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DEC 1 1 1975

Dockets Nos. 50-250
and 50-251

Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 14 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 13 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4. These amendments include Change No. 26 to the joint Technical Specifications and are in response to your request dated September 9, 1975, and Supplements dated October 29, November 21, and November 26, 1975.

These amendments modify operating limits in the Technical Specifications to allow operation of Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3, following refueling, at 2100 psia until the extended fuel residence time is reached. The operating limits for Unit 4 set forth in its Technical Specifications remain unchanged although the Unit 4 Technical Specifications will be modified to reflect the revisions to the Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 14
2. Amendment No. 13
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

OFFICE ➤	ORB#3	ORB#3 DE	OELD R. Ross	ORB#3	AD:RL/ORS KRG	
SURNAME ➤	CParrish cp	DElliott:acr	RR	GLear GL	KRGoller	
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Florida Power & Light Company

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-251

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 4

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 13
License No. DPR-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated September 9, 1975 and supplements dated October 9, November 21 and November 26, 1975, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B. of Facility License No. DPR-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   "(B) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 26"

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Karl R. Goller

Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 26
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 11, 1975

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 14
License No. DPR-31

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated September 9, 1975, and supplements dated October 9, November 21, and November 26, 1975, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B. of Facility License No. DPR-31 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   "(B) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 26"

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Karl R. Goller

Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 26
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 11, 1975

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 14 & 13

CHANGE NO. 26 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-31 AND DPR-41

DOCKETS NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Replace page i, page v, page 1-6, Figure 2.1-1, page 2.3-2, page 2.3-3, page 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-1(a) and page B3.2-1 with the attached revised pages. Add page 3.1-7, Figure 3.2-1(b), Figure 3.2-1(c) and page B.3.2-1a.

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1.16 INTERIM LIMITS

1.16.1 Fuel Residence Time Limit

The fuel residence time for Unit 3 shall be limited to 23,500 effective full power hours (EFPH) under reduced pressure operating conditions. The fuel residence time for Unit 4 shall be limited to 30,000 EFPH. 26

1.16.2 Reactor Coolant Pumps Operation

The reactor shall not be operated with less than three reactor coolant pumps in operation.

1.17 LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTS

Low power physics tests are tests below a nominal 5% of rated power which measure fundamental characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation.



Figure 2.1-1. Reactor Core Thermal and Hydraulic Safety Limits, Three Loop Operation.

Reactor Coolant Temperature

Overtemperature ΔT $\leq \Delta T_o \left[K_1 - 0.0174(T-566.6) + 0.000976(P-2085) - f(\Delta q) \right]$ 26

ΔT_o = Indicated ΔT at rated power, F

T = Average temperature, F

P = Pressurizer pressure, psig

$f(\Delta q)$ = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during startup tests such that:

For $(q_t - q_b)$ within +10 percent and -14 percent where q_t and q_b are the percent power in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and $q_t + q_b$ is total core power in percent of rated power, $f(\Delta q) = 0$.

For each percent that the magnitude of $(q_t - q_b)$ exceeds +10 percent, the Delta-T trip set point shall be automatically reduced by 3.5 percent of its value at interim power.

For each percent that the magnitude of $(q_t - q_b)$ exceeds -14 percent, the Delta-T trip set point shall be automatically reduced by 2 percent of its value at interim power.

K_1 (Three Loop Operation) = 1.120;
(Two Loop Operation) = 0.88

Over-power $\Delta T \leq \Delta T_o \left[1.09 - K_1 \frac{dT}{dt} - K_2 (T - T') - f(\Delta q) \right]$

ΔT_o = Indicated ΔT at rated power, F

T = Average temperature, F

T' = Indicated average temperature at nominal conditions and rated power, F

K_1 = 0 for decreasing average temperature, 0.2 sec./F for increasing average temperature

K_2 = 0.00134 for T equal to or more than T'; 0 for T less than T'

$\frac{dT}{dt}$ = Rate of change of temperature, F/sec

$f(\Delta q)$ = As defined above

Pressurizer

Low Pressurizer pressure - equal to or greater than 1915 psig. 26

High Pressurizer pressure - equal to or less than 2385 psig.

High Pressurizer water level - equal to or less than 92% of full scale.

Reactor Coolant Flow

Low reactor coolant flow - equal to or greater than 90% of normal indicated flow

Low reactor coolant pump motor frequency - equal to or greater than 56.1 Hz

Under voltage on reactor coolant pump motor bus - equal to or greater than 60% of normal voltage

Steam Generators

Low-low steam generator water level - equal to or greater than 5% of narrow range instrument scale

6. DNB PARAMETERS

The following DNB related parameter limits shall be maintained during power operation:

a. Reactor Coolant System Tavg $\leq$ 570.6 °F
b. Pressurizer Pressure $\geq$ 2070 psia* 26

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power using normal shutdown procedures.

Compliance with this specification is demonstrated by verifying that each of the parameters is within its limits at least once each 12 hours.

*Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of (5%) RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase in excess of (10%) RATED THERMAL POWER.

Applicability: Applies to the operation of the control rods and power distribution limits.

Objective: To ensure (1) core subcriticality after a reactor trip, (2) a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical control rod ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

Specification: 1. CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

a. Whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the shutdown control rods shall be fully withdrawn.

b. For Unit 4, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown by the solid lines on Figure 3.2-1 for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(a) for two loop operation. Control rod insertion limits for Unit 3, are shown on Figures 3.2-1(b) and 3.2-1(c). 26 26

c. For Unit 4, after 70% of the second and subsequent cycles as defined by burnup, the limits shall be adjusted as a linear function of burnup toward the end-of-core life as shown by the dotted lines on Figure 3.2-1. 26

d. The Unit 4, end-of-core life limit shown on Figure 3.2-1 and the Unit 3, control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) may be revised on the basis of physics calculations and physics data obtained during startup and subsequent operation. 26

e. Part length rods shall not be permitted in the core except for low power physics tests and for axial offset calibration tests performed below 75% of rated power.

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR THREE LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR TWO LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1(a)

UNIT 3

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR THREE LOOP OPERATION



26

FIGURE 3.2-1(b)

UNIT 3

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR TWO LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1(c)

B3.2 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, CONTROL AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

Reactivity changes accompanying changes in reactor power are compensated by control rod motion. Reactivity changes associated with xenon, samarium, fuel depletion, and large changes in reactor coolant temperature (operating temperature to cold shutdown) are compensated by changes in the soluble boron concentration. During power operation, the shutdown groups are fully withdrawn and control of reactor power is by the control groups. A reactor trip occurring during power operation will put the reactor into the hot shutdown condition.

The control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time, assuming the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn, with sufficient margins to meet the assumptions used in the accident analysis.[1] In addition, they provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod worth in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod ejection, and provide for acceptable nuclear peaking factors. The solid line shown on Figure 3.2-1 meets the shutdown requirement for the first 70% of second and subsequent cycles for Unit 4, except for two loop operation. The Unit 4 end-of-core life limit may be more restrictive, as shown by the conservative estimate represented by the dotted line. Figures 3.2-1(b) and 3.2-1(c) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 3, The Unit 4 end-of-core-life limit and the Unit 3, rod insertion limits may be 26
determined on the basis of startup and operating data to provide a more realistic limit which will allow for more flexibility in operation and still assure compliance with the shutdown requirement. Figure 3.2-1(a) shows the shutdown requirements for Unit 4 two loop operation. The 26
maximum shutdown margin requirement occurs at end-of-core life and is based on the value used in analysis of the hypothetical steam break accident. Early in core life, less shutdown margin is required, and Figure 3.2-2 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 1.77% reactivity at end-of-core-life with respect to an uncontrolled cooldown. All other accident analyses are based on 1% reactivity shutdown margin.

The overlap between successive control banks is allowed because the control rod worth is lower near the top and bottom of the core than in the center.

Positioning of the part-length rods is governed by the requirement to maintain the axial power shape within specified limits or to accept an automatic cutback of the overpower ΔT and overtemperature ΔT set points (see Specification 2.3). Thus, there is no need for imposing a limit on the physical positioning of the part-length rods.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 14 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-31, AND

AMENDMENT NO. 13 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-41

(CHANGE NO. 26 TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS)

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 3 AND 4

DOCKETS NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Introduction

By letter dated September 9, 1975, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41 for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4. Supplemental information relating to the requested changes was supplied by FPL in their letters of October 29, November 21, and November 26, 1975. The proposed changes would modify operating limits in the Technical Specifications to allow operation of Unit 3, following refueling, at 2100 psia through core cycle 3. FPL requested: (1) the allowable fuel residence time (the minimum predicted time to clad flattening) be increased from 23,000 effective full power hours (EFPH) to 23,500 EFPH, (2) the overtemperature ΔT and pressurizer low pressure limiting safety system settings (LSSS) be changed to allow operation at 2100 psia, and (3) the control rod insertion limits, a limiting condition for operation (LCO), be modified.

Because Units 3 and 4 share joint Technical Specifications, FPL proposed modifying the Technical Specifications for Unit 4 to reflect the proposed revision to the Unit 3 Technical Specifications. However, the operating limits for Unit 4 are unchanged by the Unit 3 reload for core cycle 3.

During the review of the proposed operating limits for Unit 3 the staff became aware of recent information that indicated that the bowing of fuel rods within the reactor may be greater than previously expected. FPL discussed the effect of this increased bowing of fuel rods in their submittals of November 21, and November 26, 1975.

Discussion

A. Reactor Core Description

The Unit 3 core loading for fuel cycle 3 will include 48 new prepressurized fuel assemblies. These assemblies, which are known as Region 5a and Region 5b fuel assemblies, have a slightly higher enrichment than do the Region 2 fuel assemblies they replace (2.60 and 2.90% U-235 vs. 2.56% U-235). However, the enrichment of the region 5a and 5b

fuel assemblies are within the enrichment range of other assemblies presently installed in the Unit 3 reactor (1.86% U-235 to 3.11% U-235). The increased enrichment compensates for the fission product reactivity poisoning produced within the reactor during previous operation. The Region 5 fuel assemblies have been fabricated by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the fabricator of the fuel assemblies now loaded in the Turkey Point Units. They are mechanically identical to the presently installed fuel assemblies with the exception of one Region 5a fuel assembly which contains $Zr\ O_2$-Y_2O_3 marker pellets in two fuel rods. These marker pellets will permit the gathering of fuel stability data. The staff does not consider the inclusion of these inert marker pellets in two fuel rods as a significant departure from previously approved fuel element designs.

B. Minimum Time to Clad Flattening

Turkey Point Unit 3 has been operating at a reduced primary pressure of 1900 psia since early in core cycle 1. Reduced primary pressure was initiated during cycle 1 in order to lengthen the predicted time to clad flattening by reducing the pressure differential across the fuel cladding and thus reducing the clad creep rate. The presently specified Unit 3 fuel residence limit of 23,000 EFPH was calculated prior to the initiation of core cycle 2 operation and is the analytically determined minimum time to clad flattening for Region 3 fuel assemblies assuming: (1) a reactor system pressure of 1900 psia for core cycle 2 and (3) a reactor system pressure of 2250 from the beginning of core cycle 3 to the end of fuel life. Since FPL plans to increase the cycle 3 reactor system pressure to 2100 psia, instead of the previously assumed 2250 psia, FPL has recalculated the predicted minimum time to clad collapse. This recalculated value is 23,500 EFPH.

C. Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Protection

The core protection system operates by defining a region of permissible operation in terms of power, pressure, temperature, coolant flow and axial power distribution. This allowable operating region with regard to coolant temperature difference across the reactor core is determined by the equations which define the overtemperature ΔT and overpower ΔT reactor trips. The overtemperature ΔT reactor trip protects the core against nucleate boiling, excessive hot channel exit quality, and hot channel boiling for any combination of power, pressure, temperature, and axial core power distribution. Similarly, the overpower ΔT reactor trip provides protection against exceeding fuel rod design limits for accidents involving overpower excursions.

FPL has proposed modifications to the overtemperature ΔT and pressurizer low pressure trip setpoints which are consistent with reactor operation at 2100 psia. No modifications to the overpower ΔT reactor trip were proposed as the overpower ΔT reactor trip is not a function of system pressure. The operating reactor coolant temperature will remain

unchanged when the reactor system pressure is increased to 2100 psia.

D. Control Rod Insertion Limits

Control of the operating reactor is provided by neutron absorbing control rods and soluble boric acid in the reactor coolant. The more boric acid contained in the reactor coolant the less the control rods need to be inserted to provide reactor control. The proposed control rod insertion limits are the result of analyses performed for the Unit 3 cycle 3 core configuration to insure: (1) an adequate shutdown margin is maintained throughout cycle life, (2) hot channel factors are maintained below design limits, (3) acceptable consequences of a rod ejection accident, and (4) acceptable consequences of rod misalignment. The maintenance of adequate shutdown margin at the end of core life is the consideration which defined the proposed control rod insertion limits.

E. Effect of Fuel Rod Bowing

FPL has employed the rod bow penalties determined by the Westinghouse Electric Company into their postulated accident and transient calculations. The rod bow penalties are based upon an analysis of all bowing experience to date. These penalties were determined from the inspection of 24 different regions of fuel assemblies (about 25,000 fuel rods) including more than 70 assemblies with burnups greater than 27,000 MWD/MTU.

Evaluation

A. Reactor Core Description

FPL's analysis of the loading pattern and their comparison of core physics parameters for core cycle 3 with those of core cycle 2 indicates the nuclear parameters for core cycle 3 fall within the range of values assumed in the Turkey Point Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). We agree that this comparison shows there are no significant differences between the Unit 3 cycle 2 and cycle 3 core configurations. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents and transients are not increased by the Unit 3 reload for core cycle 3 and since these consequences were previously determined to be acceptable for Turkey Point, the conclusions of previous safety evaluations are unchanged by the core reload.

B. Minimum Time to Clad Flattening

FPL has proposed that the reactor system pressure for Unit 3 be increased to 2100 psia in order to prevent the internal fuel rod pressure from exceeding the reactor system pressure during core cycle 3. By maintaining the reactor pressure at 2100 psia, instead of increasing it to the design pressure of 2250 psia, FPL will

maximize the predicted minimum time to clad flattening and still maintain the maximum internal fuel rod pressure less than the reactor system operating pressure. FPL has recalculated the minimum time to clad flattening and has determined this time to be 23,500 EFPH for Unit 3 cycle 3 fuel assemblies, assuming reactor operation at 2100 psia. The results and conclusions of previous safety evaluations and previously approved operating limits, now in effect, remain unchanged as long as clad flattening is predicted not to occur. We have reviewed FPL's request and have approved the requested Unit 3 fuel residence time. Our approval is based on FPL's use of an approved clad flattening model and our independent determination that the model was used to determine the minimum time to clad flattening for the most critical assemblies in the cycle 3 fuel loading.

C. Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Protection

Following refueling for core cycle 3, FPL plans to operate Unit 3 at a reactor system pressure of 2100 psia. FPL, therefore, proposed overtemperature ΔT and pressurizer low pressure reactor trip settings to be consistent with 2100 psia operation. Since the FPL does not plan to increase the temperature of the reactor coolant and since such a temperature increase would be possible using the proposed trip settings, the staff requested FPL to propose limiting conditions for operation (LCO) on reactor coolant average temperature and pressurizer pressure. FPL proposed these LCO's for inclusion in the Technical Specifications in their submittal of November 21, 1975. The inclusion of these LCO's in the Technical Specifications will add further assurance that actual reactor operating conditions are consistent with the operating conditions assumed in the analysis of Unit 3 postulated accidents and transients.

In their submittal of November 21, 1975, FPL also proposed for inclusion in the Technical Specifications a revised Reactor Core Thermal and Hydraulic Safety Limit curve for three loop operation at 2100 pisa. A similar curve for two loop operation at 2100 psia was not included in the Technical Specifications, at this time, because operation of the reactor with less than three reactor coolant pumps in operation is prohibited by the Technical Specifications.

We have reviewed the proposed trip settings and operating limits and have concluded that they provide the necessary departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) protection in the event of any previously postulated accident or transient. Therefore, we can further conclude that the new limits provide adequate protection against fuel clad damage.

D. Control Rod Insertion Limits

FPL has analyzed the control rod insertion limits for three loop and two loop operation and has proposed Unit 3 control rod insertion limits

which are more conservative than those previously specified. The limiting constraint in defining the proposed control rod insertion limits is the maintenance of adequate shutdown margin at the end of core life. Use of the more conservative proposed control rod insertion limits will increase the minimum available shutdown margin, maintain an acceptable core power distribution, decrease the consequences of a control rod ejection accident and decrease the consequences of control rod misalignment. Moreover, since we find that the use of the proposed control rod insertion limits will not effect previously performed applicable safety analyses, we conclude that the proposed insertion limits are acceptable.

E. Effect of Fuel Rod Bowing

FPL has performed an analysis to evaluate the effect of fuel rod bow on the calculated emergency core cooling system (ECCS) performance during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The analysis was performed for Region 3 fuel, the fuel with the highest stored energy in core cycle 3, and uses the power spike distribution for fuel assembly end-of-life conditions. Our review of FPL's evaluation supports the conclusion that the peak clad temperature following a LOCA will be less than 2200°F for core cycle 3 conditions. Therefore, the calculated ECCS cooling performance for Turkey Point Unit 3 conforms to the peak clad temperature criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (b).

In addition to the peak power penalty associated with the rod bowing phenomenon there has also been determined to be a DNB penalty resulting from the dispaced coolant flow. This penalty is 5.6% maximum, but considering the limited linear power density this penalty is reduced to 3.1% for Turkey Point Unit 3 core cycle 3. This penalty is accounted for by conservatisms in the present DNB model which are in excess of 3.3%.

Summary

Our evaluation supports the conclusion that: (1) clad flattening is predicted not to occur during a projected fuel residence time of 23,500 EFPH, (2) the reactor trip settings and LCO's incorporated in the Technical Specifications are appropriate for use during Unit 3 cycle 3 operation at 2100 psia, (3) the proposed control rod insertion limits are conservative when compared to those now in effect, and (4) the effect of fuel rod bowing does not change the results of previously postulated accidents or transients and does not change the conclusions of earlier safety evaluations. We have determined that there are no significant differences between core cycle 2 and core cycle 3 and that the conclusions of our earlier safety evaluations remain unchanged for both 1900 psia and 2100 psia operation. Moreover, we have concluded that the proposed changes have been appropriately incorporated into the proposed Technical Specifications and are acceptable.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

DATED: December 11, 1975

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETS NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments No. 14 and No. 13 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, respectively, issued to Florida Power and Light Company which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4, located in Dade County, Florida. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment modifies the operating limits in the Technical Specifications to allow operation of Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3, following refueling, at 2100 psia until the extended fuel residence time is reached. The operating limits for Unit 4 set forth in the Technical Specifications remain unchanged although the Unit 4 Technical Specifications will be modified to reflect the revisions to the Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on October 31, 1975 (40 FR 50745). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following notice of the proposed action.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated September 9, 1975 and supplements dated October 29, November 21 and November 26, 1975, (2) Amendments Nos. 14 and 13 to Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, with Change No. 26 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Environmental & Urbal Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 11th day of December, 1975.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing