

1/27/77

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket
NRC PDR
Local PDR
ORB#3 Rdg
KRGoller
TJCarter
JMcGough
GLear
DElliott
CParrish
OELD
OI&E (5)
DEisenhut
BJones (8)
TBAbernathy
JRBuchanan
ACRS (16)
File

*Correction to Amdt 22
to DPR-31*

Dockets Nos. 50-250
and 50-251

Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

By letter dated January 14, 1977, we transmitted to you Amendments Nos. 22 and 21 to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41. Due to a typographical error, Technical Specifications pages 3.2-3 and B3.2-4 for both Units Nos. 3 and 4 contained incorrect information.

Please replace pages 3.2-3 and B3.2-4 of Amendments Nos. 22 and 21 to Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 with the enclosed corrected pages 3.2-3 and B3.2-4.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

Pages 3.2-3 and B3.2-4
of Amendments Nos. 22 and 21

OFFICE >	ORB#3	ORB#3 <i>DL</i>	ORB#3 <i>DL</i>			
SURNAME >	CParrish <i>cp</i>	DElliott:acr	GLear			
DATE >	1/27/77	1/27/77	1/27/77			

Florida Power & Light Company

- 2 -

cc:

Mr. Jack R. Newman, Esquire
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis & Axelrad
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Suite 1214
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Mr. Ed Maroney
Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations
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Honorable Dewey Knight
County Manager of Metropolitan
Dade County
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Florida Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. Henry Yaeger
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Miami, Florida 33101

Chief, Energy Systems Analysis Branch (AW-459)
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Region VI Office
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Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Environmental & Urban Affairs Library
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199

reactivity insertion upon ejection greater than 0.3% $\Delta k/k$ at rated power. Inoperable rod worth shall be determined within 4 weeks.

- b. A control rod shall be considered inoperable if
 - (a) the rod cannot be moved by the CRDM, or
 - (b) the rod is misaligned from its bank by more than 15 inches, or
 - (c) the rod drop time is not met.
 - c. If a control rod cannot be moved by the drive mechanism, shutdown margin shall be increased by boron addition to compensate for the withdrawn worth of the inoperable rod.
5. CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION
- If either the power range channel deviation alarm or the rod deviation monitor alarm are not operable rod positions shall be logged once per shift and after a load change greater than 10% of rated power. If both alarms are inoperable for two hours or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reset to 93% of rated power.

6. POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

- a. At all times except during low power physics tests, the hot channel factors defined in the basis must meet the following limits:

$$F_q(Z) \leq (2.22/P) \times K(Z) \text{ for } P > .5$$

$$F_q(Z) \leq (4.44) \times K(Z) \text{ for } P \leq .5$$

$$F_{\Delta H}^N \leq 1.55 [1 + 0.2 (1-P)]$$
 where P is the fraction of rated power at which the core is operating. K(Z) is the function given in Figure 3.2-3 and Z is the core height location of F_q .
- b. Following initial loading before the reactor is operated above 75% of rated power and at regular effective full rated power monthly intervals thereafter, power distribution maps, using the movable detector system shall be made, to conform that the hot channel factor limits of the specification are satisfied. For the purpose of this comparison,

UNIT 3

An upper bound envelope of 2.22 times the normalized peaking factor axial dependence of Figure 3.2-3 has been determined to be consistent with the technical specifications on power distribution control as given in Section 3.2.

When an F_q measurement is taken, both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be allowed for. Five percent is the appropriate experimental uncertainty allowance for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system and three percent is the appropriate allowance for manufacturing tolerance.

In the specified limit of $F_{\Delta H}^N$, there is an 8 percent allowance for uncertainties which means that normal operation of the core is expected to result in $F_{\Delta H}^N < 1.55/1.08$. The logic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is that (a) normal perturbations in the radial power shape (e.g., rod misalignment) affect $F_{\Delta H}^N$, in most cases without necessarily affecting F_q , (b) the operator has a direct influence on F_q through movement of rods, and can limit it to the desired value, he has no direct control over $F_{\Delta H}^N$ and (c) an error in the predictions for radial power shape, which may be detected during startup physics tests can be compensated for in F_q by tighter axial control, but compensation for $F_{\Delta H}^N$ is less readily available. When a measurement of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ is taken, experimental error must be allowed for and 4% is the appropriate allowance for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system.

Measurements of the hot channel factors are required as part of start-up physics tests, at least once each full rated power month of operation, and whenever abnormal power distribution conditions require a reduction of core power to a level based on measured hot channel factors. The incore map taken following initial loading provides confirmation of the basic nuclear

UNIT 3

reactivity insertion upon ejection greater than 0.3% $\Delta k/k$ at rated power. Inoperable rod worth shall be determined within 4 weeks.

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 - (b) the rod is misaligned from its bank by more than 15 inches, or
 - (c) the rod drop time is not met.
- c. If a control rod cannot be moved by the drive mechanism, shutdown margin shall be increased by boron addition to compensate for the withdrawn worth of the inoperable rod.

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6. POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

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$$F_q(Z) \leq (2.22/P) \times K(Z) \text{ for } P > .5$$

$$F_q(Z) \leq (4.44) \times K(Z) \text{ for } P \leq .5$$

$$F_{\Delta H}^N \leq 1.55 [1 + 0.2 (1-P)]$$

where P is the fraction of rated power at which the core is operating. K(Z) is the function given in Figure 3.2-3 and Z is the core height location of F_q .

- b. Following initial loading before the reactor is operated above 75% of rated power and at regular effective full rated power monthly intervals thereafter, power distribution maps, using the movable detector system shall be made, to conform that the hot channel factor limits of the specification are satisfied. For the purpose of this comparison,

An upper bound envelope of 2.22 times the normalized peaking factor axial dependence of Figure 3.2-3 has been determined to be consistent with the technical specifications on power distribution control as given in Section 3.2.

When an F_q measurement is taken, both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be allowed for. Five percent is the appropriate experimental uncertainty allowance for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system and three percent is the appropriate allowance for manufacturing tolerance.

In the specified limit of $F_{\Delta H}^N$, there is an 8 percent allowance for uncertainties which means that normal operation of the core is expected to result in $F_{\Delta H}^N < 1.55/1.08$. The logic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is that (a) normal perturbations in the radial power shape (e.g., rod misalignment) affect $F_{\Delta H}^N$, in most cases without necessarily affecting F_q , (b) the operator has a direct influence on F_q through movement of rods, and can limit it to the desired value, he has no direct control over $F_{\Delta H}^N$ and (c) an error in the predictions for radial power shape, which may be detected during startup physics tests can be compensated for in F_q by tighter axial control, but compensation for $F_{\Delta H}^N$ is less readily available. When a measurement of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ is taken, experimental error must be allowed for and 4% is the appropriate allowance for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system.

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