

September 20, 1990

Docket Nos. 50-250
and 50-251

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Mr. J. H. Goldberg
Executive Vice President
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

Dear Mr. Goldberg:

SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 - EMERGENCY POWER ENHANCEMENT PROJECT
(TAC NOS. 69023 AND 69024)

The staff has requested the Office of the Federal Register to publish the enclosed "Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for a Hearing." This notice relates to your application for amendments dated July 2, 1990, as supplemented September 6, 1990, which would modify the electrical power systems, including the addition of two emergency diesel generators, two additional battery chargers, an additional battery bank, and the associated support equipment and electrical distribution equipment such as motor control centers, load centers, and switchgear. The amendments would also modify the Technical Specifications (TS), primarily those concerning electric power supplies, so that they are applicable to the improved design.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Gordon E. Edison, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

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NAME	: DMiller	: GEdison	: JCalvo	: FRosa	: HBerkow	:
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONFLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANYDOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS
CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 issued to Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) for operation of the Turkey Point Plant located in Dade County, Florida.

By letter dated July 2, 1990, as supplemented September 6, 1990, the licensee has proposed a number of design changes as part of its Emergency Power System (EPS) enhancement project. The proposed amendments would modify the electrical power systems, including the addition of two emergency diesel generators, two additional battery chargers, an additional battery bank, and the associated support equipment and electrical distribution equipment such as motor control centers, load centers, and switchgear. The amendments would also modify the Technical Specifications (TS), primarily those concerning electric power supplies, so that they are applicable to the improved design. The proposed TS are consistent with Standard Technical Specifications (STS), where the Turkey Point design permits, which are in general use in the industry.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the request for amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

In Attachment 1 of its July 2, 1990 amendment request, the licensee submitted its no significant hazards evaluation (NSHE) of the proposed changes, in the context of the proposed changes to TS, against the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 cited above. The licensee has identified and characterized the changes (see Table 1) as belonging to five categories: (1) EPS enhancements, (2) administrative changes, (3) changes that are more restrictive, (4) changes that relax requirements, and (5) deletions of requirements.

The staff reviewed the licensee's NSHE provided in Attachment 1 of its July 2, 1990 license amendment proposal. Based on that review, the staff agrees with the licensee's conclusions that the proposed amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. The staff has selected examples of the proposed TS changes in each of the five categories of characterization (administrative, more restrictive, etc.) employed by the licensee, and they are discussed below. These examples are considered to be typical of the proposed changes. The staff's evaluation of no significant hazards is presented below.

Table I - CATEGORIZATION OF CHANGES TO THE TECH SPECS

<u>PROPOSED TS NO.</u>	<u>LICENSED TS NO.⁽¹⁾</u>	<u>TYPE OF CHANGE⁽²⁾</u>	<u>NSH⁽³⁾</u>	<u>PAGE REFERENCE</u>
3.1.2.3	3.1.2.3	5		5-6
3.1.2.3, Action	3.1.2.3 Action a-c	2,5		6-7
Table 3.3-3, Item 7b,c	Table 3.3-3, Item 7b,c	1		8
3.3.3.4, Action b,c	3.3.3.4 Action b,c	2		11
Table 3.3-6, Fire zone 25	-----	1		9
Table 3.3-6, Fire zones 72-75	Table 3.3-6 Fire zones 72-75	1,2		9-10
Table 3.3-6, Fire zones 72,73	Table 3.3-6 Fire zones 72,73	2		10
-----	Table 3.3-6 footnote***	5		10
Table 3.3-6, Fire zones 133-136, 138-141	-----	1		9
3.5.2.a	3.5.2.a	1		12-13
3.5.2, Action c,d	3.5.2, Action c,d	1		13-15
3.5.2, Actions e,f	-----	1		13-15
4.5.2.g.2	4.5.2.g.2	2		15
3.7.8.2.c	3.7.8.2.c	2		16-17
3.7.8.2.d	3.7.8.2.d	1		16
3.7.8.2.e	-----	1		16
3.7.8.2, Action a	3.7.8.2, Action a	2		17
Table 3.7-5, HY26	Table 3.7-5, FH6	1		18-19
Table 3.7-5, HY18	-----	1		18-19
Table 3.7-5, HY-	Table 3.7-5, FH-	2		19
Table 3.7-5, HY10,11	Table 3.7-5, FH10,11	2		19
3.8.1.1	3.8.1.1	1,2,3		20-22
3.8.1.1, Applicability	3.8.1.1, Applicability	2		23
3.8.1.1, Action a-f	3.8.1.1, Action a-f	2,3,4,5		23-30
4.8.1.1.1	4.8.1.1.1	2		31
4.8.1.1.2	4.8.1.1.2	1,2,3,4,5		32-39
4.8.1.1.3	4.8.1.1.3	3		39-40
-----	4.8.1.1.4	5		40
Table 4.8-1	Table 4.8-1	3		36-37
3.8.1.2.a	3.8.1.2.a	2		41-42
3.8.1.2.b	3.8.1.2.b,c	1,2,3		41-43
3.8.1.2, Applicability	3.8.1.2, Applicability	2		43
3.8.1.2, Action	3.8.1.2, Action	2		44
4.8.1.2	4.8.1.2	2,3		45-46
3.8.2.1.a-d	3.8.2.1.a,b	1,2		47-50
3.8.2.1, Applicability	3.8.2.1, Applicability	2		50
3.8.2.1, Action b	3.8.2.1, Action a,b	1		51-55

Table 1 - CATEGORIZATION OF CHANGES TO THE TECH SPECS (CONTINUED)

<u>PROPOSED TS NO.</u>	<u>LICENSED TS NO.⁽¹⁾</u>	<u>TYPE OF CHANGE⁽²⁾</u>	<u>NSH⁽³⁾</u>	<u>PAGE REFERENCE</u>
3.8.2.1, Action a	3.8.2.1, Action b	1		51-55
-----	Table 3.8-1	1		51-55
4.8.2.1.a-f	4.8.2.1, a-g	1,2,3,4,5		55-60
Table 4.8-2	Table 4.8-2	2,5		56-57,59-60
3.8.2.2	3.8.2.2	1,2		61-62
3.8.2.2, Applicability	3.8.2.2, Applicability	2		62
3.8.2.2, Action	3.8.2.2, Action	1,2		63-64
3.8.3.1.a-o	3.8.3.1.a-d	1,2,3,5		65-68
3.8.3.1, Applicability	3.8.3.1, Applicability	2		69
3.8.3.1, Actions a-d	3.8.3.1, Actions a-i	1,3,4		69-72
Table 3.8-1	-----	1		69-70
Table 3.8-2	-----	1		69-70
3.8.3.2.a-c	3.8.3.2.a	1,2,3		73-75
3.8.3.2, Applicability	3.8.3.2, Applicability	2		75-76
3.8.3.2, Action	3.8.3.2, Action	2		73-76

NOTES:

(1) Amendments 137 and 132, issued August 28, 1990.

(2) Types of changes

- 1 - EPS Enhancements
- 2 - Administrative
- 3 - More restrictive
- 4 - Relaxations
- 5 - Deletion of selected requirements

(3) FPL proposed license amendment submittal dated July 2, 1990, Attachment 1. No Significant Hazards Determination.

Category 1 - EPS Enhancement Changes

EPS enhancement changes are changes to values and requirements resulting from the plant reconfiguration for reasons of design. These changes do not result in either relaxed or more restrictive requirements; rather, the technical requirements remain unchanged. Examples of these types of changes are described below.

Example 1 - Addition of Two Diesel Generators and Modification of Existing Electrical Distribution System

The licensee has evaluated this change beginning on page 20 of its NSHE in the context of TS 3/4.8.1.1 (AC Sources - Operating), Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee has addressed the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and determined that they are satisfied. The licensee's evaluation follows; note that the evaluation refers to PTP (Plant Turkey Point), and to reference 1, which is a letter from K.N. Harris to U.S. NRC dated June 4, 1990 and designated L-90-196. Some other acronyms frequently used throughout the licensee's evaluations include: MCC (motor control center), LC (load center), LOOP (loss of offsite power), EDG (emergency diesel generator), LBLOCA (large break loss of coolant accident), and AOT (allowed outage time).

The EPS Enhancement Project at PTP adds two Class 1E EDGs and modifies the existing distribution system (for design details and a safety analysis of these modifications see Reference 1). As a result of these modifications each Unit requires three EDGs (the two associated with the Unit and either one of the EDGs associated with the opposite Unit) to meet the single failure criterion and to mitigate an accident. Also, the fuel requirements for the new Unit 4 EDG fuel systems are added to the LCO.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

As postulated, LOOP and LBLOCA require the start and operation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) equipment. The enhanced system with load redistribution and addition of swing 4 kV switchgear, swing 480V LCs, and 480 V MCCs provides a greater degree of power

source availability to power the required equipment. Required ESF loads are accommodated with the enhanced EPS configuration, and no single failure will prevent the enhanced EPS from performing its required safety function in the event of an accident on either unit. The LBLOCA analysis as presented in the FSAR remains bounding under the enhanced EPS configuration. The added fuel requirements for the new Unit 4 EDG fuel systems provide requirements which are commensurate with the requirements for the existing EDG fuel systems.

Since the EDGs are not initiators of accidents, there is no increase in the probability of an accident.

There is also no increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The enhanced EPS configuration provides an improved response to the existing FSAR limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA) by providing enhanced equipment availability on the accident unit with increased EDG loading margin.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation. These changes have not resulted in new types of plant operating requirements given that the requirements for the new EDGs and the associated level of detail is commensurate with the requirements for the existing TS.
3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The addition of two new EDGs enhances the margin of safety by providing added onsite AC capacity and increased equipment availability.

The staff agrees with the licensee's conclusion that there are no significant hazards considerations, with the following comments. The changes reduce the probability and consequences of an accident because additional emergency power redundancy and capacity are provided to prevent an accident and to provide power to accident-mitigating systems. No new or different kind of accident will be created because the changes add more redundancy and capacity. Accidents resulting from a loss of power have been previously considered in the design and analyzed. Safety margins will be enhanced by the availability of added electrical power sources.

Example 2 - Addition of Battery Bank, Two Battery Chargers, and Associated Equipment

The licensee has evaluated this change beginning on page 47 of its NSHE in the context of TS 3/4.8.2.1 (DC Sources - Operating), Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee has addressed the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and determined that they are satisfied. The licensee's description of the changes, and portions of the licensee's lengthy evaluation follow; note that the evaluation refers to the RTS which are the Revised Technical Specifications issued by NRC as Amendments 137 and 132 for Units 3 and 4, respectively, on August 28, 1990.

The proposed change revises the specification to reflect the existence, following the completion of the EPS Enhancement Project, of a spare 125-volt Battery Bank (D-52) and eight (8) dedicated (2 per battery) full capacity battery chargers (currently there are four (4) dedicated and two (2) swing battery chargers). The proposed change specifies which battery charger(s) can be supplying power to a required battery bank for the battery bank to be considered OPERABLE. In addition the proposed change adds the specific MCC which powers a specified battery charger for credit to be taken for a battery charger being OPERABLE. The proposed change also requires, via a new footnote, that each of the battery chargers used to satisfy this LCO be powered by a different MCC. It also, [sic] identifies the EDG(s) associated with each MCC required to be OPERABLE to supply emergency power (swing MCCs 3D and 4D require two EDGs 3A and 3B or 4A and 4B, respectively) with a clarifying footnote, identified by a "#" symbol, identifying that inoperability of the EDG(s) specified in the LCO does not constitute inoperability of the associated battery chargers or battery banks.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated for the following reasons:

The number of D.C. electrical sources required to be OPERABLE following this amendment remains the same as in the RTS; only existence of a new full capacity 125-volt D.C. Battery Bank (D-52) has been added. The new "spare" battery bank OPERABILITY will be assured by the new battery bank undergoing the same surveillances as the existing battery banks.... The addition of this battery bank allows one battery bank to be taken out of service without the unit(s) entering into an ACTION statement.

With the enhanced EPS design two battery chargers are being added and the two existing "swing" chargers are being dedicated to a particular battery. Though the number of battery chargers required to be OPERABLE decreases from five (5) to four (4), each OPERABLE battery bank will be connected to an OPERABLE full capacity charger. The criteria used for the existing LCO and for the proposed LCO for the new design is identical

This amendment adds additional requirements for equipment associated with an OPERABLE battery bank. The revised specification provides requirements as to which MCC must be supplying power to a battery charger for it to be considered OPERABLE. The addition of this requirement assures that no single failure of an MCC concurrent with a LOOP can result in more than one battery bank without an OPERABLE charger.

Following the EPS Enhancement Project completion, each unit will require 3 EDGS to be OPERABLE to supply emergency power (both of its and one of the other unit's EDGs).... The addition of this requirement assures that no single failure of [an] EDG concurrent with a LOOP can result in more than one battery bank without an AC emergency power source....

The equipment involved in this change are not initiators of FSAR evaluated accidents and the proposed requirements will ensure that no single failures, as assumed in the FSAR analyses, will prevent the plant from mitigating the consequences of an accident as evaluated in the FSAR, thus there is no significant increase in the probability of the occurrence of an accident or significant increase in the consequences of previously analyzed accidents.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The added requirements are in accordance with the design details and safety analysis as presented in Reference 1, and assure that no single failure concurrent with a LOOP can result in the loss of more than one D.C. electrical system. As discussed in this safety evaluation, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis has been performed and no new accidents are created. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.
3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety The number of required OPERABLE D.C. electrical systems remains the same between the proposed requirements and the RTS.

The PTP D.C. system requires 3 of 4 D.C. busses (and associated chargers) to be operable to perform its accident functions. RTS (existing system) require chargers 3B, 4A and 4S to be OPERABLE (at all times) and 2 of 3 chargers 3A, 3S and 4B to be OPERABLE for the plant to not be in an ACTION statement (Note: Table 3.8.1 matrix of the RTS shows these conditions)...[o]perator action is still required to align the swing charger 3S to either the 4A or 3B D.C. bus so that 3 D.C. busses are energized via the chargers....

For the new system, the proposed TS require a select 4 of 8 chargers to be OPERABLE. The new design of the Enhanced EPS, eliminates the condition where failure of the 3A or 4B battery/bus results in the condition of two D.C. busses being without a battery charger....

Thus, the new design does not rely on [o]perator action and its reliability is... greater than the existing when the minimum equipment required by the LCO is satisfied.....

The staff agrees with the licensee's conclusion that there are no significant hazards considerations, with the following comments. The addition of one more battery bank and two battery chargers provides increased reliability of D.C. power supplies at the plant. Because D.C. power supplies provide power for equipment to prevent and mitigate accidents, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident; rather, the probability of an accident is expected to be reduced. The consequences of an accident will not be increased and, depending on the accident scenario, the consequences could be reduced because of the added D.C. power capability. No new or different kind of accident is created because the changes add more safety equipment of a type that already exists at the plant. The added reliability of D.C. power supplies will enhance safety margins.

The staff further concludes that, throughout the amendment request, where EPS enhancement changes are proposed, there are no significant hazards considerations.

Category 2 - Administrative Changes

The proposed administrative changes to the TS include editorial changes, reformatting, and changes for consistency.

Examples of administrative changes are evaluated by the licensee beginning on page 21 of its NSHE in the context of TS 3/4.8.1.1 (A.C. Sources - Operating), Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee has addressed the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and determined that they are satisfied. The licensee's evaluation follows.

The LCO has been reformatted (items b and c) to enhance consistency with the STS by combining all requirements to assure EDG OPERABILITY in one LCO (new 3.8.1.1b). A new associated footnote was added to this LCO to ensure that if one or more of the four EDG's is out-of-service that compliances with Technical Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.8.2.1 is reviewed. This administrative change also includes the consolidation of the EDG support requirements by adding the MCCs required to power each EDG's auxiliaries. Also, the rating of the startup transformers was deleted to enhance consistency with the STS and since this information was not pertinent to the LCO.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The reformatting including the new associated footnote is intended to make the TS easier to use for plant operations personnel. The addition of the MCC requirements with this LCO consolidates the OPERABILITY requirements of the EDGs. The consolidation of the EDG OPERABILITY requirements into one item improves the TS organization.

The transformer rating is FSAR design data that is not required by the reactor operators or other personnel by whom the TS are used. There are only two startup transformers at PTP and the removal of the nameplate rating will not affect identification of the startup transformers.

The above changes have not resulted in any new plant operating requirements. No accident initiating events are affected. These administrative changes do not affect the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident.

2. Based on the above discussion it can also be concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No new types of equipment are added by this change. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation. The changes are administrative only.

3. Based on the above discussion it can also be concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The changes only enhance the TS by deleting unnecessary information, consolidating requirements, and providing an additional reminder note resulting in improved TS organization and clarity.

The staff agrees with the licensee's evaluation and conclusion that there are no significant hazards considerations. The staff further concludes that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with administrative changes throughout the amendment request.

Category 3 - Requirements Which are More Restrictive

Examples of proposed changes in requirements which are more restrictive than those currently licensed are described below. These examples include changes to frequency of verifying operability and changes in surveillance requirements.

Example 1 - Verification of Startup Transformer Operability.

Technical Specification 3/4.8.1 (pages 3/4 8-1 and 8-2 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request) describes proposed requirements for operability of A.C. power sources. For example, the present TS 3/4 8.1 (License Amendment 137 and 132, issued August 28, 1990) requires that, if one of two startup transformers, an associated circuit or a required EDG is inoperable, the remaining startup transformer(s) be demonstrated operable within 24 hours. The licensee proposes increasing the frequency of verification from 24 to 8 hours for the operable startup transformers. This proposed time limit is consistent with the STS.

In the licensee's no significant hazards evaluation, Attachment 1 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request, pages 25 and 26, the licensee evaluated more restrictive changes, including startup transformer operability verification

frequency in accordance with the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and concluded that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The licensee's evaluation follows.

The frequency for verification of OPERABILITY of the OPERABLE startup transformers as required by ACTIONS "a", "b" and existing "d" and "e", has been increased from once every 24 hours to once every eight hours. The allowable time to reduce power to less than or equal to 30% in ACTION "a" has been reduced from 30 hours to 24 hours. If power is not reduced to less than or equal to 30% within 24 hours, the associated unit must be shut down within the next 54 hours if the startup transformer remains inoperable. This provision is incorporated into ACTIONS "a" and the new "e". The existing TS allows continued operation at a maximum of 30% reactor power for 30 days before requiring shutdown. Also in ACTIONS "b" and new "f", the number of hours for reaching hot shutdown has been reduced from twelve hours to six hours.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The increase in the surveillance of the startup transformer(s) is more restrictive than the existing requirements. This change will provide added assurance that the OPERABLE startup transformer(s) is (are) available to perform its (their) function, if needed. The reduction in the time for reducing power on the loss of a startup transformer will result in the plant being in a low power, stable condition sooner than required in the existing TS. Because these requirements are more restrictive than the existing requirements, the probability of an accident and its consequences are reduced. The reduction in the time allowed to reach hot shutdown from twelve hours to six hours is a direct result of the elimination of the dual unit shutdown requirement (see discussion below on deletions). This change makes this time period consistent with the rest of the TS when only a single unit shutdown is required and is more restrictive than before.

The requirement to restore an inoperable startup transformer within 72 hours following loss of an associated startup transformer with no compensatory ACTIONS (i.e., reduction of reactor power to less than or equal to 30%) reduces the AOT from 30 days to 72 hours. This new AOT for the startup transformers is consistent with the STS and NRC guidelines. This AOT change reduces the likelihood of an accident (LOOP) being initiated with the reactor at power. Therefore, this proposed change would reduce the probability of a previously evaluated accident.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The margin of safety would be enhanced because the plant operators would take compensatory ACTIONS sooner and additional

assurance of equipment OPERABILITY would be provided. Also, the startup transformers are not required for mitigation of a design basis accident. While offsite power, via the startup transformer, is normally utilized during plant shutdown, PTP has the capability of maintaining stable conditions assuming a reactor trip with no offsite power available.

The staff adds the following clarification of the first paragraph of the licensee's above evaluation. In ACTION "a", if power is not reduced to less than or equal to 30% within 24 hours, the associated unit must be in HOT STANDBY (Mode 3), as opposed to shutdown, within 54 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Also, in the last paragraph of item 1, above, the licensee has referred to LOOP (loss of offsite power) as an accident. The staff does not consider LOOP, by itself, to be an accident.

The staff agrees with the licensee's conclusion that more frequent verification of transformer operability is a more restrictive requirement, and that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 are satisfied and there are no significant hazards considerations.

Example 2 - Verification of Diesel Generator Operability

Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 (pages 3/4 8-4 through 8-6 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request) adds requirements to verify the inventory, quality, and availability of EDG lubricating oil in storage, as well as verifying certain other EDG test and operability requirements. For example, the licensee added a requirement to check lubricating oil in storage because the Unit 3 EDGs require the addition of lubricating oil after 3 days of operation. Verifying the inventory, quality, and availability of lubricating oil in storage provides assurance that an EDG can operate for a minimum of 7 days as required.

In the licensee's no significant hazards evaluation, Attachment 1 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request, pages 36 and 37, the licensee evaluated more restrictive changes to Section 4.8.1.1.2 of the Technical Specifications in accordance with the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and concluded that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The licensee's evaluation follows.

The following new restrictions are proposed: Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2a.3) requires verification of lubricating oil inventory in storage. Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2a.5 requires verification [of] automatic transfer of fuel from the day tank to the skid-mounted tank on Unit 3. Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2c through f are added in their entirety to add requirements concerning the EDG fuel oil. These requirements include, at least once per 31 days, checking for and removing accumulated water from the fuel oil storage and day tanks (Units 3 & 4) and the skid-mounted fuel tanks (Unit 3). Also, at least once per 31 days obtaining a sample from the fuel oil storage tank and verifying that the total particulate contamination is less than 10mg/liter when checked in accordance with the applicable industry standard. In addition, requirements are included to test new fuel oil in accordance with the applicable industry standards for items such as appearance, flash point, viscosity, and API Gravity. These requirements replace the current requirement to at least once per 92 days verify a sample of fuel oil is within acceptable limits for viscosity, water and sediment (4.8.1.1.2b in the RTS). In Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2a.4), 2d.1a, 2d.4), and 2e, the voltage tolerance of ± 624 volts is reduced to ± 420 volts. Table 4.8-1, "DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE", is modified to add testing frequency requirements associated with the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests. This included deleting the word "valid" in the footnotes for Table 4.8-1. Also, the word "prior" before "NRC" in the first footnote of Table 4.8-1 is deleted. These Table 4.8-1 changes enhance conformance to the STS. In Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2g.7 (4.8.1.1.2d.5 in the RTS), the test duration is extended from 8 hours to 24 hours of EDG operation (this extension provides enhanced consistency with the STS). Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2g.10 verifies that a Safety Injection signal overrides an EDG operating in the test mode. Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2g.12 verifies OPERABILITY of the automatic load sequence timer. Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2g.13 verifies proper operation of the EDG lockout relay. Finally, Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2i specifies a pressure test of the Unit 4 (only) diesel fuel oil system designed to ASME Section III, Subsection ND. This surveillance requirement also specifies a drain-down and cleaning of each EDG fuel oil storage tank to ensure a reliable source of high quality fuel.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The additional surveillance will have no impact on the probability of an accident since EDGs are not initiators of FSAR analyzed Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Extending the duration of EDG operation during testing, and adding the additional surveillance requirements to verify lube oil storage inventory, verify Unit 3 automatic fuel transfer to the skid mounted tank, and checking and analyzing diesel fuel oil serve to provide increased confidence that the EDGs will function as designed. The tightening of the tolerance allowed for the voltage provided by the EDG is more restrictive and will provide added assurance that the equipment powered by the EDGs can function as designed. The addition of testing frequency requirements associated with the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests provides increased confidence of EDG OPERABILITY by requiring an increased testing frequency due to the total number of failures in the last 100 valid tests instead of just the last 20. The required tests to ensure that a Safety Injection signal overrides the EDG test mode circuitry; the automatic load sequence time operates per design; and the EDG lockout relay prevents EDG starts, all verify that the control circuitry of the EDGs operate properly. This provides greater confidence that the EDGs will operate, as designed, to power required accident loads. Finally, the new Unit 4 EDG fuel oil system pressure test verifies the integrity of this required system and reduces the probability of EDG failure due to fuel starvation during a design accident. Thus, there will be no increase in accident consequences.
2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.
3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change would enhance the margin of safety by reducing the possibility of an EDG failure due to contaminated fuel or fuel starvation, ensuring an adequate supply of lube oil for an extended EDG run, ensuring proper operation of the EDG control circuits, ensuring a voltage well within the design tolerance of the required electrical equipment, providing increased confidence of EDG reliability by requiring increased EDG testing due to the total number of failures in the last 100 valid tests, and by lengthening the EDG run test from 8 to 24 hours which provides added assurance the EDG will function as designed.

The staff agrees with the licensee's conclusion that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with these added and more restrictive requirements. The added requirements improve surveillance and alert operators to problems sooner. Therefore, the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 are met. Furthermore, throughout the amendment request where additional or more restrictive requirements are imposed, the staff concludes there are no significant hazards considerations.

Category 4 - Changes that Relax Requirements

Relaxations are changes which result in reduced requirements, but not a significant reduction in safety. Examples of relaxations are described below.

Example 1 - Testing of Diesel Generators

The licensee has proposed a change to Technical Specifications 3.8.1.1.b and c (pages 3/4 8-2 and 3/4 8-3 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request) whereby if an EDG is intentionally made inoperable due to pre-planned maintenance or testing, special testing of the remaining EDGs is not required. In Attachment 1 of the amendment request, pages 26 and 27, the licensee evaluated the proposed changes against the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and concluded there are no significant hazards considerations. The licensee's evaluation is reproduced below.

In ACTIONS "b" and "c" an exception to the requirement to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining required EDGs is added for the case when the EDG became inoperable because of preplanned preventative maintenance or testing.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Consistent with the STS and current NRC guidance, testing of the redundant (i.e., remaining required EDGs) EDGs are to be performed after any failure or any problem which renders the EDG inoperable. The purpose of this testing is to demonstrate that the redundant EDGs have not been

degraded by a similar problem. When an EDG is intentionally taken out of service, the above concern does not exist. Therefore, it is acceptable to provide an exemption to this testing when an EDG is taken out of service for preplanned preventive maintenance or testing. Reducing the number of unnecessary EDG tests is in accordance with Generic Letter 84-15 and current NRC guidance. Since the EDGs are not initiators of FSAR analyzed accidents and this change serves to enhance EDG reliability, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The change only affects the number of times an EDG OPERABILITY demonstration may be performed. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.
3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This change serves to enhance EDG reliability by reducing the number of unnecessary EDG tests which minimizes EDG wear.

The staff agrees with the licensee's evaluation and concludes that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 are satisfied and that there are no significant hazards considerations.

Example 2 - Battery Pilot Cell Surveillance

The licensee has proposed relaxing the surveillance interval for the station battery pilot cell specific gravity surveillance (TS 4.8.2.1.a, page 3/4 8-14 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request) from once per 24 hours to once per 7 days. The proposed surveillance interval is consistent with the STS. In Attachment 1 of the amendment request, pages 58 and 59, the licensee evaluated this proposed change against the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and concluded there are no significant hazards considerations. The licensee's evaluation is reproduced below.

The required surveillance (4.8.2.1a) frequency for verifying the pilot cell specific gravity for each 125 volt battery bank is reduced from once per 24 hours to once per 7 days. The revised surveillance frequency conforms to the requirements of the STS.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Since PTP received its operating license in the early 1970's, industry experience on nuclear safety-related 125 volt battery banks, as concluded in IEEE 450, has determined that a rapid drop in pilot cell specific gravity during a 7 day period is highly unlikely. For this reason, the NRC has specified a 7 day surveillance frequency for 125 volt battery bank pilot cell specific gravity in the STS. The 24 hour surveillance requirement is inconsistent with present NRC guidelines.

Since IEEE 450 has determined that a 7 day surveillance frequency is acceptable for pilot cell specific gravity, it is concluded that this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No new types of equipment are added by this change. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.
3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above discussion, IEEE 450 and NRC guidance indicates that a 7 day surveillance frequency versus a 24 hour surveillance frequency does not significantly reduce the margin of safety.

The staff agrees with the licensee's evaluation and conclusions. The staff also notes that in footnote 1 of Table 4.8-2 of the proposed TS (page 3/4 8-16 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request), the failure of a Category A parameter, such as pilot cell specific gravity, to be within the TS limits is not sufficient to indicate an inoperable battery.

The staff concludes that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 have been met and there are no significant hazards considerations.

Example 3 - Diesel Generator Testing

In another example, described on pages 32-35 of Attachment 1 of the July 2 amendment request, the licensee has provided a lengthy and detailed evaluation of certain EPS enhancement changes and administrative changes

related to testing of the EDGs. Among these changes, the test loading for the Unit 3 EDGs has been relaxed from 2500kw to permit a test load band of 2300-2500kw. A new and higher test load band is specified for the two new EDG's of Unit 4. In addition, the proposed test procedure permits warming the EDGs with gradual loading instead of cold, fast test starts. The technical basis for these relaxations was described in more detail in the staff's Generic Letter 84-15. Basically, it was to reduce stress and wear on the engine that accompanies cold, fast test starts, and which could lower the reliability of the EDGs. The staff agrees with the licensee's evaluation and conclusions regarding these changes, but would characterize the changes as relaxations rather than EPS enhancements or administrative changes.

Throughout the proposed TS, where relaxations have been proposed by the licensee, the staff concludes that the proposed changes involve no significant hazards considerations.

Category 5 - Deletions

The licensee has identified TS requirements that are to be deleted. Generally, these deletions are a natural result of the design changes associated with the Emergency Power System upgrade. In a few cases the deletions are made to complete the conversion to STS, which are based on significantly more operating experience than were the original plant custom TS. Examples of deletions are described below.

Example 1 - Operability Requirement for Cranking Diesel Generators

The licensed Technical Specifications (TS 3/4.8.1, pages 3/4 8-1 through 3/4 8-7 of Amendments 137 and 132 issued August 28, 1990) require that, with one startup transformer inoperable or one startup transformer and one EDG inoperable, two cranking diesel generators be demonstrated operable.

This requirement is intended to provide an additional non-safety grade source of power to assist in the safe shutdown of the unit without its associated startup transformer, if required. Implementation of the EPS enhancement project will add two safety-grade EDGs to the plant with capability for cross-connect between units, replacing the need to have two cranking EDGs operable as backup to the safety EDGs or startup transformer. The EPS design eliminates this requirement with better design based on safety-grade EDGs.

In Attachment 1 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request, pages 27 through 30 and on page 40, the licensee presented a lengthy and detailed evaluation of this change against the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and determined there is no significant hazards consideration associated with this change. The staff's evaluation is provided below.

In the current design, Turkey Point has two safety-grade EDGs, with any two out of five non-safety cranking diesels available as backup. In the proposed design, the plant will have four safety-grade EDGs with the non-safety cranking diesels available as backup. The two additional safety EDGs will have a complete set of TS, and thus replace the cranking diesels with higher capability and more reliable equipment. The cranking diesels will be maintained and available as a backup power source. In addition, a requirement for surveillance of the cranking diesels every 18 months is imposed on page 3/4 7-11 of the licensed TS. However, it is no longer necessary for the TS to require a demonstration of operability of the cranking diesels when a safety EDG and/or startup transformer is inoperable.

The deletion of this requirement is more than compensated for by the two additional safety EDGs which are required to be operable as described in the proposed TS.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because deletion of the requirement to demonstrate operability of cranking diesel generators is more than compensated for by the new requirement to demonstrate operability of the additional safety EDGs, as stated in LCO 3.8.1.1.b and in ACTION b of proposed TS 3.8.1.1 on pages 3/4 8-1 and 8-2 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident because the cranking diesels will still be maintained and available and because no change in potential accident initiators has occurred. The addition of two safety-grade EDGs helps to make the plant safer and provide added protection. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the added safety EDGs provide additional safety margin. In addition, the cranking diesels will still be available.

Therefore, the staff concludes that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with deleting the TS requirement to demonstrate operability of the cranking diesels when a safety EDG and/or startup transformer is inoperable.

Example 2 - Surveillance of D.C. Power Sources

The licensee proposes to delete certain DC power surveillances as described on pages 59 and 60 of Attachment 1 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request. The licensee's description of the proposed changes and no significant hazards evaluation follows.

Surveillances 4.8.2.1c and e have been deleted. Surveillances 4.8.2.1c required rotating the pilot cell and checking water level every 31 days. This surveillance requirement is a maintenance activity only and does not verify battery OPERABILITY. Surveillance 4.8.2.1e required performance of a battery charger visual inspection quarterly. This surveillance requirement is a preventive maintenance activity and does not verify battery charger OPERABILITY. Also, the requirement to verify a battery equalizing charge is started, found in Notes 1 and 2 of Table 4.8-2, has been deleted.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Surveillances 4.8.2.1c and e are maintenance activities only. NRC guidance indicates that the above deleted surveillance requirements are not required to verify OPERABILITY of this equipment. The latest STS do not contain these surveillance requirements. Instead, Surveillance 4.8.2.1a contains a requirement to verify pilot cell electrolyte level weekly. Also, the requirement in Table 4.8-2, Notes 1 and 2, to start an equalizing charge when a battery's cell does not comply with the category A and B limits of the table, is not included in STS. An equalizing charge will be applied, as needed.

Therefore, based on the above discussion, the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident is not significantly increased.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or a different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No new types of equipment are added by this change. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation. They only delete extraneous surveillance requirements that are not contained in the STS.
3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The deleted surveillance requirements (4.8.2.1c and e) are preventive maintenance items only. Failure to perform Surveillance 4.8.2.1c will have no effect on the margin of safety

because Surveillance 4.8.2.1a, which is performed more frequently than Surveillance 4.8.2.1c (weekly versus monthly), verifies redundant pilot cell requirements. The Surveillance 4.8.2.1e deletion does not significantly affect the margin of safety because its required inspection of the battery chargers does not determine if this equipment is OPERABLE or not. Finally, deletion of the requirement to verify that an equalizing charge is started in Notes 1 and 2 of Table 4.8-2 has no affect on the margin of safety, because the OPERABILITY requirements of the batteries are determined by the battery parameter limits of Table 4.8-2. An equalizing charge will be applied as needed, to conform with the OPERABILITY requirements.

The staff notes that comprehensive surveillance requirements for D.C. power sources are provided in the proposed TS on pages 3/4 8-14 through 8-18 of Attachment 2 of the July 2, 1990 amendment request. In particular, requirements for important battery parameters are shown in Table 4.8-2 on page 3/4 8-16. The staff agrees with the licensee's evaluation and conclusions and concludes that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 have been met and there are no significant hazards considerations involved in deleting the surveillance requirements described above.

The staff also concludes that, throughout the amendment request, where deletions are proposed, there are no significant hazards considerations involved.

For all the reasons given above, including those given (above) by the licensee, the staff agrees with the licensee's determination, and therefore proposes to determine that the amendments do not involve a significant hazard consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room P-223, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By October 26, 1990 , the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility operating licenses and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Request for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the Local Public Document Room located at the Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR §2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or

expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the request for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendments and make it effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendments.

If a final determination is that the amendments involve a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendments until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendments before the expiration of the 30-day notice period,

provided that its final determination is that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 325-6000 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to Herbert N. Berkow: (petitioner's name and telephone number), (date petition was mailed), (plant name), and (publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice). A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and to Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzer, P.C., 1615 L Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20036, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted

based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendments dated July 2, 1990, as supplemented September 6, 1990, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the Local Public Document Room located at Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of September 1990.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



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