Although this capability may not be needed to support the immediate protective action recommendations during an accident, the information would be useful for decision-makers trying to limit the public's ingestion of radioactive materials. (See item 4.3 under Verifications and Commitments.)

The staff believes that the changes related to the elimination of PASS that are described in the topical report, related SE and this proposed change to the TSs are unlikely to result in a decrease in the effectiveness of the licensee's emergency plan. The licensee, however, must evaluate possible changes to its emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the change decreases the effectiveness of its site-specific plan. The licensee should perform the appropriate evaluations and report changes to its emergency plan in accordance with applicable regulations and procedures.

The staff notes that redundant, safety-grade, containment hydrogen concentration monitors are required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(1), are addressed in NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.97, and are relied upon to meet the data reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VI.2.a.(i)(4). The staff concludes that during the early phases of an accident, the safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration. The staff sees value in maintaining the capability to obtain grab samples for complementing the information from the hydrogen monitors in the long term (i.e., by confirming the indications from the monitors and providing hydrogen measurements for concentrations outside the range of the monitors). As previously mentioned, the licensee's contingency plan (see item 4.1) for obtaining highly radioactive samples will include sampling of the containment atmosphere and may, if deemed necessary and practical by the appropriate decision-makers, be used to supplement the safety-related hydrogen monitors.

#### 4.0 VERIFICATIONS AND COMMITMENTS

As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this CLIP topic, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific verifications and commitments.

- 4.1 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere.

The licensee has verified that it has contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples from the RCS, containment sump, and containment atmosphere. The licensee has committed to maintain the contingency plans within its Chemistry Department

implementing procedures. The licensee stated in its application that it has implemented this regulatory commitment.

- 4.2 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold (typically this is 300  $\mu\text{Ci/ml}$  dose equivalent iodine). This capability may utilize the normal sampling system and/or correlations of sampling or letdown line dose rates to coolant concentrations.

The licensee has verified that it has the capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold. The licensee has committed to maintain the capability for the Alert classification within its Emergency Plan implementing procedures. The licensee stated in its application that it has implemented this regulatory commitment.

- 4.3 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs.

The licensee has verified that it has the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. The licensee has committed to maintain the capability for monitoring iodines within its Emergency Plan implementing procedures. The licensee stated in its application that it has implemented this regulatory commitment.

The NRC staff finds that the licensee's administrative processes, including its commitment management program, provide reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments. Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would define the appropriate change control and reporting requirements. The staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements which would require prior NRC approval of subsequent changes. The NRC staff has agreed that Nuclear Energy Institute 99-04, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes," provides reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to the NRC staff (see Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, Managing Regulatory Commitments Made by Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC Staff, dated September 21, 2000). The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these commitments in a future inspection or audit.

## 5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

## 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (66 FR 55009). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

## 7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. Reckley

Date: January 8, 2002