

Mr. J. H. Goldberg  
President-Nuclear Division  
Florida Power and Light Company  
P.O. Box 14000  
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

Dear Mr. Goldberg:

SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE:  
POWER-OPERATED RELIEF VALVE RELIABILITY AND LOW TEMPERATURE  
OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION - GENERIC LETTER 90-06  
(TAC NOS. M77389, M77390, M77464 AND M77465)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 166 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 160 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Plant, Unit Nos. 3 and 4, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated November 25, 1992, to implement Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability,' and Generic Issue 94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors,' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)." Your application was supplemented by letter dated March 4, 1994.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

(Original Signed By)

Richard P. Croteau, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 166 to DPR-31
- 2. Amendment No. 160 to DPR-41
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

Distribution  
See next page

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*DFO*

DATED: June 28, 1994

AMENDMENT NO. 166 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31-TURKEY POINT UNIT 3  
AMENDMENT NO. 160 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41-TURKEY POINT UNIT 4

Docket File  
NRC & Local PDRs  
PDII-2 Reading  
S. Varga, 14/E/4  
G. Lainas, 14/H/3  
H. Berkow  
E. Tana  
R. Croteau  
OGC  
OTSB  
D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB  
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Mr. J. H. Goldberg  
Florida Power and Light Company

Turkey Point Plant

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 166  
License No. DPR-31

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated November 25, 1992, as supplemented by letter dated March 4, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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P PDR

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 166, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B is hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 28, 1994



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-251

TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO. 4

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 160  
License No. DPR-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated November 25, 1992, as supplemented by letter dated March 4, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 160, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B is hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 28, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 166 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31

AMENDMENT NO. 160 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41

DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove pages

3/4 4-10  
-  
3/4 4-36  
B 3/4 4-3  
-  
-

Insert pages

3/4 4-10  
3/4 4-10a  
3/4 4-36  
B 3/4 4-3  
B 3/4 4-3a  
B 3/4 4-3b

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.4.4 Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close each PORV's associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; with both block valves closed with power removed, restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status within 30 days and restore power to its associated block valve; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With one or both block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, place its associated PORV in manual control within the next hour and be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within 30 days if both block valves are inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

RELIEF VALVES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.4 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of Specification 3.4.4 or is closed to provide an isolation function.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.4.9.3 The high pressure safety injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) shall be isolated, and below an RCS average coolant temperature of 275°F at least one of the following Overpressure Mitigating Systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a) Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of  $415 \pm 15$  psig, or
- b) The RCS depressurized with a RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2.20 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 (below an RCS average coolant temperature of 275°F), 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the high pressure safety injection flow paths to the RCS unisolated, restore isolation of these flow paths within 4 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 4 (below an RCS average coolant temperature of 275°F), restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.20 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- c. With one PORV inoperable in MODES 5 or 6 with the reactor vessel head on, either (1) restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2.20 square inch vent within a total of 32 hours, or (3) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least one open PORV and associated block valve within a total of 32 hours.
- d. With both PORVs inoperable, either restore one PORV to OPERABLE status or complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2.20 square inch vent within 24 hours.
- e. In the event either the PORVs or a 2.20 square inch vent is used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence. A Special Report is not required when such a transient is the result of water injection into the RCS for test purposes with an open vent path.
- f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

The opening of the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) fulfills no safety-related function and no credit is taken for their operation in the safety analysis for MODE 1, 2 or 3. Equipment necessary to establish PORV operability in Modes 1 and 2 is limited to Vital DC power and the Instrument Air system. Equipment necessary to establish block valve operability is limited to an AC power source. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a PORV fail in the open position.

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves is determined on the basis of their being capable of performing the following functions:

- A. Manual control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This is a function that is used as a back-up for the steam generator tube rupture and to support plant shutdown in the event of an Appendix R fire. These functions are considered to be important-to-safety, or Quality Related per the FPL Quality Assurance program.
- B. Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This is a function that is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
- C. Manual control of the block valve to: (1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure, and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive leakage.
- D. Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.
- E. Ability to open or close the valve(s), consistent with the required function of the valve(s).

The PORVs are also used to provide automatic pressure control in order to reduce the challenges to the RCS code safety valves for overpressurization events. (The PORVs are not credited in the overpressure accident analyses as noted above.)

Surveillance Requirements provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their functions. Specification 4.0.5. is applicable to PORVs and block valves. Specification 4.4.4. also addresses block valves. The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### RELIEF VALVES (Continued)

ACTION statement a. includes the requirement to maintain power to closed block valves because removal of power would render block valves inoperable, with respect to their ability to be reopened in a timely manner to support decay heat removal or depressurization through the PORVs, and the requirements of ACTION statement c. would apply. Power is maintained to the block valve(s) so that it is operable and may be opened subsequently to allow use of the PORV for reactor pressure control or decay heat removal by using feed and bleed. Closure of the block valve(s) establishes reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity in the case of a PORV with excess leakage or for bonnet or stem leakage on the PORV or block valve which is isolable. (Reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity takes priority over the capability of the PORV to mitigate an overpressure event.) However, the APPLICABILITY requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to operate with the block valve(s) closed with power maintained to the block valve(s) are intended only to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed to eliminate the leakage condition.

ACTION statements b. and c. include removal of power from a closed block valve as additional assurance against inadvertent opening of the block valve at a time in which the PORV is inoperable for causes other than excessive seat leakage. (In contrast, ACTION statement a. is intended to permit continued plant operation for a limited period with the block valves closed, i.e., continued operation is not dependent on maintenance at power to eliminate excessive PORV leakage. Therefore, ACTION statement a. does not require removal of power from the block valve.)

ACTION statement d. establishes remedial measures consistent with the function of block valves. The most important reason for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck-open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve(s) cannot be restored to operable status within 1 hour, the remedial action is to place the PORV in manual control to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event, and thus avoid the potential for a stuck-open PORV at a time when the block valve is inoperable. The time allowed to restore the block valve(s) to operable status is based upon the remedial action time limits for inoperable PORVs per ACTION statements b. and c. These actions are also consistent with the use of the PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure if the block valves are inoperable at a time when they have been closed to isolate PORVs with excessive leakage.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the Reactor Coolant System and the Secondary Coolant System (reactor-to-secondary leakage = 500 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a reactor-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that reactor-to-secondary leakage of 500 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with the all volatile treatment (AVT) of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of 40% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 166 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 160 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41  
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY  
TURKEY POINT UNIT NOS. 3 AND 4  
DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 25, 1992, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL or the licensee) proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4 (Turkey Point or the facility). The proposed changes are in response to Generic Letter (GL) 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability,' and Generic Issue 94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors,' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)," which was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the staff) on June 25, 1990. A discussion of the proposed changes and the staff findings relative to each of the above generic issues are addressed in section 3.0 of this safety evaluation.

The licensee's earlier response to GL 90-06 dated December 21, 1990, also provided specific commitments regarding the GL 90-06 recommendations for quality assurance, maintenance and testing of the power operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves.

By letter dated March 4, 1994, the licensee provided additional information which was within the scope of the action described in the Federal Register (58 FR 19478) and did not change the staff's no significant hazard consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

GL 90-06 represents the technical resolution of two generic issues and includes changes which are safety enhancements.

Generic Issue 70, "Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability" involves the evaluation of reliability of PORVs and block valves, and their safety significance in pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants. The GL discussed how PORVs are increasingly being relied on to perform safety-related functions and the corresponding need to improve the reliability of both PORVs and their associated block valves. Based on its studies, the staff proposed and required that all affected facilities implement TS improvements to

increase the reliability of these components and provide assurance that they will function as required.

Generic Issue 94, "Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors" involves the evaluation of the safety significance of low-temperature overpressure (LTOP) transients. The generic letter noted that LTOP protection systems unavailability is the dominant contributor to risk from low-temperature overpressure transients and discussed the need to further restrict the allowed outage time (AOT) for a LTOP channel in operating modes 4, 5, and 6. Based on its studies, the staff determined that all affected facilities should implement TS improvements to increase the availability of LTOP systems.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

By letters dated December 21, 1990, November 25, 1992, and March 4, 1994, the licensee provided responses to the recommendations of GL 90-06 and proposed TS changes.

#### 3.1 GENERIC ISSUE 70

##### 3.1.1 Quality Assurance and Inservice Testing

The generic letter recommended that the PORVs and block valves be included within the scope of the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B quality assurance program, and the PORVs, valves in the PORV control air systems, and block valves be included within the scope of a program covered by Subsection IWV, "Inservice Testing of Valves in Nuclear Power Plants," of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code).

The licensee's response indicates that its quality assurance program and the program for maintenance and replacement parts and spares relating to the PORVs and block valves are consistent with the GL recommendations and, therefore, are acceptable.

In its December 21, 1990 letter the licensee indicated that the PORVs and block valves are included within the scope of inservice testing (IST) program. However, the control air system valves are not included within the scope of the licensee's IST program. These valves are tested in accordance with established plant procedures. In Modes 4, 5, and 6 (with the reactor vessel head on) surveillance is conducted on the nitrogen backup system. Procedural tests are conducted, including supply pressure, pressure regulator output, and control air check valve leak tests. As recommended by the generic letter, the PORV block valves are part of the expanded motor operated valve (MOV) test program in accordance with GL 89-10 "Safety-related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."

The staff's review of the licensee's submittal indicates that the licensee's proposed actions meet the intent of the GL 90-06 recommendations and, therefore, are acceptable.

### 3.1.2 TS Changes

Consistent with the GL recommendations, the licensee proposed TS changes. The GL recommends TS changes to modify the limiting conditions of operation (LCO) of PORVs and block valves in Modes 1, 2, and 3 incorporating the staff positions adopted in recent licensing actions. These recent licensing actions require plants that operate with the block valve closed due to leaking PORVs, to maintain electrical power to the block valves so they can be readily opened from the control room upon demand. Additionally, plant operation in Modes 1, 2, and 3 with PORVs and block valves inoperable for reasons other than seat leakage is not permitted for periods of more than 72 hours.

Staff review indicates that the licensee's proposed TS changes reflect all the GL recommendations with the exception of allowable outage times (AOT). The proposed TS changes specify an AOT of 30 days to restore one PORV (when both the PORVs are inoperable) and allow indefinite operation with one PORV inoperable.

The staff has recognized that the primary safety enhancement associated with the availability of PORVs and block valves is derived from the increase in feed-and-bleed capability. Most plants require both PORVs to support feed-and-bleed. The licensee's analyses show that only one PORV is required to support feed-and-bleed capability provided it is opened within 20 to 25 minutes of loss of feedwater, depending on operator action. Also, since feed-and-bleed capability is beyond the design basis, the licensee considers that single failure assumptions are not applicable.

The licensee's proposed AOTs were determined by evaluating the need for PORVs to support feed-and-bleed without resulting in an unacceptable increase in core melt frequency. The licensee indicated that the Turkey Point design includes systems which reduce the need to resort to feed-and-bleed. These systems include diverse sources of feedwater, including three safety-related steam-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps and two non-safety-related electric driven standby steam generator feedwater pumps, for a total of 500% capacity. During a loss-of-offsite power condition the main feedwater pumps would not be available but the AFW and standby steam generator feedwater pumps would be available. Accordingly, the licensee considers that low reliance on feed-and-bleed due to diverse feedwater sources and the ability of one operable PORV to support feed-and-bleed justify the proposed AOT for inoperable PORVs.

The staff has reviewed the information provided by the licensee to support its proposed TS changes and agrees that the Turkey Point design includes equipment other than that assumed in the GL. Based on the above discussions, the staff finds the proposed changes meet the intent of the GL and, therefore, are acceptable.

GL 90-06 recommended surveillances at least once per 18 months to demonstrate PORV operability by operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel in Modes 3 or 4. At Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, the PORVs and block valves are tested in accordance with the ASME Section XI, IST Program. The PORVs are cycled in Modes 3 or 4 during cooldown, and prior to Mode 4 during

heatup, unless cycled within the previous 92 days. Additionally, the PORVs are cycled in Modes 5 and 6 at least once every 3 months when required to be operable and following any maintenance. This meets the intent of the GL and, therefore, is acceptable.

The licensee did not propose to perform a channel calibration of the actuation instrumentation. At Turkey Point, operation of the PORVs in response to a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), plant cooldown, or a feed-and-bleed event is by manual operator action only. Accordingly, instruments associated with the PORVs are not required to perform TS-related functions with the unit at power. In addition, the PORVs and block valves are presently powered only from Class 1E power sources. Accordingly, a surveillance to check transfer of the valves to their safety-related power source is not required.

The licensee also proposed other editorial changes to the TS and TS bases to reflect implementation of the GL. These changes are editorial and do not affect plant safety.

The staff, based on its review of the licensee's submittal, finds that the proposed changes meet the intent of the GL and, therefore, are acceptable.

### 3.2 GENERIC ISSUE 94

Consistent with the GL 90-06 recommendations, the licensee proposed changes to TS 3.9.3 to enable use of PORVs for the feed-and-bleed cooling function in the event of a loss of secondary heat sink capabilities and to specify reduced AOT when operating in Modes 5 and 6 and when LTOP equipment is inoperable.

The licensee proposed to change the time allowed for depressurization in action statement 3.4.9.3.c of GL 90-06 (to be included as action statement 3.4.9.3.d) from 8 hours to 24 hours to allow for an orderly depressurization. The licensee also proposed several other TS changes which are editorial in nature and did not affect plant safety.

The staff finds the proposed TS changes meet the intent of the recommendations of GL 90-06 as applied to Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 and, therefore, are acceptable.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Florida State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendments, the Florida State official had no comments.

## 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 19478). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

Based on the staff evaluation in Section 3.0 above, the staff concludes that the proposed Technical Specifications changes are acceptable.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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