

Forked River, NJ 08731-0388

2130-01-20240 November 27, 2001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Docket No. 50-219

**Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions** 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, enclosed is the newly revised Index for the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and the below listed procedures.

Procedure Number	<u>Title</u>	Revision
EPIP-OC01	Classification of Emergency Conditions	11
EPIP-OC02	Direction of Emergency Response/Emergency Control Center	30
EPIP-OC41	Emergency Duty Roster Activation	6
OEP-ADM-1319.02	Emergency Response Facilities & Equipment Maintenance	10

If further information is required, please contact Mr. David G. Slear, Manager, Regulatory Assurance at 609-971-4112.

Very truly yours,

Ron J. DeGregorio Vice President Oyster Creek

RJD/JJR:ew

Enclosures

cc: Administrator, Region I NRC Sr. Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector A045

### EPIP SERIES - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

PROCEDURE NO.	TITLE	REV. NO.	<u>DATE</u>
6630-ADM-4010.03	Emergency Dose Calculation Manual (EDCM)	11	07/23/00
EPIP-OC01	Classification of Emergency Conditions	11	11/19/01
EPIP-OC02	Direction of Emergency Response/EmergencyControl Center	30	11/19/01
EPIP-OC03	Emergency Notification	29	11/07/01
EPIP-OC06	Additional Assistance and Notification	25	10//05/01
EPIP-OC10	Emergency Radiological Surveys Onsite	11	08/08/00
EPIP-OC11	Emergency Radiological Surveys Offsite	17	11/07/01
EPIP-OC12	Personnel Accountability	9	07/07/01
EPIP-OC13	Site Evacuation and Personnel Mustering at Remote Assembly Areas	8	11/09/00
EPIP-OC25	Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)	25	10/01/01
EPIP-OC26	The Technical Support Center	23	07/05/01
EPIP-OC27	The Operations Support Center	11	11/09/00
EPIP-OC31	Environmental Assessment Command Center	11	08/08/00
EPIP-OC33	Core Damage Estimation	5	08/08/00
EPIP-OC35	Radiological Controls Emergency Actions	14	08/08/00
EPIP-OC40	Site Security Emergency Actions	11	11/30/00
EPIP-OC41	Emergency Duty Roster Activation	6	11/19/01
EPIP-OC44	Thyroid Blocking	2	07/21/01
EPIP-OC45	Classified Emergency Termination/Recovery	2	10/05/01
OEP-ADM-1311.03	Emergency Preparedness Section Administration	4	08/08/01
OEP-ADM-1319.01	Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Program	9	07/02/01
OEP-ADM-1319.02	Emergency Response Facilities & Equipment Maintenance	10	11/20/01
OEP-ADM-1319.04	Prompt Notification System	3	12/08/00
OEP-ADM-1319.05	Emergency Preparedness Event Reports	2	07/02/01

## OYSTER CREEK

Number

An Exelon/British Energy Company IMPLEMENTING		OEP-ADM-1319.02
Title		Revision No.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT	MAINTENANCE	10
Applicability/Scope	Usage Level	Responsible Department
Applies to work at Oyster Creek	3	Emergency Preparedness
This document is within QA plan scope 50.59 Reviews Required	X Yes No X Yes No	Effective Date // 20/0/

Prior Revision 9 incorporated the following Temporary Changes:

This Revision <u>10</u> incorporates the following Temporary Changes:

N/A

N/A

List of Pages (all pages rev'd to Rev. 10)

1.0 to 10.0 E1-1 to E1-21 E2-1 to E2-5E3-1 to E3-2 E4-1 to E4-4E5-1 E6-1 to E6-2E7-1 to E7-3E8-1 to E8-2 E9-1

> NON-CONTROLLED This Document Will Not Be Kept Up To Date **DCC Oyster Creek**

Signature Concurring Organization Element Date	
Signature Concurring Organization Element Date	
Originator EP Coordinator . 1/19	10
Approved By Radiation Protection Manager 11/19	01



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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

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#### DOCUMENT HISTORY

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	PREPARED BY: REVIEWED BY: APPROVED BY:
7	07/17/92	Revise forms requirement at several centers, update JIC equipment.	
8	08/93	Major rewrite of Procedure.	D. VanNortwick
9	09/94	Update form ie. Quantities and Nomenclature. Remove telephones, desks, chairs, clocks from inventory.	A. Smith
10	12/94	Update forms for various inventories at centers.	A. Smith
11	05/19/95	Reduce inventory of fixed equipment and normal consumables i.e. pens & pads clarify reporting instructions on inventory forms. Due to the extent of the change rev bars are not appropriate.	A. Smith
0	.04/06/96	Remove North Gate inventories. Adjust various inventories to reflect anticipated needs. Further clarify reporting instructions.  Correct responsible titles. Clarify review process for completed inventories. Due to the extent of the change rev bars are not appropriate.	A. Smith
1	02/97	Reduce quantities of full face neg. pressure resp. at ERF's, add Zeolite cartridge insp., add Dosimeter charger to APP A-1, adjust the size of Phillips Head screw drivers in APP. "D" to reflect actual contents.	A. Smith
2	12/97	Delete Ref. To EPIP-OC04 add inventory sheet for new primary EAA which is now OCAB Cafeteria. Modify tests for EACC Computers to reflect current testing.	A. Smith
3	06/98	Adjusting inventories on various appendixes to reflect additional equip. consolidate forms for cleaner documentation. Change air sampler in on site van from hi-vol to lovol.	J. Rayment
4	09/98	Remove respirators from offsite FMT vans as per Revision 1 of this procedure.	A. Smith
5	02/99	Change "Xetex Chirper" to ESRD or equivalent.	D. VanNortwick
6	08/99	Include rescue equipment in lockers-clarify locker location.	D. VanNortwick
7	DOS	Remove Comec and GPU cover page. Change reference from GPU or GPUN to OCNGS.	A. Smith
8	04/01	Relocate first aid equipment.	G. Hutton
9	06/01	Update titles, include change management process, update new locations for equipment.	A. Smith
10	11/01	Remove certain chemistry equipment and keep what is required by the plan.	A. Smith



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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

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#### 1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure delineates the requirements to maintain availability and reliability of Emergency Equipment.

#### 2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

This procedure applies to the Oyster Creek Division and Support
Divisions assigned responsibilities for Emergency Response Facilities
and/or equipment.

#### 3.0 <u>DEFINITIONS</u>

Housekeeping as used in this document is intended to maintain emergency lockers in a neat and orderly fashion.

#### 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

#### 4.1 All Responsible Organizations

4.1.1 Directors/Managers shall be responsible to assign an individual to inventory equipment/material needs for each facility as identified in Section 4.0.

#### NOTE

Directors/Managers shall be responsible to replace any equipment and/or supplies which were used or are missing or require maintenance.

### 4.2 The Emergency Preparedness Manager-OC or designee shall:

4.2.1 Assign a facility custodian to maintain the Emergency
Operations Facility (EOF), Tech Support Center (TSC), and
Building 14 Remote Assembly Area in a state of readiness.



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4.2.2 Ensure that inventories are performed at frequencies defined in this procedure and that surveillance deficiencies are identified, resolution scheduled and tracked to completion.

- 4.2.3 Review the results of inventories in accordance with Section 5.4.
- 4.3 The <u>Manager</u>, <u>Chemistry/Radwaste</u> shall maintain the Emergency Chemistry equipment in a state of readiness.
- 4.4 The <u>Manager of Operations</u> shall maintain the Emergency Control Center (ECC) in a state of readiness.
- 4.5 The <u>Manager Security</u> shall maintain the Main Gate Processing Center, and the Emergency Assembly Area in a state of readiness.
- 4.6 The Manager Radiation Protection shall:
  - 4.6.1 Make available Rad-Techs following each drill or quarter as necessary to assist completing the required inventory of facilities and Emergency Radiological Controls equipment. EP, individual facility coordinators, RCCs or GRC's will indicate the facilities and equipment to be inventoried and replenished.
  - 4.6.2 Assign a custodian to test and maintain the Dose Projection

    Computer equipment located in the Computer Room (off of the

    Control Room) and in the Rad Analysis Support Engineer's

    office in the TSC.
  - 4.6.3 Assign a facility custodian to ensure Rad Assessment Support
    Office in TSC is kept orderly and in a state of readiness.
  - 4.6.4 Maintain Emergency Respirator Equipment Facility.
  - 4.6.5 Ensure the Emergency Off-Site Monitoring Equipment is inventoried and maintained.



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- 4.7 The Supervisor Radwaste/Environmental shall:
  - 4.7.1 Maintain the Environmental Assessment Command Center (EACC) in a state of readiness.
- 4.8 The <u>Occupational Health</u> shall ensure that First Aid and Rescue equipment is maintained.
- 4.9 The <u>Director Maintenance-OC</u> shall:
  - 4.9.1 Assign a facility custodian and maintain the Operations
    Support Center (OSC) in a state of readiness.
  - 4.9.2 Ensure that Manager Rad Engineering
- 4.10 Manager Rad Engineering
  - 4.10.1 Will ensure that Rad Pro emergency instruments are properly maintained, calibrated, and inventoried per applicable procedures.

#### 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 <u>Emergency Response Facilities</u>

A facility custodian should be assigned for the TSC, OSC and EOF and may be assigned for other Emergency Response Facilities by the responsible director, manager, or supervisor as identified in Section 4.0. These facility custodians or the responsible Director, Manager, or Supervisor shall oversee the readiness of the assigned facility. Any changes to emergency facilities or equipment must be reviewed in accordance with the Change Management Process as referenced in this procedure.

This includes:

- 5.1.1 Maintenance of controlled procedures, drawings, logbooks, etc.
- 5.1.2 Inspection and inventory of the assigned facility after each use, but in no case less than quarterly, to verify stockage of required items and to test equipment operability.

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5.1.3 The use of the Dose Projection Computers and associated equipment during a drill will constitute the inspection required after each drill as long as the quarterly requirements are met.

#### NOTE

Appendix H of this procedure will still be filled out to document the results of the inspection.

#### 5.2 Emergency Equipment

Emergency equipment shall be inventoried, calibrated, and maintained by the responsible departments identified in Section 4.0.

- 5.2.1 Emergency kits/lockers shall be inventoried once each calendar quarter and after use during drills, exercises, training or actual emergencies. An inventory performed after use during drills, exercises, training or actual emergencies may also satisfy the quarterly requirement.
  - 5.2.1.1 Inventories should be completed within 10 days of drill or training usage or end of quarter.
- 5.2.2 Radiological instruments should be inspected for serviceability, calibration, battery condition.
- 5.2.3 When removing any instrument or equipment for repair/calibration from any emergency equipment storage location, an equivalent (serviced and calibrated) replacement shall be provided by the end of the shift it was taken out of service on.
- 5.2.4 Radiological instruments in emergency lockers are not to be used for any other purpose in the plant. They are for emergency and drill use only.
- 5.2.5 Silver Zeolite Cartridges are certified by the manufacturer to have a ten year shelf life when in a sealed sleeve. The sleeve integrity and date on sleeve should be checked during each inventory. All other cartridges out of sleeves should be marked "For Training Use".



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5.2.6 Emergency lockers and kits will be locked and periodically (at least quarterly) inspected for lock integrity. Lockers or kits with suspect integrity should be inventoried.

#### NOTE

Emergency kits which contain TLD's DO NOT store button source close to TLD's.

#### 5.3 Emergency Equipment/Facility Inventory

A-13

- 5.3.1 The Emergency Preparedness Surveillance Coordinator or designee shall, at least quarterly, send out inventory checklists to be completed by the responsible departments along with appropriate instructions to complete inventories.

  (Ref. 1R95-20 Nov)
- 5.3.2 The responsible organization shall assign an individual to complete the inventory of the facilities and equipment as follows:

#### Appendix Organization A-1 Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness A-2Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness A-3A-4Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness A-5 A-6 Respiratory Protection Maintenance A-7Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness A-8 A-9 Respiratory Protection Maintenance A - 10Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness A-11 Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness A-12 Rad Pro/Emergency Preparedness

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B-1	Rad Pro/EP
B-2	Rad Pro/EP
С	Rad Pro/EP
D	Rad Pro/EP
E	Environmental or Rad Pro
F	Rad Pro/EP (ECC, EOF, TSC, OSC, MGPC, JIC))
G	Rad Engineering/Environmental or Rad Pro
Н	Radiac I & C or Rad Pro
5.3.2.1	The assigned individual shall use the appropriate
	appendix as identified in 5.3.2.
5.3.2.2	Items listed on the inventory sheet shall not be
	allowed to remain less than 70% of the required

- quantity without replacement immediately. There are no upper limits for inventory quantities, normal housekeeping should apply.

  5.3.2.3 Deficiencies shall be noted and corrected. Damage
- 5.3.2.3 Deficiencies shall be noted and corrected. Damage to the facility or equipment should be noted.

  Items which are found to be in quantities described by 5.3.2.2 above shall not be considered deficient.

  Items which cannot be immediately corrected shall be identified with corrective action and date to be completed noted.
- 5.3.2.4 Consumables with established shelf life should be verified current through the next expected inventory.



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#### 5.4 Inventory Review

- 5.4.1 The inventory checklist will be reviewed by a responsible department supervisor or designee indicating any deficiencies found have been corrected. Unresolved deficiencies will be noted including suggestions for corrective actions, sign checklist and return to the Emergency Preparedness Surveillance Coordinator.
- The Emergency Preparedness Surveillance Coordinator or designee shall review ERF Checklists in accordance with inventory expectations and this procedure and subsequently file all Emergency Equipment/Facility Checklists in Emergency Preparedness Section files for interim storage until filed in the DCC as LP Documents. Receipt of the checklists will be tracked using Appendix J. A random sample of inventories will be reviewed by the EP Manager for each drill or at least quarterly.

#### 6.0 REFERENCES

- 6.1 2000-PLN-1300.01, OCGS Emergency Plan.
- 6.2 Emergency Preparedness Procedure, OEP-ADM-1319.01, Oyster Creek
  Emergency Preparedness Program
- 6.3 AD-AA-1101 Change Management
- 6.4 AD-AA-1102 Change Management Overview and Supplemental Information
- 6.5 AD-AA-1103 Change Management Checklist

#### 7.0 <u>EXHIBITS</u>

7.1	Appendix A	Emergency Rad Pro Equipment
7.2	Appendix B	Emergency Monitoring Equipment
7.3	Appendix C	Emergency Chemistry Equipment
7.4	Appendix D	Emergency First Aid and Rescue Equipment
7.5	Appendix E	EACC Checklist
7.6	Appendix F	Emergency Facilities Equipment
7.7	Appendix G	Emergency Offsite Dose Projection Computers
7.8	Appendix H	Hospital Rad Pro Equipment

Inventories Tracking Form

7.9

Appendix I



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#### APPENDIX A

#### Emergency Rad Con Equipment

Appendix Section	<u>Location</u>
A-1	Emergency Assembly Area(Warehouse)
A-2	Emergency Control Center
A-3	Remote Assembly Area (Berkeley)
A-4	Operations Support Center
A-5	Main Gate Processing Center
A-6	Technical Support Center
A-7	Emergency Operations Facility
A-8	Emergency Respiratory Equipment Issue Facility
A-9	Contaminated/Injured Worker Transport Kits Ambulance
A-10	RWP Office
A-11	RAA Transport Kit (OSC)
A-12	FRAA (Building 14)
A-13	Emergency Assembly Area (OCAB)

### E1-2

### APPENDIX A-1 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Emergency Assembly Area</u> (Warehouse)	Type: Emergency L	ocker Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed and Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed: By Dept. Superviso	Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	☐ Post Drill ☐	Other (explain in Remarks)
ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Button Source	1	
Dose Rate Meter w/batt. (0-1R/Hr.)	1	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	1	
Area Rad Monitor w/alarm	1*	
Air Sampler, Continuous Monitoring w/alarm	1*	
Air Sampler, Low Vol. RAS 1	1	
Particulate Air Sample Filter	50	
Silver Zeolite Cartridge GY130	5	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	1	
Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)	2	
Smear Disc	Approx. 100	
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 100	
Radiation Warning Rope	Approx. 200 ft.	
	Emergency Prepare	edness Department Review//

<sup>\*</sup> THESE ITEMS STORED OUTSIDE OF LOCKER

### E1-3

### APPENDIX A-1 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Emergency Assembly Area</u> Ty (Warehouse)	pe: <u>Emergency Loc</u>	ker Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed Re and Equipment Verified By Locked or Sealed	viewed: Dept. Supervisor	Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement [	] Post Drill 🗍 🤇	)ther (explain in Remarks)□
ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Poly Bag (medium)	10	
Radiological Warning Signs	5	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 200	
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 200	
Facility Rad Con Survey Map	10	
Bull Horn	2	,
Rad Materials Stickers	20	
Step-off Pad	2	
	Emergency Prep	paredness Department Review/

### APPENDIX A-2 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Emergency Control Center</u> Type: _	Emergency Locker	Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed Reviewe	ed :	Date:
Inventory Performed Reviewe and Equipment Verified By Dept	. Supervisor	Ducc.
Locked or Sealed		
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement  Post	Drill 🗌 Other (e	xplain in Remarks) 🗌
	NUMBER	
ITEM	REOUIRED	COMMENTS
Button Source	1	COMMENTS
Dose Rate Meter (0-50 R/Hr.)		
Alarming Dosimeter	5	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	1	
Air Sampler, Continuous monitoring w/alarm	1	
Air Sampler, Low Vol. RAS 1	1	
Air Sampler, Hi Vol. H809V	1	
Count Rate Survey Meter (0-50 KCPM)	1	
Dosimeter, 0-200 mRem	20	
Dosimeter, 0-10 Rem	10	
Dosimeter Charger	1	
Full Face Negative pressure respirator w/Filter	5	
SCBA Paks	4	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	1	
Particulate Air Sample Filter	Approx. 100	
Silver Zeolite Air Sample Cartridge (GY-130)	5	
Smear Disc	Approx. 100	
n		
Emergency Preparedne	ss Department Review	/ Initials Date
	*	Initials Date

### APPENDIX A-2 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Emergency Control Center</u>	Type: Emergen	cy Locker	Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed	By Dept. Super	visor	Date:explain in Remarks) [
ITEM		NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Sample Envelopes		Approx. 100	
PC's Paper (Sets)		50	
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)		Approx. 100	
Emergency Message Forms		Approx. 500	
Poly Bag (Medium)		10	
Radiological Warning Signs		2	
Control Point Access Ticket		Approx. 200	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Fo	rm	10	
Personnel Contamination Survey Form		10	
Facility Rad Con Survey Map		10	
Rad Material Stickers		10	
Step-off Pad		2	
Emer	gency Preparedn	ess Department	Review/

Remarks:

(131902/S4)

### APPENDIX A-3 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location Remote Assembly Area (RAA) Berkeley Ty	ype: <u>Emerqe</u>	acy Lock	<pre>cer/Closet Inventory Date:</pre>
Inventory Performed Rand Equipment Verified B Locked or Sealed Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement Post	Reviewed: By Dept. Supe		
	NUI	1BER	
ITEM	<del></del>	JIRED	COMMENTS
Protective Clothing (Full Set)		20	
Smear Disc	Appro	x. 500	
Sample Envelopes	Appro	x. 500	
Radiological Warning Signs w/inserts		20	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	Appro	x. 100	
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	Appro	x. 100	
Facility Rad Con Survey Map		50	
Bull Horn		2	
Step-off Pad		5	
Boots (Pairs)		12	
Catch Container		2	
Rad Material Stickers	Appro	x. 100	
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)	<del></del>	x. 600	
Emergency Prepa			Review/ Initials Date

Remarks:

(131902/S4)

### E1-1

### APPENDIX A-4 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location Operation Support Center (OSC)	Type: <u>Emergency Locker</u>	Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed	Reviewed:By Dept. Supervisor	Date:
	By Dept. Supervisor	
Locked or Sealed Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement  Post	Drill   Other (explain	in Remarks) [
Reason for inventory. Quarterly Requirement [ 1030	Dilli 🖸 Ocher (explain	III Nematiks/
	NUMBER	
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Button Source	1	
Dose Rate Meter (0-1000 R/Hr.)	2	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	3	
Area Radiation Monitor w/alarm	1	
Air Sampler, Continuous Monitoring w/alarm	1	
Air Sampler, Hi Vol. H809V	2	
Air Sampler, Lo Vol. RAS-1	2	
Air Sampler, Lapels	5	
Lapel Air Sampler Cartridges	Approx. 50	
Lapel Air Sampler Charger	1	
Count Rate Survey Meter (0-50 KCPM)	1	
Dosimeter, 0-200 mRem	10	
Dosimeter, 0-10 Rem	10	
Dosimeter, 0-200 Rem	10	
Dosimeter Charge	1	
Full Face Negative Pressure Respirator w/Filter	10 Respirators	
SCBA's	8	
Face Pieces for SCBA's	5	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	5	

Emergency	Preparedness	Department	Review	/
			Initials	Date

### APPENDIX A-4 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location Operation Support Center (OSC)	Type: <u>Emer</u>	gency Locker	Inventory Date:	
Inventory PerformedEquipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed:_ By Dept. S	upervisor	Date:	and
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	Post Drill 🗌	Other (explain in R	emarks) 🔲	
	NUMBER			
ITEM	REQUIRED		COMMENTS	
Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)	5			
Particulate Air Sampler Filter	Approx. 200			
Silver Zeolite Air Sample Cartridge (GY-130)	50			
Smear Disc	Approx. 500			
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 500			
Water Sample Bottle	10			
Poly Bag (Medium)	25			
Radiological Warning Signs	20			
Control Point Access Ticket	20			
Paper PC's for Reverse Contamination	50			
Plastic Booties for Reverse Contamination	50 pair			
Surgeon Gloves for Reverse Contamination	100 pair			
Emergen	cy Preparedness	Department Review	tials Date	

Remarks:

### APPENDIX A-4 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location Operation Support Center (OSC)	Type: <u>Emergen</u>	cy Locker Inventory Date:	
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed: By Dept. Super	rvisor	
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement $\square$	Post Drill 🔲 Ot	cher (explain in Remarks)	
	NUMBER		
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 100		
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 100		
Facility Rad Con Survey Map	Approx. 50		
Step-off Pad	10		
Boots (Pairs)	Approx. 50		
Rad Material Stickers	Approx. 100		
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)	Approx. 500 Ft.	,	
Emergency Message Forms	Approx. 100		
Emergency Preparedness Department Review/			

### APPENDIX A-5 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location Main	Gate Processing Center	Type: <u>Emergency Locker</u>	Inventory Date:
Insentant Danfarra	1	Davis	Date
and Equipment Verif Locked or Sealed	l	Reviewed: By Dept. Supervisor	Date:
Reason for Inventor	ry: Quarterly Requirement   Pos	t Drill 🗌 Other (explain in Rer	marks) 🗌
	. <u>N</u> C	OTE	
K	EY FOR LOCKER IN MAIN GATE IS IN	SECURITY OFFICE KEY BOX, KEY #21.	

	NUMBER	
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Button Source	1	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	1	
Area Radiation Monitor w/alarm	1	
Air Sampler, Continuous Monitoring w/alarm	1	
Electronic Self Read Dosimeter or Equivalent	20	
Full Face Negative Pressure Respirator w/Filter	5	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	1	
Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)	1	
Particulate Air Sample Filter	50	
Smear Disc	Approx. 100	
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 100	
Step-off Pad	2	
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)	Approx. 500	

Emergency	Preparedness	Department	Review_	/	′	
				Initials	Date	

Remarks:

### APPENDIX A-5 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Main Gate Processing Center</u>	Type: <u>Emergency Locker</u> Inventory Date:
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed: Date: By Dept. Supervisor
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement   Po	st Drill   Other (explain in Remarks)
	NOTE
KEY FOR LOCKER IN MAIN GATE IS IN	SECURITY OFFICE KEY BOX, KEY #21.

ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Poly Bag (Medium)	10	
Radiological Warning Signs	5	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	10	
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	10	
Facility Rad Con Survey Map	10	
Rad Material Stickers	10	

Emergency	Preparedness	Department	Review		/	
-	-	_		Initials	Date	

Remarks:

### APPENDIX A-6 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Technical Support Center (TSC)</u> Type: <u>Emer</u>	gency Locker	Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed Review and Equipment Verified By Dep Locked or Sealed	wed: ot. Supervisor	Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement $\square$ Post Dril	l 🗌 Other (exp	olain in Remarks) 🗌
ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Button Source	1	
Dose Rate Meter (0-1R/Hr.)	1	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	2	
Area Radiation Monitor w/alarm	1	
Air Sampler, Continuous Monitoring w/alarm	1	
Air Sampler, Hi Vol. H809V	1	
Air Sampler, Lo Vol. RAS1	1	
Dosimeter, 0-200 mRem	40	
Full Face Negative Pressure Respirator w/Filter	5	
Count Rate Survey Meter	1	
PC's Paper (Sets)	Approx. 50	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	1	
Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)	2	
Particulate Air Sample Filter	Approx. 100	
Silver Zeolite Air Sample Cartridge (GY-130)	10	
Smear Disc	Approx. 100	
Emergency Prepared	ness Department	Review/

Remarks:

(131902/S4)

### APPENDIX A-6 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Technical Support Center (TSC)</u>	Type: Emer	rgency Locker Inventory Date:	
Inventory Performed and Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed:_ By Dept. S	Date: upervisor	
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	Post Drill 🗌	Other (explain in Remarks)	
	NUMBER		
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS	
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 100		
Water Sample Bottle	5		
Step-off Pad	5		
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)	Approx. 200		
Poly Bay (Medium)	25		
Radiological Warning Signs	10		
Control Point Access Ticket	20		
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	10		
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	10		
Facility Rad Con Survey Map	10		
Rad Material Stickers	Approx. 100		
Emergency Message Forms	Approx. 100		
SRD Charger	1		
Emergency Preparedness Department Review/			

Initials

Date

### APPENDIX A-7 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Emergency Operation Facility (EOF)</u> Type: <u>Emergency Locker</u> Inventory Date:			
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified	Reviewed:_ By Dept. Su	Date:	
Locked or Sealed Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement $\Box$	Post Drill 🗌	Other (explain in Remarks)	
	NUMBER		
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS	
Button Source (See Remarks)	1		
Frisker w/probe & power cable	1		
Smear Disc	Approx. 100		
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 100		
Poly Bag (Medium)	10		
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	10		
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	10		
Rad Material Stickers	5		

Remarks:

NOTE: BUTTON SOURCE IS LOCATED IN THE KEY LOCK BOX NEAR ENTRANCE TO EOF. (THE BOX IS UNLOCKED)

(131902/S4)

### APPENDIX A-8 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

quipment Location <u>Bldq. 14</u> nventory Performed	Type: N/A Reviewed: By Dept. Supervisor	Inventory Date: Date:
eason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement [	Post Drill  Other (explain	in Remarks) 🗌
ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Emergency Dosimetry SRD's 0-200 MR	100	
Emergency Dosimetry SRD's 0-200 MR Procedure EPIP-OC35 in Red Book	100	

NOTE:

### APPENDIX A-9 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>RP Auto Access Sign in Area</u>	Type: <u>Medi</u>	cal Transport Kit Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed	Reviewed:	Date:
and Equipment Verified	By Dept. $\overline{S_1}$	pervisor
Locked or Sealed		
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	☐ Post Drill ☐	Other (explain in Remarks) 🔲
	NUMBER	
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Count Rate Survey Meter	1	CONTIDATO
Pancake Probes	2	
Button Source	1	
Disposable Blanket	1	
Paper (PC) 1 Set	1	
Smear Pads	20	
Gloves (Pairs)	2	
Tape (rolls)	2	
Survey Forms Radiological, Skin, Clothing	5 Each	
Rad Ribbon	Approx. 100 Ft.	
Rad Material Stickers	10	
Procedure 6630-ADM-4330.02	1	
Emerg	ency Preparedness	Department Review/ Initials Date

Remarks:

(131902/S4)

### Kit Location <u>RWP Office</u> Inventory Performed \_

Type:	Medical	Transport	Kit

Inventory Date: \_\_\_\_\_

and Equipment Verified

APPENDIX A-10 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Date:

Locked or Sealed

Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement ☐ Post Drill ☐ Other (explain in Remarks) ☐

ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Count Rate Survey Meter	<u> </u>	
Pancake Probes	2	
Button Source	1	
Disposable Blanket	1	
Paper (PC) (Set)	1	
Trash Bags	5	
Smear Pads	20	
Gloves (Pairs)	2	
Tape (rolls)	2	
Survey Forms Radiological, Skin, Clothing	5	
Rad Ribbon	Approx. 100 Ft.	
Rad Material Stickers	10	
Procedure 6630-ADM-4330.02	1	

Emergency Preparedness Department Review\_ Initials Date

## E1-18

### APPENDIX A-11 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location OSC	Type: <u>RAA</u>	Transport Kit Inventory Date:
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed		Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	☐ Post Drill ☐	Other (explain in Remarks)
ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Dose Rate Meter (0-1R/Hr.)	2	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	2	
Button Source	1	
Dosimeter, 0-200 mRem	10	
Paper (PC) (Set)	5	
Rad Ribbon	Approx. 100 Ft.	
Smear Pads	20	
Gloves (Pairs)	10	
Tape (rolls)	2	
Survey Forms Radiological, Skin, Clothing	5 Each	
Radiological Material Stickers	10	
Emer	gency Preparedness	Department Review/ Initials Date

Remarks:

Note: FRISKERS FOR TRANSPORT KITS ARE IN THE OSC LOCKERS

### 巴1-

#### APPENDIX A-12 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>FRAA (Bldg. 14)</u>	Type: _	Emergency Locke:	Inventory Date:	
Inventory Performed Revie and Equipment Verified By De Locked or Sealed  Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement Post Dril		ewed: Date:ept. Supervisor		
reason for inventory. Quarterly Requirement [ ] for		NUMBER	Turn in Remarks,	
ITEM		REQUIRED	COMMENTS	
Button Source		1		
Dose Rate Meter (0-1R/Hr.)		2		
Frisker w/probe & power cable		3		
Area Radiation Monitor w/alarm		1		
Air Sampler, Continuous Monitoring w/alarm		1		
Dosimeter, 0-200 mRem		10		
Protective Clothing (Full Set)		20		
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)		12		
Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)		5		
Particulate Air Sample Filter		Approx. 100		
Smear Disc		Approx. 500		
Sample Envelope		Approx. 500		
Water Sample Bottle		10		
Emergency P	reparedn	ess Department B	Review/ Initials Date	

### E1-20

### APPENDIX A-12 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location FRAA (Bldg. 14)	Type: Emerg	ency Locker Inventory Date:
Inventory Performed	Reviewed:	Date:
and Equipment Verified	By Dept. Sup	Date:
Locked or Sealed		
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement $\square$	Post Drill 🗌 C	other (explain in Remarks)
	NUMBER	
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Poly Bag (Medium)	25	
Radiological Warning Signs	20	
Control Point Access Ticket	15	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 100	
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 100	
Facility Rad Con Survey Map	Approx. 10	
Bull Horn	2	Verify Operational
Towels (paper)	Approx. 100	
Herculite (ft.)	Approx. 100	
Bottles, Liquid Waste (15 Gal.)	5	
Step-off Pad	5	
Boots (Pairs)	Approx. 50 Pr.	
Sponges	Approx. 100	
Soap (Bars)	2	
Rad Material Stickers	Approx. 100	
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)	Approx. 600	
Emergency Message Forms	50	
Emorgon	av Proparodnoss D	enartment Review /

Remarks:

NOTE: G.E.T. SUPPLIES ARE AN AVAILABLE RESOURCE

Initials

Date

### APPENDIX A-13 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location <u>Emergency Assembly Area (OCAB)</u>	Type: Emergency Lo	cker Inventory Date:
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed: By Dept. Supervisor	Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	Post Drill 🗌 🤇	Other (explain in Remarks)
	NUMBER	
ITEM	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Button Source	11	
Dose Rate Meter w/batt. (0-1R/Hr.)	1	
Frisker w/probe & power cable	1	
Area Rad Monitor w/alarm (AM-2)	1	
Air Sampler, Low Vol. RAS 1	1	
Particulate Air Sample Filter	50	
Silver Zeolite Cartridge GY130	10	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	11	
Smear Disc	Approx. 100	
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 100	
Radiation Warning Rope or Ribbon	Approx. 200 ft	,
Radiological Warning Signs	5	
Rad Materials Stickers	20	
Step-off Pads	2	
Poly Bags (Medium)	10	
Facility Rad Con Survey Maps	10	
Personnel Clothing Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 50	
Personnel Contamination Survey Form	Approx. 50	
	Emergency Preparedn	ess Department Review /

### APPENDIX B-1

### Monitoring Kit Inventory Checklist For Three FMT's

#### <u>OCAB</u>

ITEM:	Number	Number	Number
Monitoring Kit Instrument Locker	1	2	3
Button Source	1	1	1
Dose Rate Meter and Probe w/cables	1	1	1
Count Rate Meter (0-50 KCPM) and Probe w/cables	3	3	3
Frisker w/pancake type probe	1	1	1
Air Sampler Hi Vol H809V	1	1	1
Air Sampler Hi Vol H809C DC only	1	1	1
Map of Offsite Monitoring Points	1	1	1
Procedure EPIP-OC11	1	1	1
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 1 Field Monitoring Team Checklist	5	5	5
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 2 FMT Activation Checklist	5	5	5
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 2B Dose Rate & Count Rate Instr Op Ck	5	5	5
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 2C AC Air Sampler Op Check	2	2	2
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 2D DC Air Sampler Op Check	2	2	2
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 3 FMT Termination Checklist	2	2	2
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 11 Offsite Monitoring Points	1	1	1
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 14 Sample Record	5	5	5
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 15 Countrate Survey Record	5	5	5
EPIP-OC11 Exhibit 16 Environmental Sample	2	2	2
Dosimeter 0-200 mRem	4	4	4
Dosimeter 0-1500 mRem	4	4	4
Badge, TLD Holder w/TLD Chips	2	2	2
Cellular Phones	11	1	1
MONITORING KIT (VEHICLE):	·		
Masking Tape (2 Inch Roll)	2	2	2
Paper PC's	4	4	4
Shoe Covers (pairs)	12	12	12
Paper Hoods	4	4	4
Dosimetry Charger	1	1	1
Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)	2	2	2
Silver Zeolite Cartridge (GY-130)	10	10	10
Two Way Radio (Portable or Truck Mounted)	1	1	1
Smear Disc (package of 100 each)	3	3	3
Sample Envelopes	Approx	Approx	
	100	100	100
Water Sample Bottle	10	10	10
Soil Sample Container	10	10	10

### APPENDIX B-1 (continued)

### Monitoring Kit Inventory Checklist

#### OCAB

ITEM:	Number	Number	Number
Monitoring Kit	1	2	3
Flashlight	2	2	2
Surgeons Gloves (Box of Each)	- 1	1	1
Silver Zeolite Cartridge Sample Labels	15	15	15
Radiation Warning Rope (ft.)	Approx.	Approx.	Approx.
Writing Tablet	2	2	2
Marking Pen	2	2	2
Clipboard	2	2	2
Wax Pencil	2	2	2
Waterproof Marker	-2	2	2
Poly Bag (Medium)	25	25	25
Biotic Media Sample Labels	15	15	15
Radiological Warning Signs	5	5	5
Dimes for Telephones	10	10	10
Trowel	1	1	1
Tweezers	1	1	1
Clippers	1	1	1
Control Point Access Ticket	10	10	10
Key (JD-1, LB-2, LA-1, FRH-6)	1 Ea.	1 Ea.	1 Ea.
First Aid Kit	1	1	1
Life Preservers	2	2	2

Inventory Performed		Date
and Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed		
Reviewed By: Dept. Supervisor	•	Date:
Reason for Inventory:	Quarterly Requirement   Post Drill	Other D Explain in Remarks
Emerg. Prep. Department	ReviewInitials	Date:
Remarks:		

### APPENDIX B-2 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location RP SAFETY LAB	ype: <u>Monit</u>	toring Kit Inventory Date:	
Inventory Performed R Equipment Verified B Locked or Sealed	eviewed: y Dept. Sup	Date: and epervisor	
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement   Post Dril	l 🗌 Other	er (explain in Remarks) 🗌	
ITEM	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS	
Button Source	1		
Dose Rate and Probe w/cables, see Note	1		
Count Rate Meter (0-50K CPM and Probe w/cable), see Note	2		
Air Sampler, Hi Vol. H809C DC, see Note	1		
Air Sampler, Lo Vol.	2		
Map of Off Site Monitoring Points	1		
Procedure EPIP-OC10	1		
EPIP-OC10 Survey Form	15		
EPIP-OC10 Sample Record	15		
Procedure EPIP-OC11	1		
EPIP-OC11 Off Site Rad/Env Survey Team Log	15		
EPIP-OC11 Sample Record	15		
EPIP-OC11 Count Rate Survey Record	15		
Vehicle Key Set	1		
Emergency Prepa	aredness De	epartment Review/ Initials Date	

Note: Phone stored in RP Supervisor key box "On Charge"

### APPENDIX B-2 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location RP Safety Lab	Type: <u>M</u> c	onitoring Kit Inventory Date:
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed By Dept.	: Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement [	] Post Drill [	Other (explain in Remarks)
	NUMBER	COMMENTS
ITEM .	REQUIRED	
Dosimeter 0-1500 mRem	2	
Badge, TLD Holder w/TLD Chips	2	
Dosimetry Charger	1	
Duct Tape (2 inch roll)	2	
Tweezers	1	
Clippers	1	
Control Point Access Ticket	10	
Key (JD-1)	1	

1

10

1

Emergency	Preparedness	Department		/	·
			Initials	Date	

Remarks:

Key (Met Tower) First Aid Kit

Poly Sheets (4 ft. x 8 ft.)
Silver Zeolite Cartridges GY-130

Smear Disc (Package 100)

Two Way Radio (Portable or Truck member)

E2-4

### APPENDIX B-2 (continued) INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

it Location <u>RP Safety Lab</u>	Type: <u> </u>	Monitoring Kit	Inventory Date:				
nventory Performed	Reviewe	d:	Date:				
nd Equipment Verified	By Dept	Reviewed: Date: By Dept. Supervisor					
ocked or Sealed							
eason for Inventory: Quarterly Require	ement   Post Drill	_ Other (explain	ın Remarks) ∐				
	NUMBER						
ITEM	REQUIRED		COMMENTS				
Sample Envelopes	Approx. 200						
Water Sample Bottle	10						
Soil Sample Container	10						
Particulate Filters	50						
Flashlight	2						
Surgeons Gloves (Box)	1						
Rad Warning Rope (ft.)	Approx. 100						
Writing Tablet	2						
Marking Pen	2						
Clipboards	2						
Wax Pencil	2						
Waterproof Marker	2						
Poly Bag (Medium)	25						
Biotic Media Sample Labels	15						
Radiological Warning Signs	5						
Trowel	1						
110,101							

(131902/S6)

Remarks:



Number

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### APPENDIX C

Emergency Chemistry Equipment

<u>Location</u>

<u>Kit</u>

C-1 OSC (Hallway)

No. 5 and 6

### APPENDIX C-1 INVENTORY FORM - EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Kit Location OSC (Hallway) Kit Number 5 and 6	Type: Emergency	Chemistry	Equipment Inventory Date:
Inventory Performedand Equipment Verified Locked or Sealed	Reviewed: By Dept. Super	visor	Date:
Reason for Inventory: Quarterly Requirement	Post Drill 🗌	Other (expl	ain in Remarks) 🗌
		NUMBER	
ITEM		REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Remote Handling Tools		5	
Particulate Filter Cask		1	
Iodine Cartridge Cask		1	
Noble Gas Sample Cask w/insert		1	
Particulate/Iodine Sample Holder (Loaded-Sealed	in Plastic Bag	1	
Particulate Filters (47mm dia.)		20	
Remote Valve Handling Tool		1	
Iodine Sample Cartridges	· ·	5	
Remote Handling Tool Heads		3	
Septum Bottles (15cc)		10	
Gas Marinelli Flask w/valves (1000cc)		1	
Emergency Pr	eparedness Depar	rtment Revie	w/ Initials Date

Remarks:



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### APPENDIX D

### Emergency First Aid and Rescue Equipment

Location	<pre>Kit/Locker/Stretcher</pre>
MOB-3, Fire Brigade Turnout Gear Room	Trauma Kit (W/02 resuscitator)
New Radwaste Bldg. Control Room	Stretcher
Reactor Building Elevation:	
23 ft. adjacent to Stairwell Entrance 23 ft. adjacent to Elevator	Stretcher Stretcher/Extrication Locker (RB-EL23) w/Trauma Kit
51 ft. adjacent to Elevator 75 ft. adjacent to Elevator 119 ft. adjacent to Elevator 119 ft. Stairwell Landing	Stretcher Stretcher Stretcher Extrication Locker (RB-EL119)
Turbine Building Elevation:	w/Trauma Kit
46 ft. adjacent to P.C. Change Area	Stretcher/Extrication Locker (TB-EL46) w/Trauma Kit
23 ft. adjacent to Elevator	Stretcher
0 ft. North, adjacent to Condenser Bay Entrance	Stretcher
0 ft. South, adjacent to Condenser Bay Entrance	Stretcher
Main Office Bldg., Third Floor adjacent to Rad Con Monitor and Control Point	Stretcher
Main Gate Processing Center, South Wall	Stretcher/Trauma Kit
Access Center, Building 14, Forked River	Trauma Kit
Ambulance, Designated Parking Area	Trauma Kit



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### APPENDIX D (continued)

### Emergency First Aid and Rescue Equipment Inventory Checklist

### Extrication Locker Equipment

LOCKER NUMBERS: TB-EL46, RB-EL23, RB-EL119	NUMBER REQUIRED EACH LOCKER			COMMENTS
EQUIPMENT LIST	RECOMMENDED		ED	
	TBOF	RX-119'	RX-23'	
1/2" Rope ~200'	1	1	1	
1/2" Rope ~150'	2	2	2	
7/16" Rope ~48'	3	3	3	
Full Body Red Harnesses	2	2	2	
Large Carabineers	7	7	7	
X Large Carabineers	2	2	2	
Pulleys	3	3	3	
Gibbs Ascender	2	2	2	
Break bar	1	1	1	
Webbing	1	1	1	
Anchor Straps	4	4	4	
Australian Gold 4-1 Haul sys w/pulleys	1	1	0	
Figure 8 with ears	1	1	1	
Locker with Lock	1	1	11	
Pillow	1	1	1	
Blanket	1	1	1	
Leather Gloves	10	10	10	
Trauma Kit	1	1	11	

<u>NOTE</u>: Locker seal to be inspected quarterly to confirm intact. Complete inventory performed annually.



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### APPENDIX D (continued)

### Emergency First Aid and Rescue Equipment Inventory Checklist STRETCHER STATIONS

STRETCHER LOCATIONS	NUMBER	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
New Radwaste, 46 ft. el.	1	Ea.	
REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION:			
23 ft. (Elevator)	1	Ea.	
23 ft. (Drywell Entrance)	1	Ea.	
51 ft. (Elevator)	1	Ea.	
75 ft. (Elevator)	1	Ea.	
119 ft. (Elevator)	1	Ea.	
TURBINE BUILDING ELEVATION:			
46 ft. (Elevator)	1	Ea.	
23 ft. (Elevator)	1	Ea.	
0 ft. North	1	Ea.	
0 ft. South	1	Ea.	
Main Office Bldg. Third Floor	1	Ea.	
Main Gate Processing Center	1	Ea.	



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### APPENDIX D (Continued)

### TRAUMA KIT LOCATIONS

### TB-EL46, RB-EL23, RB-EL119, FIRE BRIGADE TURNOUT GEAR ROOM, MAIN GATE, BLDG. 12 OR 14

	NUMBER REQUIRED	COMMENTS
FACILITY LOCKER TRAUMA KIT CONTENTS:		
Container, Trauma Kit	1 Each	
Gloves (Pair)	5 Each	
Face Shields	2 Each	
Pocket Mask/(CPR Shield)	1 Each	
Arm Splints	2 Each	
Ice Packs	2 Each	
Stethoscope	1 Each	
Triangular Bandage	10 Each	
Ace Bandage, 3 inch	3 Each	
Gauze Bandage	3 Each	
Dressings Assorted	5 Each	
Combine Dressing	3 Each	
Eye Pads	2 Each	
Tape, 1 Inch Roll	1 Each	
Scissors	1 Each	

	criencies were found,	ctive action below
Reason for inventory (Check as applic	able)	
Quarterly Post Dril	.1	
Inventoried by:(Signature)		(Date)
Department Supervisor Review:	(Signature)	(Date)
Emergency Preparedness Dept. Review	(Initials)	(Date)



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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

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#### APPENDIX E

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT COMMAND CENTER MASTER CHECKLIST

The following Emergency Planning equipment has been checked:

CIRCLE ONE (YES OR NO) ITEM YES / NO Field Monitoring Team (FMT) radio present and operational? COMMENTS: Telephone Lines including Environmental Direct Line YES / NO Assessment Operational? COMMENTS: YES / NO EOF Dose Summary visual aid projector operational? COMMENTS: YES / NO Reuter-Stokes modem and printer operational? COMMENTS: YES / NO Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) board clean? COMMENTS:

#### Post-Drill Inventory Items

Ensure EPIP-OC31 and Emergency Dose Calculation Manual (6632-ADM-4010.03) are available? COMMENTS:	YES / NO
Ensure copies of EPIP-OC31 Exhibit 1, 2, 3, and 4 are available? COMMENTS:	YES / NO
Offsite Dose Assessment computer checklist complete? COMMENTS:	YES / NO

DATE OF TEST:	
SIGNATURE OF TESTER:	
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEPARTMENT REVIEW:	
Initials	



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#### APPENDIX F

### Emergency Facilities Equipment Inventory Checklist

### **Facility**

Location

### Section 1 - Site Direct Support Facilities:

Emergency Control Center (ECC)

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Technical Support Center (TSC)

Operations Support Center (OSC)

Main Gate Processing Center (MGPC)

Control Room

Pineland Division Office Lakewood, New Jersey

Site Emergency Building

Drywell Processing Center

Main Gate



Number

OEP-ADM-1319.02

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

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#### APPENDIX F Section 1

### Emergency Facilities Equipment Inventory Checklist

ITEM:	ECC	EOF	TSC	OSC	MGPC	JIC	SIM
Emergency Preparedness Portable							_
Radios w/charger Units	5	Q	2	5	2	0	5
Emergency Preparedness Remote Base				-			
Radio Units	1	1	2	2	0	0	1
State EMRAD Units	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Facility Key Locker (Key Inventory							
Inside Locker)	11	1	1	1	0	0	0
20' Battery Booster Cable	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Radio	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
19" Televisions	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Flip Chart Pad	0	2	· 2	2	0	1	0
Transparencies (Approx.)	0	50	50	50	0	0	0
Emergency Operating Procs.	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
DOCUMENTS:							
Emergency Staff Log Books	2	2	4	2	0	1	2
Station Procedure Set	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
Emergency Plan Implementation				İ		ļ	
Procedure Set	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Backgrounder Book	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Technical Specifications	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Updated Final Safety Analysis			•		:	1	] _
Report	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Emergency Plan					_	_	_
(2000-PLN-1300.01)	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Selected Plant Prints File (ECC							
Complete Set)	1	1	1 1	1	0	0	1
Position Specific Red Books	2	10	10	3	0	3	2

No Deficiencies Defi desc	ciencies were found, ription/remarks/corre	ctive action below
Reason for inventory (Check as applic		
Inventoried by:		
(Signature)		(Date)
Department Supervisor Review:	(Signature)	(Date)
Emergency Preparedness Dept. Review	(Initials)	(Date)



Number

OEP-ADM-1319.02

Title

Revision No.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

10

### APPENDIX G

### Emergency Offsite Dose Projection Computers

### Facility

Emergency Control Center (ECC) OCNGS

Technical Support Center (TSC) and TSC Backup

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) (EACC)

### Location

Control Room

OCNGS Site Emergency

Building

Pineland Division

Office

Lakewood, New Jersey



Number

OEP-ADM-1319.02

Title

Revision No.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

10

APPENDIX G (continued)

Emergency Offsite Dose Projection Computer Operability Test Instructions

#### Purpose:

The purpose of the following instructions is to assess the operability of the offsite dose projection computer to function as required to perform its emergency plan function. The offsite dose projection computing system should be tested four times a year by the person who is trained and assigned to use that system in its Emergency Plan capacity.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES:

It is the responsibility of the person performing the system test to:

- (1) Perform the test of the system per attached instructions and to create a record of that test which is to be forwarded to the Emergency Preparedness Manager for review.
- (2) Have the offsite dose projection system brought up to functional status if it fails any of the tests on three consecutive attempts.
- (3) Repeat the tests on those items that failed their initial quarterly test after repair has been effected.

### INSTRUCTIONS TO TEST OYSTER CREEK OFFSITE DOSE PROJECTION COMPUTER SYSTEM

- (1) Have checklist available for use for offsite dose projection functionability test.
- (2) Check clock display on modem. If time is incorrect, follow attached instructions for setting of time.
- (3) Turn on IBM-PC, printer and screen and allow to warm up.
- (4) Initialize RAC program by entering "RAC" if not done automatically.
- (5) Update computer time and date if required.
- (6) Press "F3 Met Data" key
- (7) Wait for MET Data.
- (8) After final copy is automatically produced power down the computer, screen and printer.



Number

OEP-ADM-1319.02

Title

Revision No.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

10

APPENDIX G (continued)

Section 1

CHECKLIST FOR OFFSITE DOSE PROJECTION COMPUTER

	ECC	TSC EACC	
Check if	E sati	sfactory, explain below if not:	•
		IBM-PC present and has power available.	
		Modem present and operational.	
		Offsite dose projection program discs present.	
		Offsite dose projection program loads.	
		Printer present and has power.	
		Modem goes offhook and dial tone is heard.	
		Modem dials PCS number and PCS phone rings.	
		PCS answers and sends tone to modem.	
		Data from PCS Data is transmitted to IBM-PC.	
		Printer makes satisfactory copy.	
		Spare ream of paper available for printer.	
		Successful connection via LAN to national weather service Forecast Dața $({\it EACC\ Only})$ .	
Explanat	cion c	of Deficiencies:	
Date of	test_		
Signatur	re of	tester	
Emergeno	cy Pre	eparedness Dept. Review	Date



Number

OEP-ADM-1319.02

Title

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

Revision No.

APPENDIX H

**Hospital Checklist** 

<u>Hospital</u>

Location

Southern Ocean County Hospital

1140 W. Bay Avenue Manahawkin, N.J. 08050

Community Medical Center

99 Highway 37 West Toms River, N.J. 08753



Number

OEP-ADM-1319.02

Title

10

Revision No.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

APPENDIX H (Continued)

### HOSPITAL CHECKLIST

### <u>FOR</u>

### SOUTHERN OCEAN COUNTY AND COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER

ITEM	QUANTITY EACH HOSPITAL	COMMENTS
SRD'S 0-200 Mr/Hr.	10	
SRD Reader	1	
Portable Dose Rate Meter 0-200Mr/Hr	1	
Minivol Air Sampler	1	
Count Rate Meter	1	
Air Sampler Particulate Filters	1 box	
Button Source	1	
Reason for inventory (Check as applicab	le)	
Quarterly	Post Drill	
Inventoried by:(Signature)		(Date)
Department Supervisor Review:	(Signature)	
	•	(Date)

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	- 1

APP	Appendix I  DATE PERFORMED  DATE PERFORMED				
		1ST QUARTER	2ND QUARTER	3RD QUARTER	4TH QUARTER
A-1	Emergency Assembly Area (Warehouse)				
A-2	Emergency Control Center	<u> </u>			
A-3	Remote Assembly Area (Berkeley)				
A-4	Operations Support Center				
A-5	Main Gate Processing Center				
A-6	Technical Support Center				
A-7	Emergency Operations Facility				
A-8	Emergency Respiratory Equipment Issue Facility				
A-9	Contaminated/Injured Worker Transport Kits Ambulance				
A-10	RWP Office				
A-11	RAA Transport Kit				
A-12	FRAA (Building 14)				
A-13	Emergency Assembly Area (OCAB Cafeteria)			,	
B-1	Field Monitoring Vans				
B-2	On Site Emergency Van				
C-1	Monitoring Kit 5 & 6				
C-2	Pass Room				
D	First Aid/Rescue Equipment				
E	Environmental Assessment Command Center				
F-1	Emergency Control Center				
F-1	Emergency Operations Facility				
F-1	Tech Support Center				
F-1	Operations Support Center				
F-1	Main Gate Processing Center				
F-1	JIC Joint Information Center				
F-1	Simulator				
G-1	Emergency Control Center				
G-1	Tech Support Center				
G-1	Environmental Assessment Command Center				
Н	Southern Ocean County Hospital				
Н	Community Medical Center				

Emergency Preparedness Quarterly Review

1ST QUARTER	2ND QUARTER	3RD QUARTER	4TH QUARTER

INITIAL AND DATE BLOCK.

### AmerGen.

# OYSTER CREEK EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

Number

EPIP-OC-.41

Title
EMERGENCY DUTY ROSTER ACTIVATION

Revision No.

Applicability/Scope

Applies to work at Oyster Creek

Usage Level

Responsible Department
Emergency Preparedness

This document is within QA plan scope Safety Reviews Required X Yes No
X Yes No

Effective Date

11-19-01

Prior Revision <u>5</u> incorporated the following Temporary Changes:

This Revision  $\underline{\phantom{a}6\phantom{a}}$  incorporates the following Temporary Changes:

N/A

N/A

List of Pages (all pages rev'd to Rev. 6)

1.0 to 3.0 E1-1

# NON-CONTROLLED THIS DOCUMENT WILL NOT BE KEPT UP TO DATE IRMC OYSTER CREEK

			T
	Signature	Concurring Organization Element	Date
		Emergency Planner	11/16/01
Originator 4 Approved By	2 Mark Moore	Radiation Protection Manager	11/16/01



Number

EPIP-OC-.41

Title
EMERGENCY DUTY ROSTER ACTIVATION

Revision No.

6

### DOCUMENT HISTORY

2017	EFFECTIVE DATE	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	PREPARED BY: REVIEWED BY: APPROVED BY:
REV 2	05/94	Expand instructions for operating autodialer.	
3	05/96	Remove instructions for activating teleclerk which will be provided by memo to appropriate organizations.	D. VanNortwick
4	06/97	Include Teleclerk activation utilizing Security memo # 016-97. Include new activation code number messages.	D. VanNortwick
5	DOS	Required due to sale of Oyster Creek.	A. Smith
6	10/01	Add Usage Level; correct pager stand down code. Add note to enable pager code 999999 to be used to staff ERO at a credible security threat.	A. Smith



Number

EPIP-OC-.41

Title Revision No.

6

#### 1.0 PURPOSE

1.1 This procedure provides instructions for security actions for the notification of Emergency Duty Roster personnel and for the activation of Emergency Response Facilities.

### 2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

2.1 This procedure applies to Oyster Creek Security for use in declared or simulated emergencies.

#### 3.0 <u>DEFINITIONS</u>

None

### 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 The Security Shift Commander is responsible to implement Exhibit 1.

### 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 When the Security Shift Commander is notified of the declaration of an emergency, he shall complete Exhibit 1.

#### 6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EPIP-OC-.25

#### 7.0 EXHIBITS

7.1 Exhibit I, "Security Shift Commander Checklist"



Number

EPIP-OC-.41

Revision No. Title EMERGENCY DUTY ROSTER ACTIVATION EXHIBIT I SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR CHECKLIST Time /Initials Activate Teleclerk System per Security memo #016-97. 1.0 Call group page number and enter password per Security memo 2.0 #016-97. NOTE CREDIBLE SECURITY THREAT ERO STAFFING When Security and the Shift Manager have determined that there is a credible security threat per SY-AA-101-132, an Unusual Event will be declared. Security will activate the teleclerk and pagers per memo #016-97. Use pager code 99999# 2.1 Enter appropriate notification code message NO. MESSAGE 777777# - UNUSUAL EVENT 1 999999# - ALERT OR HIGHER OR CREDIBLE THREAT UNUSAL EVENT 88888# - STAND-DOWN Roster "Filled Position Reports" are automatically generated and are sent via fax to TSC and Security. 3.0 If Teleclerk fails to operate or an emergency center has 4.0 requested personnel to fill open positions, then as manpower permits, attempt to fill positions by using the confidential telephone listing. If pagers fail to activate. Teleclerk will begin to call 5.0 team members after approximately 15 minutes using work numbers, and home numbers in that order. CAUTION Do not turn off Teleclerk prior to terminating scenario. If it is necessary to terminate Teleclerk activity: 6.0 6.1 Press "C" and ENTER, this terminates scenario. 6.2 Status report will automatically print. Report the status of Emergency Duty Roster/personnel 7.0 callout and facility activation to the GOS/ED Assistant within 45 minutes. Include any vacant positions as well as any facility activation problems as might exist. Date: Signature:

Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC)

Revision No.

30

Applicability/Scope

Applies to work at Oyster Creek Division & Support Divisions

Usage Level 1

Responsible Department Emergency Prep

This document is within QA plan scope 50.59 Applicable

<u>X</u>Yes\_ Yes<u>X</u>No Effective Date

Prior Revision 29 incorporated the following Temporary Changes:

3.0 \_ incorporates the This Revision following Temporary Changes:

N/A

N/A

List of Pages (All pages rev'd to Rev. 30)

1.0 to 7.0 E1-1 to E1-17

E2-1 to E2-3

E3-1

E4-1 to E4-3

E5-1

E6-1 to E6-3

E7-1 to E7-2

E8-1 to E8-3E9-1 to E9-2

E10-1

E11-1

E12-1

E13-1 E14-1

E15-1

E16-1

NON-CONTROLLED This Document Will Not Be Kept Up To Date **DCC Oyster Creek** 

	K.			
		Signature	Concurring Organization Element	Date
Originator			Emergency Planner	11/16/01
Approved By	E	mad Moore	Radiation Protection Manager	11/16/21

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An Exelon/British Energy Company

# OYSTER CREEK EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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### DOCUMENT HISTORY

REV.	DATE	ORIGINATOR	SUMMARY OF CHANGE
14	12/94	R. Finicle	Add guidance on media access to the site during declared emergencies.
15	02/95	A. Smith	Add Security Events to media access to get approval from local Law Enforcement and Security. EPIP-COM-45 to EPIP-OC29
16	06/95	A. Smith	Note for North Gate Applicability, Title changes of Buildings and General Typo's.
17	12/95	T. Blount	Correct typo's. Also modify Deviation documentation.
18	05/96	Bontempo	Revise Par Logic Diagram to address March 15, 1996 NRC/GPUN meeting. Delete Exhibit 1b pg. E1-16 through E1-19. Add Steps 2.1.1 through 2.1.3 of Exh. 1b Par Guide.
19	05/97	T. Blount	AEOF Removed from E-Plan 1000-PLN-1300.01 in Rev. 11. On-shift Team dispatch and mustering activity described.
20	10/97	A. Smith	Clarify nomenclature for fax machine in control room.
21	05/98	P. Hays	Change terminology from "Tech. Functions" to "Engineering", reflects elimination of Radwaste Supervisor, adds OCAB into considerations of on-site protective actions and clarifies transfer of authority for off-site notifications.
22	02/99	A. Smith	EPIP-COM44 and EPIP-COM45 have been changed to Oyster Creek site specific procedures and the new numbers are EPIP-OC44 and EPIP-OC45 (reference EP changes 98-021 & 98-022)
23	05/99	A. Smith	Clarify off-site notification transfer between ECC & EOF. Incorporate new public information process.
24	10/99	A. Smith	Clarify computer for ESDS usage.
25	DOS	A. Smith	Change references from GPU or GPUN or OCNGS.
26	09/00	G. Busch	Remove shift ORC Coordinator and clarify Communication Coordinator not necessarily a CRO.
27	10/00	A. Smith	Clarify transfer of Off Site Notification from ECC to EOF. Provide clarification for team tracking from the ECC. Improve 50.54X format.
28	06/01	R. Finicle	Revised step 3.1 of Exhibit 1 regarding personally providing the PAR to the Senior State Official at the State EOC. Added new Exhibit 16 PAR Notification Form. Change Ref. use from 1702.
29	10/01	A. Smith	Move Step 7.0 over on Exhibit 8 and add sign off line. Add sample and "This is a drill", "This is not a drill" to Exhibit 16. 50.59 Review applicability to "NO".
30	11/01	A. Smith	Add step to Exhibit 1 to staff ERO at credible security threat for UE, add note to Exhibit 1 to indicate requirements concerning transfer of command and control.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		



Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

30

### 1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure describes the actions to be taken by the Onshift Emergency

Director (ED)/Site Shift Manager after an emergency is declared.

This procedure also describes the staffing, activation and operation of the

Emergency Control Center (ECC).

### 2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

- 2.1 This procedure applies to the ED/GSS(SSM) and describes actions that must be taken by the ED/GSS(SSM) or his staff to implement the OCNGS Emergency Plan.
- 2.2 This procedure shall apply to all personnel assigned to the ECC during all levels of emergency classifications.

#### 3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Site Shift Manager - Is the Group Shift Supervisor on shift, responsible for the overall site operation as it pertains to the operation of the plant.

#### 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

- 4.1 The ED/GSS(SSM) will perform or delegate the completion of the ED/GSS(SSM) checklist (Exhibit 1).
- 4.2 The Operation Coordinator/GOS will assume responsibilities outlined in Exhibit 3 (Operations Coordinator Responsibilities).
- 4.3 The Shift Technical Advisor will advise the ED/GSS(SSM) on activities that impact the safe operation of the plant.
- 4.4 A qualified person assigned as the on shift communicator will perform duties as specified in "Emergency Notification" Procedure EPIP-0C-.03.
- 4.5 The Initial Response Organization ECC communications coordinator and ECC communicators will perform duties as specified in accordance with this procedure.
- 4.6 A CRO or qualified person assigned as the initial OSC Coordinator will take direction from the SSM or GOS for coordination of initial emergency activities.



Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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#### 5.0 PROCEDURE

- 5.1 The following actions shall be performed by the on shift crew upon recognition of in plant or site conditions that have exceeded Emergency Action Levels (EALs) specified in EPIP-OC-.01.
  - 5.1.1 GSS(SSM) will assume ED responsibilities (Exhibit 2) and complete actions listed on the ED/GSS(SSM) checklist (Exhibit 1).
  - 5.1.2 GOS will assume Operations Coordinator responsibilities (Exhibit 3).
  - 5.1.3 The person assigned by the GSS(SSM) will perform actions of "Communications Coordinator" as specified in EPIP-OC-.03.
  - 5.1.4 Emergency responders on shift shall be directed to respond to events by the ED(SSM) or Ops Coordinator (GOS) from the ECC.

    If the conditions of the event indicate shift personnel should muster at a designated location, (to protect personnel) the ED shall direct them to an appropriate area.

    This area/location may be:
    - 1) The EO room next the Control Room
    - 2) The OSC
    - 3) A suitable location selected by the GSS/ED.

      When the OSC is Staffed by the IREO (typically 1 Hr from the Alert), the on-shift responders should be directed to report to that location.



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EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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- 5.1.5 Team(s) dispatched prior to Activation of the OSC by the IREO should be "tracked" using the information similar to Exhibit 1C, Checklist. The Operations or OSC Coordinator onshift will perform the briefing/tracking of teams. If this individual is unable to perform this activity due to responding to the event, the ED/GSS will perform or designate a temporary replacement as needed to support the Team dispatch function.
- 5.2 Once the Initial Response Emergency Organization (IREO) members have reported to the ECC, the following actions shall be performed.
  - 5.2.1 GSS(SSM) will complete the "ED Turnover Checklist" (Exhibit 1a) and turnover ED responsibilities to the on call ED. After this turnover the GSS(SSM) will continue to fill out applicable portions of the "ED/GSS(SSM) Checklist" (Exhibit 1).
  - 5.2.2 GOS or GSS(SSM) will brief the on call Operations Coordinator with the "ED Turnover Checklist". The Operations Coordinator will then establish communications and assume responsibilities as outlined in Exhibit 3.
  - 5.2.3 CRO or person performing on shift OSC Coordinator duties will brief the on call (IREO) Operations Coordinator on the status of teams dispatched from the ECC. The Ops Coordinator in turn will brief the on call OSC Coordinator of team status.
  - 5.2.4 The person performing Communication Coordinator duties will brief the on call Communication Coordinator on the status of communications and turnover responsibilities as outlined in EPIP-OC-.03.
  - 5.2.5 The on call ECC Communicators will assume communicator duties as listed in Exhibit 8, 9 and 10.
- 5.3 A description of evacuation preplanning for Alternate Emergency Response Facilities is provided in Exhibit 5.

### AmerGen.

### OYSTER CREEK EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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### 6.0 REFERENCES

- 6.1 2000-PLN-1300.01, OCNGS Emergency Plan.
- 6.2 Procedure 126, "Procedure for Notification of Station Events"
- 6.3 EPA 400-R-92-001, October 1991, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.
- 6.4 EPIP-OC.26, The Technical Support Center.
- 6.5 Evacuation Time Estimates Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station,
  Dresdner, Robin & Associates December 1991.
- 6.6 O C File No. 96003, Letter 6730-96-3167 dated 04/24/96 Summary of March 15, 1996 Emergency Preparedness Meeting with the NRC.
- 6.7 1820-IMP-1720.01, Emergency Public Information Implementing Procedure.

#### 7.0 EXHIBITS

- 7.1 Exhibit 1, Emergency Director/GSS(SSM) Checklist
- 7.2 Exhibit 1a, ED Turnover Checklist
- 7.3 Exhibit 1b, Protective Action Recommendation Guide
- 7.4 Exhibit 1c, "Team Dispatch From CR" Checklist
- 7.5 Exhibit 2, Emergency Director Responsibilities
- 7.6 Exhibit 3, Operations Coordinator Responsibilities
- 7.7 Exhibit 4, Press Release Approval Guidance
- 7.8 Exhibit 5, Alternate Emergency Response Facilities
- 7.9 Exhibit 6, Emergency Director Authorization for Deviations from Requirements
- 7.10 Exhibit 7, Site Access Policy For Media During Emergencies
- 7.11 Exhibit 8, ECC Communications Coordinator Checklist
- 7.12 Exhibit 9, ECC Communicator Engineering Line

### AmerGen...

# OYSTER CREEK EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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7.13	EXHIBIC	ЭA,	Edaibmeur	Status	DISPIG	iy bysce	=111
7.14	Exhibit	10,	ECC Commun	nicator	Plant	Status	Update

7.15 Exhibit 11, Emergency Shift Schedule

7.16 Exhibit 12, HIFAX Log (Example)

7.17 Exhibit 13, Communicator Log (Example)

7.18 Exhibit 14, Emergency Message Form (Example)

7.19 Exhibit 15, Media Access Briefing Form

7.20 Exhibit 16, PAR Notification Form



Number

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Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR/GSS(SSM) CHECKLIST

### EXHIBIT 1

### "UNUSUAL EVENT"

Init	ial When Com	mpleted
1.0	Activate t	the ECC by performing the following (classification):
	1.1	EAL:
<u></u>	1.2	Announce self as ED. Announce emergency classification and give brief description/reason for declaration:
	1.3	Remain cognizant of plant conditions/EALs to ensure appropriate emergency classification is declared.
2.0	Notificati	ons
	2.1	Direct that offsite agencies are notified IAW EPIP-OC03.
		2.1.1 N.J. State Police (within 15 minutes).
		2.1.2 NRC (within 1 hour).
		2.1.3 Brief BNE when BNE representative calls Control Room (should be within 30 minutes of declaration - if no return call - contact NJSP and inform them). Conduct periodic briefings as requested and time permits.
	2.2	Direct that plant page announcements and management notifications be made IAW EPIP-OC03.
	2.3	Direct Security Shift Supervisor to implement EPIP-OC40 (Security actions). When time permits, discuss whether sabotage was involved.
	2.4	When Security and the Shift Manager have determined that there is a credible security threat per SY-AA-101-132, the Shift Manager will direct the Security Shift Supervisor to call out he ERO at the unusual event in accordance with EPIP-OC41.
3.0	Protective	Actions
	3.1	Consider hazards to site personnel (see Exhibit 1b).
4.0	As necessa	ry, review Exhibit 2, ED Responsibilities.
5.0		ccess to the site is requested, refer to Exhibit 7, "Site Access Media During Emergencies".



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#### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR/GSS(SSM) CHECKLIST

### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

#### "UNUSUAL EVENT"

- 6.0 All deviations from procedures, equipment operating limits, Technical Specifications, License, and License Conditions will be authorized and documented using the guidance in Exhibit 6.
- 7.0 Review and approval of press releases should be accomplished in a timely manner. The guidance in Exhibit 4 may be used to facilitate the review.

#### NOTE

The IREO and the TSC are not normally activated during an Unusual Event. Step 8.0 below applies only if the IREO ED and/or TSC is activated.

8.0 ED Briefing/Turnover

#### NOTE

Transfer of Command and Control responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC is  $\underline{not}$  required for an Unusual Event, and therefore, will be at the discretion of the Shift Manager and TSC Emergency Director.

Contact and brief Initial Response ED, utilize office, home, or pager phone numbers as necessary. At direction of initial response ED conduct a turnover to him (or in his absence, ESD) using Exhibit 1a. This turnover should be complete prior to the IREO ED assuming the position. The assumption of the ED position by the IREO ED should be the final step in activating the TSC. Termination/Recovery (If not turned over to Initial Response ED). If plant is in a stable configuration and NO emergency action level criteria apply: Direct Termination Page Announcement. Direct Termination Notifications Offsite. 9.2 Conduct close-out briefing with BNE. 9.3 9.4 Issue a press release.



Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

30

### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR/GSS(SSM) CHECKLIST

### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

#### "ALERT"

Initial When Completed				
1.0	If not already activated, activate the ECC and classify or reclassify the event by performing the following:			
	1.1	EAL:		
	1.2	If not relieved by Initial Response ED, announce self as ED, announce emergency classification, and give brief description/reason for declaration:		
	1.3	Remain cognizant of plant conditions/EALs to ensure appropriate emergency classification is declared.		
2.0	Notificati	ons		
	2.1	Direct that offsite agencies are notified IAW EPIP-OC03.		
		2.1.1 N.J. State Police (within 15 minutes).		
		2.1.2 NRC (within 1 hour).		
	<u></u>	2.1.3 Brief BNE when BNE representative calls Control Room (should be within 30 minutes of initial declaration - if no return call - contact NJSP and inform them). Conduct periodic briefings as requested and time permits.		
	2.2	Direct that plant page announcements and management notifications be made IAW EPIP-OC03.		
	2.3	Direct Security Shift Supervisor to implement EPIP-OC40 (Security actions) and EPIP-OC41 (activation of ERO). (Should be within 15 minutes of initial declaration).		
	<del></del>	2.3.1 When time permits discuss whether sabotage was involved.		
<del></del>	2.4	If necessary call out a licensed or certified individual, preferably a GOS or GSS(SSM), to support the OSC.		
3.0	Protective	Actions		
	3.1	Consider hazards to site personnel (see Exhibit 1b).		
4.0	As necessa	ry, review Exhibit 2, ED Responsibilities.		
5.0	If media access to the site is requested, refer to Exhibit 7, "Site Access Policy For Media During Emergencies".			



Number

EPIP-OC-.02

Title

DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) Revision No.

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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR GSS(SSM) CHECKLIST

#### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

#### "ALERT"

- 6.0 All deviations from procedures, equipment operating limits, Technical Specifications, License, and License Conditions will be authorized and documented using the guidance in Exhibit 6.
- 7.0 Review and approval of press releases should be accomplished in a timely manner. The guidance in Exhibit 4 may be used to facilitate the review.
- 8.0 At direction of Initial Response ED conduct a turnover to him (or in his absence, ESD) using Exhibit 1a. This turnover should be complete prior to the IREO ED assuming the position. The assumption of the ED position by the IREO ED should be the final step in activating the TSC.
- 9.0 Emergency Teams shall be directed from the ECC until the OSC is operational. Exhibit 1c should be used to track Emergency Teams. Teams may be directed by the ECC until the OSC Coordinator is available at the OSC to direct teams. At that time, team dispatch may be turned over to the OSC.
- 10.0 Termination/Recovery (If not turned over to Initial Response ED or ESD)

  10.1 Implement EPIP-OC-.45.
- 10.2 Conduct close-out briefing with BNE.



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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR GSS(SSM) CHECKLIST

### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

### "SITE AREA EMERGENCY"

<u>Init</u>	ial When Com	pleted
1.0		eady activated, activate ECC and classify or reclassify event by the following:
	1.1	EAL:
	1.2	If not relieved by Initial Response ED, announce self as ED, announce emergency classification, and give brief description/reason for declaration:
	1.3	Remain cognizant of plant conditions/EALs to ensure appropriate emergency classification is declared.
2.0	Notification	ons
	2.1	If not turned over to the EOF, direct that offsite agencies be notified IAW EPIP-OC03.
	·	2.1.1 N.J. State Police (within 15 minutes).
		2.1.2 NRC (within 1 hour).
		2.1.3 Brief BNE when BNE Representative calls Control Room (should be within 30 minutes of initial declaration - if no return call - contact NJSP and inform them). Conduct periodic briefings as requested and time permits.
	2.2	Direct that plant page announcements and management notifications are made IAW EPIP-OC03.
	2.3	If not already done, direct Security Shift Supervisor to implement EPIP-OC40 (Security Actions) and EPIP-OC41 (Activation of ERO). (Should be within 15 minutes of initial declaration).
	·	2.3.1 When time permits discuss whether sabotage was involved.
	2.4	If necessary call out a licensed or certified individual, preferably a GOS or GSS(SSM), to support the OSC.
3.0	Protective	Actions
	3.1	Consider hazards to site personnel (see Exhibit 1b).



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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR GSS/(SSM) CHECKLIST

#### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

#### "SITE AREA EMERGENCY"

- 3.2 If not relieved by Initial Response ED, direct site accountability.
  - 3.2.1 Provide route to EAA. RAC/GRCS may be asked for input.

#### NOTE

Essential personnel within the protected are should be accounted for within 30 minutes. Full accountability should be achieved within 60 minutes. If not, search and rescue efforts should commence.

3.3 ECC support of site accountability

### NOTE

References to the North Gate are only applicable when the gate is open during outages.

- 3.3.1 In the event of Security Computer failure assign an individual to collect accountability cards in facility or slot numbers from those outside the ECC. (Ensure Radwaste and all other Operations personnel are included)
- 3.3.2 Direct individual to call the Main Gate Security with badge slot numbers within 10 minutes of initial declaration of accountability

Main Gate  $\,$  - dial code 80 on the Security Line or 4950 from Site Phone

- 3.3.3 Accountability notification completed for facility.
- 3.4 Review PAR Logic Diagram (Exhibit 1b)
- 3.5 Consider the need to continue radwaste operations and direct Radwaste Operators appropriately. Inform Initial Response ED, when available, of disposition.
- As necessary, review Exhibit 2, ED Responsibilities.



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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR GSS/(SSM) CHECKLIST

#### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

#### "SITE AREA EMERGENCY"

- 5.0 If media access to the site is requested, refer to Exhibit 7, "Site Access Policy For Media During Emergencies".
  6.0 All deviations from procedures, equipment operating limits, Technical Specifications, License, and License Conditions will be authorized and documented using the guidance in Exhibit 6.
  7.0 Review and approval of press releases should be accomplished in a timely manner. The guidance in Exhibit 4 may be used to facilitate the review.
  8.0 ED Turnover (If not previously completed).
  - 8.1 At direction of Initial Response ED conduct a turnover to him (or in his absence, ESD) using Exhibit 1a. This turnover should be complete prior to the IREO ED assuming the position. The assumption of the ED position by the IREO ED should be the final step in activating the TSC.
- 9.0 Emergency Teams shall be directed from the ECC until the OSC is operational. Exhibit 1c should be used to track Emergency Teams. Teams may be directed by the ECC until the OSC Coordinator is available at the OSC to direct Emergency Teams. At that time, team dispatch may be turned over to the OSC.
- 10.0 Termination/Recovery (If not turned over to Initial Response ED/ESD).

  10.1 Implement EPIP-OC-.45.

  10.2 Conduct close-out briefing with BNE.



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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D) "GENERAL EMERGENCY"

Initial When Completed			
1.0		eady activated, activate the ECC and classify or reclassify the erforming the following:	
	1.1	EAL:	
	1.2	If not relieved by Initial Response ED, announce self as ED, announce emergency classification, and give brief description/reason for declaration:	
	1.3	Remain cognizant of plant conditions/EALs to ensure appropriate emergency classification is declared.	
2.0	Notification	ons	
	2.1	If not turned over to the EOF, direct that offsite agencies be notified IAW EPIP-OC03.	
	_	2.1.1 N.J. State Police, Ocean County, Ocean Township, and Lacey Township (within 15 minutes).	
	·· <del>·····</del>	2.1.2 NRC (within 1 hour).	
		2.1.3 Brief BNE when BNE representative calls Control Room (should be within 30 minutes of initial declaration - if no return call - contact NJSP and inform them). Conduct periodic briefings as requested and time permits.	
	2.2	Direct that plant page announcements and management notifications are made IAW EPIP-OC03.	
	2.3	If not already done, direct Security Shift Supervisor to implement EPIP-OC40 (Security Actions) and EPIP-OC41 (ERO Activation). (Should be within 15 minutes of initial declaration).	
		2.3.1 When time permits discuss whether sabotage was involved.	
* ** * <u>**</u>	2.4	If necessary call out a licensed or certified individual, preferably a GOS or GSS(SSM), to support the OSC.	
3.0	Protective	Actions and Recommendations	
	3.1	If turnover to IREO ED or ESD is not complete, personally convey the PAR to the Senior State official at the State EOC using Exhibit 16, within approximately 15 minutes of declaration (see Exhibit 1b, PAR Logic Diagram).	

3.1.1 Discuss with BNE representative as soon as time permits.



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
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#### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST

#### EXHIBIT 1 (CONT'D)

#### "GENERAL EMERGENCY"





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#### EXHIBIT 1a

#### 

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION	DATE/TIME OF DECLARATION
UNUSUAL EVENT	
ALERT	
SITE AREA EMERGENCY	
* GENERAL EMERGENCY	
Reactor power at time of event%	
* CURRENT PAR STATUS (Required for Genera	
STATUS OF ACCOUNTABILITY/ONSITE PROTECTIVE	ACTIONS
PRESENT STATUS OF PLANT	
At Power (	
Hot Standby	
Hot Shutdown	
Cooling down (describe cooldown mo	de)

### AmerGen ... An Exelon/British Energy Company

## OYSTER CREEK EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

Number

EPIP-OC-.02

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#### EXHIBIT 1a (CONT'D)

#### 

Estimated time to 'STABLE' plant conditions ho	ours
Did reactor trip?	YES - NO
Did ECCS activate?	YES - NO
Is offsite power available?	YES - NO
Are both Diesel Generators operable?	YES - NO
Are Diesel Generators running? EDG#1 YES - NO EDG#2	YES - NO
Are the Station Blackout CTs available?	YES - NO
Is fuel integrity maintained?	YES - NO
Is containment integrity maintained?	YES - NO
If no, specify	
Do you suspect there is a release	
Details:	
Are there any abnormally high inplant radiation levels?  Specify location	YES - NO
Are there any personnel injuries? Provide status	YES - NO
Were there any news releases issued?  Specify	YES - NO



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### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TURNOVER CHECKLIST

(Page 3 of 3)

Are there any open technical issues?		YES - NO
Specify		
	The state of the s	
News releases issued ATTACHED		
NOTES:		
	1.00	
	The state of the s	
	1 10 TH	
Turnover Completed: Date	Time *	
Current ED Sign	Oncoming ED	
Sign		Sign

\*Note time should be filled in when the oncoming ED assumes ED responsibilities.



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#### EXHIBIT 1b

#### PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS GUIDE

#### 1.0 Onsite

- 1.1 Inform the OSC Coordinator of personnel who were dispatched in support of emergency before the OSC was activated.
- 1.2 Relocate site personnel from areas of hazard or where the dose is projected to exceed 1000 mRem Total Whole Body Dose (TEDE). Consult RAC.
- 1.3 Evacuation of any area, site accountability, and site evacuation may be ordered at the discretion of the Emergency Director.

#### NOTE

If the Main Gate is evacuated, accountability can not be conducted.

- 1.4 Consider protective actions such as: securing ventilation, access control, Safety Department support. Consider securing Main, Turbine Bldg., and Computer Room doors to the Control Room in accordance with Control Room HVAC Procedure 331.1 if radiological release could affect Control Room personnel.
- 1.5 Consider protective actions such as: leaving the site, sheltering, or evacuation to an assembly area for Forked River Site, Combustion Turbine Site, Southern Area Stores Warehouse, Oyster Creek Administration Building (OCAB), and Trailer 300. If action is necessary, personnel may be informed by the following mechanisms:
  - 1.5.1 Contact Security Shift Supervisor to make a page announcement on the Forked River Site, and Trailer 300.

#### AND

1.5.2 Direct Security Shift Supervisor to dispatch a patrol to the affected areas to direct personnel to take the prescribed protective actions. Consider Security manpower requirements when taking this action.

OR

1.5.3 Direct available personnel (e.g., from OSC) to go to the affected areas to direct personnel to take the prescribed protective actions.



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#### EXHIBIT 1b (CONT'D)

#### PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS GUIDE

- 1.6 Consider use of KI if personnel have been exposed to significant Iodine. Consult RAC and Medical representative. EPIP-OC-.44 provides guidance.
- 1.7 Consider the need for security to control access to hazardous areas outside the RCA or outside the Protected Area.
- 1.8 Emergency Exposure Guidelines
  - A. Voluntary Life Saving Actions

No Pre-established Limit

B. Corrective Actions

Administrative Guidelines

1. Total Whole Body Dose (TEDE)

10 Rem

30 Rem

Lens of eye
 Total organ dose

100 Rem

#### 2.0 Off-site

- 2.1 At the General Emergency, review the Protective Action Logic Diagram and provide PAR's to the State within approximately 15 minutes of declaring the General Emergency.
  - The guidance provided by the NRC for a Protective Action Recommendation at a General Emergency is Evacuation 2 miles in 360 degrees and 5 miles downwind. Shelter all other non-affected areas of the 10 mile EPZ.

#### NOTE

If PAGs are exceeded, or are expected to be exceeded, beyond the 10 mile EPZ, assess the impact on an AD HOC Basis (i.e. Field Monitoring Team Data or Hand Written Contingency Calculations), and provide recommendations as appropriate.

- 2.1.2 Under certain circumstances it is permissible to recommend Sheltering if it is known that Sheltering WILL PROVIDE GREATER PROTECTION.
  - This would most likely occur only for short (puff) 2.1.2.1 release periods that are less than 1.5 Hrs. (which is substantially shorter than the evacuation time).



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#### EXHIBIT 1b (CONT'D)

#### PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS GUIDE

- 2.1.2.2 There must be strong assurance that there is <u>definite</u> control of the release and termination of the release by the positive actions of the emergency responders actions during the release process (such as Containment Venting).
- 2.1.3 Sheltering may be the protective action of choice, if rapid evacuation is impeded by:
  - a) severe environmental conditions--e.g. severe weather or floods;
  - b) physical constraints to evacuation--e.g. inadequate roads

#### NOTE

The information in 2.1.3 "a" and "b" MAY ONLY BE AVAILABLE from previous discussions with New Jersey Office of Emergency Management or New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Personnel.

- 2.2 During a Site Area Emergency, Protective Action Recommendations should not be immediately necessary, however, the PAR Logic Diagram should be reviewed.
- 2.3 Offsite protective actions should not be required during an Unusual Event or Alert.

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EPIP-OC-.02


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EXHIBIT 1B (CONT'D) OYSTER CREEK PAR LOGIC DIAGRAM



beyond the 10 mile EPZ, assess the impact on an AD HOC Basis (i.e. Field Monitoring Team Data or Hand Written Contingency Calculations, and provide recommendations as appropriate.

(See Exhibit 1b Section 2.1.1 through 2.1.3)

CONTINUE ASSESSMENT BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE PLANT AND FIELD MONITORING INFORMATION

EXPAND EVACUATION RECOMMENDATION TO COVER AREAS WHERE DOSES ARE EXPECTED TO EXCEED 1 REM TEDE OR 5 REM ADULT THYROID



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EXHIBIT 1c(Example)
"TEAM DISPATCH FROM C.R." CHECKLIST

	NOTE	
Star	t team numbers as ECC-001, ECC-002 etc.	
Dear		
Team '	Member Name(s): Team N	o.:
1 Cuin	Telloci Malle (b) .	
	THIRTAY CDACE AN DIGIN	
	INITIAL SPACE AT RIGHT	
1.0	Member(s) has/have been advised of radiological and/or	
2.0	industrial hazards in area or route. Radiological monitoring capability is available to team.	
	(Dose rate meter, alarming dosimeter or Rad Con escort)	
3.0	Work scope and direction has been provided to team.  Location Dispatch to:	
	Function of Team:	<u> </u>
		<del></del>
	Time team returned and brief description of function.	<del></del>
		<u> </u>
	Moore N	
Team	Member Name(s): Team N	o.:
	INITIAL SPACE AT RIGHT	
1.0	Member(s) has/have been advised of radiological and/or	
2.0	industrial hazards in area or route. Radiological monitoring capability is available to team.	
2.0	(Dose rate meter, alarming dosimeter or Rad Con escort)	
3.0	Work scope and direction has been provided to team.	
	Location Dispatch to:	
	Time team returned and brief description of function.	
		_
		<del>_</del>
Team	Member Name(s): Team N	o.:
	INITIAL SPACE AT RIGHT	
1.0	Member(s) has/have been advised of radiological and/or	
1.0	industrial hazards in area or route.	
2.0	Radiological monitoring capability is available to team.	
3.0	(Dose rate meter, alarming dosimeter or Rad Con escort) Work scope and direction has been provided to team.	
-	Location Dispatch to:	_
	Function of Team:	
	Time team returned and brief description of function.	



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EPIP-OC-.02

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#### EXHIBIT 2

#### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

The ED is vested with certain authority and responsibilities that may not be delegated to a subordinate. Included are:

- A. Approving and directing official notifications to offsite agencies.
- B. Approving and directing information releases to the media. ED/ESD approval is not required for public announcement of formal emergency declaration and changes of emergency classifications.
- C. Approving and, if possible, personally conveying appropriate Protective

  Action Recommendations to the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management.
- D. Serve as principle "point of contact" for receiving NRC directives.
- E. Classification of an emergency event.
- F. Directing onsite evacuation at the Alert or lower level emergency classification based on potential hazard to nonassigned personnel.
- G. Authorizing emergency workers to exceed 10 CFR 20 Radiation Exposure
  Limits in accordance with Exhibit 1b.
- H. Approving and directing deviation from established operating procedures, normal equipment operating limits, or technical specifications during attempts to control the plant emergency/or during a declared National Security Emergency.



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EXHIBIT 2 (continued)

NOTE: For National Security Emergencies, the following conditions must

 When this action is immediately needed to implement national security objectives as designated by the National Command Authority through the NRC.

and

 No action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can meet national security objectives is immediately apparent.

In essence, no one below a licensed SRO individual can make the NOTE: decision to depart from the license. However, if a more senior manager is present (i.e., Emergency Director) even though he may not posses an SRO license, the decision authority would be passed to him as a higher authority in the chain of command. licensed SRO shall provide his best judgement to the ED for his consideration. Beyond that, the SRO shall follow the orders of his supervisor. It is imperative that the Emergency Director consult the SRO, and the Technical Support Center to the fullest extent practicable in arriving at a decision to deviate from prescribed procedures. However, Emergency Operating Procedures should generally not be deviated from. If the decision is made to depart from licensing conditions or technical specifications, notify the NRC before taking such actions if time permits or if time does not permit then within one hour.



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EXHIBIT 2 (continued)

When the Emergency Support Director (ESD) arrives at the EOF and declares himself to be ready to assume that role, he will assume overall responsibility for management of the response to the accident and recovery operations. With the activation of the Emergency Support Director function, the ESD specifically will assume decision authority for Items A, B, C, and D. However, decision authority for Items E, F, G, and H will be retained by the ED. Decisions on all of the listed actions normally will result from close and continuous consultation between the ED and the ESD, and it shall be the responsibility of the ED to ensure the ESD is provided with the necessary information to arrive at timely and appropriate decisions. the special case of event classification, the ESD shall retain the prerogative to overrule the ED if, in the judgment of the ESD, uncertainty or other considerations exist to the extent warranting classification of higher level of emergency than that classified by the ED.



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#### EXHIBIT 3

#### OPERATIONS COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES

- A. Coordinate operations and maintenance activities through the GSS(SSM) and the OSC Coordinator.
- B. Establish and maintain direct communication with the TSC and OSC (when activated).
- C. Inform the ED of all significant plant changes and status of operator responses.
- D. Ensure ED's directions are provided to and implemented by the ECC (GSS(SSM)) and the OSC (OSC Coordinator).
- E. Consider the effects of operations and maintenance activities to off-site and on-site personnel prior to and during event response.



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#### EXHIBIT 4

#### PRESS RELEASE APPROVAL GUIDANCE

- 1.0 Press releases should be issued within approximately one hour from the time that a major plant event has occurred. Press release shall be written in accordance with the following guidelines:
  - 1.1 The following categories of information should be included in press releases.
    - a. Level of Emergency

This is simply identifying which one of the four emergency levels was declared.

b. Basis for Emergency Declaration

This should be a simplified description of the plant condition which produced the emergency action level (e.g., a leak of radioactive water within the plant building).

c. Operations Status of Plant

A simple description of plant status at the time of the emergency declaration (e.g., OCGS was operating at 100% power when the leak was discovered, however, the plant is currently reducing power).



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#### EXHIBIT 4

#### PRESS RELEASE APPROVAL GUIDANCE

#### d. Company/Government Interface

This is intended to inform the public that OCGS has notified and is working closely with government officials so that public confidence and company credibility can be increased.

#### e. Corrective Actions

This should be a nontechnical description of what plant personnel are doing to correct the problem. It may include such language as "attempts are being made to stop the leak" or "plant personnel are investigating the cause of the leak."

#### f. Offsite Impact

A statement which simply assesses what impact this event may have on the environment. This is intended to provide factual information on offsite radiological conditions (e.g., a radioactive release is in progress, however, environmental monitoring teams have not detected any radiation levels offsite in excess of normal background). The <u>initial</u> press release should include all or part of the above information since time is of the essence. However, at the very least, it should contain items a-e above.



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EPIP-OC-.02

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#### EXHIBIT 4

#### PRESS RELEASE APPROVAL GUIDANCE

- 2.0 In addition to the above, the following guidance should be used in issuing press releases:
  - Speculation, dose projections and Protective Action Recommendations should not be included in press releases.
  - Press releases may have operational and radiological review but shall have concurrence by the ED. Original initialed copies are to be retained for records. Exceptions to this are limited to press releases with boiler plate information only (e.g., Pre-approved boiler plate press releases are contained in Procedure 1820-IMP-1720.01, Attachment 1) which may be issued without prior review and approval. Once the Governor has declared a "State of Emergency", all OCNGS press releases shall be provided to the State Police representative in the Media Center for review prior to final issuance. Changes made as a result of this review should be communicated to the ESD (ED if ESD is not activated).

#### NOTE

For Security related events, press releases containing potential safeguards information are to be reviewed by the Security Coordinator.

- Press releases will be reviewed expeditiously in order to support timely issuance.
- Press releases should avoid technical terms (e.g., plant names) and jargon
  (e.g., trip) and should be written as simple as possible. For example,
  ISO Condenser could be referred to as a heat removal process from the
  Reactor.



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### EXHIBIT 5 ALTERNATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES

This exhibit provides for a description of evacuation preplanning for Alternate Emergency Response Facilities as follows:

- Control Room/ECC Evacuation of Control Room the Operators control the plant from remote shutdown panels and the GSS(SSM) directs plant operations from the TSC. All other ECC IREO members are integrated into the TSC organization. (Refer to 2000-ABN-3200.30 for specific direction).
- 2. OSC Evacuation of OSC all OSC personnel are evacuated to the SOSC which is located in the rear of the TSC. (Refer to EPIP-OC-.27 for specific direction.)
- 3. TSC Evacuation of TSC the ED support staff which includes the ED, ED
  Assistant, RAC, RASE, and PI Rep. evacuate to the Control Room (ECC). The
  Tech Support staff which includes the TSC Coordinator, TSC Engineers,
  Communication Coordinator, Communicators and the Tech Assistant evacuate to
  the OSC. The Core Engineer would initially report to the Control Room, but
  if his services are not needed, he will be sent to the OSC. (Refer to EPIPOC-.26 for specific direction).
- 4. Remote Assembly Area Evacuation of RAA's if the Forked River Bldg. 14 RAA is not available then relocate to the Berkeley Customer Operations Center.
- 5. Emergency Assembly Area The EAA may be redirected to the Forked River
  Assembly Area or to the Remote Assembly Area at Berkeley Customer Operations
  Center as directed by management. In this case Site Accountability is
  conducted as personnel exit the site.
- 6. EOF There are no backup facilities for the EOF because it is remote from the site and it is unlikely that a nuclear related incident would affect both the plant and this center.



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Time:

Time:

Date:

Date:

#### EXHIBIT 6

### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR DEVIATIONS FROM REQUIREMENTS

	FOR DEVIATIONS FROM REQUIREMENTS
TYPE OF	DEVIATION
[ ] I	Deviations authorized under the Emergency Plan.  Deviations from operating procedures, emergency procedures, emergency plan implementing procedures, or normal equipment operating limits that do not result in a deviation from Technical Specifications, Operating License, License Conditions or other NRC Rules, Regulations, or Orders.
[ ] I	I. Deviations authorized by 10 CFR $50.54$ (x) and (y) for the protection of public health and safety.
	[ ] A. Departure from a Technical Specification requirement.
	[ ] B. Departure from the Operating License.
	[ ] C. Departure from a License Condition. (Refer to page E6-2 & 3 for assistance in defining "License Conditions")
	[ ] D. Departure from NRC Rules, Regulations, or Orders.
Deviation	ons are only permissible if all of the following are met:
1. A	n Emergency condition exists which can impact the public health and Safety.
	he deviation is allowed if there are no actions which are consistent with icense conditions or technical specifications.
	he action must be taken immediately in order to be effective in protecting he public health and safety.
<u>D</u> .	eviation Justification
. —	
_	
_	
À	lternatives Considered
throughou	

SRO Concurrence:

NRC Notification:

NRC Person Notified:

(use ENS line)

ED Approval:

TSC Eng. Concurrence: \_

#### EXHIBIT 6

Procedure: EPIP-OC-.02 Rev. 30

### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR DEVIATIONS FROM REQUIREMENTS (continued)

LICENSED CONDITIONS

REGULATION	REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION	DEVIATION		
10 CFR 50.54(A) 10 CFR 50 APP: B	The state of the s		A 50.54(x) deviation consists of not implementing the OQA Plan or a section of the Plan to protect public safety and health. See NOTE 1 below.		
10 CFR 50.54(p) 10 CFR 73.55	Safeguards and Security Plan	Requirement for Physical Security and control of information pertaining to the method employed.	A 50.54(X) deviation is not implementing a major portion of the Security Plan to protect public health and safety. See Note 2 below.		
10 CFR 50.54(q) 10 CFR 73.55(b) 10 CFR 50 APP. E	Emergency Plan	Plan to insure the appropriate facilities, personnel, procedures and equipment are available to adequately respond to emergencies.  The sub-parts of this item are:  *Standard Classification System  *Notification of Local, State and Federal Organizations  *Methods, Systems & Equipment for assessing & monitoring actual or potential radiological consequences  *Use of Protective Action Recommendations  *Controlling radiological exposure  *Activation of the Emergency Response Facilities  *Activation/use of Emergency Response Facilities  *Use of ERDs (Emergency Response Data System)	All of theses sub-parts of the Emergency Plan are implemented via implementing procedures. Examples of 50.54(x) DEVIATIONS, while protecting public health and safety follow:  Deciding Intentionally to NOT.  * Control exposures of all workers per EPA-400 limits  * Activate the Emergency Response organization  * Use/Activate Emergency Facilities  The other items of this part do not meet the criteria for a 50.54(x) DEVIATION that would still protect the public health and safety. Any instance of not complying with these parts is a violation, but not a valid DEVIATION.		
10 CFR 50.54(z)	NRC Operations Center	Requires notify and maintain communications with the NRC Operations Center of events specified in 10 CFR 50.72	a $50.54(x)$ deviation is when the NRC is intentionally Not notified or when communications with the NRC is being suspended without NRC concurrence to protect public health and safety.		

#### NOTE 1

The OQA Plan describes the formal plan to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. The Plan contains the controls and bases for procedures that implement the Plan. If an entire process described in the Plan is not followed, this must be considered under 10 CFR 50.54(x). It is unlikely that such a deviation could be considered to protect the health and safety of the public thus could not be authorized under 10 CFR 50.54(x).

Specific and individual deviations from the plan's implementing procedures are not considered a deviation from the Plan, and as such would still require the approval of

the Emergency Director and documentation on Exhibit 6 but would not require not ifi cation of the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(a) (2) (i) (C).

#### NOTE 2

The Security Plan implements the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. In essence, deviations from the Security Plan are deviations from 10 CFR 73.55 and in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(a) are reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(x). In addition to the Security Plan, 10 CFR 73.55 requires a Safeguards Contingency Plan which gives guidance to accomplish specific defined objectives for different events. The Safeguards Contingency Plan is considered similar to an implementing document and therefore specific deviations from it are not 10 CFR 50.54(x) deviations. However, if whole parts of the Safeguards Contingency Plan are not followed, these should be considered under 10 CFR 50.54(x).

Example: The Security Plan, as required by 10 CFR 73.55, contains requirements on access controls. If access controls are suspended this should be considered a deviation of the Security Plan and be reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(x). However, if access controls will be maintained but differently than described in the procedures, this is not a 10 CFR 50.54(x) deviation but would still require the appropriate approval and documentation using this exhibit page E6-1.



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#### EXHIBIT 6

### EMERGENCY DIRECTOR AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR DEVIATIONS FROM REQUIREMENTS (continued)

#### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND REGULATORY EXCERPTS

50.54(X) - A licensee may take reasonable action that departs from a license condition or technical specification (contained in a license issued under this part) in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

#### NOTE

The NRC has interpreted 50.54(x) to apply to NRC rules, regulations and orders in addition to Technical Specifications, Licenses, and License Conditions.

- 50.54(y) Licensee action permitted by paragraph (x) of this section shall be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action.
- 73.55(a) In accordance with section 50.54(x) and (y) of Part 50, the licensee may suspend any safeguards measure pursuant to Section 73.55 in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with the license conditions and technical specifications that can be provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension of safeguards measures must be reported in accordance with the provisions of 73.71.

  Reports made under Section 50.72 need not be duplicated under 73.71.

#### NOTE

In essence, no one below a licensed SRO individual can make the decision to depart from the License. However if a more senior manager is present (ie., Emergency Director) even though he does not possess an SRO license, the decision authority would be passed to him as a higher authority in the chain of command. The licensed SRO shall provide his best judgement to the ED for his consideration. Beyond that the SRO shall follow the orders of his supervisor.

It is suggested that the Emergency Director consult to the extent practicable with the Technical Experts at the TSC in arriving at a decision to deviate rom prescribed procedures. However, Emergency Operating Procedures should not generally be deviated from.

50.72(b) - Any deviation from the plant's technical specifications authorized pursuant 50.54(x) of this part.

#### NOTE

Notify the NRC before taking action if time permits but at least within 1 hour of the deviation.

The NRC interprets the reporting requirement to cover any departure under 50.54(x) AND (Y), and is not limited to Technical Specification deviations.



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#### EXHIBIT 7

#### SITE ACCESS POLICY FOR MEDIA DURING EMERGENCIES

Providing reasonable site access to the media during a plant emergency is in the best interest of the corporation and the public.

Responsibility for approving site access rests with the Emergency Support Director, or, if the EOF is not activated, with the Emergency Director.

For purposes of media access to the site during an emergency, the same industrial safety and security standards and requirements that apply to non-essential employees will be applied to the media.

#### Communication Department Responsibilities

Requests for media access will be made to the ESD or ED by the Public Information Duty Representative or the Media Center Lead.

Communications will provide the ED/ESD with the number of media to gain site access, areas to be accessed and length of time the media will be there, (Communications will decide the number of media gaining access based on conditions at the time of the emergency. An attempt will be made to gain access for, at a minimum, one representative each from radio, television and print media.)

Communications will provide media transportation on and off site.

Communications will have each member of the media sign a Media Access Briefing Form, Exhibit 15, indicating they were briefed about the risks as they were known at the time by the corporation.

- If media access does not involve entry into a posted radiologically controlled area:
  - a. At Oyster Creek, Security will retain responsibility for sign in and badging.
  - b. Communications will supervise and escort the media while on site.
  - c. Communications will conduct a briefing explaining the radiological and industrial conditions and risks on site.
- If media access involves entry into a posted radiologically controlled area:
  - a. Media will be processed at Bldg. 14 as appropriate, receiving dosimetry, training, bioassay, waivers and briefings based on established procedural requirements.
  - b. Communications will notify the Security Coordinator prior to site access.
  - c. Communications in conjunction with Radiological Controls will supervise and escort the media while in posted radiologically controlled areas.



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#### EXHIBIT 7 (cont.)

#### SITE ACCESS POLICY FOR MEDIA DURING EMERGENCIES

#### ED/ESD Responsibilities

1. The ED/ESD will consult with the RAC/Group Leader R&EC, and media will be granted access if the projected dose will not exceed the 500 millirem annual limit including external and internal exposure.

#### NOTE

For Security Driven Events, media access to the site must also be approved by the local Law Enforcement Agency and Security.

2. Approve media access to the site if requirements are met.



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#### EXHIBIT 8

#### ECC COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATOR CHECKLIST

INITIALS	
1.0	Report to the Operations Coordinator\ED Assistant and support information transmittals to the TSC, OSC, EOF, BNE and NRC. Also corporate engineering if applicable.
	2.0 Direct communications operations at the facility and ensure all communicator actions are completed in accordance with procedure.
3.0	Implement EPIP-OC03, Emergency Notification.
	NOTE
	Initial Off-site notifications to the State must be accomplished within fifteen (15) minutes of the declaration.
4.0	Continue Off-site notifications until the ESD has assumed the offsite notification and the EOF communicator relieves the ECC of that responsibility. The ECC will continue to make On-Site plant page announcements.
	NOTE
	Transmissions of information to the NRC and BNE may require special attention. Any NRC and BNE needs should be addressed as soon as practical.
5.0	When relieved of Off-Site Notifications, by the EOF Communicator, the ECC Communicator shall provide a turnover of prior notifications made by ECC via the telephone and follow up with a fax of all completed notifications made from the ECC.
	NOTE
	On-site plant page announcements will remain the responsibility of the ECC.
6.0	In accordance with EPIP-OC03 establish and maintain communications with Off-site agencies until relieved by the TSC or EOF Communications Coordinator.



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EXHIBIT 8 (continued)

#### ECC COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATOR CHECKLIST

INITIALS

#### NOTE

After EOF is activated and the BNE is present, the transmission of Station Statues Checklist to BNE should be terminated.

- 7.0 Initiate the development of watch bill for your organization that will support the emergency on a 24 hour/day basis. (Exhibit 11)
- 8.0 Ensure that communications to the NRC via NRC/ENS line, this function may be transferred to the TSC if communications personnel are available in that location. This may require callout of addition personnel.

#### NOTE

Notifications are required within  $\underline{1}$  HR of declarations. NRC may require constant manning of this phone.

- 9.0 When the TSC communication coordinator is fully staffed and ready, transfer ENS line responsibilities to the TSC. NRC may resist this transfer but manpower limitations mandate it. If ERDS is operational it will facilitate the transfer.
- \_\_\_\_10.0 As requested, provide the Ops. Coordinator with the status of the OSC teams utilizing an available lan based PC

#### NOTE

If this system fails, obtain status via phone and ensure the Ops Coordinator is kept apprised.

11.0 Report failed communications systems to the TSC Communications
Coordinator. Provide specific information for each trouble report
including: circuit, nature of problem, location, etc.



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EXHIBIT 8 (continued)

#### ECC COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATOR CHECKLIST

INITIALS				
12.0	Call o	out additional person	nnel, if required (e.g., for NRC interfac	ce)
			NOTE	·
		Supervisor. For add	ty Roster personnel, contact Security Sh ditional staff, contact Group Leader Adm ailable, use normal dept. call-out method	
	13.0	If the plant compute parameters to the TS or as conditions cha	er system fails, transmit critical plant SC approximately every <u>fifteen (15)</u> minu ange.	tes,
14.0	this s	system fails, equipme	s maintained by the assigned communicator ent status should be manually transmitted _minutes or as conditions change.	r. If d to
	15.0		the emergency, ensure those agencies in EPIP-OC03 have been advised of the	
		transferred, t	otifications responsibility has been this responsibility should be transferre completion with appropriate Communicatio	d ns
16.0		ompleted logs and recredness Dept.	cords are then forwarded to the Emergency	У
		SignatureECC Comm	m. Coord.	_



EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC)

### OYSTER CREEK EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

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EXHIBIT 9

#### ECC COMMUNICATOR

#### Engineering Line

#### INITIALS

- 1.0 Report to ECC Comm. Coordinator.
- 2.0 As required, conference the Engineering line.
- 3.0 If the Plant Computer System is inoperable, obtain and complete Critical Plant Parameters sheet and ensure it is transmitted over the fax to all centers except ECC.

#### NOTE

Use the time the data was compiled as opposed to the time the data is sent when filling out the sheet.

- 4.0 Maintain the Equipment Status Display on the computer with EP applications for current Plant Status. (Instructions are in Exhibit 9A.)
- 5.0 Complete Station Status Checklist and transmit it to the BNE until the BNE function is at the EOF. Obtain directions from the ECC Comm. Coord. on when to terminate transmittal.
- 6.0 Maintain a Communicator Log (Exhibit 13) which includes:
  - Verbal communication messages not documented in writing elsewhere.
  - Any relevant information to communicator duties.
- 7.0 The Communicator may request the assistance of the Communications Coordinator to assign other personnel, such as the Off-shift STA, to perform Station Status Checklist transmission, or other tasks as necessary.



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#### EXHIBIT 9A

#### EQUIPMENT STATUS DISPLAY SYSTEM

- 1.0 Ensure that the computer with the EP applications is logged onto the LAN.
- 2.0 Open the "EP Applications" folder.
- 3.0 Double Click on the ESDS Icon.
- 4.0 Select the center from which you are accessing ESDS (i.e.; ECC, TSC, CSC, Other).
- 5.0 IF asked "Do you wish to reset status screen", THEN click the YES button.

#### NOTE

The ECC and TSC have the ability to change equipment status and add comments. The OSC has the ability to add comments. All other centers can view status. All changes being made by the TSC or OSC should be coordinated with the ECC Engineering Line Communicator.



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#### EXHIBIT 10

#### ECC COMMUNICATOR

		Plant Status Update Line					
INITIALS							
<del></del>	1.0	Activate the fax machine and select $A/B$ switch for desired line.					
		1.1 Line "A" is the primary which is commercial line i.e. 609-971-XXXX.					
		1.2 Line "B" is the backup which is the EP Circuit.					
	2.0	Set time and date of fax by PCS clock.					
	3.0	Send test transmission to TSC, OSC, and EOF (when activated). If messages are waiting, the first may be used as the test transmission.					
	4.0	Number and log each fax transmission using Exhibit 12.					
		NOTE					
		Number transmissions sequentially regardless of the type of transmission. Use location designator as part of sequential number, i.e. ECC-001, ECC-002, etc.					

- 5.0 The priority for routine transmissions are:
  - Critical Plant Parameters to TSC (<u>every 15 minutes</u> at a minimum) if the Plant Computer System is inoperable.
  - Equipment Diagrams to TSC (<u>every 30 minutes or</u> as changes occur) if equipment status <u>display system</u> is inoperable.
  - Station Status checklist to BNE at <u>least every 30 minutes</u> until they are activated at EOF or as directed by the Comm. Coordinator. (Must change Fax to commercial line "A".)
  - Other transmissions, Emergency Message Forms with appropriate information (Exhibit 14).

#### NOTE

The ECC Communications Coordinator may pre-empt these priorities.

6.0 Receive, log and distribute messages sent via fax to ECC.

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EXHIBIT 11

Page of

#### EMERGENCY SHIFT SCHEDULE

DATE:

GROUP (eg. Admin.):

TIME:	SHIFT 1	SHIFT 2	SHIFT 3
BEGIN			
END			

			NAME	NAME	NAME
	POSITION	#			
P H	HOME	#			
0 N	WORK	#			
E	BEEPER	#			
	POSITION	#			
P H	HOME	#			
0 N	WORK	#			
E	BEEPER	#			
	POSITION	#			
P H	HOME	#		•	
0 N	WORK	#			
E	BEEPER	#			
	POSITION	#			
P H	HOME	#			
0 N	WORK	#			
E	BEEPER	#			

### AmerGen ...

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#### EXHIBIT 12 HIFAX LOG

#### EXAMPLE

MESSAGE	TIME	SEND INITIAL	TSC	osc	EOF	ECC	COMMENTS
		111111111111111111111111111111111111111					
·· <u> </u>							
·							
<u>,</u>			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
					`		
			:				
<del></del>							
						·	
				·			
			TSC	osc	EOF	ECC	COMMENTS



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EXHIBIT 13

EXAMPLE

### OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

Communicator Log

Location:	Date:
Name:	·
Time:	Remarks:
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	



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EXHIBIT 14

EXAMPLE

							· .	Number	
ocgs	Eme	rgeno	<b>'y</b>	Messa	ıge				
To:	• 0:	sc •	TSC	:	• EACC				
	• E	cc •	EOF	•			Staff	Position Other	
Messag		CC	· EOF						
Origina			ff P	osition <b>TSC</b>	• osc	Initials • EACC	Time • EOF	Date	
Reply:									
Reply C	omplet	<b>ea by:</b> S	taff	Positi	on/Other	Initials	Time	Date	



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### EXHIBIT 15

#### MEDIA ACCESS BRIEFING FORM

I have been briefed about the risks, both industrial and radiological, to which I may be exposed while at this nuclear facility. I understand there may be some risk and willingly accept it for the purpose of visiting the plant site.

Signature	
Date	
News Organization	
Communications Rep.	



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#### EXHIBIT 16

#### PAR NOTIFICATION FORM

#### SAMPLE

'nТ	$\sim$	л	Τ
TΛ	v	Т	Ε

Personally provide the PAR to the Senior State Official at the State EOC, within 15 minutes of a General Emergency. Verify that you are speaking to the Senior Official at the State EOC when providing the PAR. If the PAR is provided prior to State EOC activation, the State has agreed that the State Dispatcher will be considered the "Senior State Official".

	EOC activation, the State has agreed that the State Dispatcher Will be dered the "Senior State Official".
	THIS IS A DRILL; THIS IS A DRILL or
	THIS IS NOT A DRILL; THIS IS NOT A DRILL.
	INITIAL PAR
	We recommend evacuation for the general population within 2 miles of the plant and Compass Sectors, and out to a distance of miles. We also recommend Sheltering, for the general population within all other areas of the EPZ.
	We recommend Sheltering for the general population within the 10 mile EPZ.
	EXPANSION OF PAR
	We recommend evacuation for the general population within miles of the plant and Compass Sectors, and out to a distance of miles. We also recommend sheltering for the general population within all other areas of the EPZ.
	We recommend evacuation for the general population within miles of the plant.
Signat	ture Date
Senioi	State Official Notified Time Date

### OYSTER CREEK

Number

Allei Geli.	IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE		EPIP-OC01	
An Exelon/British Energy Company Title	1MbPEWEN.1.1	NG PROCEDURE	Revision No.	
CLASSIFICATION OF EME	RGENCY CONDITI	ons	11	
Applicability/Scope		Usage Level	Responsible Department	
Applies to work at Oy	ster Creek	1	Emergency Preparedness	
This document is within QA 50.59 Reviews Required	plan scope	X Yes No X Yes No	Effective Date //-/9-0	

Prior Revision 10 incorporated the following Temporary Changes:

This Revision  $\underline{\phantom{a}}$  11 incorporates the following Temporary Changes:

N/A

N/A

List of Pages (all pages rev'd to Rev. 11)

1.0 to 9.0 E1-1 to E1-13 E2-1 to E2-38 E3-1 to E3-4 E4-1

### **NON-CONTROLLED** THIS DOCUMENT WILL NOT BE KEPT UP TO DATE IRMC OYSTER CREEK

Concurring Organization Element	Date
Emergency Preparedness Planner	1/16/01
Radiation Protection Manager	11/16/01
	Emergency Preparedness Planner



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CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

11

#### PROCEDURE HISTORY

REV	DATE	ORIGINATOR	SUMMARY OF CHANGE		
4	11/95	P. Hays	Adds description of "explosion", add EAL for ISFSI facility, rewords UE I.4 to reflect physical changes to plant, and revised/deleted EAL's based on NRC's EPPOS #1.		
5	01/99	A. Smith	Add phone number for Lamont-Doherty Observatory, to Category "O" Basis. Add note to Category "Q" Fire to Review Cat. P-2 for Potential Explosive Damage. Update the reference to Rolm phones to Meridian in Category "L" Basis. Change "AND" to "AN" in Category "P" Basis as it relates to explosion.		
6	05/99	A. Smith	Rephrase statement in CAT "K" basis for "Major Spent Fuel Damage"		
7	03/00	S. Smith	Provide examples of fuel clad damage in table on E4-1. Correct typo on E2-16 MR/HR to MR/YR. Correct typo on E2-29. EAL #4 to EAL #5, add clarifying words to basis relating to the "Facility" for tornado touch down and add "area" to protected boundary.		
8	DOS	A. Smith	Change references from GPU or GPUN to OCNGS.		
9	11/00	A. Smith	Move applicability statements to conform to procedure format.		
10	05/01	A. Smith	Remove reference to MPC limits in Cat. "J" Basis statement for UE Alert, typo CHARMS to CHRRMS, Safety Review req. to "NO".		
11	11/01	A. Smith	Revise Category R unusual event classification to clarify security threat classification based on a credible threat as determined by SY-AA-101-132. Also change Group Shift Supv. to Shift Manager.		



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CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Revision No.

#### 1.0 PURPOSE

- 1.1 To define those conditions which shall be classified as emergency conditions at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS).
- 1.2 To provide guidance in classifying such conditions.

#### 2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

2.1 To the OCNGS Plant Operations Department and the Emergency Response Organization to identify and classify in-plant or onsite emergency conditions as defined under the OCNGS Emergency Plan.

#### 3.0 DEFINITIONS

- 3.1 Alert Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
- 3.2 <u>Emergency Action</u> Those measures or steps taken to ensure that an emergency situation is assessed (assessment actions) and that the proper corrective and/or protective actions are taken.
- Emergency Actions Levels (EAL's) Predetermined conditions or values, including radiological dose rates, specific contamination levels of airborne or waterborne concentrations of radioactive materials, events such as natural disasters or fire, or specific instrument indications which, when reached or exceeded, require the implementation of the Emergency Plan. See Appendix 1 of this procedure, "Matrix of Emergency Action Levels".



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3.4 <u>EAL Applicability</u> - Reactor Plant conditions are specified for which each EAL category of events are applicable. If the plant is in an applicable condition as listed in the category an emergency declaration is required. If the plant is not in a condition listed, an emergency declaration is not required. The definitions of the five possible plant conditions are listed on the bottom of each page in the Matrix of EALs.

### 3.5 Fission Product Barriers

- The Fuel Cladding
- The Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
- The Primary Containment
- 3.6 <u>Fuel cladding integrity</u> The fuel cladding shall be considered breached if coolant activity exceeds 300 uci/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) or, Off-gas discharge indicates greater than 10,000 mR/Hr.
- 3.7 <u>General Emergency</u> Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
- 3.8 <u>Primary Containment Integrity</u> The primary containment shall be considered breached if any of the following conditions exist <u>during</u> an accident sequence:
  - 3.8.1 Unexplained rapid decrease in D.W. Pressure (exceeds makeup capacity)

-or-

3.8.2 Unexplained increase in Secondary Containment A.R.M.'s in more than one area with known or suspected leakage from Primary Containment.

-or-

3.8.3 Venting of the D.W. is required for accident control.



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- 3.9 <u>RCS Integrity</u> Shall be considered breached if there is confirmed leakage from the RCS in excess of 50 gpm.
- 3.10 <u>Site Area Emergency</u> Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near Site Boundary.
- 3.11 <u>Sustained</u> In excess of (5) five consecutive minutes or less at the Emergency Director's discretion.
- 3.12 <u>Unusual Event</u> Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

#### 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

- 4.1 The Shift Manager (SM) is responsible for the initial evaluation of abnormal or emergency site conditions and for directing immediate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure emergency actions once assuming the duties of the Emergency Director.
- 4.2 The Shift Manager (SM) is responsible for implementing this procedure until relieved of Emergency Director duties by a qualified Emergency Director.
- 4.3 The Emergency Director is responsible for the continuous assessment and evaluation of emergency conditions and for directing immediate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure emergency actions.



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#### 5.0 PROCEDURE

- The Shift Manager (SM)/Emergency Director (ED) shall <u>evaluate</u> upon recognition of in-plant and onsite conditions to determine if an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been attained or will be attained. Appendix 1 of this procedure, "Matrix of Emergency Action Levels", will aid in rapid identification of the appropriate emergency classification. Appendix 2 of this procedure provides the basis for specific EALs. Exhibit 2 provides a guideline for assessing the status of the fission product barriers.
- The Shift Manager (SM)/ED shall <u>CLASSIFY</u> the emergency condition when an EAL has been confirmed to be attained or exceeded at the highest applicable Emergency level. The GSS/ED should <u>CLASSIFY</u> an emergency condition before the EAL has been reached if it has been determined with his judgment that the EAL will be reached.
  - 5.2.1 Emergency Classifications <u>shall</u> be made as soon as possible after confirmation that an EAL has been met or will be met.

    This ensures that proper protective and corrective actions are implemented and that appropriate offsite authorities are promptly notified (within 15 minutes of declaration).
  - 5.2.2 If a time requirement for an entry condition is not met and information is available indicating that the time requirement will eventually be met, the GSS/ED should without waiting declare the event prior to the time requirement being met.



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- If an EAL is missed and discovered at some time in the future, an emergency declaration is not appropriate <u>if</u> the EAL is no longer met. Timely (approximately within 15 minutes) notification to NRC and NJOEM should still be performed indicating the EAL missed and current plant status. Judgment must be exercised in determining if the EAL is no longer in existence. All effects on plant safety must be considered even after the event has passed. (i.e. A tornado striking the facility would normally pass quickly, but the effects on safety equipment could be sustained. Therefore, an ALERT (cat. 0.4.) should be declared as soon as possible even after the tornado has passed.)
- 5.3 When an emergency classification has been made, the GSS/ED shall

  IMPLEMENT EPIP-OC-.02 and assume the duties of the Emergency Director until relieved of Emergency Director duties by a qualified Emergency Director.
- 5.4 The GSS/ED shall <u>CONTINUE ASSESSMENT</u> of in-plant, onsite and offsite emergency conditions that may prompt emergency reclassification.

#### 6.0 REFERENCES

- OCNGS Emergency Plan, 2000-PLN-1300.01.
- OCNGS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP-OC-.02)

  "Direction of Emergency Response/Emergency Control Center".
- OCNGS Emergency Operating Procedures.
- NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations to Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.



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### 7.0 EXHIBITS

- 7.1 Appendix 1, "Matrix of Emergency Action Levels for Emergency Classification".
- 7.2 Appendix 2, EAL Basis Exhibits.

RPV Level

RPV Pressure

Rx Power

D.W. Temp, Cont. Press, Torus Temp/Level

RCS Integrity

Fuel Conditions

Radiological Releases

Contamination/Rad Material Control

Control Room Indications

Electrical Power

Plant Equipment/Eng. Safety Features

Natural and Man-Made Hazards

Fire

Security/Sabotage

Fission Product Barriers

Emergency Directors Judgement

- Ex. 1 Cross Reference Index
- Ex. 2 Fission Product Barrier Guidelines

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(A) RPV LEVEL Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refuel	RPV Level ≤ 86" TAF     (Low Low Level) for     5 minutes or longer,     -and-     Not lowered by procedure	1. RPV Level ≤ 61" TAF (Low Low Low level) for 5 minutes or longer, -and- Not lowered by procedure	RPV Level ≤ 0" TAF for 5 minutes or longer, -and- Not lowered by procedure, -or-     RPV Level cannot be determined for 2 minutes or longer.	1. RPV Level ≤-30" TAF for 2 minutes or longer NOTE: This condition is indicative of a "loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third".
(B) RPV PRESSURE Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown	NONE	RX pressure greater than     1230 psig.	RX pressure greater than     1375 psig.	NONE
(C) RX POWER  Applicability: Power Operations	NONE	A scram signal received and power remains greater than 2%.	A scram signal received and power remains greater than 2% with torus temperature greater than or equal to Fig. L Boron injection temp. limit per EMG-3200.01B.	NONE
(D) DRYWELL TEMPERATURE Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown	Drywell bulk temp. ≥ 150°F     (normal maximum drywell     temperature) but < 281°F     for 5 minutes or longer.	Drywell bulk temp. cannot be maintained below 281°F. (maximum drywell design temperature)	Drywell bulk temp. cannot be maintained below 281°F. (maximum drywell temperature) and containment spray inoperable.	NONE

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

Refuel - Tech Spec Definition of Refuel Mode and Rx coolant temperature below 212°F and vented.

### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	<u>ALERT</u>	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(E) CONTAINMENT PRESSURE  Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown	Three (3) psig or greater containment pressure and RPV level cannot be maintained greater than 138 inches TAF (Lo level scram).	Torus pressure >12.0 psig.	Torus pressure above primary containment pressure limit (Figure J, EMG-3200.02 - Containment Venting required).	1. Containment hydrogen Concentration equal to or greater than 6% and Drywell or Torus Oxygen Concentration greater than 5%. NOTE: This condition is indicative of a "Loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third".
(F) TORUS TEMPERATURE Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown	Torus water temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 95°F within 24 hrs. during normal operations or below 105°F while testing.	Torus water temperature at or above 110°F.	Torus temperature and Rx pressure cannot be maintained below the heat capacity temperature limit. (Figure F, per EMG-3200.02).	NONE
(G) TORUS LEVEL  Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown *Cold Shutdown *Refuel	1. Torus water level below minimum LCO (143 inches W.R.) but greater than 110 inches W.R. actual level and cannot be restored within 4 hours.  -or-  2. Torus water level above maximum LCO (156 inches W.R.) and cannot be restored within 4 hours.	Torus water level at or below 110 inches W.R., and Torus level cannot be restored within 4 hours.	Torus level and RPV     pressure cannot be     maintained below the torus     load limit. (Figure E,     per EMG-3200.02)	NONE

<sup>\*</sup>Torus Level is <u>not</u> applicable in cold shutdown or refuel conditions if Tech Spec section 3.5.A.1 is <u>not</u> required to be met.

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel-Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode}\ and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

APPENDIX 1

MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	<u>ALERT</u>	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
RCS INTEGRITY  Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown	a. Rx isolation confirmed to be caused by:  • Low-Low Level, -or- • MSL Hi Flow, -or- • MSL Low Press, (with verified pipe break) -or- • MSL Trunnion Room high temperature -or- b. ISO Condenser Isolation confirmed to be caused by: Isolation Condenser Hi Flow (with verified pipe break) -or- c. Primary containment isolation confirmed to be initiated by: • Low-Low Level, -or- • Hi Drywell Pressure -or- Confirmed Leak rate greater than: a. 5 gpm total unidentified leakage -or- b. 25 gpm total (identified and unidentified) but less than 50 gpm from the Rx Coolant System.	1. a. Rx Isolation required -and- MSIV's malfunction causing unisolated Main Steam Line -or- b. ISO Condenser (IC) isolation required -and- ISO Condenser steam or condensate valves mal- function causing un- isolated I.Cor- c. Primary Cont. isolation required and Primary Cont. isolation valves malfunction causing unisolated release pathor- 2. Confirmed leak rate exceeds 50 gpm from the Rx Coolant System.	1. a. Confirmed main steam line break which exceeds 500,000 lbm/hr outside primary containment -and-MSL's are not isolated -or- b. ISO Condenser break outside primary containment -and-ISO Condenser steam or condensate lines are not isolated.  NOTE: These conditions represent a loss of containment and Rx Coolant System Barriers.	NONE

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

Refuel - Tech Spec Definition of **Refuel Mode** and Rx coolant temperature below 212°F and vented.

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	<u>ALERT</u>	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(I) FUEL CONDITIONS  Applicability: All plant conditions	1. Offgas of 3,330 mR/hr or increase of 666 mR/hr in 30 minutes.  -or-  2. Reactor coolant lodine activity of greater than 0.2 uCi/gm, but less than 300 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent lodine (DEI)  -or-  3. Unexplained, verified stack gas rad monitor Hi-Hi Alarm;  -or- Unexplained, verified Hi-Hi alarm on any process rad monitor.  -or-  4. Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure due to MSL High Radiation	1. Offgas of greater than 10,000 mR/Hr -or- 2. Reactivity coolant lodine (DEI) activity of greater than or equal to 300 uCi/gm, DEI.	Significant (20%) Fuel Cladding failure indicated by:  1. Containment Hi-Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading greater than or equal to 2.0E+4 R/Hr -or-  2. Containment Hydrogen greater than or equal to 10%.	NONE

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel-Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode}\ and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(J) RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES  Applicability: All plant conditions	1. Noble Gas: Stack Monitor greater than CPSUE* -or- 2. Iodine: Release rate greater than 4 uCi/sec -or- 3. 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, Limits exceeded in discharge canal at Rt. 9 Bridge -or- Offsite Dose:  4. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 0.1 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) but less than 10 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings -or- 5. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than 0.5 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid but less than 50 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid but less than 50 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid dose exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings	1. Noble Gas: Stack Monitor greater than CPSA** -or- 2. lodine: Release rate greater than 40 uCi/sec -or- 3. 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, Limits exceeded by a factor of 10 in discharge canal at Rt. 9 Bridgeor- Offsite Dose:  4. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 10 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) but less than 50 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings -or- 5. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 50 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid but less than 250 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid dose exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings	Offsite Dose:  4. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 50 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) but less than 1000 mRem (1 Rem) total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings -or-  5. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 250 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid but less than 5000 mRem (5 Rem) (CDE) adult thyroid dose exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings	Offsite Dose:  4. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 1000 mRem (1 Rem) total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings -or-  5. A valid integrated dose at (or beyond) the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 5000 mRem (5 Rem) (CDE) adult thyroid exists as indicated by:  • dose projections -or- • field team readings

MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

\*\*CPSA is the Alert trigger provided routinely by Chemistry.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel\ -\ Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode\ } and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	<u>UNUSUAL EVENT</u>	<u>ALERT</u>	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(K) CONTAMINATION/ RAD MATERIAL CONTROL  Applicability: All plant conditions	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation  1. 2R/hr at the face of a SF Module  -or-  1R/hr at 1 foot from a damaged Module in the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation	ALERT  Rad Material Control  1. Verified mechanical damage to irradiated fuel which results in a high alarm on any of the following refuel floor ARM's: B-9, C-9, C-10.  -or-  2. Any incident involving rad material which results in unexpected increase of in-plant rad levels or air-borne contamination by a factor of 1000.	Fuel Handling  1. Major damage to spent fuel resulting in uncontrolled release of radioactive material, or uncontrollable decrease in fuel pool water level below top of spent fuel.	GENERAL EMERGENCY  NONE

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel-Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode}\ and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(L) CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS  Applicability: Power Operations	Loss of Indications:  1. Loss of indication or alarm on processing monitored systems or effluent stream in Control Room, causing Rx to be shutdown.  -or-  2. Loss of any means of plant assessment, causing Rx to be shutdown.	Loss of Indications:  1. Loss of 3 or more Control Room Annunciator Panels during power operations for greater than 5 mins. No backup alarm information capability available (SAR & PCS).	Loss of Indications:  1. Loss of 3 or more Control Room Annunciator Panels during power operations for greater than 5 mins. No backup alarm information capability available (SAR & PCS).  -and-  A plant transient condition exists which causes a change in Rx power of more than 10% (APRM).	NONE
(L) CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS  Applicability: All Plant Conditions	Valid unplanned loss of all communications capability such that no means of notification to offsite agencies exist as determined by the GSS/ED.	2. Evacuation of Control Room anticipated or required with control of shutdown system established from local stations within 15 minutes.	Evacuation of Control Room and control of shutdown systems <u>not</u> established from local stations within 15 minutes.	NONE

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

Refuel - Tech Spec Definition of **Refuel Mode** and Rx coolant temperature below 212°F and vented.

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(M) ELECTRICAL POWER  Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdown	Loss of Power:  1. Loss of power to 4160V Buses 1A and 1B for greater than one hour;  -or- 2. Loss of both diesel generator capabilities for greater than one hour.	Loss of Power:  1. Loss of power to 4160V Buses 1A and 1B for greater than 60 seconds but less than 15 minutes -andLoss of both diesel generator capabilities: -or- 2. Loss of all plant vital DC power for greater than 60 seconds but less than 15 minutes.	Loss of Power:  1. Loss of power to 4160V Buses 1A and 1B Exceeds 15 minutes  -andLoss of both diesel generator capabilities; -or- 2. Loss of all plant vital DC power for more than 15 minutes.	NONE
(M) ELECTRICAL POWER  Applicability: Cold Shutdown Refuel/Defueled	3. Loss of power to 4160V Buses 1A and 1B for greater than 60 seconds but less than 15 minutes -and- Loss of both diesel generator capabilities -or- 4. Loss of all plant vital DC power for greater than 60 seconds but less than 15 minutes.	3. Loss of power to 4160V Buses 1A and 1B Exceeds 15 minutes.  -and- Loss of both diesel generator capabilities; -or- 4. Loss of all plant vital DC power for more than 15 minutes.	NONE	· NONE

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel - Tech Spec Definition of \ \textbf{Refuel Mode} \ and \ {\tt Rx \ coolant \ temperature \ below \ 212°F \ and \ vented}.$ 

### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(N) PLANT EQUIPMENT ENGINEERED SAFETY	Failure to comply with Tech. Spec. L.C.O.'s	Loss of Cold Shutdown Equipment	Loss of Hot Shutdown Equipment	Loss of Decay Heat Heat Removal
FEATURES OR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM  Applicability: Power Operations	Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specification L.C.O Action Statement Time.	Complete loss of all ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.	Complete loss of any function needed for plant hot shutdown, (e.g. Rx Prot. Sys. or CRD System) when hot shutdown is required.	Shutdown occurs, but all decay heat removal capability is lost.     Significant cladding failure or fuel melt could occur in 10 hours with subsequent containment failure.
Hot Shutdown for SAE, and GE				
Power Operations Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refuel for UE and Alert				

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel-Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode}\ and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

(O) Natural Phenomenon Natural Phenomenon Natural Phenomenon None  NATURAL HAZARDS (Earthquakes, Intake Levels High Winds)  OR Natural Phenomenon Natural Phenomenon None  1. Verified earthquake felt operations.  1. Earthquake affecting plant operations.  Or	CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
2-2.0 feet as measured by the staff gauge. Or Applicability: All Plant Conditions for UE and Alert  Applicability for SAE 1, 2, 3, & 4 Power Operations, Hot Shutdown.  Applicability for SAE 1, 5. The National Weather Service is forecasting sustained winds in excess of 74 mph for the site within 4 hours. Or  6. The Oyster Creek site is included in a tornado "warning" area.  S-2.0 feet as measured by the staff gauge. Or  3. Intake water level at the intake structure lower deck.  Sustained hurricane force winds of greater than 8 feet above sea level. (2.0 feet above intake structure lower deck).  Or  4. Sustained high winds greater than 95 mph, as indicated on wind speed recorder. Or  5. The National Weather Service is forecasting sustained winds in excess of 74 mph for the site within 4 hours. Or  6. The Oyster Creek site is included in a tornado "warning" area.	(O) NATURAL HAZARDS (Earthquakes, Intake Levels High Winds)  Applicability: All Plant Conditions for UE and Alert  Applicability for SAE 1, 2, 3, & 4 Power Operations, Hot	Natural Phenomenon  1. Verified earthquake felt in plant.  -or- 2. Intake canal water level <a href="ex-2.0">&lt;-2.0 feet as measured by the staff gauge.</a> -or- 3. Intake water level 4.5 feet above sea level (1.5 feet below intake structure lower deck).  -or- 4. Sustained high winds greater than 74 mph, as indicated on wind speed recorder.  -or- 5. The National Weather Service is forecasting sustained winds in excess of 74 mph for the site within 4 hours.  -or- 6. The Oyster Creek site is included in a tornado	Natural Phenomenon  1. Earthquake affecting plant operations.  -or-  2. Intake canal water level ≤-2.5 feet as measured by the staff gauge.  -or-  3. Intake water level at the intake structure lower deck.  -or-  4. Sustained hurricane force winds of greater than 95 mph, as indicated on wind recorder.  -or-  5. Any tornado striking the	Natural Phenomenon  1. Earthquake affecting systems required for shutdown.  -or-  2. Intake canal water level ≤-3.0 feet, as measured by the staff gauge.  -or-  3. Intake water level greater than 8 feet above sea level. (2.0 feet above intake structure lower deck).  -or-  4. Sustained wind speed in excess of 100 mph indicated in the Control	

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel\ -\ Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode}\ and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	<u>ALERT</u>	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(P) MAN-MADE HAZARDS  Applicability: All Plant Conditions for UE and Alert  Applicability for SAE 1, 2 & 3 Power Operations Hot Shutdown	Hazards Experienced/Projected  1. Onsite aircraft crash outside the protected area fence AND NOT impacting permanent plant structures.  -or-  2. Unanticipated explosion detected near the site OR onsite.  -or-  3. Near the site or onsite TOXIC GAS, FLAMMABLE GAS or LIQUID release which could affect the habitability required for normal plant operability.  -or-  4. Turbine rotor component (i.e., blades, wheels, shroud, bearings, or other rotating component) failure causing a Rx trip.	Hazards Experienced/Projected  1. Aircraft crash OR other missile impact within the protected area OR onto any permanent structures.  -or- 2. Known explosion damage to any permanent plant structure.  -or- 3. Release of TOXIC, or FLAMMABLE GAS into the plant which affects the safe operation of the plant as determined by the Shift Manager/ Emergency Directoror- 4. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration.	Hazards Experienced/Projected  1. Aircraft crash which affects vital structures by impact OR by fire.  -or- 2. Explosion OR missile impact which caused severe damage to safe shutdown equipmentor- 3. Entry of TOXIC or FLAMMABLE GAS into vital area which affects the operation of safe shutdown equipment.	NONE
(Q) FIRE Applicability: All Plant Conditions	Fire  1. Valid Fire inside the Protected Area which cannot be controlled by the fire brigade within 10 minutes from the time of verification.	Fire  1. Fire which potentially affects the operability of a Safety System and the plant is in a transient condition requiring the use of the System.	Fire  1. Fire which renders a Safety System completely inoperable and that system is needed to function for for accident control.	NONE
	NOTE: Also see Cat. P-2	NOTE: Also see Cat. P-2	NOTE: Also see Cat. P-2	

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

Refuel - Tech Spec Definition of **Refuel Mode** and Rx coolant temperature below 212°F and vented.

### APPENDIX 1 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(R) SECURITY- SABOTAGE  Applicability: All Plant Conditions	Security Threat  1. Shift Manager/Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Supervisor that an attempted entry, or attempted sabotage of the site (owner controlled area) condition exists.  -or- 2. Shift Manager/Emergency Director determination based on advice from Site Protection Supervisor of an Actual Threat that meets ALL of the following criteria:  • A credible threat determined per SY-AA-101-132; AND • Is specifically directed towards the station; AND • Is imminent (within 2 hours).  -or- 3. Any attempted act of sabotage which is deemed legitimate in the judgment of the Shift Manager/Emergency Director, and affects the operations of the plant.	Security Threat  1. Shift Manager/ Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Shift Supervisor that the compromise is onsite, but no penetration of the protected area has occurred.  -or-  2. Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level or safety of the plant, as judged by the Group Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.	Security Threat  1. Shift Manager/ Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Shift Supervisor that security of the plant (vital area) is threatened by unauthorized (forcible) entry of the facility (protected area).  -or- 2. Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public, as judged by the Shift Manager/ Emergency Director.	Security Threat  1. Shift Manager/ Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Shift Supervisor that the loss of physical security control of the plant (vital area) has occurred.  -or-  2. Any act of sabotage which results in imminent significant cladding failure or fuel melting with the potential for loss of containment integrity or the potential for the release of significant amounts of radioactivity in a short time as judged by the Shift Manager/ Emergency Director.
(S) FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS  Applicability: Power Operations Hot Shutdowns	None	None	None	Fission Product Barriers  1. Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential loss of the third (i.e., loss of coolant accident, failure of ECCS, Core Melt Probable

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

 ${\tt Refuel-Tech\ Spec\ Definition\ of\ \textbf{Refuel\ Mode}\ and\ Rx\ coolant\ temperature\ below\ 212°F\ and\ vented.}$ 

#### MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

				and Loss of Containment imminent).
CATEGORY	UNUSUAL EVENT	<u>ALERT</u>	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(T) EMERGENCY DIRECTOR'S JUDGMENT	Whenever plant conditions are in progress or have occurred which may indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, as judged by the Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.	Whenever plant conditions are in progress or have occurred which may involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant, as judged by the Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.	Whenever plant conditions are in progress or have occurred which may involve actual or likely major failures of the plant functions needed for the protection of the public as judged by the Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.	None
Applicability: All Plant Conditions	NOTE: In exercising the judgment as to the need for declaring an Unusual Event, uncertainty concerning the safety status of the plant, the length of time the uncertainty exists and the prospects of resolution of ambiguities in a reasonable time period is sufficient basis for declaring an Unusual Event.	NOTE: In exercising the judgment as to the need for declaring an Alert, uncertainty concerning the safety status of the plant, the length of time the uncertainty exists the prospects for resolution of ambiguities beyond a reasonable time period and the potential of the level of safety of the plant is sufficient basis for declaring an Alert.	NOTE: In exercising the judgment as to the need for declaring a Site Area Emergency, uncertainty concerning the status of the plant functions needed for the protection of the public, the length of time of the uncertainty exists, the prospects for resolution of ambiguities beyond a reasonable time and the potential degradation of the plant functions needed for protection of the public is sufficient basis for declaring a Site Area Emergency.	

Power Operations - Tech Spec Definition.

Hot Shutdown - Shutdown Condition or Refuel Mode as defined by Tech Spec and Rx coolant temperature not below 212°F or not vented. Cold Shutdown - Tech Spec Definition.

Refuel - Tech Spec Definition of **Refuel Mode** and Rx coolant temperature below 212°F and vented.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category A "RPV Level"

(A)

Basis

Condition **Applicability**  Power Operations, Hot Shutdown, Cold Shutdown, Refuel

Because Tech Specs recognize reactor level as a Safety Limit when there is irradiated fuel in the vessel, this EAL category shall apply for all conditions while there is fuel in the vessel. The

only condition which does not apply is the Defueled condition.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL

RPV level <86" TAF (Low-Low Level) for 5 minutes or longer,

-and-

Not lowered by procedure

Basis

This EAL is a precursor to situations leading to inadequate core cooling conditions. This situation indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of plant due to an apparent inability to maintain normal makeup to the reactor vessel. EAL is not intended to be applied to momentary reductions of level due to transients such as a Rx scram where level is controlled below the normal operating level. The use of 86" TAF as the setpoint is based on the Tech Spec value (7'2") as discussed under the Limiting Safety System Settings bases as an initiation signal to Core Spray System to ensure adequate Core Cooling. The 5 minutes is to prevent declaration of events which are simply transient conditions and not sustained failures. Intentional level reductions in accordance with SBEOPs or approved operation/maintenance procedures are not considered level control emergencies for the UE, Alert or SAE classes.

Classification

Alert

EAL

RPV level ≤61" TAF (Low-Low-Low Level) for 5 minutes or longer,

-and-

Not lowered by procedure

Basis

The inability to maintain RPV level above 61" TAF should be considered a substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The use of 61" TAF as the setpoint is based on the Symptom Based Emergency Operating Procedures. This lower limit for the alternate RPV water level control band is to ensure contingency actions can be initiated before RPV level decreases to the top of active fuel. This value is utilized to be consistent with the SBEOP's concern for Core Cooling by submergence.

The 5 minutes is to prevent declaration of events which are simply transient conditions and not sustained failures. Intentional

level reductions in accordance with SBEOPs or approved

operation/maintenance procedures are not considered level control

emergencies for the Alert class.



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APPENDIX 2 (continued)

Category A "RPV Level"

Basis (con't) Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

(2) RPV level cannot be determined for 2 minutes or longer

Basis

- (1) This EAL addresses the potential concern of adequate core cooling resulting from major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. This condition assumes a loss of coolant in excess of makeup capacity with the potential loss of adequate core cooling. The use of 0" TAF is based on the SBEOP concern that the only mechanism to assure adequate core cooling is steam cooling. Intentional level reductions in accordance with SBEOPs or approved operation/maintenance procedures are not considered level control emergencies for the SAE class.
- (2) This EAL is intended to address the circumstances where "RPV level cannot be determined" as used by the SBEOP's. Since level cannot be determined the conservative assumption is made that it is less than the top of the active fuel. The 2 minutes is used because it is the most limiting maximum core uncovery time and therefore provides additional conservatism. This EAL may escalate to the GE class based on indications of further degradation such as increasing Containment Hydrogen concentration, Containment High Range Radiation Monitors or other indicators of a "loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third".



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APPENDIX 2 (continued)

Category A "RPV Level"

Classification

General Emergency

EAL

RPV level <-30" TAF for 2 minutes or longer,

Basis

This EAL assumes a breach of the RCS is the cause of the low RPV level. Due to the low level, overheating of the fuel clad with subsequent failure could occur leading to a potential containment failure. The cladding failure may be exhibited by the production of hydrogen. If this condition exists venting of the containment could be required. Under this set of circumstances plant conditions are unstable indicating a "loss of two out of three fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third. The use of -30" TAF is in recognition of the loss of core submergence and the loss of the Minimum Steam Cooling Water Level as identified in the SBEOP's. Further degradation may lead to clad failure and ultimately substantial core damage. The 2 minutes establishes the conservative approach by assuming the core is uncovered within 5 minutes of S/D, thereby meeting the max. core uncovery time limit.

It should also be noted, the classification is required even if a procedure would instruct such actions (level/power control) due to the potential for fuel damage under such

extreme conditions.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category B "RPV Pressure"

(B) Condition Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown

CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Basis

For the vessel to have pressure present the reactor must be in either Power Operation or Hot Standby condition. The other conditions by definition do not include any pressure operation.

Classification

Alert

EAL

Rx pressure greater than 1230 psig.

Basis

This EAL is an escalation of the U.E. class. The value of 1230 psig was selected because it is the highest opening value for the safety valves as specified in Technical Specifications. This condition is indicative of a continuing pressure control failure which was not corrected by several safety functions. This EAL is not intended for short-lived pressure spikes such as after the design based transient - turbine trip without bypass capability, but rather a continuous high pressure condition, (existing for 5 consecutive minutes).

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

Rx Pressure greater than 1375 psig

Basis

This EAL is a further escalation of the high pressure condition. The value 1375 psig was selected because it is the safety limit value provided in Tech Specs. The pressure vessel is capable of withstanding this pressure, however, the extent to which this value can be exceeded and the duration of the condition is not readily known. Pressures in excess of design can lead to catastrophic failure of the vessel, having unknown impact on the fuel clad and containment barriers. Additionally this condition is indicative of a major loss of pressure control ability. For these reasons confirmed RPV pressures in excess of 1375 psig for any length of time should be classified at this level.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category C "Rx Power"

(C) Condition Applicability

**Power Operation** 

Basis

The Alert and SAE levels require Rx power to remain above 2%. By definition the only condition which the Rx can be critical in is Power Operations. The other conditions do not allow criticality by design and therefore do not apply.

Classification

Alert

EAL

A scram signal received and power remains greater than 2%.

Basis

This EAL is intended to address the failure of the RPS to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical. This condition represents a major failure of the reactor protection system to complete its intended function. Such a failure is a substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This EAL does not distinguish between a manually initiated scram or automatically initiated scram. If either method fails to initiate and complete the scram function and power remains greater than 2%, this EAL is met regardless of whether a backup function is implemented to completion.

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

A scram signal received and power remains greater than 2% with torus temperature greater than or equal to Figure L, Boron injection initiation temperature limit per EMG-3200.01B.

Basis

This EAL is an upgraded condition of the Alert Classification. In conjunction with the failure of the RPS, the main condenser is assumed to be lost causing the containment to absorb the energy from the reactor. Continued operation in this manner could lead to a major failure of the primary containment which would have a significant impact on the general public.



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APPENDIX 2

Category D, E, F, G "D.W. Temp, Cont. Press. Torus Temp and Level"

(D & E)
Condition
Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown

CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Basis

The OC EAL basis for both of these categories is to address conditions which could lead to a loss of containment integrity. OC Tech Specs require containment integrity to be provided whenever the plant is greater than 212°F, or the Rx is critical (except during physics testing). By definition the only conditions which apply to critical or hot operations are Power Operation and Hot Shutdown.

(F) Condition Applicability

Power Operation, Hot Shutdown

Basis

Torus temperature is an indication of a reactor coolant leak when at power or hot. Additionally, its temperature is considered in accident analysis for accidents occurring while at power.

Tech Specs Section 3.5.A.1.C specifies when torus temperature limits apply. All limits are stated for power operation.

Because containment integrity is required when hot or critical, torus temperature EALS are required when in Power Operation or Hot Shutdown.

(G) Condition Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown, \*Cold Shutdown, \*Refuel

Basis

Torus level is required for conditions beyond conditions requiring containment integrity. Tech Spec Section 3.5.A.1.a&b state the max and min level allowed in the Torus and they are limiting if there is irradiated fuel in the vessel and work is being done which has potential to lower vessel level or the RPV is pressurized. This means torus level limits apply to all defined EAL Rx conditions except for Defueled or if Tech Spec Section 3.5.A.1 is not required to be met (\*while in Cold Shutdown or Refuel).

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL's

- Cat. D Drywell bulk temperature ≥150°F. (Normal maximum D.W. temperature) but less than 281°F for 5 minutes or longer.
- Cat. E Three psig or greater containment pressure and RPV level cannot be maintained greater than 138 inches TAF. (Lo Level Scram)
- Cat. F Torus water temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 95°F within 24 hours during normal power operations or below 105°F while testing.
- Cat. G Torus water level below minimum LCO or above maximum LCO -, and cannot be restored within 4 hours.



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### APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Category D, E, F, G "D.W. Temp, Cont. Press. Torus Temp and Level"

Basis

The EAL's in these categories at the U.E. Class are intended to address those precursor events and conditions which could lead to a loss of containment integrity. These EAL's are considered potential problems which have an impact on containment integrity. The primary concern is mitigation of the condition which is posing a threat to the containment.

Classification

Alert

EAL's

- Cat. D Drywell bulk temp cannot be maintained below 281°F. (Maximum drywell design temperature.)
- Cat. E Torus pressure >12.0 psig.
- Cat. F Torus water temperature at or above 110°F.
- Cat. G Torus water level at or below 110 inches W.R., and torus level cannot be restored within 4 hours.

Basis

The alert classification assumes a breach of the reactor coolant system has caused the increased containment parameters or a breach of the containment is the cause of the decreased torus level. Under these assumptions, the containment parameters utilized are indicative of a substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. These conditions should be validated by other plant parameters indicating a loss of coolant to the containment or a torus leak.

#### Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL's

- Cat. D Drywell bulk temp. cannot be maintained below 281°F and containment spray is inoperable.
- Cat. E Torus pressure above primary containment pressure limit (Figure J EMG-3200.02 Containment Venting req'd).
- Cat. F Torus temperature and Rx pressure cannot be maintained below the heat capacity temperature limit (Figure F, EMG-3200.02).
- Cat. G Torus level and RPV pressure cannot be maintained below the torus load limit (Figure E, EMG-3200.02).

Basis

The conditions necessary to meet these EAL's are assumed to be from a breach of the Reactor Coolant System. These conditions are upgraded from the Alert Class because of the potential loss of containment. The breach of the containment may be from it's inability to withstand further stress or, intentional venting when directed by procedure. In any case this provides a release path to the environment which could adversely affect the general public.



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APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Category D, E, F, G "D.W. Temp, Cont. Press. Torus Temp and Level"

Classification

General Emergency

EAL

Cat. E Containment H2 concentration equal to or greater than 6% and D.W. or Torus O2 concentration greater than 5%.

Basis

This EAL is intended to cover those situations where the hydrogen production is due to the zirconium-water reaction expected in fuel melt sequences. The oxygen component may be achieved through venting the containment or other means are possible. With the levels of 6% hydrogen and 5% oxygen an explosive mixture could exist. If ignited this could cause a breach of the containment. Since the fuel clad is already breached (zirc-water reaction) and the RCS is breached (hydrogen in containment) then this situation should be considered a loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss (or actual loss) of the third.



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APPENDIX 2
Category H "RCS Integrity"

(H) Condition Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown

Basis

All items listed in this category are listed for systems required if hot or at power.

When in Cold S/D or Refuel condition, excessive leakage will cause RPV level to decrease and EAL category (A) will become the entry action level for these events.

This category is not applicable in the Defueled condition because RPV conditions are no longer supporting irradiated fuel containment.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL

- 1a. Rx Isolation confirmed to be caused by:
  - •Low-Low level, -or-
  - •MSL hi flow, -or-
  - •MSL Low Press, (with verified pipe break)
  - •MSL Trunnion Room high temperature

-or-

- b. Iso Condenser isolation confirmed to be caused by: Isolation Condenser Hi Flow (with verified pipe break) -or-
- c. Primary Containment Isolation confirmed to be initiated by:
  - •Low-Low Level, -or-
  - •Hi Drywell Pressure

-or-

- 2. Confirmed leak rate greater than:
  - a. 5 gpm total unidentified leakage

-or-

b. 25 gpm total (identified and unidentified) but less than 50 gpm from the Rx Cool. System

Basis

The EAL's presented in this class are indicative of a significant leak from the Reactor Coolant System. The conditions under item 1 indicate the need to stop a presumed leak and the isolation function works.

The EAL's under item 2 are derived from the Tech Spec LCO on Rx Coolant allowable leak rate, since the Nureg specifically requires meeting this condition. In order to address relatively small leak rate concerns, confirmatory actions (assessment) should be done expeditiously, preferably within one hour of identification of problem. These EAL's should not be applied in circumstances which do not require meeting the Tech Spec conditions such as testing, or when the vessel is de-fueled.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category H "RCS Integrity"

Classification

Alert

EAL

1a. Rx isolation required

-and-

MSIV's malfunction causing unisolated main steam line -or-

b. Iso Condenser (I.C.) isolation required

-and-

Iso Condenser steam or condensate valves malfunction causing unisolated I.C.

-or-

c. Primary Containment isolation required and primary containment isolation valves malfunction causing unisolated release path

-or-

Confirmed leak rate exceeds 50 gpm from the Rx Coolant System

Basis

The intent of EAL #1 is to address the failure of the automatic isolation function. This is considered a significant degradation in the level of safety of the plant since the automatic function was required and did not occur or continue to completion. If a manual isolation is initiated by operator actions prior to the automatic function taking place this classification should not be declared. Alternately, if the automatic function fails to occur and a manual isolation or operator initiated isolation (eg. mode switch placed in run with MSL pressure less than 850) is implemented, the conditions of these EAL's are met. If the manual isolation actions fail to be effective consideration should be given to the SAE class of this category for continued release concerns.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category H "RCS Integrity"

Classification

Alert

Basis

The intent of EAL #2 is to address excessive leak rates from the Rx Coolant System. Confirmation of the leak rate should be done expeditiously, preferably within one hour of identification of the problem. Leak rate may be integrated over a reasonable period of time (e.g., 30 minutes) in cases where accuracy is important (i.e., around 50 gpm), but incases of obvious large leaks, this period should be minimized. Thirty minutes was chosen as the integration period because it represents approximately 8 inches of RPV level at 50 gpm and is a marked step increase from the Unusual Event EAL. Thirty minutes also allows for an accurate measurement that reduces effects of transient conditions. A leak of this magnitude has the potential to cause damage to other equipment even during periods when there is no fuel in the vessel. For this reason, leaks from the RCS at this rate or higher require declaration of an Alert.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category H "RCS Integrity"

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

1a. Confirmed main steamline break which exceeds 500,000 lbm/hr outside primary containment

-and-

Main steamlines are not isolated

-or-

b. Iso Condenser break outside primary containment -and-

Iso Condenser steam or condensate lines are not isolated

Basis

The conditions cited in these EAL's represent a release path to the environment. Under these conditions 2 fission product barriers are breached (Rx Coolant System indicated by the leak and primary containment indicated by failure to isolate or is being bypassed). Off-site dose assessment should be performed before de-escalation or termination from this condition because of the unknown release impact. The reason that 500,000 lb/hr was chosen is that this is the smallest value that CR instrumentation can indicate on the main steamline flow instrument on the front panel.

Other situations may occur which indicate a failure of the RCS and also bypass containment, under these conditions E.D. Judgement may apply, but in all cases dose assessment should be performed.

These EAL's are intended to address the Nureg statement "BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation".



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category I "Fuel Conditions"

(I) Condition Applicability

All Plant Conditions.

Basis

All conditions apply because even fuel pool accidents could lead to conditions meeting some of the EALs listed here.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL's

Fuel Damage Indicated

- 1. Offgas of 3,330 mR/hr, or increase of 666 mR/hr in 30 min. -or-
- Reactor coolant Iodine activity of greater than 0.2uCi/gm, but less than 300 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI)
- -or3. Unexplained, verified stack gas rad monitor Hi-Hi Alarm;
  -orUnexplained, verified Hi-Hi Alarm on any process rad monitor;
  -or-
- 4. Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure due to MSL High Radiation.

Basis

These EAL's are intended to address indications of irradiated fuel cladding perforation and the subsequent release of fission product gases. These conditions are precursors of more serious cladding degradation. The use of alarmed functions provides warning to the operator of potential fuel damage. The off-gas value of 3,330 mR/hr is derived from the use of the conversion factor of "150". The Nureg 0654 limit is 500,000 uci/sec. The conversion factor is normally less than the "150" value, however this provides the appropriate conservatism when assessing the status of the fuel.

### Classification

Alert

EAL's

Loss of Fuel Cladding

- 1. Offgas of greater than 10,000 mR/hr:
  - -or-
- Reactor coolant Iodine activity of greater than or equal to 300 uCi/cc, DEI.

Basis

These EAL's are indicative of a breach of the fuel clad fission product boundary. This condition should be considered a "loss of 1 out of 3 fission product barriers" and requires classification as an alert.

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL's

Significant (20%) Fuel Cladding failure indicated by:

- Containment Hi-Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading greater than or equal to 2.0E+4 R/Hr.
  - -or-
- 2. Containment Hydrogen greater than or equal to 10%.



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### APPENDIX 2

Category I "Fuel Conditions"

Basis

The radiation reading or hydrogen concentration inside the primary containment are expected to be due to a degraded core condition and a breach of the RCS boundary. This condition is indicative of a "loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers". The use of 10% H<sub>2</sub> concentration in this case has no bearing on the impact to the containment, but rather is indicative of the amount of fuel clad damage by the metal-water reaction.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category J "Radiological Releases"

(J) Condition Applicability

All Plant Conditions.

Basis

This covers any event which leads to a rad release regardless of plant condition.

Classifications

Unusual Event

EAL's

- 1. Noble Gas: Stack Monitor greater than  $\mathrm{CP}S_{\mathrm{UE}}$
- 2. Iodine: Release rate greater than 4 uCi/sec
- 3. 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, limits exceeded in discharge canal at Rt. 9 Bridge -or-

Off-site Dose:

- 4. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 0.1 mRem total whole body (TEDE) but less than 10 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings
- 5. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 0.5 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid but less than 50 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid dose exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.

Basis

Unplanned releases in excess of the site technical specifications that continue for 5 minutes or longer represent a potential degradation in the level of safety. The final integrated dose is not the primary concern here, it is the degradation in plant control implied by the fact that the release was not isolated. The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a radioactive discharge permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit. Offsite Dose due to plant releases (readings above background) can be determined from field measurement readings or dose projections. Monitor indications are calculated on the basis of the methodology of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), which demonstrates compliance with 10CFR20 and/or 10CFR50 Appendix I requirements.

In EAL 4, the 0.1 mR value is based on a proration of two times the 500 mR/yr for an individual member of the public stated in the Oyster Creek Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual, rounded down to 0.1 mRem per event.

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#### APPENDIX 2

Category J "Radiological Releases"

-or-

Classification

Alert

EAL's

- 1. Noble Gas: Stack Monitor greater than CPS,
- 2. Iodine: Release rate greater than 40 uCi/sec -or-
- 3. 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, Limits exceeded by a factor of 10 in discharge canal at Rt. 9 Bridge.

Offsite Dose:

- 4. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 10 mRem but less than 50 mRem total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.
  -or-
- 5. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 50 mRem but less than 250 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid dose exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.

Basis

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 10. In EAL 3, the 10.0 mR/hr value is based on a proration of 200 times the 500 mR/Yr limit for an individual member of the public stated in the Oyster Creek Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual, rounded down to 10.0 mR/hr. EALs' at this level or higher are entry conditions to Procedure EMG-3200.12.

Classification Site Area Emergency

EAL's

Offsite Dose:

- 4. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 50 mRem but less than 1000 mRem (1 Rem) total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.
- 5. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 250 mRem but less 5000 mRem (5 Rem) (CDE) adult thyroid exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.

Basis

The 50 mRem is based on the corporate philosophy for classification relative to the EPA's protective action guidelines, where 5% of the lower limit shall be the trigger value for a Site Area Emergency. The 250 mRem child thyroid dose is in consideration of the 1:5 ratio established by the PAG's for total whole body dose (TEDE) to (CDE) adult thyroid relationship.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category J "Radiological Releases"

Classification General Emergency

EAL's

Offsite Dose:

- 4. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 1000 mRem (1 Rem) total whole body dose (TEDE) exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.
- 5. A valid integrated dose at or beyond the Site Boundary of greater than or equal to 5000 mRem (5 Rem) (CDE) adult thyroid exists as indicated by: dose projections or field team readings.

Basis

The 1000 mRem total whole body (TEDE) and the 5000 mRem (CDE) adult thyroid integrated dose are based on the proposed EPA protective action guidance which indicates that public protective actions are warranted if the dose exceeds 1 rem total whole body (TEDE) or 5 rem (CDE) adult thyroid. This is consistent with the emergency class description for a General Emergency and the Nureg's initiating conditions. Actual meteorology (including forecasts) should be used.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category K "Contamination/Rad Material Control"

(K) Condition Applicability

All Plant Conditions.

This covers any event which leads to a rad material release regardless of plant condition.

Classification Unusual Event

EAL

Basis

Independent Spent fuel Storage Installation

1. 2R/hr at the face of a SF Module

-or-

1R/hr at 1 foot from a damaged Module in the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

Basis

This event is intended to apply to a degraded plant condition that represents a potential for increased doses to the plant staff. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

The 2R/hr value was selected by the Site to provide positive indication of a potential problem within the cask. This is a value which is higher than expected normal and low enough to minimize off-site impact. The 1R/hr reading on a damaged Module indicates the damage may be of sufficient magnitude to not control the release of radioactive material.

Classification Alert

EAL

1. Verified mechanical damage to irradiated fuel which results in a Hi alarm on any of the following refuel floor ARM's:

B-9

C-9

C-10

-or-

 Any incident involving rad material which results in unexpected increase of in-plant rad levels or airborne contamination by a factor of 1000.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category K "Contamination/Rad Material Control"

Basis

EAL #1 is intended to meet the Nureg concern for a fuel damage accident which results in a release of radioactivity to the secondary containment. The damage addressed by this EAL is expected from bumping, dropping or otherwise mishandling of a fuel bundle during fuel handling evolutions. In the case of both EAL #1 and #2 not all area radiation monitors are installed for the purposes of providing general habitability information in normal and emergency conditions. Some area monitors are in effect process monitors which provide the health physics staff a quick indication of routine but radical changes in radiological conditions. example, an area radiation monitor in the vicinity of a radwaste filtration system backwash filter may routinely increase by a factor of several hundred times when the system is in use. This information is important real time information for health physics in providing work permits but is not an indication of an emergency. Thus, this EAL addresses an event of significance to the protection of the public, i.e., failure of the fuel cladding resulting in high RCS activity with high area radiation monitor readings in the vicinity of the RCS, or radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicates a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials.

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

Fuel Handling

 Major damage to spent fuel resulting in uncontrolled release of radioactive material, or uncontrollable decrease in fuel pool water level below top of spent fuel.

Basis

This EAL is an escalation of the Alert condition caused by mechanical damage or overheating of multiple fuel bundles. Readings of approximately 10 times the set points of ARMS's B-9, C-9 or C10 is indicative of "Major Damage". This EAL is intended to address irradiated spent fuel requiring water coverage. It is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage or other incidents not related to irradiated fuel storage. The concern addressed by this condition is a release of gap activity from damaged fuel rods or excessive heating of the fuel from decay heat leading to clad perforation. This release is of sufficient magnitude to be detected by the ventilation monitoring system. Since a release is expected from this condition off-site dose assessment should be performed immediately.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category L "Control Room Indications"

(L) Condition Applicability

Power Operations or All Plant Conditions as Listed in EAL.

Basis

Events which apply only to Power Operations can only occur during power operations as worded. Events which apply to all Plant Conditions could occur during any plant condition.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL

Loss of Indications

 Loss of indication or alarm on process monitored systems or effluent streams in Control Room, causing Rx to be shutdown.

-or-

2. Loss of any means of plant assessment, <u>causing</u> Rx to be shutdown.

-or-

 Valid unplanned loss of all communications capability such that no means of notification to off-site agencies exist as determined by the GSS/ED.

Basis

The loss of assessment capability sufficient to necessitate a plant shutdown due to a tech spec condition or as a prudent measure should be considered sufficient cause for declaration of an Unusual Event since this may be a precursor to a more serious condition as well as a loss of the ability to monitor The process monitored systems addressed in plant conditions. this category include - Offgas System, Turbine Bldg. - Rx. Bldg. Ventilation Systems, RAGEMS System I & II or other radiological monitored release points to the environment. The loss of all communication capability prevent notification of offsite agencies. This loss is meant to include loss of the Meridian phone system, the Dedicated Telephone lines, the direct NJ Bell lines which is in the TSC, CR and OSC, the microwave lines and the radio channels between the site and the outside world. If notification can be accomplished via any of the above systems then conditions of the EAL are not On the other hand if conditions are met it will not be possible to make this notification from the site. It would be prudent to send a driver to a offsite location to attempt to complete the notification.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category L "Control Room Indications"

#### Classification

#### Alert

EAL

Loss of Indications

- Loss of 3 or more Control Room Annunciator Panels during power operations for greater than 5 minutes. No backup alarm information capability available (SAR and PCS).
- Evacuation of Control Room anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from local stations within 15 minutes.

Basis

A major failure of a significant portion of indications severely hampers assessment of off-normal conditions. The use of 3 or more panels is intended to provide a point of reference, however, if the condition is less than 3 panels, judgement should be applied to determine the safety significance of the loss considering specific information. The backup Alarm information does not have to be located in the C.R. however it should be readily available. EAL #2 applies to those circumstances where the Control Room is unavailable for plant operation regardless of cause. Plant operations conducted from areas outside the Control Room reduce the operating staff's ability to assess plant conditions and warrants declaration of an Alert.

#### Classification

#### Site Area Emergency

EAL

Loss of Indications

- Loss of 3 or more Control Room Annunciator Panels during power operations for greater than 5 minutes. No backup alarm information capability available (SAR and PCS). -and-
  - A plant transient condition exist which causes a change in Rx power of more than 10% (APRM).
- Evacuation of Control Room <u>and</u> control of shutdown systems <u>not</u> established from local stations within 15 minutes.

Basis

These EAL's are escalations of the Alert classifications where a plant transient, including conduct of a shutdown, places the operating condition in a less stable state with the additional burden of reduced assessment capabilities.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category M "Electrical Power"

(M) Condition Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown or All Plant Conditions as Listed in EAL.

Basis

In Tech Specs 3.7, electrical power requirements are for Power Operations or Hot Shutdown on only. Events I. and 2. for each level of emergency apply for Power Operation or Hot Shutdown.

Loss of power when Cold Shutdown, Refuel or Defuel will not cause any immediate release problem which is not covered by other EALs.

The reactor temperature will rise with loss of cooling and at 212 F events 1. or 2. will become applicable because Cold Shutdown was not maintained.

If in Cold S/D, Refuel or Defueled condition, the level of emergency is reduced to a more appropriate response as listed for events 3. and 4. If temperatures increase to  $> 212\,^{\circ}F$  the levels in this category revert back to the higher level of response.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL's

Loss of Power

- Loss of power to 4160V buses 1A and 1B for greater than one hour;
  - -or-
- Loss of both diesel generator capabilities for greater than one hour.

Basis

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). The intent of these EAL's is to identify electrical power concerns which are outside the Tech Spec LCO's on Aux. Elect. Power.



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### APPENDIX 2

Category M "Electrical Power"

Classification

Alert

EAL's

Loss of Power

- Loss of power to 4160V buses 1A and 1B for greater than 60 seconds but <u>less than 15 minutes</u> and: - loss of both diesel generator capabilities;
- Loss of all plant vital DC power; for greater than 60 seconds but less than 15 minutes.

Basis

Loss of backup AC power or vital DC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including those systems needed for residual heat removal, ECCS and spent fuel heat removal. Intermittent power interruptions lasting less than 15 minutes should be indicative of a potential complete power failure which would escalate this event to the Site Area Emergency.

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL's

Loss of Power

- Loss of power to 4160V busses 1A and 1B exceeds 15 minutes and:
  - loss of both diesel generator capabilities;

-or-

2. Loss of all plant vital DC power for more than 15 minutes.

Basis

A prolonged loss of power condition will compromise all plant safety systems. The systems necessary for heat removal from the Reactor and containment will be adversely affected leading to core uncovering and loss of containment integrity. This event will escalate to a General Emergency through the loss of fission product barriers.



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### APPENDIX 2

Category N "Plant Equipment/Engineered Safety Features or Fire Protection System"

(N) Condition Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown for SAE and GE

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown, Cold Shutdown and Refuel for UE and Alert

Basis

For the SAE and GE apply when coolant temperature is > 212 F.

For the Alert all conditions with fuel in the vessel apply due to the interpretation of NRC Nureg 0654 example 10 for Alert.

Classification

Unusual Event

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EAL

Failure to comply with Tech. Spec. L.C.O.'s

1. Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specification LCO Action Statement Time.

Basis

This EAL is intended to address the loss of Tech. Spec. required equipment, systems and/or condition. Although exceeding a Tech. Spec. LCO is not an indication that the safety of the plant is challenged when coupled with the inability to meet the LCO Action Statement within the required time does indicate a substantial challenge to plant safety. This condition could lead to the inability to reach and maintain Hot and/or Cold Shutdown and thus would escalate to an ALERT, SAE or GE.

This EAL should be declared as soon as it is determined that the plant cannot be brought to the required mode within the time limit.

Classification

Alert

EAL

Loss of Cold Shutdown Equipment

 Complete loss of all ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category N "Plant Equipment/Engineered Safety Features"

Basis

If the ability is lost at any time to achieve or maintain cold shutdown, an Alert level of emergency is warranted by interpretation of NUREG 0654 example 10. This means that if there is no way to achieve or maintain cold shutdown regardless of the methods or systems used, an Alert is required. Escalation to Site Area Emergency or General Emergency would be via radiological release or fission product barrier categories.

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

Loss of Hot Shutdown Equipment

 Complete loss of any function needed for plant hot shutdown, (e.g. Rx Protection System or CRD System) when hot shutdown is required.

Basis

This condition refers to the capability to bring the reactor from full power to a controlled hot shutdown condition. To accomplish this operation a minimum of safety related equipment would be necessary. The selected equipment should be capable of maintaining the following parameters within acceptable limits:

Rx Power (Reactivity Control - CRD/SBLC/RPS)
Rx Pressure (EMRV's, Iso Cond, Bypass Valves)
RPV Inventory (Feed/Condensate, CRD, Core Spray)
Decay Heat Removal (Mn Condenser, Suppression Pool,
Ultimate Heat Sink)

It is appropriate to utilize any means available to control the identified parameters, however the control should be a direct result of intended actions. There are numerous alternatives to controlling each of the identified parameters, the intent is that the inability to control any one of these in a hot, pressurized condition can lead to significant consequences.

#### Classification

General Emergency

EAL

Loss of Decay Heat Removal

 Shutdown occurs, but all decay heat removal capability is lost. Significant cladding failure or fuel melt could occur in 10 hours with subsequent containment failure.

Basis

This EAL assumes a Rx S/D has occurred however, the lack of heat removal capability such as possibly an extended station blackout condition could lead to fuel clad overheating, energy release to the containment followed by its failure providing a release path to the environment. This condition is expected to be slow in development and thus protective actions adequately addressed.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Categories O & P "Natural and Man-made Hazards"

(O & P)
Condition
Applicability

All Plant Conditions for UE and Alert

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown for SAE

Basis

Events listed under UE and Alert could affect plant safety and lead to offsite release warranting an UE or Alert level of emergency regardless of plant condition.

Events listed under SAE could only warrant an SAE level of emergency if the plant is Hot or Critical. This is because there is a driving force available in the reactor vessel which could cause a more significant potential for offsite rad release under these conditions.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL's

Natural Phenomenon

1. Verified earthquake felt in plant.

-or-

- Intake canal water level ≤ -2.0 feet as measured by the staff gauge. -or-
- Intake water level 4.5 feet above mean sea level (1.5 feet below intake structure lower deck).
- 4. Sustained high winds greater than 74 mph, as indicated on wind speed recorder.
- 5. The National Weather Service is forecasting sustained winds in excess of 74 mph for the site within 4 hours.
- 6. The Oyster Creek Site is included in a tornado warning.

### Man-made Hazards

- 2. Unanticipated explosion detected near the site  $\underline{\mathsf{OR}}$  onsite.

-or-

- 3. Near the site or onsite TOXIC GAS, FLAMMABLE GAS or LIQUID release which could affect the habitability required for normal plant operability.
- Turbine rotor component (i.e., blades, wheels, shroud, bearings or other rotating component) failure causing a Rx trip.



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Categories O & P "Natural and Man-made Hazards"

Natural Phenomenon Cat. O

Basis

These two categories deal with those destructive hazards which could lead to plant damage. The condition at this level should be considered from an industrial hazards perspective. The problems created by these hazards are expected to create personnel safety concerns. If the extent of damage is sufficient to interrupt plant operations or affect safety systems adversely these conditions will escalate to an Alert or Site Area Emergency class.

EAL #1 is based on the Nureg criteria - earthquake felt in plant, and should be verified by the Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory Business Hours 914-359-2900, After Hours 914-365-2487, through the Environmental Controls Department if possible. The primary concern is to ensure increased awareness on the part of the plant staff and outside agencies in the event conditions worsen. It is expected that any damage associated with an earthquake will be visible upon inspection. This condition may escalate or terminate based on plant damage assessment.

EAL #2 is based on the Nureg concern for low water level related to the ultimate heat sink. A situation indicative of a potential loss of the suction to the circulating water pumps, emergency service water pumps and service water pumps is sufficient reason to make this declaration. This is not intended to address situations where the travelling screens become clogged and can be remedied immediately. This condition can be caused by strong winds from a westerly direction or by a hurricane in the vicinity of OCNGS. Other causes are possible, however, they are not addressed by the updated FSAR directly. Nureg guidance suggest that the 50 yr. low water level be used for this EAL. 50 yr. data is not available for OCNGS but an engineering assessment of the ESW pump operability as a function of intake level (memo 5310-90-005) identified -2.0' MSL to be the most appropriate level for the U.E. Class.

EAL #3 addresses high water level conditions in the intake canal. The primary concern is a potential loss of plant cooling capability through the loss of pump motors at the intake. At the designated levels the motors are not in immediate jeopardy, however, additional caution and concern should be exercised due to the inability to predict the course of events initiated by environmental changes in weather. This condition is expected to be initiated by hurricane force winds. Unusually high tides are not expected to cause declaration of this condition unless it is accompanied by additional concerns such as high winds, earthquake or other phenomenon.



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Categories O & P "Natural and Man-made Hazards"

Basis (con't)

Natural Phenomenon Cat. O

EAL #4, #5, and #6 address high wind conditions where physical damage to plant property may exist due to the weather. This damage may be caused by direct impact of high winds or as the result of high winds, because of the unknown extent of such damage the EAL intends to increase awareness on the part of the staff.

Man-made Hazards Cat. P

EAL #1 addresses the Nureg concern of aircraft falling from the sky, causing damage to the plant which the extent of may not be fully appreciated without close inspection. The intent is to increase the awareness of the plant staff.

EAL #2 addresses the potential for damage caused by an explosion from any source. The amount of damage must be assessed to determine if this condition should escalate, however, the intent here is to declare the event based on the possibility of increasing damage from an unknown source.

#### NOTE

Explosions can cause fires, therefore, a review of Category "Q" Fires EAL's should be considered when declaring the appropriate EAL.

As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration.

EAL #3 addresses releases of substances that inhibit normal day-to-day operation of the plant. For instance, gas releases which necessitate evacuation of personnel from a particular area or require the use of respiratory equipment to enter the area because of the release and would not be required otherwise. This condition would escalate to an alert if this release affected operations of the plant.

EAL #4 is intended to meet the Nureg concern for a major plant component failure causing a reactor trip.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Categories O & P "Natural and Man-made Hazards"

#### Classification

#### Alert

EAL's

#### Natural Phenomenon

1. Earthquake affecting plant operations.

-or-

- 2. Intake canal water level  $\leq$  -2.5 feet, as measured by the staff gauge.
- 3. Intake water level at the intake structure lower deck.
- Sustained hurricane force winds of greater than 95 mph, as indicated on wind speed recorder.
   -or-
- 5. Any tornado striking the facility.

#### Man-made Hazards

- Aircraft crash <u>OR</u> other missile impact within the protected area <u>OR</u> onto any permanent plant structure.
- 2. Known explosion damage to any permanent plant structure. -or-
- Release of TOXIC or FLAMMABLE GAS into the plant which affects the safe operation of the plant as determined by the Shift Manager/Emergency Director.
- 4. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration.

Basis

An Operational Basis Earthquake (0.11G) may cause damage to some portions of the site but should not affect the ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection is validated by a reliable source (e.g. Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory: (914)359-2900). The OBE is as determined from 10CFR100. The EAL's addressing intake water level both high and low are escalations of a worsening condition cited in the U.E. class. The level's address the Nureg concern for approaching design conditions where the heat sink's effectiveness may be reduced and subsequently lost. EAL #5 is based on the assumption that a tornado striking (touching down) the facility (within the protected area boundary) may have potentially damaged plant structures containing function or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If such damage is confirmed, the event may be escalated to a Site Area Emergency.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Categories O & P "Natural and Man-made Hazards"

#### EAL's (con't)

#### Man-made Hazards

Category P is intended to address such items as plane or helicopter crash or barge crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the incident is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to Site Area Emergency.

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials.

#### NOTE

Explosions can cause fires, therefore, a review of Category "Q" Fires EAL's should be considered when declaring the appropriate EAL.

The release of toxic gases affecting the safe operation of the plant is intended to address those situations where routine habitability is restricted or routine evolutions are modified to compensate for a "life threatening" atmosphere.

#### Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

#### Natural Phenomenon

- 1. Earthquake affecting systems required for shutdown.
  - -or-
- 2. Intake canal water level  $\leq$  -3.0 feet, as measured by the staff gauge.
  - -or-
- Intake water level greater than 8 feet above sea level. (2.0 feet above intake structure lower deck), and not in cold shutdown.
  - -or-
- Sustained wind speed in excess of 100 mph indicated in the Control Room.



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Categories O & P "Natural and Man-made Hazards"

EAL's (con't)

#### Man-made Hazards

1. Aircraft crash which affects vital structures by impact  $\underline{OR}$  by fire.

-or-

- Explosion <u>OR</u> missile impact which causes severe damage to safe shutdown equipment.
   -or-
- Entry of TOXIC or FLAMMABLE GAS into vital area which affects the operation of safe shutdown equipment.

Basis

The EAL dealing with earthquakes is based on the FSAR's Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) value of 0.22 G. Seismic events of this magnitude can cause widespread damage to safety functions. These EAL's are escalated events from the Alert Classification and represent significant damage to the plants ability to complete a "safe shutdown". These conditions are of significant concern if the plant is not in cold shutdown. If the plant is in cold shutdown the possibility of radioactive releases from incidental damage is reduced as well as being in a very stable configuration. A further degradation of the events is expected to cause slow escalation of jeopardy to the plant and may be handled with additional assistance relatively easily.

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown, such that it cannot perform its intended function, should be considered.

As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category Q "Fire"

(Q) Condition Applicability

All plant conditions

Basis

This applies to all conditions - exceptions are inherent within current wording.

Classification

Unusual Event

EAL

Fire

1. Valid fire inside the Protected Area which <u>CANNOT</u> be controlled by the fire brigade within 10 minutes from the time of verification.

Basis

This EAL is written to address any fire occurring inside the protected area. The 10 minute time is intended to start when the fire has been verified to be actual by two independent means.

A fire of this magnitude implies additional assistance may be required and the extent of damage will not be readily apparent. Increased awareness and concern should be demonstrated by the staff in preparation for possible degrading conditions.

Fires arising outside the protected area will be handled by off-site authorities and do not pose a significant threat to the plant. If such a threat were to occur the GSS/ED should use his judgement to ensure the safety of the plant and personnel.

#### NOTE

Fires can be caused by explosions, therefore, a review of Category "P" Man Made Hazards should be considered when declaring the appropriate EAL.

Classification

Alert

EAL

Fire

 Fire which potentially affects the operability of a Safety System and the Plant is in a transient conditions requiring the use of the System.



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### APPENDIX 2

Category Q "Fire"

Basis

The intent of this EAL is to address those circumstances where the operability of a safety system is questionable due to a fire. This would be evidenced by such things as burn marks on equipment, insulation disfigured or other indications which would warrant closer scrutiny of the components during plant operations requiring the use of such system, subsystem, train or component.

#### NOTE

Fires can be caused by explosions, therefore, a review of Category "P" Man Made Hazards should be considered when declaring the appropriate EAL.

Classification

Site Area Emergency

EAL

Fire

 Fire which renders a Safety System completely inoperable and that system is needed to function for accident control.

Basis

This EAL is intended to encompass those situations where a safety system, or subsystem, is unable to perform it's intended function as a direct result of a fire and plant conditions require the use of that systems function. The emphasis is placed on the significance of a fire having such severity to disable a safety system. Additional damage may have been done; however, this will not be immediately evident. As a conservative measure a Site Area Emergency is prudent given that accident mitigation is also taking place.

#### NOTE

Fires can be caused by explosions, therefore, a review of Category "P" Man Made Hazards should be considered when declaring the appropriate EAL.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category R "Security/Sabotage"

(R) Condition Applicability

#### All plant conditions

#### Basis

Events could occur during all plant conditions.

Classification

Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area and General Emergency

EAL's

- U.E. Security Threat
- 1. Shift Manager/Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Supervisor that a security threat, attempted entry, or attempted sabotage of the site (owner controlled area) condition exists.
- Any attempted act of sabotage which is deemed legitimate in the judgement of the Shift Manager/Emergency Director, and affects the operation of the plant.

A. - Security Threat

- Shift Manager/Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Supervisor that the compromise is onsite, but no penetration of the protected area has occurred.
- Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant, as judged by the Shift Manager/Emergency Director.

S.A.E. - Security Threat

- 1. Shift Manager/Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Supervisor that security of the plant (vital area) is threatened by unauthorized (forcible) entry of the facility (protected area).
- Any act of sabotage which results in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public, as judged by the Shift Manager/Emergency Director.

G.E. Security Threat

- Shift Manager/Emergency Director determination based on advice from the Site Protection Supervisor that the loss of physical security control of the plant (vital areas) has occurred.
  - -or
- 2. Any act of sabotage which results in imminent significant cladding failure or fuel melting with the potential for loss of containment integrity or the potential for the release of significant amounts of radioactivity in a short time, as judged by the Shift Manager/Emergency Director.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category R "Security/Sabotage"

Basis

These EAL's are intended to be gradient conditions of threats directed at OCGS. The U.E. class deals with confirmed threats that are determined to be station-specific and imminent, or conditions limited to outside the owner controlled area or vandalism of the plant which results in off-normal component condition (i.e., valve mispositioned, setpoint changes) where there is no indication of major damage (i.e., wiring cut, valves or piping cut, or disassembled).

The Alert class is an escalation of the conditions for the U.E. This level deals with situations between the Owner Controlled Area and the Protected Area or acts of vandalism which causes a major plant component to malfunction or otherwise not perform it intended function in the expected manner.

The S.A.E. class is intended to address entry into the Protected Area by a hostile force. Vital Areas are threatened in this circumstance. Acts of vandalism consistent with this classification would consist of the loss of a safety system function (i.e., complete loss of all Core Spray, or Containment Spray).

The General Emergency class addresses entry into Vital Areas. Damage to major plant equipment which indicates the ability to ensure adequate core cooling and containment integrity may not be possible due to acts by a hostile force should be considered sufficient reason for a G.E. declaration.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category S "Fission Product Barriers"

(S)
Condition
Applicability

Power Operations, Hot Shutdown

Basis

The definitions of the other conditions mean that 2 of the 3 barriers are <u>not</u> required to be intact. The only barrier required to be intact for these conditions is the cladding. (i.e. RCS is vented and Primary containment is not required.)

Regardless of the plant condition, consideration should be given in declaring a General Emergency for a loss of cladding accident which has Rad level increases as specified in EAL category J (Radiological Releases). If dose monitoring equipment or dose assessment capabilities are unavailable and cladding has failed with no RCS or Containment a General Emergency is warranted during any plant condition.

Classification

General Emergency

EAL

Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barrier's with the potential loss of the third i.e. loss of coolant accident, failure of ECCS, Core Melt Probable and Loss of containment imminent.

Basis

The fission product barriers addressed by this EAL are:

- Fuel Cladding
- Rx Coolant System Boundary
- Primary Containment

The concern is that a significant radioactive release to the environment is imminent during unstable plant conditions. The intent is to make the G.E. declaration because of plant conditions which are leading to a release of known or unknown magnitude. Releases during accident conditions are expected to require protective actions for the general public. Declaration of this class prior to such releases improves the effectiveness and completeness of appropriate protective actions. This EAL is not dependent on a dose assessment or projection, it is intended to be applied based on the status of fission product barriers and the potential for a release to the environment with a degraded core. This EAL should not be applied during situations where primary containment is not enforced unless "a degraded core condition" which could lead to a significant release is of primary concern. Exhibit 2 provides guidelines for assessing fission product barriers status. This is This is not all inclusive and does not address such things as an "interfacing LOCA" where the containment is effectively bypassed, however when assessing each barrier consideration should be given to the barriers ability to perform its intended function under the circumstances presented.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category T "Emergency Director's Judgement"

(T) Condition Applicability

All Plant Conditions.

Basis

Judgment for events not covered specifically in the EALs could apply to any plant condition.

Classification

Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency

EAL's

<u>Unusual Event</u>
Whenever plant conditions are in progress or have occurred which may indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, as judged by the Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.

#### NOTE

In exercising the judgement as to the need for declaring an Unusual Event, uncertainty concerning the Safety Status of the plant, the length of time the uncertainty exists and the prospects for resolution of ambiguities in a reasonable time period is sufficient basis for declaring an Unusual Event.

#### <u>Alert</u>

Whenever plant conditions are in progress or have occurred which may involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant, as judged by the Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.

### NOTE

In exercising the judgement as to the need for declaring an Alert, uncertainty concerning the safety status of the plant, the length of time the uncertainty exists the prospects for resolution of ambiguities beyond a reasonable time period and the potential of the level of safety of the plant is sufficient basis for declaring an Alert.

#### Site Area Emergency

Whenever plant conditions are in progress or have occurred which may involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public, as judged by the Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director.



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#### APPENDIX 2

Category T "Emergency Director's Judgement"

#### NOTE

In exercising the judgement as to the need for declaring a Site Area Emergency, uncertainty concerning the status of the plant functions needed for protection of the public, the length of time the uncertainty exists, the prospects for resolution of ambiguities beyond a reasonable time and the potential degradation of the plant functions needed for protection of the public is sufficient basis for declaring a Site Area Emergency.

Basis

These EAL's are intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency class because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under one of the above classes. The Unusual Event level implies that Plant Safety is jeopardized, however, operation may continue with heightened awareness (e.g., outside Tech. Spec. LCO's).

The Alert level implies that Plant Safety has been significantly impaired, (e.g., Operations beyond FSAR design consideration).

The Site Area Emergency level concern is for the loss of the ability to ensure the protection of the public due to a lack of confidence in plant functions (i.e., containment integrity, adequate Core Cooling, other Fission Product barriers).

There is no General Emergency EAL for this category since the required actions directly impact the public. This is to ensure that if declared there is no doubt a G.E. condition exist (i.e., core melt sequence with a loss of containment integrity imminent).



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### EXHIBIT 1

### Cross-Reference Index

### <u>Unusual Events</u>

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1.	A-1, E-1
2.	J-1, J-2, J-3
3.a	I-1, I-3
3.b	I-2, I-4
3.c	N/A BWR
4.	*
5.	A-1, D-1, E-1, H-1, H-2
6.	D-1, E-1, F-1, H-1
7.	M-1, M-2
8.	N-1 *
9.	N-1 *
10.	Q-1
11.	L-1, L-2, L-3 *
12.	R-1, R-2
13.	O-1 through 5
14.	P-1 through 5
15.	T
16.	*
17.	N/A BWR

<sup>\*</sup> Coverage deleted/changed based on NRC's Branch Position of Acceptable Deviations to Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.



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EXHIBIT 1 (continued)

### Cross-Reference Index Alert

Nureg-0654	Alerc	EPIP-OC01 Appendix 1
Initiating Conditions		- ··
1a.		I-1
1b.		I-2
1c.		N/A BWR
2.		N/A BWR
3.		N/A BWR
4.		H-1a, H-1b
5.		H-1c, A-1, H-2
6.		K-2
7.		M-1
8.		M-2
9.		I-1, I-2
10.		N-1
11.		N-1, C-1
12.		K-1
13.		Q-1
14.		L-1
15.		J-1 through 5
16.		R-1 & 2
17.		O-1 through 5
18.		P-1 through 4
19.		<b>T</b> .
20.		L-2

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### EXHIBIT 1 (continued)

### Cross-Reference Index

### Site Area Emergency

Nureg-0654 Initiating Conditions	EPIP-OC01 Appendix 1
1.	A-1, A-2
2.	I-1 & 2
3.	N/A BWR
4.	H-1a & b
5.	N/A BWR
6.	M-1
7.	M-2
8.	N-1
9.	C-1, N-1
10.	K-1
11.	Q-1
12.	L-1
13a, b, c	J-1 & 2
14.	R-1 & 2
15.	0-1 through 4
16.	P-1 through 3
17.	Т
18.	L-2

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EXHIBIT 1 (continued)

Cross-Reference Index

### General Emergency

Nureg-0554 Initiating Conditions	EPIP-OC01 Appendix 1
1a.	J-1 & 2
1b.	A-1, E-1
2.	A-1, E-1, S-1
3.	R-1 & 2
4.	A-1, E-1, S-1
5.	N/A BWR
6.	A-1, E-1, N-1, S-1
7	A-1, E-1, N-1, S-1



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#### EXHIBIT 2

#### Fission Product Barriers Guidelines

Cat. "S" - Fission Product Barriers Guidelines - This table is not all inclusive, it is provided as possible indications of boundary breaches.

EAL - Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers with the <u>Potential Loss</u> of the third Barrier. (For example, loss of Reactor Coolant System Boundary, Fuel Clad failure and high potential for loss of Containment.)

Boundary	Potential Loss	<u>Barrier Loss</u> I
Rx Coolant System	<ol> <li>Drywell Pressure &gt;3 psig due to suspected L.O.C.A.</li> </ol>	1. Confirmed leakage from Rx. Coolant System >50 gpm.
Fuel Clad	<ol> <li>Main Steamline Radiation monitor High-High Alarm.</li> </ol>	Coolant activity     exceeds 300 uci/gm dose     equivalent iodine.
	2. RPV Level ≤ -30" TAF.	* SEE TABLE BELOW
	3. Rx. Power Oscillations	2. Off-gas discharge indicates >10,000 mR/Hr.
Primary Containment	1. D.W. Bulk temperature cannot be maintained below 281°F.	Unexplained rapid decrease in D.W. pressure after initial increase due to L.O.C.A.
	2. Boron injection required IAW EMG-3200.01 RPV Control.	2. Unexplained increase in Area Radiation monitors outside Primary Containment in more than one area with known or suspected leakage from the Pri. Containment.
	3. Containment H2 concentration >6% and D.W. or Torus O2 concentration >5%.	3. Venting of the Containment is required for Accident Control.

FUEL CLAD DAMAGE CONDITIONS FOR COOLANT ACTIVITY EXCEEDING 300 UCI/GM DOSE EQUIVALENT IODINE

Conditions	CHRRMS	Stack	Rad Engineering Calculation Number
LOCA Reactor Building	N/A	0.13 μCi/cm3	2820-99-012
LOCA Drywell	440 R/hr	N/A	2820-99-017
No LOCA	63 R/hr	N/A	96-004