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Dockets Nos. 50-250
and 50-251

Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 17 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 16 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4. These amendments are in response to your request dated February 25, 1976, and Supplements dated February 25, April 21, May 10, May 13, and May 19, 1976.

These amendments modify operating limits in the Technical Specifications to allow operation of Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit 4, following refueling for core Cycle 3. The operating limits for Unit 3 set forth in its Technical Specifications remain unchanged although the Unit 3 Technical Specifications will be modified to reflect the revisions to the Unit 4 Technical Specifications.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 17
2. Amendment No. 16
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

OFFICE ➤	ORB#3	ORB#3	OELD	ORB#3		
SURNAME ➤	CParrish	DElliott:kmb	R. Ross	GLear		
DATE ➤	5/26/76	5/26/76	5/26/76	5/28/76		

cc:

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S. E. First National Bank Building
Miami, Florida 33131

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-250

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 17
License No. DPR-31

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated February 25, 1976 and supplements dated February 25, April 21, May 10, May 13 and May 19, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

   E. After weighing the environmental aspects involved, the issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 28, 1976

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 17

TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31

DOCKET NO. 50-250

Replace page 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-1(a), page B3.1-7 and B3.2-1 with the attached revised pages.

Add pages 3.1-7a and B3.1-8.

6. DNB PARAMETERS

The following DNB related parameters limits shall be maintained during power operation:

a. Reactor Coolant System Tavg $\leq$ 578.2 °F

b. Pressurizer Pressure $\geq$ 2220 psia*

c. Reactor Coolant Flow $\geq$ 268,500 gpm

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power using normal shutdown procedures.

Compliance with a. and b. is demonstrated by verifying that each of the parameters is within its limits at least once each 12 hours.

Compliance with c. is demonstrated by verifying that the parameter is within its limits after each refueling cycle.

* Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of (5%) RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase in excess of (10%) RATED THERMAL POWER.

Applicability: Applies to the operation of the control rods and power distribution limits.

Objective: To ensure (1) core subcriticality after a reactor trip, (2) a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical control rod ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

Specification:

1. CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

a. Whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the shutdown control rods shall be fully withdrawn.

b. For Unit 4, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(a) for two loop operation.

c. For Unit 3, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(c) for two loop operation.

d. The Unit 4 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 and the Unit 3 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) may be revised on the basis of physics calculations and physics data obtained during startup and subsequent operation.

e. Part length rods shall not be permitted in the core except for low power physics tests and for axial offset calibration tests performed below 75% of rated power.

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR THREE LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR TWO LOOP OPERATION



Amendment No. 17

FIGURE 3.2-1(a)

reac' · coolant would be released tc he secondary system. All the noble gas activity transferred to the steam generator was assumed released, while the iodine was assumed to partition between the liquid and vapor phases.

The resultant site boundary dose is approximately 0.25 rem whole body and approximately 2.5 rems to the thyroid, using the two-hour meteorological dispersion factor for the plant. These doses are less than 1% of the guideline doses of 10CFR100.

5. Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen and Chloride Concentration

By maintaining the reactor coolant chemistry within the limits specified, the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System is protected.(3)

If these limits are exceeded, measures can be taken to correct the condition, e.g., replacement of ion exchange resin or adjustment of the hydrogen concentration in the volume control tank, and further because of the time dependent nature of any adverse effects arising from concentrations in excess of the limits, it is unnecessary to shutdown immediately since the condition can be corrected. Thus the period of 24 hours for corrective action to restore the concentrations within the limits has been established. If the corrective action has not been effective at the end of the 24 hour period, then the reactor will be brought to the cold shutdown condition and the corrective action will continue.

6. DNB Parameters

Reactor Coolant Flow Measurements[4]

Elbow taps are used in the reactor coolant system as an instrument device that indicates the status of the reactor coolant flow. The basic function of this device is to provide information as to whether or not a reduction in flow rate has occurred. The correlation between flow reduction and elbow tap readout has been well established by the following equation:

$$\frac{\Delta P}{\Delta P_o} = \left(\frac{W}{W_o}\right)^2$$, where ΔP_o is the referenced pressure differential with the corresponding referenced flow rate W_o, and ΔP is the pressure differential with the corresponding flow rate W. The full flow reference point is established during initial startup. The low flow trip point is then established by extrapolating along the correlation curve.

References

(1) FSAR Table 4.1-3

(2) FSAR Section 14.1.10

(3) FSAR Section 4.2.8

(4) FSAR Section 4.2.9

B3.2 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, CONTROL AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

Reactivity changes accompanying changes in reactor power are compensated by control rod motion. Reactivity changes associated with xenon, samarium, fuel depletion, and large changes in reactor coolant temperature (operating temperature to cold shutdown) are compensated by changes in the soluble boron concentration. During power operation, the shutdown groups are fully withdrawn and control of reactor power is by the control groups. A reactor trip occurring during power operation will put the reactor into the hot shutdown condition.

The control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time, assuming the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn, with sufficient margins to meet the assumptions used in the accident analysis.(1) In addition, they provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod worth in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod ejection, and provide for acceptable nuclear peaking factors. Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-1(a) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 4. Figures 3.2-1(b) and 3.2-1(c) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 3. The Unit 4 and Unit 3 rod insertion limits may be determined on the basis of startup and operating data to provide a more realistic limit which will allow for more flexibility in operation and still assure compliance with the shutdown requirement. The maximum shutdown margin requirement occurs at end-of-core life and is based on the value used in analysis of the hypothetical steam break accident. Early in core life, less shutdown margin is required, and Figure 3.2-2 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 1.77% reactivity at end-of-core-life with respect to an uncontrolled cooldown. All other accident analyses are based on 1% reactivity shutdown margin.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-251

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 4

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 16
License No. DPR-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated February 25, 1976 and supplements dated February 25, April 21, May 10, May 13 and May 19, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

   E. After weighing the environmental aspects involved, the issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 28, 1976

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 16

TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41

DOCKET NO. 50-251

Replace page 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-1(a), page B3.1-7 and page B3.2-1 with the attached revised pages.

Add pages 3.1-7a and B3.1-8.

6. DNB PARAMETERS

The following DNB related parameters limits shall be maintained during power operation:

a. Reactor Coolant System Tavg $\leq$ 578.2 °F

b. Pressurizer Pressure $\geq$ 2220 psia*

c. Reactor Coolant Flow $\geq$ 268,500 gpm

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power using normal shutdown procedures.

Compliance with a. and b. is demonstrated by verifying that each of the parameters is within its limits at least once each 12 hours.

Compliance with c. is demonstrated by verifying that the parameter is within its limits after each refueling cycle.

* Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of (5%) RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase in excess of (10%) RATED THERMAL POWER.

Applicability: Applies to the operation of the control rods and power distribution limits.

Objective: To ensure (1) core subcriticality after a reactor trip, (2) a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical control rod ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

Specification:

1. CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

a. Whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the shutdown control rods shall be fully withdrawn.

b. For Unit 4, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(a) for two loop operation.

c. For Unit 3, whenever the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) for three loop operation and on Figure 3.2-1(c) for two loop operation.

d. The Unit 4 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 and the Unit 3 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1(b) may be revised on the basis of physics calculations and physics data obtained during startup and subsequent operation.

e. Part length rods shall not be permitted in the core except for low power physics tests and for axial offset calibration tests performed below 75% of rated power.

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR THREE LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1

Amendment No. 16

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS
FOR TWO LOOP OPERATION



Amendment No. 16

FIGURE 3.2-1(a)

reactor coolant would be released to the secondary system. All the noble gas activity transferred to the steam generator was assumed released, while the iodine was assumed to partition between the liquid and vapor phases.

The resultant site boundary dose is approximately 0.25 rem whole body and approximately 2.5 rems to the thyroid, using the two-hour meteorological dispersion factor for the plant. These doses are less than 1% of the guideline doses of 10CFR100.

5. Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen and Chloride Concentration

By maintaining the reactor coolant chemistry within the limits specified, the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System is protected.[3]

If these limits are exceeded, measures can be taken to correct the condition, e.g., replacement of ion exchange resin or adjustment of the hydrogen concentration in the volume control tank, and further because of the time dependent nature of any adverse effects arising from concentrations in excess of the limits, it is unnecessary to shutdown immediately since the condition can be corrected. Thus the period of 24 hours for corrective action to restore the concentrations within the limits has been established. If the corrective action has not been effective at the end of the 24 hour period, then the reactor will be brought to the cold shutdown condition and the corrective action will continue.

6. DNB Parameters

Reactor Coolant Flow Measurements[4]

Elbow taps are used in the reactor coolant system as an instrument device that indicates the status of the reactor coolant flow. The basic function of this device is to provide information as to whether or not a reduction in flow rate has occurred. The correlation between flow reduction and elbow tap readout has been well established by the following equation:

$$\frac{\Delta P}{\Delta P_o} = \left(\frac{W}{W_o}\right)^2$$, where ΔP_o is the referenced pressure differential with the corresponding referenced flow rate W_o, and ΔP is the pressure differential with the corresponding flow rate W. The full flow reference point is established during initial startup. The low flow trip point is then established by extrapolating along the correlation curve.

References

(1) FSAR Table 4.1-3

(2) FSAR Section 14.1.10

(3) FSAR Section 4.2.8

(4) FSAR Section 4.2.9

B3.2 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, CONTROL AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

Reactivity changes accompanying changes in reactor power are compensated by control rod motion. Reactivity changes associated with xenon, samarium, fuel depletion, and large changes in reactor coolant temperature (operating temperature to cold shutdown) are compensated by changes in the soluble boron concentration. During power operation, the shutdown groups are fully withdrawn and control of reactor power is by the control groups. A reactor trip occurring during power operation will put the reactor into the hot shutdown condition.

The control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time, assuming the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn, with sufficient margins to meet the assumptions used in the accident analysis.(1) In addition, they provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod worth in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod ejection, and provide for acceptable nuclear peaking factors. Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-1(a) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 4. Figures 3.2-1(b) and 3.2-1(c) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 3. The Unit 4 and Unit 3 rod insertion limits may be determined on the basis of startup and operating data to provide a more realistic limit which will allow for more flexibility in operation and still assure compliance with the shutdown requirement. The maximum shutdown margin requirement occurs at end-of-core life and is based on the value used in analysis of the hypothetical steam break accident. Early in core life, less shutdown margin is required, and Figure 3.2-2 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 1.77% reactivity at end-of-core-life with respect to an uncontrolled cooldown. All other accident analyses are based on 1% reactivity shutdown margin.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 17 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-31, AND

AMENDMENT NO. 16 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-41

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 3 AND 4

DOCKETS NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

Introduction

By letter dated February 25, 1976, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units Nos. 3 and 4. Supplemental information relating to the requested changes was supplied by FPL in their letters of February 25, April 21, May 10, May 13 and May 19, 1976. In their letter of February 25, 1976, FPL proposed a modification of control rod insertion limits, a limiting condition for operation (LCO). The proposed control rod insertion limits would be used during Unit No. 4 operation following refueling for core Cycle 3.

Because Unit No. 3 and Unit No. 4 share joint Technical Specifications, the Technical Specifications for Unit No. 3 will be modified to reflect the proposed revision to the Unit 4 Technical Specifications. However, the operating limits for Unit No. 3 are unchanged by the Unit No. 4 reload for core Cycle 3.

Discussion

The Unit No. 4 core loading for fuel Cycle 3 will include 40 new pre-pressurized fuel assemblies. These assemblies, which are known as Region 5 fuel assemblies, have a slightly higher enrichment than do the Region 2 fuel assemblies which they replace (3.00% U-235 vs 2.56% U-235). However, the enrichment of the Region 5 fuel assemblies are within the enrichment range of other assemblies presently installed in the Unit No. 4 reactor (1.85% U-235 to 3.11% U-235). The increased enrichment compensates for the fission product reactivity poisoning produced within the reactor during previous operation. The Region 5 fuel assemblies have been fabricated by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the fabricator of the fuel assemblies now loaded in the Turkey Point Units, and are mechanically identical to the presently installed fuel assemblies.

Evaluation

1. Accident Analysis

During the review of the Unit No. 4 Cycle 3 core configuration, the staff requested FPL to verify that the reference loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), FSAR Revision 39 dated March 10, 1975, was not modified by: (1) the Unit No. 4 Cycle 3 core power distribution or (2) the variation in internal fuel pin pressure between the reference LOCA analysis and the core Cycle 3 limiting fuel region. In addition we requested FPL to analyze the effect of plugged steam generator tubes on the results of the LOCA analysis.

FPL determined: (1) that there is a 6°F increase in peak clad temperature due to variations in core power distribution and internal fuel pin pressure until a core Cycle 3 average fuel burnup of 3000 MWD/MTU is reached and (2) there is less than a 36°F increase in peak clad temperature due to the 3.6% plugged steam generator tubes. Such incremental increases in calculated temperature will raise the analyzed fuel pin clad temperature following a LOCA to a peak value of less than 2192°F. Our review of FPL's evaluation supports the conclusion that: (1) the peak clad temperature following a LOCA will be less than 2200°F and (2) the maximum local metal-water reaction and the total core wide metal-water reaction will be less than the allowable limits of 17% and 1%, respectively. Therefore, the calculated emergency core cooling system (ECCS) performance for Turkey Point Unit No. 4 conforms to the peak clad temperature and maximum oxidation and hydrogen generation criteria of 10 CFR 50.46(b).

In their submittal of February 25, 1976, FPL presented a comparison of nuclear parameters for core Cycle 3 with those for core Cycle 2. This comparison showed that the nuclear parameters for core Cycle 3 fall within the range of values assumed in the Turkey Point Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). We agree that this comparison shows there are no significant differences between the Unit 4 Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 core nuclear parameters. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents and transients are not increased by the Unit 4 reload for core Cycle 3 and since these consequences were previously determined to be acceptable for Turkey Point, the conclusions of previous safety evaluations are unchanged by the core reload.

2. Technical Specifications

(a) Control Rod Insertion Limits

The proposed control rod insertion limits are the result of analyses performed for the Unit No. 4 Cycle 3 core configuration to insure: (1) an adequate shutdown margin is maintained throughout cycle life, (2) hot channel factors are maintained below design limits, (3) acceptable consequences of a rod ejection accident, and (4) acceptable consequences of rod misalignment. The maintenance of adequate shutdown margin at the end of core life is the consideration which defined the proposed control rod insertion limits for reactor operation with three reactor coolant pumps operating. When two reactor coolant pumps are operating the reactor coolant flow is reduced and the reactor coolant inlet temperature is increased. These changes in operating conditions are sufficient to make the maintenance of an acceptable hot channel factor the consideration which defined the proposed control rod insertion limits for reactor operation with two reactor coolant pumps operating.

The proposed control rod insertion limits allow the control rods to be inserted into the reactor core a smaller amount in core Cycle 3 than they were in core Cycle 2. A decrease in the amount of allowed insertion is conservative and increases the minimum available shutdown margin, maintains an acceptable core power distribution, decreases the consequences of a control rod ejection accident and decreases the consequences of control rod misalignment. Moreover, since we find that the use of the proposed control rod insertion limits will not effect previously performed applicable safety analyses, we conclude that the proposed insertion limits are acceptable.

(b) Operating Limits on DNB Related Parameters

At the request of the staff, FPL proposed in their letter of May 13, 1975, LCO's on reactor coolant system average temperature, pressurizer pressure and reactor coolant flow. The inclusion of these new Unit No. 4 LCO's in the Technical Specifications will add further assurance that actual reactor operating conditions are consistent with the operating conditions assumed in the analysis of Unit No. 4 postulated accidents and transients; and thus, the proposed Technical Specification change is acceptable.

3. Physics Startup Tests

The core Cycle 3 physics startup tests were reviewed to determine that: (1) all necessary tests would be performed and (2) the acceptance criteria are reasonable. The physics startup tests to be performed at Turkey Point Unit No. 4 will: (1) check the reactor fuel loading, (2) verify the calculational methods used to determine power distributions, shutdown margins and control rod worths, and (3) measure the moderator temperature coefficient and critical boron concentration. Our review of the Turkey Point physics startup test program supports the conclusion that the test program will verify analytical predictions and give a good indication of core Cycle 3 performance. Therefore, the physics startup test program is acceptable.

Summary

Our evaluation supports the conclusion that: (1) the core reload does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or a significant decrease in a safety margin, (2) the LCO's incorporated in the Technical Specifications are appropriate for use during Unit No. 4 core Cycle 3 operation, (3) the proposed control rod insertion limits are conservative when compared to those now in effect, and (4) FPL has an adequate physics startup test program in use at Turkey Point. Moreover, we have concluded that the proposed changes have been appropriately incorporated into the Technical Specifications and are acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which are insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance

of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: May 28, 1976

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETS NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments No. 17 and No. 16 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, respectively, issued to Florida Power and Light Company which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4, located in Dade County, Florida. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments modify operating limits in the Technical Specifications to allow operation of Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit 4, following refueling for core Cycle 3. The operating limits for Unit 3 set forth in its Technical Specifications remain unchanged although the Unit 3 Technical Specifications will be modified to reflect the revisions to the Unit 4 Technical Specifications.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments were not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated February 25, 1976, and supplements dated February 25, April 21, May 10, May 13 and May 19, 1976, (2) Amendments Nos. 17 and 16 to Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Environmental & Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 28th day of May, 1976.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors