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Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

*Posted  
Amdt. 72  
to DPR-41*

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President  
 Advanced Systems and Technology  
 Florida Power and Light Company  
 Post Office Box 529100  
 Miami, Florida 33152

LICENSE AUTHORITY FILE COPY

DO NOT REMOVE

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 78 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 72 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos. 3 and 4, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated November 30, 1981, as supplemented February 10, 1982.

These amendments change the Technical Specifications to permit removal of the requirements for Boron Injection Tanks (BIT) effective upon installation of the new model 44F steam generator.

We find that modifications you requested acceptable. However, in a phone conversation with your staff they agreed that the near term modifications, dilution of the BIT to 1950 ppm and isolation of the BIT from the chemical and volume control system, rather than capping the pipes or removal of the BIT, would be applied until further notification.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED

Marshall Grotenhuis, Project Manager  
 Operating Reactors Branch #1  
 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 78 to DPR-31
2. Amendment No. 72 to DPR-41
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

\*Previous concurrence see next page

OFFICE	ORB #1:DL*	ORB#1:DL*	ORB#1:DL*	AD/OR:DL*	OELD*		
SURNAME	CParrish	MGrotenhuis	SVarga	TNovak			
DATE	02/ /82	02/ /82:ds	02/ /82	02/ /82	02/ /82		

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Florida Power and Light Company

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 78  
License No. DPR-31

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated November 30, 1981, as supplemented February 10, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;  
and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 78 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 2, 1982



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-251

TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO. 4

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 72  
License No. DPR-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated November 30, 1981, as supplemented February 10, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 72, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 2, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 78 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31

AMENDMENT NO. 72 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41

DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Revise Appendix A as follows:

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3.4-1	3.4-1
3.4-2	3.4-2
4.5-2	4.5-2
Table 4.1-2 (sheet 1 of 3)	Table 4.1-2 (sheet 1 of 3)
B3.4-1	B3.4-1
B3.4-2	B3.4-2
B3.6-1	B3.6-1

### 3.4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

Applicability: Applies to the operating status of the Engineered Safety Features.

Objective: To define those limiting conditions for operation that are necessary: (1) to remove decay heat from the core in emergency or normal shutdown situations, (2) to remove heat from containment in normal operating and emergency situations, and (3) to remove airborne iodine from the containment atmosphere in the event of a Maximum Hypothetical Accident.

Specification: 1. SAFETY INJECTION AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS

- a. The reactor shall not be made critical, except for low power physics tests, unless the following conditions are met:
  1. The refueling water tank shall contain not less than 320,000 gal. of water with a boron concentration of at least 1950 ppm.
  2. The boron injection tank shall contain not less than 900 gal. of a 20,000 to 22,500 ppm boron solution. The solution in the tank, and in isolated portions of the inlet and outlet piping, shall be maintained at a temperature of at least 145F. TWO channels of heat tracing shall be operable for the flow path.\*
  3. Each accumulator shall be pressurized to at least 600 psig and contain 875-891 ft<sup>3</sup> of water with a boron concentration of at least 1950 ppm, and shall not be isolated.
  4. FOUR safety injection pumps shall be operable.

\* See reference (11) on Page B3.4-2

5. TWO residual heat removal pumps shall be operable.
  6. TWO residual heat exchangers shall be operable.
  7. All valves, interlocks and piping associated with the above components and required for post accident operation, shall be operable, except valves that are positioned and locked. Valves 864-A, B; 862-A, B; 865-A, B, C; 866-A, B shall have power removed from their motor operators by locking open the circuit breakers at the Motor Control Centers. The air supply to valve 758 shall be shut off to the valve operator.
- b. During power operation, the requirements of 3.4.1a may be modified to allow one of the following components to be inoperable (including associated valves and piping) at any one time except for the cases stated in 3.4.1.b.2. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of 3.4.1a within the time period specified, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of 3.4.1a are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition. Specification 3.0.1 applies to 3.4.1.b.
1. ONE accumulator may be out of service for a period of up to 4 hours.
  2. ONE of FOUR safety injection pumps may be out of service for 30 days: A second safety injection pump may be out of service, provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours. - TWO of the FOUR safety injection pumps shall be tested to demonstrate operability before initiating maintenance of the inoperable pumps.
  3. ONE channel of heat tracing on the flow path may be out of service for 24 hours. \*

\*See reference (11) on Page B3.4-2

2. Pumps shall start and reach required head for normal or recirculation flow, whichever is applicable to the operating condition; the instruments and visual observations shall indicate proper functioning. Test operation shall be for a least 15 minutes.

b. Valves

1. The boron injection tank isolation valves receiving a Safety Injection signal shall be cycled monthly.†† \*
2. The containment recirculation sump suction valves shall be cycled monthly.†
3. Accumulator check valves shall be checked for operability during each refueling shutdown.
4. The refueling water storage tank outlet valves shall be tested in performing the respective pump tests.†

† - N.A. during cold or refueling shutdowns. The specified tests, however, shall be performed within one surveillance interval prior to reactor startup.

†† - N.A. during cold or refueling shutdowns. The specified tests, however, shall be performed within one surveillance interval prior to heatup above 200 F.

\* See reference (11) on Page B3.4-2

TABLE 4.1-2 (Sheet 1 of 3)

## MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT AND SAMPLING TESTS

	<u>Check</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Max. Time Between Tests (Days)</u>
1. Reactor Coolant Samples	Radiochem. ( $T_{1/2} > 30$ Min)	Monthly	45
	C <sub>1</sub> & O <sub>2</sub> & F	5/Week	3
	Tritium Activity	Weekly	10
	Gross $\beta, \gamma$ Activity ( $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$ )	5/Week	3
	Boron Concentration	2/Week	5
	$\bar{E}$ Determination	Semi-annually	30 Wks
2. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Sample	Boron Concentration	Weekly†	10
3. Boric Acid Tank	Boron Concentration	2/Week	5
4. Boron Injection Tank*	Boron Concentration	Monthly†	45
5. Control Rods	Rod drop times of all full length rods	For all rods at least once per 18 months and following each removal of the reactor vessel head. For specifically affected individual rods following maintenance on or modification of the control rod drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific rods.	NA
	Partial movement of full length rods	Biweekly while critical	20
6. Pressurizer Safety Valves	Set Point	Each refueling shutdown	NA
7. Main Steam Safety Valves	Set Point	Each refueling shutdown	NA
8. Containment Isolation Trip	Functioning	Each refueling shutdown	NA
9. Refueling System Interlocks	Functioning	Prior to each refueling	NA
10. Accumulator	Boron Concentration	At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of $\geq 1\%$ of tank volume.†	NA

\* See reference (11) on Page B3.4-2

## BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

1. Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal Systems

- a.1 The requirements for refueling water tank storage meet the safety analysis. (1)
- a.2 The boron injection tank contains sufficient solution to meet the steam line break accident analysis. (1)(2)(11)
- a.3 Any two accumulators meet the requirements for the MHA analysis. (1)(3)
- a.4 Any two safety injection pumps meet the requirements of the MHA analysis and the steam line break accident analysis. (2)(4)(5)
- a.5, A single residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger  
a.6 meets the MHA analysis requirements. (4)(5)
- b.1 See a.3 above
- b.2 See a.4 above
- b.3, See a.5 above  
b.4

2. Emergency Containment Cooling Systems

Either two of the three emergency containment cooling units or one of the two spray pumps has the cooling capability required to meet the MHA analysis. (6)(7)(9)

3. Emergency Containment Filtering System

Two of three filter units have capacity to meet the MHA analysis. (7)(8)

4. Component Cooling System

One pump and two heat exchangers meet the requirements of the MHA analysis. (10)

5. Intake Cooling Water System

One pump meets the requirements of the MHA analysis. (6)

References:

- (1) FSAR 6.2.2
- (2) FSAR 14.2.5
- (3) FSAR 14.3.2
- (4) FSAR 14.1.9
- (5) FSAR 6.2.3
- (6) FSAR 14.3.4
- (7) FSAR 6.3
- (8) FSAR 14.3.5
- (9) FSAR 6.4
- (10) FSAR 9.3
- (11) The requirement for use of the BIT tanks for Mitigation of the Main Steam Line Break accident has been removed following installation of the Model 44F Steam Generators. The required supporting analyses can be found in L-81-(502), dated 11/30/81. The temperature requirement above 145° F is no longer applicable. Therefore, the heat tracing requirement is not necessary. There is no Boron Concentration Requirement in the BIT.

B3.6 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

The Chemical and Volume Control System provides control of the Reactor Coolant System boron inventory. There are three sources of borated water available for injection through three different paths:

- (1) The boric acid transfer pumps can deliver the boric acid tank contents to the charging pumps.
- (2) The charging pumps can take alternate suction from the refueling water storage tank.
- (3) The safety injection pumps can take their suction from the refueling water storage tank and inject the boron injection tank contents. \*

The quantity of boric acid in storage from either the boric acid tanks or the refueling water storage tank is sufficient for cold shutdown at any time during core life.

One channel of heat tracing is sufficient to maintain the specified temperature limit.

\* See reference (11) on Page B3.4-1

Reference

FSAR - Section 9.2



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 78 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 72 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41  
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY  
TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NOS. 3 AND 4  
DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 30, 1981, as supplemented February 10, 1982, the Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) requested amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos. 3 and 4. The amendments would change the Technical Specifications to permit the removal of the requirement for the Boron Injection Tanks.

This is effective with the installation of the new model 44F steam generators. In discussions with the licensee staff, they agreed that the near term modification, dilution of the BIT to 1950 ppm and isolation of the BIT from the chemical and volume control system, would be applied until further notification by the licensee.

BACKGROUND

Westinghouse has incorporated a Boron Injection Tank into their nuclear steam supply system design to meet the requirements of the standard Review Plan Section 15.1.5, "Steam System Piping Failures Inside and Outside of Containment (PWR)." The acceptance criteria for this event seeks assurances that the capability to cool the core is maintained and that the resulting offsite dosage complies with the

requirements set forth in 10 CFR 100. For postulated steam line break events, a potential for return to criticality exists as the moderator temperature decreases. The Boron Injection Tank (BIT) was specifically designed to mitigate the consequences of this event with the high-head safety injection system (HHSI) by purging the highly concentrated boron solution (20,000 ppm) into the primary system.

Experience with the BIT has placed excessive maintenance requirements upon the plant operators and technicians. As a result, the licensee submitted a request for design modifications to remove the Boron Injection Tank from both Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (Reference 1). The request for removal of the BIT was accompanied by detailed supporting evaluations of the limiting steam line break event and Safety or Dump valve failure event. The following is our evaluation of the proposed modifications and supporting analyses.

#### EVALUATION

The staff has reviewed the licensee's request to remove the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) from both Units 3 and 4 at Turkey Point. This request is documented in Reference 1. The staff's review of the reference document resulted in the request for additional information, as documented in Reference 2. Reference 3 is the licensee's response to our request for additional information.

The BIT was designed to mitigate the consequences of postulated steam line break events. During these events, the high head safety injection pumps automatically align to discharge through the BIT, which contains 900 gallons of highly concentrated boric acid solution (20,000) (ppm) This solution is then flushed into the primary system to assure adequate shutdown reactivity.

During normal plant operation, the BIT is aligned with the Chemical Volume Control System to assure proper concentration and prevent precipitation of the boric acid solution. When removing the BIT from the system, this recirculation path must be isolated. The means for isolating the BIT from the CVCS is documented in Reference 3 and is acceptable to the staff. These include two near term options:

- (1) Dilute the BIT to the RWST system concentration. Next, isolate the BIT from the CVCS by closing associated power operated valves and removing their power supply. To prevent boron precipitation due to back leakage past the isolation valves, heat tracers surrounding the high-head safety injection piping would remain operational.
- (2) Dilute the BIT to the RWST system concentration and physically isolate the BIT from the CVCS by cutting and capping the respective connecting lines.

The final long term modification to the system is to physically remove the BIT from the HHSI network.

To justify the removal of the highly borated BIT from the system, the licensee reanalyzed the limiting steam line break events. These included large piping ruptures and failure of a steam generator safety or dump valve in the open position. The limiting steam line break was analyzed to be the large steam line rupture (limited to 1.4 ft<sup>2</sup> as result of the steam generator integral flow restrictor) with offsite power available. The analyses incorporated the limiting failure of a HHSI pump and assumed the limiting RCCA in the fully withdrawal position.

During this event, the minimum DNBR did not decrease below 1.3. This assures no consequential clad perforation. As such, the requirements of SRP 15.1.5 are met.

The analyses performed assumed a zero boron concentration within the BIT and throughout the lines leading to the primary piping injection point. After depleting this inventory, 2,000 ppm borated ECC coolant was injected into the primary system from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Since the RWST Technical Specification for boron concentration is 1950 ppm, the licensee confirmed that 1950 ppm boron concentration in the RWST would not alter the conclusions of the analyses (2000 ppm). That is, no fuel damage would occur. The staff finds this acceptable.

The analytical methodology used in evaluating the consequences from postulated steam line breaks is undergoing staff review. Our review at this time indicates reasonable assurance that the conclusions based on the licensee's submittal will not be appreciably altered by completion of review.

#### SUMMARY

The staff has reviewed Florida Power & Light's submittal for removal of the Boron Injection Tank and related Technical Specification changes for both Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The supporting analyses demonstrated compliance to Section 15.1.5 of the Standard Review Plan, while assuming zero boric concentration in the BIT.

The analytical methodology for evaluating steam line break events is presently undergoing staff review. Our review at this time indicates reasonable assurance that the conclusions based on the licensee's submittal will not be appreciably changed by completion of review. Although limited clad perforation following a steam line break event can be acceptable, the licensee has demonstrated that no clad perforation is expected. As such, there exists adequate margin of safety to acceptable limits, as specified in SRP 15.1.5. The staff, therefore,

concludes the licensee's application to perform appropriate system and technical specification modifications to remove the BIT from service or operate with the BIT tank installed without restrictions on the minimum boron concentration is acceptable. However, the staff does not support the licensee's decision to maintain a boron concentration consistent with RWST limits while the BIT is connected to the system.

### Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: March 2, 1982

Principal Contributors:  
Jack Guttman  
C. Y. Li

REFERENCE

1. Letter to D. Eisenhut (NRC) from R. Uhrig (FPL), "Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Docket No. 50-250, 50-251 Proposed License Amendment Removal of Boron Injection Tank," L-81-502, November 30, 1981.
2. Letter to R. Uhrig (FPL) from S. Varga, "Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Questions Regarding the Removal of the Boron Injection Tank," January 21, 1982.
3. Letter to S. Varga (NRC) from R. Uhrig (FPL), "Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 Proposed License Amendment Removal of Boron Injection Tank," L-82-49, February 10, 1982.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 78 to Facility Operating License NO. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 72 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 issued to Florida Power and Light Company (the licensees), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of Turkey Point Plant, Unit Nos. 3 and 4 (the facilities) located in Dade County, Florida. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications to permit removal of the requirements for Boron Injection Tanks (BIT) effective upon installation of the new model 44F steam generator.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.


The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

- 2 -

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated November 30, 1981, as supplemented February 10, 1982, (2) Amendment Nos. 78 and 72 to License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 2nd day of March, 1982.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing