SEPTEMBER 2 1 1978

Docket Nos. 50-250
and 50-251

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Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 37 and 30 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated August 9, 1978.

The amendments authorize the deletion of the requirements for Part-Length Rod Cluster Control Assemblies from the Technical Specifications, and their removal from the reactor.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance also are enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment Nos. 37 and 30 to License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

OFFICE	DOR:ORB1	DOR:ORB1	DOR:RSB		OELD Goldberg	DOR:ORB1
SURNAME	CParrish:jd	MGrotenhuis	MDunenfeld			ASchwencer
DATE	9/11/78	9/11/78	9/11/78		9/19/78	9/21/78

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cc: Mr. Robert Lowenstein, Esquire
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis & Axelrad
1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW
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Environmental & Urban Affairs Library
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199

Mr. Norman A. Coll, Esquire
Steel, Hector and Davis
1400 Southeast First National
Bank Building
Miami, Florida 33131

Florida Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. Henry Yaeger
Plant Manager
Turkey Point Plant
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Honorable Dewey Knight
County Manager of Metropolitan
Dade County
Miami, Florida 33130

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Chief, Energy Systems
Analyses Branch (AW-459)
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U.S.Environmental Protection Agency
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Washington, D.C. 20460

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IV Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
345 Courtland Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 37
License No. DPR-31

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated August 9, 1978, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-31 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (B) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 37 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 21, 1978

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 30
License No. DPR-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated August 9, 1978, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (B) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 30 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 21, 1978

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31

AMENDMENT NO. 30 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41

DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Replace the following pages of the Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A of the above-indicated licenses with the attached pages bearing the same numbers, except as other wise indicated. The changed areas on the revised pages are reflected by a marginal line.

Remove	Insert
3.2-1	3.2-1
3.2-2	3.2-2
5.2-1	5.2-1
5.2-2	5.2-2
B2.1-2	B2.1-2
B3.2-1a	B3.2-1a
B3.2-2	B3.2-2
B3.2-6	B3.2-6
B3.2-7	B3.2-7

3.2 CONTROL ROD AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

Applicability: Applies to the operation of the control rods and power distribution limits.

Objective: To ensure (1) core subcriticality after a reactor trip, (2) a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical control rod ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

Specification: 1. CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

a. Whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the shutdown control rods shall be fully withdrawn.

b. For Unit 4, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(a) for two loop operation.

c. For Unit 3, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(c) for two loop operation.

d. The Unit 4 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 and the Unit 3 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) may be revised on the basis of physics calculations and physics data obtained during startup and subsequent operation.

e.* Part length rods shall not be permitted in the core except for low power physics tests and for axial offset calibration tests performed below 75% of rated power.

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* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

f. Except for low power physics tests, the shutdown margin with allowance for a stuck control rod shall exceed the applicable value shown on Figure 3.2-2 under all steady-state operating conditions from zero to full power, including effects of axial power distribution. The shutdown margin as used here is defined as the amount by which the reactor core would be subcritical at hot shutdown conditions (540 F) if all control rods were tripped, assuming that the highest worth control rod remained fully withdrawn, and assuming no changes in xenon, boron concentration or part-length rod position.

g. During physics tests and control rod exercises, the insertion limits need not be met, but the required shutdown margin, Figure 3.2-2 must be maintained or exceeded.

2. MISALIGNED CONTROL ROD

If a part length* or full length control rod is more than 15 inches out of alignment with its bank, and is not corrected within 8 hours power shall be reduced so as not to exceed 75% of interim power for 3 loop or 45% of interim power for two loop operation, unless the hot channel factors are shown to be no greater than allowed by Section 6a of Specification 3.2.

3. ROD DROP TIME

The drop time of each control rod shall be no greater than 1.8 seconds at full flow and operating temperature from the beginning of rod motion to dashpot entry.

4. INOPERABLE CONTROL RODS

a. No more than one inoperable control rod shall be permitted during sustained power operation, except it shall not be permitted if the rod has a potential

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

5.2 REACTOR

REACTOR CORE

1. The reactor core contains approximately 71 metric tons of uranium in the form of slightly enriched uranium dioxide pellets. The pellets are encapsulated in Zircaloy – 4 tubing to form fuel rods. The reactor core is made up of 157 fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly contains 204 fuel rods.

2. The average enrichment of the initial core is a nominal 2.50 weight per cent of U-235. Three fuel enrichments are used in the initial core. The highest enrichment is a nominal 3.10 weight per cent of U-235.

3. Reload fuel will be similar in design to the initial core. The enrichment of reload fuel will be no more than 3.5 weight per cent of U-235.

4. Burnable poison rods are incorporated in the initial core. There are 816 poison rods in the form of 12-rod clusters, which are located in vacant rod cluster control guide tubes. The burnable poison rods consist of borated pyrex glass clad with stainless steel.

5. There are 45 full-length RCC assemblies and 8 partial-length* RCC assemblies in the reactor core. The full-

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

length RCC assemblies contain a 144 inch length of silver-indium-cadmium alloy clad with the stainless steel. The partial-length* RCC assemblies contain a 36 inch length of silver-indium-cadmium alloy with the remainder of the stainless steel sheath filled with Al_2O_3.

6. Up to 10 grams of enriched fissionable material may be used either in the core, or available on the site, in the form of fabricated neutron flux detectors for the purposes of monitoring core neutron flux.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

1. The design of the Reactor Coolant System complies with the code requirements.

2. All piping, components and supporting structures of the Reactor Coolant System are designed to Class I requirements, and have been designed to withstand:

   a. The design seismic ground acceleration, 0.05g acting in the horizontal and 0.033g acting in the vertical planes simultaneously, with stresses maintained within code allowable working stresses.

   b. The maximum potential seismic ground acceleration, 0.15g, acting in the horizontal and 0.10g acting in the vertical directions simultaneously with no loss of function.

3. The nominal liquid volume of the Reactor Coolant System, at rated operating conditions, is 9088 cubic feet.

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

Use of these factors results in more conservative curves than if the Interim Limits were used.

These limiting hot channel factors are higher than those calculated at full power for the range from all control rods fully withdrawn to maximum allowable control rod insertion. The control rod insertion limits are covered by Specification 3.2. Slightly higher hot channel factors could occur at lower power levels because additional control rods are in the core. However, the control rod insertion limits dictated by Figure 3.2-1 ensure that the DNBR is always greater at partial power than at full power.

The hot channel factors are also sufficiently large to account for the degree of malpositioning of part-length* rods that is allowed before the reactor trip set points are reduced and rod withdrawal block and load runback may be required.[(1)] Rod withdrawal block and load runback occur before reactor trip setpoints are reached.

The Reactor Control and Protection System is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions that would result in a DNBR of less than 1.30. [(2)]

Reference

(1) FSAR 3.2.2

(2) FSAR 14.1.1

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

The overlap between successive control banks is allowed because the control rod worth is lower near the top and bottom of the core than in the center.

Positioning of the part-length* rods is governed by the requirement to maintain the axial power shape within specified limits or to accept an automatic cutback of the overpower ΔT and overtemperature ΔT set points (see Specification 2.3). Thus, there is no need for imposing a limit on the physical positioning of the part-length* rods.

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

The various control rod banks are each to be moved as a bank, that is, with all rods in the bank within one step (5/8 inch) of the bank position. The control system is designed to permit individual rod movement for test purposes. Position indication is provided by two methods: a digital count of actuating pulses which shows the demand position of the banks and a linear position indicator (LVDT) which indicates the actual rod position.(2) The relative accuracy of the linear position indicator (LVDT) is such that, with the most adverse error, an alarm will be actuated if any two rods within a bank deviate by more than 15 inches. In the event that an LVDT is not in service, the effects of a malpositioned control rod are observable on nuclear and process information displayed in the control room and by core thermocouples and in-core movable detectors. Complete rod misalignment (part-length* or full-length control rod 12 feet out of alignment with its bank) does not result in exeeding core limits in steady-state operation at rated power. If the condition cannot be readily corrected, the specified reduction in power to 75% (3 loop) or 45% (2 loop) will insure that design margins to core limits will be maintained under both steady-state and anticipated transient conditions. The 8-hour permissible limit on rod misalignment is short with respect to the probability of an independent accident. The 24-hour period ensures that no significant burnup effects would be caused by the inserted rod.

The specified rod drop time is consistent with safety analyses that have been performed.(1)

The In-Core Instrumentation has five drives with detectors each of which has ten thimbles assigned.(3) This provides broad capability for detailed flux mapping.

The ion chambers located outside the reactor vessel measure flux distribution at the top and bottom of the core. Core traverses in a few of the in-core instrument paths will establish that the fixed flux measurement equipment is properly calibrated.

Operating experience has established that the flux measurement system is of a reliable design, and that the 10% load reduction, in the event of recalibration delay, is ultra conservative compensation.

References:

(1) FSAR - Section 14

(2) FSAR - Section 7.2

(3) FSAR - Section 7.6

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

Flux Difference ($\Delta\phi$) and a reference value which corresponds to the full design power equilibrium value of Axial Offset (Axial Offset = $\Delta\phi$/fractional power). The reference value of flux difference varies with power level and burnup but expressed as axial offset it varies only with burnup.

The technical specifications on power distribution control assure that the F_q upper bound envelope of 2.22* times Figure 3.2-3 is not exceeded and xenon distributions are not developed which at a later time, would cause greater local power peaking even though the flux difference is then within the limits specified by the procedure.

The target (or reference) value of flux difference is determined as follows. At any time that equilibrium xenon conditions have been established, the indicated flux difference is noted with part length+ rods withdrawn from the core and with the full length rod control rod bank more than 190 steps withdrawn (i.e., normal rated power operating position appropriate for the time in life. Control rods are usually withdrawn farther as burnup proceeds). This value, divided by the fraction of design power at which the core was operating is the design power value of the target flux difference. Values for all other core power levels are obtained by multiplying the design power value by the fractional power. Since the indicated equilibrium value was noted, no allowances for excore detector error are necessary and indicated deviation of ±5% ΔI are permitted from the indicated reference value. During periods where extensive load following is required, it may be impractical to establish the required core conditions for measuring the target flux difference every rated power month. For this reason, methods are permitted by Item 6c of Section 3.2 for updating the target flux differences. Figure B3.2-1 shows a typical construction of the target flux difference band at BOL and Figure B3.2-2 shows the typical variation of the full power value with burnup.

Strict control of the flux difference (and rod position) is not as necessary during part power operation. This is because xenon distribution control at part power is not as significant as the control at full power and allowance has been made in predicting the heat flux peaking factors for less strict control at part power. Strict control of the flux difference is not possible during certain physics tests or during the required, periodic excore calibra-

*For steam generator tube plugging in excess of 10%, this value becomes 2.20.

+ Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

tions which require larger flux differences than permitted. Therefore, the specifications on power distribution control are not applied during physics tests or excore calibration. This is acceptable due to the extremely low probability of a significant accident occurring during these operations.

In some instances of rapid plant power reduction automatic rod motion will cause the flux difference to deviate from the target band when the reduced power level is reached. This does not necessarily affect the xenon distribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which can be reached on a subsequent return to full power within the target band. However, to simplify the specification, a limitation of one hour in any period of 24 hours is placed on operation outside the band. This ensures that the resulting xenon distributions are not significantly different from those resulting from operation within the target band. The instantaneous consequences of being outside the band, provided rod insertion limits are observed, is not worse than a 10 percent increment in peaking factor for flux difference in the range +14% to -14% (+11% to -11% indicated) increasing by ± 1% for each 2% decrease in rated power. Therefore, while the deviation exists, the power level is limited to 90% of design power or lower depending on the indicated flux difference.

If, for any reason, flux difference is not controlled within the ±5% band for as long a period as one hour, then xenon distributions may be significantly changed and operation at 50% of design power is required to protect against potentially more severe consequences of some accidents.

As discussed above, the essence of the procedure is to maintain the xenon distribution in the core as close to the equilibrium full power condition as possible. This can be accomplished without part length* rods by using the boron system to position the full length control rods to produce the required indicated flux difference.

* Any reference to part-length rods no longer applies after the part-length rods are removed from the reactor.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 37 AND 30 TO LICENSE NOS DPR-31 AND DPR-41

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS NOS. 3 AND 4

DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Introduction

By letter dated August 9, 1978, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) proposed a license amendment to delete the requirements for Part-Length Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (PLRCCA's) from the Technical Specifications for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. FPL plans to remove these PLRCCA's during refueling outages.

Discussion and Evaluation

Part length control rods were initially installed to suppress xenon induced power oscillations in the axial direction, should such oscillations occur. They were also intended for use in axial offset calibration tests or low power physics tests.

The Technical Specifications, as now written, require that these PLRCCA's be withdrawn and excluded from the core at all times during reactor operations. The PLRCCA's are not needed, used or assumed to be available to achieve required reactor shutdown conditions. The proposed removal, therefore, will not cause any change in required reactivity characteristics, or safety margins at full power, low power or shutdown. To the contrary, removal will eliminate the potential for part length rods dropping into the core during operation. Such an event could cause abnormal flux distribution or reactor shutdown.

In addition, in order to preserve the current dynamic operating characterisitics of the reactor (i.e., pressure drops, coolant flow rates, etc.) which could be affected if just removal of the PLRCCA's were to be performed, FPL proposes to install thimble plug assemblies in the spaces previously occupied by PLRCCA's. The thimble plug assembly consists of a flat base plate with short rods suspended from the bottom surface and a spring pack assembly. The twenty short rods, called thimble plugs, project into the upper ends of the guide thimbles to reduce the bypass flow area. Fuel assemblies without control rods, burnable poison rods, or source rods use identical devices. Similar short rods are also used on the source assemblies and fuel assembly guide thimbles. At installation in the core, the thimble plug assemblies interface with both the upper core plate and with the fuel assembly top nozzles by resting on the adapter plate. The spring pack is compressed by the upper core plate when the upper internals assembly is lowered into place. Each thimble plug is permanently attached to the base plate by a nut which is locked to the threaded end of the plug by a pin welded to the nut.

All components in the thimble plug assembly, except for the springs, are constructed from type 304 stainless steel. The springs are wound from Inconel x-750 for corrosion resistance and high strength.

These thimble plugs will effectively limit bypass flow through the rod cluster control guide thimbles in the fuel assemblies from which the PLRCCA's have been removed, just as they currently limit bypass flow in those assemblies which do not contain control rods, source rods, or burnable poison rods.

Based on the considerations that (1) the PLRCCA's are not needed for reactor operation, (2) that removal of these assemblies will remove the chance for an abnormal flux distribution reactor shutdown, and (3) that insertion of the thimble plug assemblies will preserve the current dynamic operating characteristics of the reactor, we conclude that this change is acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: September 21, 1978

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment Nos. 37 and 30 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, respectively, issued to Florida Power and Light Company which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units Nos. 3 and 4, located in Dade County, Florida. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments authorize the deletion of the requirements for Part-Length Rod Cluster Control Assemblies from the Technical Specifications, and their removal from the reactor.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated August 9, 1978; (2) Amendments Nos. 37 and 30 to License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 and; (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C. and at the Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 21st day of September, 1978.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors