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JUL 1 1981

Docket Nos. 50-250 ✓  
and 50-251 ✓

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President  
Advanced Systems and Technology  
Florida Power and Light Company  
Post Office Box 529100  
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

On October 27, 1976, you submitted an amendment request in partial response to our letter of September 8, 1976 which provided model Technical Specifications which updated in part a previous submittal dated September 27, 1974. On December 20, 1976 you submitted a letter which made reference to the "considerable activity relative to the condition of the steam generator tubes at Turkey Point." As a result of the "considerable activity," the Turkey Point steam generators have been inspected according to special license conditions initially imposed originally by Amendment 20 dated December 3, 1976 for Unit 4 and by Amendment 22 dated January 14, 1977 for Unit 3. Thus, Technical Specifications for the inservice inspection of the steam generator tubes were not required.

By Order dated June 19, 1981 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has terminated the proceeding relative to the repair of the steam generators and has authorized issuance of amendments to permit the repair project to proceed. Enclosed is a set of model Technical Specifications for steam generator inspection. You should review your December 20, 1976 and September 27, 1974 submittals and update your request for a license amendment using the enclosed model Technical Specifications as a guide. The model Technical Specifications should be appropriately adapted to your specific format and to the number of steam generators in your plant. These Technical Specifications must be in force for the operation of the new steam generators and will serve as a basis for the removal of the present license conditions which pertain to the inspection of the degraded steam generators.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:

Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc: See next page

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Robert E. Uhrig  
Florida Power and Light Company

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## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.6 STEAM GENERATORS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.4.6 Each steam generator shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more steam generators inoperable, restore the inoperable generator(s) to OPERABLE status prior to increasing  $T_{avg}$  above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.6.0 Each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.6.1 Steam Generator Sample Selection and Inspection - Each steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown by selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number of steam generators specified in Table 4.4-1.

4.4.6.2 Steam Generator Tube Sample Selection and Inspection - The steam generator tube minimum sample size, inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Table 4.4-2. The inservice inspection of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.4.6.3 and the inspected tubes shall be verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.4.6.4. The tubes selected for each inservice inspection shall include at least 3% of the total number of tubes in all steam generators; the tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:

- a. Where experience in similar plants with similar water chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected, then at least 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas.
- b. The first sample of tubes selected for each inservice inspection (subsequent to the preservice inspection) of each steam generator shall include:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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1. All nonplugged tubes that previously had detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20%).
  2. Tubes in those areas where experience has indicated potential problems.
  3. A tube inspection (pursuant to Specification 4.4.6.4.a.8) shall be performed on each selected tube. If any selected tube does not permit the passage of the eddy current probe for a tube inspection, this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be selected and subjected to a tube inspection.
- c. The tubes selected as the second and third samples (if required by Table 4.4-2) during each inservice inspection may be subjected to a partial tube inspection provided:
1. The tubes selected for these samples include the tubes from those areas of the tube sheet array where tubes with imperfections were previously found.
  2. The inspections include those portions of the tubes where imperfections were previously found.

The results of each sample inspection shall be classified into one of the following three categories:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Inspection Results</u>
C-1	Less than 5% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes and none of the inspected tubes are defective.
C-2	One or more tubes, but not more than 1% of the total tubes inspected are defective, or between 5% and 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes.
C-3	More than 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes or more than 1% of the inspected tubes are defective.

Note: In all inspections, previously degraded tubes must exhibit significant (greater than 10%) further wall penetrations to be included in the above percentage calculations.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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4.4.6.3 Inspection Frequencies - The above required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the following frequencies:

- a. The first inservice inspection shall be performed after 6 Effective Full Power Months but within 24 calendar months of initial criticality. Subsequent inservice inspections shall be performed at intervals of not less than 12 nor more than 24 calendar months after the previous inspection. If two consecutive inspections following service under AVT conditions, not including the preservice inspection, result in all inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if two consecutive inspections demonstrate that previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred, the inspection interval may be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months.
- b. If the results of the inservice inspection of a steam generator conducted in accordance with Table 4.4-2 at 40-month intervals fall in Category C-3, the inspection frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall apply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specification 4.4.6.3.a; the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months.
- c. Additional, unscheduled inservice inspections shall be performed on each steam generator in accordance with the first sample inspection specified in Table 4.4-2 during the shutdown subsequent to any of the following conditions:
  1. Primary-to-secondary tubes leaks (not including leaks originating from tube-to-tube sheet welds) in excess of the limits of Specification 3.4.7.2.
  2. A seismic occurrence greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake.
  3. A loss-of-coolant accident requiring actuation of the engineered safeguards.
  4. A main steam line or feedwater line break.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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#### 4.4.6.4 Acceptance Criteria

a. As used in this Specification:

1. Imperfection means an exception to the dimensions, finish or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy-current testing indications below 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections.
2. Degradation means a service-induced cracking, wastage, wear or general corrosion occurring on either inside or outside of a tube.
3. Degraded Tube means a tube containing imperfections greater than or equal to 20% of the nominal wall thickness caused by degradation.
4. % Degradation means the percentage of the tube wall thickness affected or removed by degradation.
5. Defect means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the plugging limit. A tube containing a defect is defective.
6. Plugging Limit means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be removed from service and is equal to (40)%\* of the nominal tube wall thickness.
7. Unserviceable describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified in 4.4.6.3.c, above.
8. Tube Inspection means an inspection of the steam generator tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg.

\*Value to be determined in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.121, August 1976.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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9. Preservice Inspection means an inspection of the full length of each tube in each steam generator performed by eddy current techniques prior to service to establish a baseline condition of the tubing. This inspection shall be performed after the field hydrostatic test and prior to initial POWER OPERATION using the equipment and techniques expected to be used during subsequent inservice inspections.
- b. The steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE after completing the corresponding actions (plug all tubes exceeding the plugging limit and all tubes containing through-wall cracks) required by Table 4.4-2.

#### 4.4.6.5 Reports

- a. Following each inservice inspection of steam generator tubes, the number of tubes plugged in each steam generator shall be reported to the Commission within 15 days.
- b. The complete results of the steam generator tube inservice inspection shall be submitted to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 12 months following the completion of the inspection. This Special Report shall include:--
  1. Number and extent of tubes inspected.
  2. Location and percent of wall-thickness penetration for each indication of an imperfection.
  3. Identification of tubes plugged.
- c. Results of steam generator tube inspections which fall into Category C-3 and require prompt notification of the Commission shall be reported pursuant to Specification 6.9.1 prior to resumption of plant operation. The written followup of this report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to determine cause of the tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.

TABLE 4.4-1  
 MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO BE  
 INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION

Preservice Inspection	No			Yes		
	Two	Three	Four	Two	Three	Four
No. of Steam Generators per Unit						
First Inservice Inspection	All			One	Two	Two
Second & Subsequent Inservice Inspections	One <sup>1</sup>			One <sup>1</sup>	One <sup>2</sup>	One <sup>3</sup>

Table Notation:

1. The inservice inspection may be limited to one steam generator on a rotating schedule encompassing 3 N % of the tubes (where N is the number of steam generators in the plant) if the results of the first or previous inspections indicate that all steam generators are performing in a like manner. Note that under some circumstances, the operating conditions in one or more steam generators may be found to be more severe than those in other steam generators. Under such circumstances the sample sequence shall be modified to inspect the most severe conditions.
2. The other steam generator not inspected during the first inservice inspection shall be inspected. The third and subsequent inspections should follow the instructions described in 1 above.
3. Each of the other two steam generators not inspected during the first inservice inspections shall be inspected during the second and third inspections. The fourth and subsequent inspections shall follow the instructions described in 1 above.

TABLE 4.4-2

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION

1ST SAMPLE INSPECTION			2ND SAMPLE INSPECTION		3RD SAMPLE INSPECTION	
Sample Size	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required
A minimum of S Tubes per S. G.	C-1	None	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 2S tubes in this S. G.	C-1	None	N/A	N/A
			C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 4S tubes in this S. G.	C-1	None
					C-2	Plug defective tubes
					C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample
	C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample	N/A	N/A		
	C-3	Inspect all tubes in this S. G., plug defective tubes and inspect 2S tubes in each other S. G.  Prompt notification to NRC pursuant to specification 6.9.1	All other S. G.s are C-1	None	N/A	N/A
			Some S. G.s C-2 but no additional S. G. are C-3	Perform action for C-2 result of second sample	N/A	N/A
			Additional S. G. is C-3	Inspect all tubes in each S. G. and plug defective tubes. Prompt notification to NRC pursuant to specification 6.9.1	N/A	N/A

$S = 3 \frac{N}{n} \%$  Where N is the number of steam generators in the unit, and n is the number of steam generators inspected during an inspection

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

#### LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.4.7.1 The following Reactor Coolant System leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The containment atmosphere (gaseous or particulate) radioactivity monitoring system,
- b. The containment pocket sump level and flow monitoring system, and
- c. Either the (containment air cooler condensate flow rate) or a containment atmosphere (gaseous or particulate) radioactivity monitoring system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With only two of the above required leakage detection systems OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours when the required gaseous or particulate radioactive monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.7.1 The leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Containment atmosphere (gaseous and/or particulate) monitoring system-performance of CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at the frequencies specified in Table 4.3-3,
- b. Containment pocket sump level and flow monitoring system-performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months,
- c. (Specify appropriate surveillance tests depending upon the type of leakage detection system selected.)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.4.7.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,
- b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,
- c. 1 GPM total primary-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators not isolated from the Reactor Coolant System and (500) gallons per day through any one steam generator not isolated from the Reactor Coolant System,
- d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System, and
- e.          GPM CONTROLLED LEAKAGE at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of  $2235 \pm 20$  psig.
- f. 1 GPM leakage from any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least two closed manual or deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.7.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

- a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere (gaseous or particulate) radioactivity monitor at least once per 12 hours.
- b. Monitoring the containment pocket sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours.
- c. Measurement of the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE to the reactor coolant pump seals when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is  $2235 \pm 20$  psig at least once per 31 days with the modulating valve fully open. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4.
- d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours.
- e. Monitoring the reactor head flange leakoff system at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.7.2.2 Each Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, except that in lieu of any leakage testing required by Specification 4.0.5, each valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit:

- a. At least once per 18 months.
- b. Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months.
- c. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve.
- d. Within 24 hours following valve actuation due to automatic or manual action or flow through the valve.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES

The power operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

#### 3/4.4.6 STEAM GENERATORS

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the primary coolant system and the secondary coolant system (primary-to-secondary leakage = 500 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a primary-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that primary-to-secondary leakage of 500 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of (40)% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing in-service inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be promptly reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1 prior to resumption of plant operation. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

#### 3/4.4.7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

##### 3/4.4.7.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

##### 3/4.4.7.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 GPM. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS Pressure Isolation Valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS Pressure Isolation Valves is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

The 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the leakage detection systems.

The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE limitation restricts operation when the total flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals exceeds ( ) GPM with the modulating valve in the supply line fully open at a nominal RCS pressure of 2235 psig. This limitation ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the safety injection flow will not be less than assumed in the accident analyses.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 GPM for all steam generators not isolated from the RCS ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of Part 100 limits in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 GPM limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

#### 3/4.4.8 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

#### 3/4.4.9 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the resulting 2-hour doses at the site boundary will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of Part 100 limits following a steam generator tube rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady state primary-to-secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1.0 GPM. The values for the limits on specific activity represent limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters of the ( ) site, such as site boundary location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the primary coolant's specific activity greater than 1.0 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4-1, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER. Operation with specific activity levels exceeding 1.0 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 but within the limits shown on Figure 3.4-1 must be restricted to no more than 800 hours per year (approximately 10 percent of the unit's yearly operating time) since the activity levels allowed by Figure 3.4-1 increase the 2-hour thyroid dose at the site boundary by a factor of up to 20 following a postulated steam generator tube rupture. The reporting of cumulative operating time over 500 hours in any 6 month consecutive period with greater than 1.0 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 will allow sufficient time for Commission evaluation of the circumstances prior to reaching the 800-hour limit.

Reducing  $T_{avg}$  to less than 500°F prevents the release of activity should a steam generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the primary coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the primary coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action. Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

#### 3/4.4.10 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G.

- 1) The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 for the first full-power service period.
  - a) Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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- b) Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation, other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity, may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.
- 2) These limit lines shall be calculated periodically using methods provided below.
  - 3) The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is below 70°F.
  - 4) The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100°F/hr and 200°/hr respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 320°F.
  - 5) System preservice hydrotests and in-service leak and hydrotests shall be performed at pressures in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

The fracture toughness properties of the ferritic materials in the reactor vessel are determined in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan, ASTM E185-73, and in accordance with additional reactor vessel requirements. These properties are then evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of the 1976 Summer Addenda to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the calculation methods described in WCAP-7924-A, "Basis for Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves, April 1975."

Heatup and cooldown limit curves are calculated using the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature,  $RT_{NDT}$ , at the end of (12) effective full power years of service life. The (12) EFY service life period is chosen such that the limiting  $RT_{NDT}$  at the 1/4T location in the core region is greater than the  $RT_{NDT}$  of the limiting unirradiated material. The selection of such a limiting  $RT_{NDT}$  assures that all components in the Reactor Coolant System will be operated conservatively in accordance with applicable Code requirements.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial  $RT_{NDT}$ ; the results of these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4-1. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron ( $E$  greater than 1 MEV) irradiation can cause an increase in the  $RT_{NDT}$ . Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence and copper content of the material in question, can be predicted using Figure B 3/4.4-1 and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, "Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials." The heatup and cooldown limit curves of Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 include predicted adjustments for this shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  at the end of (12) EFPY (as well as adjustments for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments).

Values of  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  determined in this manner may be used until the results from the material surveillance program, evaluated according to ASTM E185, are available. Capsules will be removed in accordance with the requirements of ASTM E185-73 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix H. The surveillance specimen withdrawal schedule is shown in Table 4.4-5. The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  determined from the surveillance capsule exceeds the calculated  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

Allowable pressure-temperature relationships for various heatup and cooldown rates are calculated using methods derived from Appendix G in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, and these methods are discussed in detail in WCAP-7924-A.

The general method for calculating heatup and cooldown limit curves is based upon the principles of the linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) technology. In the calculation procedures a semi-elliptical surface defect with a depth of one-quarter of the wall thickness,  $T$ , and a length of  $3/2T$  is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall as well as at the outside of the vessel wall. The dimensions of this postulated crack, referred to in Appendix G of ASME Section III as the reference flaw, amply

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TABLE B 3/4.4-1

REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>COMP CODE</u>	<u>ASME MATERIAL TYPE</u>	<u>CU %</u>	<u>P %</u>	<u>NDTT °F</u>	<u>50 FT-LB/35 MIL TEMP °F</u>		<u>RT °F</u>	<u>MIN. UPPER SHELF FT-LB</u>	
						<u>LONG</u>	<u>TRANS</u>		<u>LONG</u>	<u>TRANS</u>

B 3/4 4-9

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


Figure B 3/4 4.1 Fast Neutron Fluence ( $E > 1\text{mev}$ ) as a Function of Full Power Service Life

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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exceed the current capabilities of inservice inspection techniques. Therefore, the reactor operation limit curves developed for this reference crack are conservative and provide sufficient safety margins for protection against non-ductile failure. To assure that the radiation embrittlement effects are accounted for in the calculation of the limit curves, the most limiting value of the nil ductility reference temperature,  $RT_{NDT}$ , is used and this includes the radiation-induced shift,  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$ , corresponding to the end of the period for which heatup and cooldown curves are generated.

The ASME approach for calculating the allowable limit curves for various heatup and cooldown rates specifies that the total stress intensity factor,  $K_I$ , for the combined thermal and pressure stresses at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than the reference stress intensity factor,  $K_{IR}$ , for the metal temperature at that time.  $K_{IR}$  is obtained from the reference fracture toughness curve, defined in Appendix G to the ASME Code. The  $K_{IR}$  curve is given by the equation:

$$K_{IR} = 26.78 + 1.223 \exp [0.0145(T - RT_{NDT} + 160)] \quad (1)$$

where  $K_{IR}$  is the reference stress intensity factor as a function of the metal temperature  $T$  and the metal nil ductility reference temperature  $RT_{NDT}$ . Thus, the governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is defined in Appendix G of the ASME Code as follows:

$$C K_{IM} + K_{It} \leq K_{IR} \quad (2)$$

Where,  $K_{IM}$  is the stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress.

$K_{It}$  is the stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

$K_{IR}$  is provided by the code as a function of temperature relative to the  $RT_{NDT}$  of the material.

$C = 2.0$  for level A and B service limits, and

$C = 1.5$  for inservice hydrostatic and leak test operations.

At any time during the heatup or cooldown transient,  $K_{IR}$  is determined by the metal temperature at the tip of the postulated flaw, the appropriate value for  $RT_{NDT}$ , and the reference fracture toughness curve. The thermal stresses resulting from temperature gradients through the vessel wall are calculated and then the corresponding thermal stress intensity factor,  $K_{IT}$ , for the reference flaw is computed. From Equation (2) the pressure stress intensity factors are obtained and, from these, the allowable pressures are calculated.

### COOLDOWN

For the calculation of the allowable pressure versus coolant temperature during cooldown, the Code reference flaw is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall. During cooldown, the controlling location of the flaw is always at the inside of the wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses at the inside, which increase with increasing cooldown rates. Allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. From these relations, composite limit curves are constructed for each cooldown rate of interest.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because control of the cooldown procedure is based on measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is actually dependent on the material temperature at the tip of the assumed flaw. During cooldown, the 1/4T vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel ID. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It follows that at any given reactor coolant temperature, the delta T developed

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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during cooldown results in a higher value of  $K_{IR}$  at the 1/4T location for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state operation. Furthermore, if conditions exist such that the increase in  $K_{IR}$  exceeds  $K_{It}$ , the calculated allowable pressure during cooldown will be greater than the steady-state value.

The above procedures are needed because there is no direct control on temperature at the 1/4T location; therefore, allowable pressures may unknowingly be violated if the rate of cooling is decreased at various intervals along a cooldown ramp. The use of the composite curve eliminates this problem and assures conservative operation of the system for the entire cooldown period.

### HEATUP

Three separate calculations are required to determine the limit curves for finite heatup rates. As is done in the cooldown analysis, allowable pressure-temperature relationships are developed for steady-state conditions as well as finite heatup rate conditions assuming the presence of a 1/4T defect at the inside of the vessel wall. The thermal gradients during heatup produce compressive stresses at the inside of the wall that alleviate the tensile stresses produced by internal pressure. The metal temperature at the crack tip lags the coolant temperature; therefore, the  $K_{IR}$  for the 1/4T crack during heatup is lower than the  $K_{IR}$  for the 1/4T crack during steady-state conditions at the same coolant temperature. During heatup, especially at the end of the transient, conditions may exist such that the effects of compressive thermal stresses and different  $K_{IR}$ 's for steady-state and finite heatup rates do not offset each other and the pressure-temperature curve based on steady-state conditions no longer represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the 1/4T flaw is considered. Therefore, both cases have to be analyzed in order to assure that at any coolant temperature the lower value of the allowable pressure calculated for steady-state and finite heatup rates is obtained.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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The second portion of the heatup analysis concerns the calculation of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which a 1/4T deep outside surface flaw is assumed. Unlike the situation at the vessel inside surface, the thermal gradients established at the outside surface during heatup produce stresses which are tensile in nature and thus tend to reinforce any pressure stresses present. These thermal stresses, of course, are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time (or coolant temperature) along the heatup ramp. Furthermore, since the thermal stresses, at the outside are tensile and increase with increasing heatup rate, a lower bound curve cannot be defined. Rather, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration.

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of non-ductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or an RCS vent opening of greater than ( ) square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to (275)°F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to ( )°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of a HPSI pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.11 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

Components of the reactor coolant system were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, \_\_\_\_\_ Edition and Addenda through \_\_\_\_\_.