REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Distribution
Docket File 50-250
NRC PDR
Local PDR
NRR Rdg
ORB1 Rdg
D. Eisenhut
B. Grimes
W. Gammill
A. Schwencer
C. Parrish
M. Grotenhuis
Attorney, OELD
I&E (5)
B. Jones (4)
B. Scharf (10)
D. Brinkman
B. Harless
C. Miles
R. Diggs
H. Denton
ACRS (16)
TERA
NSIC

Docket No. 50-250 JANUARY 25 1980

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology
Florida Power and Light Company
Post Office Box 529100
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 52 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 10, 1980, as supplemented by letter dated January 18, 1980.

The amendment permits continued operation of the Turkey Point Plant Unit 3 for six equivalent months of operation from January 24, 1980 at which time the steam generators shall be inspected.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 52 to DPR-31
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

CP3

8002250 077

OFFICE						
SURNAME						
DATE			P			

NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 ☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-289-369

Distribution
Docket File 50-250
NRC PDR
Local PDR
NRR Rdg
ORB1 Rdg
D. Eisenhut
B. Grimes
W. Gammill
A. Schwencer
J. Parrish
M. Grotenhuis
Attorney, OELD
I&E (5)
B. Jones (4)
B. Scharf (10)
D. Brinkman
B. Harless
C. Miles
R. Diggs
H. Denton
ACRS (16)
TERA
NSIC

Docket No. 50-250

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology
Florida Power and Light Company
Post Office Box 529100
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 10, 1980.

The amendment permits continued operation of the Turkey Point Plant Unit 2 for six equivalent months of operation from January 24, 1980 at which time the steam generators shall be inspected.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. to DPR-31
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

OFFICE	DOR:ORB1	DOR:ORB1	DOR:AD:ORP	OELD	DOR:ORB1	
SURNAME	MGrotenhuis:jb	CSParrish	WPGammill for	S. GOLDBERG	ASchwencer	
DATE	01/24/80	01/24/80	01/25/80	01/24/80	01/25/80	

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

January 25, 1980

Docket No. 50-250

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology
Florida Power and Light Company
Post Office Box 529100
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 52 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 10, 1980, as supplemented by letter dated January 18, 1980.

The amendment permits continued operation of the Turkey Point Plant Unit 3 for six equivalent months of operation from January 24, 1980 at which time the steam generators shall be inspected.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 52 to DPR-31
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

cc: Honorable Dewey Knight
County Manager of Metropolitan
Dade County
Miami, Florida 33130

Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations
660 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Mr. Jack Shreve
Office of the Public Counsel
Room 4, Holland Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Dr. David B. Hall
400 Circle Drive
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Michael A. Bauser, Esquire
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis,
Axelrad and Toll
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Mr. Mark P. Oncavage
12200 S.W. 110th Avenue
Miami, Florida 33176

Mr. Bruce S. Rogow, Esquire
Nova Law School
3301 College Avenue
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33314

Normal A. Coll, Esquire
Steel, Hector and Davis
1400 S.E. First National Bank Building
Miami, Florida 33131

Dr. Oscar H. Paris
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Counsel for NRC Staff
Office of the Executive Legal Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 52
License No. DPR-31

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated January 10, 1980, as supplemented by January 18, 1980 letter, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, paragraph 3.E of the license is modified to amend subparagraph 3.E.5 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 to read as follows:

E. Steam Generator Inspections

5. In order to perform an inspection of the steam generators, Unit No. 3 shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition within six equivalent months of operation from January 24, 1980 or at the next refueling shutdown, whichever occurs first, unless: (1) an inspection of the steam generators is performed within this period as a result of the requirements in 2, 3 and 4 above, or (2) an acceptable analysis of the susceptibility for stress corrosion cracking of tubing is submitted to explicitly justify continued operation of Unit No. 3 beyond the authorized period of operation. Any analysis justifying continued operation must be submitted at least 45 days prior to the expiration date of the authorized period of operation. For the purpose of this requirement, equivalent operation is defined as operation with a primary coolant temperature greater than 350°F. NRC approval shall be obtained before resuming power operation following this inspection.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Page 4 of Operating
License DPR-31

Date of Issuance: January 25, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 52 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31

DOCKET NO. 50-250

Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 with the attached page as indicated. The changed area in the license is indicated by a marginal line.

Remove Page	Insert Page
4	4

2. Primary to secondary leakage through the steam generator tubes shall be limited to 0.3 gpm per steam generator. With any steam generator tube leakage greater than this limit, the reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours. The leaking tube(s) shall be evaluated and plugged prior to resuming power operation, if leaking is not attributable to the denting phenomena.

3. Reactor operation shall be terminated and Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval shall be obtained prior to resuming operation if primary to secondary leakage attributable to the tube denting phenomena is detected from two or more tubes in the plant in any 20-day period.

4. Unit No. 3 steam generators shall be inspected during the next refueling outage or sooner in the event the limitations of 2 and 3, above, are exceeded. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval shall be obtained before resuming power operation following this inspection.

5. In order to perform an inspection of the steam generators, Unit No. 3 shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition within six equivalent months of operation from January 24, 1980 or at the next refueling shutdown, whichever occurs first, unless: (1) an inspection of the steam generators is performed within this period as a result of the requirements in 2, 3 and 4 above, or (2) an acceptable analysis of the susceptibility for stress corrosion cracking of tubing is submitted to explicitly justify continued operation of Unit No. 3 beyond the authorized period of operation. Any analysis justifying continued operation must be submitted at least 45 days prior to the expiration date of the authorized period of operation. For the purpose of this requirement, equivalent operation is defined as operation with a primary coolant temperature greater than 350°F. NRC approval shall be obtained before resuming power operation following this inspection.

F. Physical Security

The licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The approved security plan documents, withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d), collectively titled "Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos. 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan", dated October 18, 1979, as supplemented February 20, 1979.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 52 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-250

INTRODUCTION

By letter (L-80-8) dated January 10, 1980, Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted the results of the December 1979 steam generator inspection and implemented preventative plugging at Turkey Point Unit 3. The licensee concluded that the inspection results, implemented plugging program, and previously submitted analyses support at least an additional ten (10) equivalent* months of operation prior to performing the next steam generator inspection, and requested NRC approval to return Unit 3 to power operation.

BACKGROUND

Turkey Point Unit 3 was previously inspected in January 1979. On the basis of the inspection results and implemented plugging program, the licensee requested by letter (L-79-51) dated March 6, 1979 authorization to operate for ten (10) equivalent months prior to the next steam generator inspection. The technical basis for the preventive plugging program implemented subsequent to the inspection was consistent with that for programs performed previously at this and other similarly degraded units. These programs have been determined adequate by the NRC to support six equivalent months of operation. The plugging criteria implemented during this inspection were more conservative than those implemented prevously for six (6) months operation to support the request for ten (10) equivalent months of operation.

However, whereas ten (10) months operation was requested, License Amendment 46 authorized Turkey Point Unit 3 to operate for only six (6) equivalent months. Our supporting Safety Evaluation indicated that we did not have an adequate technical basis to predict steam generator performance for longer than six (6) months at a time, and that our consideration of extended operation beyond six (6) months would depend upon the operating experience at this and similarly degraded units.

License Amendment 50 dated September 26, 1979 extended the previously authorized six (6) equivalent months of operation for Turkey Point Unit 3 by seven (7) equivalent weeks, to the November 1979 refueling and steam generator inspection outage. The bases of this extension were (1) that the implemented plugging criteria were significantly more conservative than those accepted by NRC as being adequate to support six months operation, and (2) that the authorized six (6) equivalent months operation had essentially been completed with no detectable steam generator leakage. A similar two (2) equivalent month extension for Turkey Point

*For purposes of this SER, equivalent operation is defined as operation with primary coolant temperature greater than 350°F.

Unit 4 was recently granted on a similar technical basis.

DISCUSSION

Inspection Program

The December 1979 steam generator inspection at Turkey Point Unit 3 included programs to assess the condition of the steam generator tubes with regard to both denting and wastage degradation. For denting, tube gauging was performed using .540",.610", and .650" diameter eddy current probes in all three steam generators to assess the extent and pattern of denting. On the hot leg side, all tubes near the tube lane which were predicted to be bounded by the 17.5% tube hoop strain contour plus an additional four rows of tubes were gauged. Turkey Point Unit 3 has operated approximately 17 effective months since full closure of the support plate flow slots was first observed during the December 1977 inspection. The tube hoop strains calculated by the finite element analysis for 17 effective months beyond full closure were used to determine the 17.5% strain boundary. Whereas the previous inspection had employed a 15% strain boundary, the licensee maintains that extensive data from that and earlier inspections validate the conservatism of the 15% boundary and the adequacy of the 17.5% boundary. In addition, all tubes restricting the .610" or .540" probes, which form the basis for the plugging patterns in the tubelane region, have fallen within the 17.5% (plus four rows of tubes) inspection boundary.

Gauging within the 17.5% strain boundary was supplemented by additional gauging in the wedge and patch plate regions where significant activity could be expected based upon past experience at this and similar units. Additionally, when a restricted tube was found close to the inspection boundary, the inspection was expanded in that area. Gauging was also performed on the cold leg side in all three steam generators.

With regard to the three and nine o'clock tubelane/wedge regions, previous inspections had included the gauging of all tubes at or inside tube column 14 and all tubes at or outside tube column 79 where finite element analysis predicts tube deformation should develop more rapidly near the flow slots than other flow slot areas (between columns 14 and 79). Based upon denting degradation actually observed in these regions, the licensee concludes that wedge and tubelane interaction is apparently causing the finite element analysis to overpredict tube deformations in these regions. For this inspection, therefore, the inspection boundary near the three and nine o'clock tubelane/wedge locations was decreased from column 14 to column 10 and from column 79 to column 83, respectively.

Although the revised inspection boundary continued to bound the areas of significant tube restriction activity in the three and nine o'clock tubelane/wedge regions, two tubes (row 22, column 13 in steam generator A and row 12, column 80 in steam generator B) which had been previously observed (in January 1979) to restrict the .650" probe, were now located outside the inspection boundary. The licensee had planned to inspect these tubes and all adjacent tubes; however R12-C80 and the surrounding tubes in steam generator B and R22-C13 in steam generator A were inadvertently not inspected. The tubes surrounding R22-C13 in steam generator A were inspected.

The licensee did not learn of this oversight until after the inspection had been completed and the steam generators closed up. The licensee discussed this matter with the NRC staff by phone and stated that reinspection would result in unwarranted additional radiation exposures because the tubes in question (1) did not contain pluggable restrictions in the previous inspection, (2) the tubes are clearly isolated from the region of significant tube restriction activity which has been fully inspected, (3) the tubes surrounding one of the two tubes in question were inspected and found not to be restricted, (4) there is only a remote probability of developing a leak during the next operating interval. The licensee further argued that existing license restrictions regarding primary to secondary steam generator leakage will adequately protect public health and safety in the unlikely event that a leak should develop. The licensee concluded that the 10-15 man-rem required to reopen the steam generators for inspection of these tubes was not warranted. The staff concurred with this position. At the staff's request, the licensee submitted its technical basis for not inspecting the subject tubes by letter dated January 18, 1980.

A random eddy current inspection for wastage was conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.83 in all of the steam generators. This included an inspection of all tubes with greater than a 20% indication during the previous inspection, but which were not plugged. Eddy current examinations were also conducted on the small radius U-bends of the unplugged tubes in rows two through five of steam generator B.

Handhole inspections of the visible flow slots in all steam generators in steam generator B were performed to assess the conditions of the support plates and to provide input to the finite element analysis of the support plate/tube deformation.

Results of Inspection

The following table summarizes the tubes that would not pass the indicated probe size (.650", .610" and .540"). It also indicates which side of the tubes (hot leg or cold leg) were restricted.

Tube Restriction Summary

	Tubelane		Periphery and Wedge		Patch Plate
	Hot Leg	Cold Leg	Hot Leg	Cold Leg	Hot Leg
SG A					
.650"	31	0	43	0	35
.610"	5	0	3	1	0
.540"	0	0	1	0	0
SG B					
.650"	8	0	19	0	1
.610"	3	1	4	2	0
.540"	0	0	1	0	0
SG C					
.650"	22	0	15	0	2
.610"	5	0	2	0	0
.540"	0	0	2	0	0

Areas of denting activity are consistent with past data for this and other similar units. Four (4) tubes restricted passage of the .540" probe, none of which were located in the tubelane. Twenty-six tubes including 14 in the tubelane restricted passage of the .610" probe. These results compare with a total of 51 tubes including 22 tubes in the tubelane which restricted the .540" probe, and a total of 122 tubes including 78 tubes in the tubelane which restricted the .610" probe in the January 1979 inspection.

The licensee attributes the apparent reduction in additional restricted tubes to the fact that plugging in January 1979 was performed to support ten months operation, whereas only approximately 7 equivalent months of operation actually ensued.

The eddy current inspection of the central bundle region of the tubes (hot and cold leg sides) in all three steam generators was performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.93. No hot leg side tube defects were indicated. However, one (1) tube in steam generator B and four (4) tubes in steam generator C were indicated to contain cold leg side defects slightly in excess of the 40% plugging limit. Each of these defects had previously exhibited greater than 20% indications during the January 1979 inspection. The cold leg side inspection samples in steam generators B and C were expanded to 6%, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.83, with no additional defects found in steam generator B, but one (1) additional defect was found in steam generator C. The cold leg inspection sample in steam generator C was subsequently expanded to 12% with no additional defect found. As a result of this inspection, a total of one tube in steam generator B and five (5) tubes in steam generator C were plugged. This is considerably less than the 33 tubes plugged as a result of the January 1979 Regulatory Guide 1.83 inspection. Eddy current inspection revealed no degradation in the U-bends in rows two through five of steam generator B.

PLUGGING CRITERIA

The plugging criteria implemented during the previous January 1979 steam generator inspection were the same as that implemented previously at this unit and at other similarly degraded units with one exception in the conservative direction to support ten (10) rather than six (6) months operation. The exception was that three (3) tubes, instead of two (2) tubes, beyond any tube in columns 14 to 79 which did not pass the .540" probe were preventively plugged, and for tubes near the tubelane in columns 1 to 13 and 80 to 92, three (3) to six (6) tubes, instead of two (2) to four (4) tubes, were preventively plugged. As with the previously accepted plugging criteria, preventive plugging was based upon the projected growth of the critical (17.5%) tube hoop strain contour during the next operating interval as predicted by finite element analysis.

With regard to the December 1979 inspection, the licensee had again intended to implement plugging criteria to support ten (10) months operation. However, the absence of any .540" restrictions in the tubelane region negated application of the more conservative plugging criteria implemented previously in January 1979. The plugging criteria which did come into play during the December 1979

inspection were consistent with the criteria implemented during previous inspections at this and similarly degraded units. In addition, tubes with greater than a 40% eddy current indication were plugged.

Implementation of the plugging criteria resulted in the plugging of 66, 43, and 52 tubes for denting and 0, 1, and 4 tubes for wastage in steam generators A, B, and C, respectively. One additional tube in steam generator B which was obstructed by a carbon steel fragment was plugged as a conservative measure following removal of the fragment (Licensee Event Report L25 79-031 dated December 31, 1979). Total steam generator plugging to date is approximately 19.3% which is bounded by the 25% tube plugging assumed in the currently approved ECCS analysis which was previously submitted.

EVALUATION

The licensee concludes that the results of the December 1979 inspection, the implemented plugging program, and previously submitted analyses support at least ten (10) equivalent months of operation prior to performing the next steam generator inspection, and requests NRC approval to return Turkey Point Unit 3 to power operation.

We have reviewed the inspection results and agree that the implemented inspection program adequately bounded the region of significant denting activity. The sharply reduced number of restricted tubes in the tubelane, including the complete absence of .540" restricted tubes, compared to the results of the previous inspection is indicative of the more conservative plugging criteria implemented in the previous inspection. Eddy current inspection of all three steam generators was performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.83 and indicates that wastage degradation is not developing at a significant or unexpected rate. We conclude that the results of the December 1979 inspection do not reveal any new or unexpected phenomenon, and that the inspection performed was sufficient to adequately determine the condition of the Turkey Point Unit 3 steam generators.

With regard to the two (2) tubes which were observed to restrict passage of a .650" probe during the January 1979 inspection, but which were inadvertently not inspected in this inspection, we find that the licensee has provided an adequate technical basis to support its conclusion that these tubes do not represent a safety concern. We agree that reopening the steam generators to inspect these tubes is not warranted in view of the additional 10-15 man-rem exposure which would be incurred.

With regard to the licensee's contention that the inspection and implemented plugging support in excess of ten (10) months operation between inspections, we continue to have reservations about the validity of extrapolating the predictive methodology beyond six (6) equivalent months. We note that the more conservative plugging criteria implemented in the previous inspection to support ten (10) rather than six (6) months operation did not come into play during the December 1979 inspection due to the absence of .540" restricted tubes in the tubelane. This suggests that there is an increased likelihood that

.610" and .540" restricted tubes will occur in the tubelane during the next operating interval. Therefore, additional operating experience is necessary before the effectiveness of the more conservative preventative plugging criteria can be properly evaluated.

The preventive plugging program implemented by the licensee is consistent with previous programs at this and other similarly degraded units and has been proven effective in supporting six (6) equivalent months of operation. It is, therefore, our conclusion that Turkey Point Unit 3 may be allowed to return to power for six (6) equivalent months of operation.

Operation of Turkey Point Unit 3 will be carefully monitored by the staff and consideration of extended operation beyond the currently authorized six (6) equivalent months will depend upon the operating experience at this unit and at other similarly degraded units.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: January 25, 1980

7590-01

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-250

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 52 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 issued to Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit No. 3 (the facility) located in the Dade County, Florida. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment permits continued operation of Turkey Point Plant Unit No. 3 for six equivalent full power months from January 24, 1980 at which time the steam generators shall be inspected.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since this amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated January 10, 1980, as supplemented by letter dated January 18, 1980, (2) Amendment No. 52 to License No. DPR-31, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 25th day of January, 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors