

RAS 3616

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October 17, 2001

Emile L. Julian, Assistant for  
Rulemakings and Adjudications  
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff  
Office of the Secretary  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
11555 Rockville Pike, One White Flint North  
Mail Stop: O16G15  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: In the Matter of Private Fuel Storage, LLC, Docket 72-22

Dear Mr. Julian;

Enclosed are the original and two copies of the signature page of the declaration of Dr. Marvin Resnikoff (October 10, 2001), the faxed copy of which was filed in conjunction with State of Utah's October 10, 2001 Request for Admission of Late-Filed Contention Utah RR (Suicide Mission Terrorism and Sabotage).

Thank you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jean Braxton".

Jean Braxton,  
Legal Assistant

Enclosure: as stated  
cc: PFS Docket 72-22-ISFSI Service List, without enclosure

Template = SECY-018

SECY-02


consequences would be for an accident of any of those severity categories. Thus, the numerical abstraction has no factual content. There is no assessment of how many people would die; how many people would get sick; what would be the effects on wildlife; how much land would be contaminated; how long the contamination would last; etc. By making this numerical abstraction, the DEIS masks the significance of the dose savings that would be achieved under accident conditions if the spent fuel were allowed to decay onsite before transporting it.

26. As a result of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, I am also greatly concerned about the vulnerability of a transportation cask to a similar type attack. Based on my assessment, it is my opinion that the proposed design of a HI-STAR transportation cask is not adequate to protect the public from a September 11<sup>th</sup> type attack. Such a cask is designed to withstand a 30 mph drop onto an unyielding surface and a ½ hour fire at 1,475 °F. The cask is not designed to withstand the impact of a 767 jet engine traveling at 500 mph, or a fire burning at 1,850 °F for several hours.

27. Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR §§ 72.94, 72.34, and 51.45(b)(1) and (2), the ER and the DEIS do not investigate the regional environmental impact of a September 11<sup>th</sup> attack on a transportation cask. Such a cask is not designed to withstand the impact of a 767 jet engine traveling at 500 mph, or a fire burning at 1850 °F for several hours. This potential accident would exceed a category 6 transportation accident and lead to major radiation exposures due to inhalation and direct gamma exposures. The consequences of such an accident would exceed those discussed in ¶ 22 above. Further, contrary to 10 CFR § 72.32, PFS has not developed an emergency plan that could respond to a September 11<sup>th</sup> type attack, including the cleanup of contaminated areas.

Executed this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October 2001,

By

  
Marvin Resnikoff, PhD