April 24, 1991

Docket No. 50-328

Mr. Dan A. Nauman
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Nauman:

SUBJECT: COLD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATOR INLEAKAGE (TAC NO. 79820) (TS 91-01) - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 141 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This amendment is in response to your application dated February 14, 1991.

The amendment modifies Section 3/4.5.1.1, Cold Leg Injection Accumulators, of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Technical Specifications. The change reduces the required boron concentration for one of the four cold leg injection accumulators from between 2,400 and 2,700 parts per million (ppm) boron to between 1,900 and 2,700 ppm boron. This will reduce the frequency at which the Unit 2 cold leg injection accumulator No. 3 is being removed from service for periodic draindowns and refills. This periodic evolution has been necessary as a result of a continuing small reactor coolant inleakage into the accumulator on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 gallon per minute. The change would be only for the remainder of the current Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. You requested an expedited review so that this relief may be implemented as soon as possible.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David E. LaBarge, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 141 to License No. DPR-79
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC	PDII-4/LA*	PDII-4/PM	PDII-4/PM	OGC*	EMEB*	SRXB*	PDII-4/DD*	PDII-4/D
NAME	MKrebs	JDonohew	DLaBarge		JNorberg	RJones	SBlack	FHebdon
DATE	3/28/91	4/24/91	4/24/91	4/12/91	3/28/91	4/10/91	4/23/91	4/24/91

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: SQN TS 91 01

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

AMENDMENT NO. 141 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: April 24, 1991

Distribution

Docket File	
NRC PDR	
Local PDR	
SQN Reading File	
S. Varga	14-E-4
G. Lainas	14-H-3
F. Hebdon	
S. Black	
M. Krebs	
D. LaBarge(2)	
B. Wilson	RII
W. Little	RII
OGC	15-B-13
D. Hagan	MNBB-3302
E. Jordan	MNBB-3302
G. Hill	P1-130
Wanda Jones	MNBB-7103
J. Calvo	11-F-22
J. Norberg	7-D-2
R. Jones	8-E-23
ACRS(10)	
GPA/PA	2-G-5
OC/LFMB	MNBB-9112
J. Donohew	

Mr. Dan A. Nauman

cc:
Mr. Marvin Runyon, Chairman
Tennessee Valley Authority
ET 12A
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Mr. Edward G. Wallace
Manager, Nuclear Licensing
and Regulatory Affairs
Tennessee Valley Authority
5B Lookout Place
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Mr. John B. Waters, Director
Tennessee Valley Authority
ET 12A
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Mr. W. F. Willis
Senior Executive Officer
ET 12B
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
ET 11H
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Mr. Dwight Nunn
Vice President, Nuclear Projects
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dr. Mark O. Medford
Vice President, Nuclear Assurance,
Licensing and Fuels
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Mr. Jack Wilson, Vice President
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
P. O. Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

Ms. Marci Cooper
Site Licensing Manager
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

County Judge
Hamilton County Courthouse
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. Paul E. Harmon
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director
Division of Radiological Health
T.E.R.R.A Building 6th Floor
150 9th Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37219-5404

Tennessee Valley Authority
Rockville Office
11921 Rockville Pike
Suite 402
Rockville, Maryland 20852

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 141
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated February 14, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 141 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Frederick J. Hebdon

Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 24, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 141

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 5-1	3/4 5-1

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

COLD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. A contained borated water volume of between 7615 and 8094 gallons of borated water,

c. Between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron,# and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 683 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

a. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

The requirement to maintain between 2400 and 2700 ppm of Boron for each cold leg injection accumulator is modified to require only three of four accumulators to be maintained between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron and one accumulator to be maintained between 1900 and 2700 ppm of boron during Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. This allowance is in effect until the restart of Unit 2 Cycle 5 refueling outage.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ENCLOSURE 2

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 141 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 14, 1991, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposed to modify Section 3/4.5.1.1, Cold Leg Injection Accumulators, of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The Limiting Condition for Operation, TS 3.5.1.1, would be revised to add a footnote. The footnote would reduce the required boron concentration for one of the four cold leg injection accumulators (CLIAs) from between 2,400 and 2,700 parts per million (ppm) boron to between 1,900 and 2,700 ppm boron. This would reduce the frequency at which the Unit 2 No. 3 CLIA is being removed from service for periodic draindowns and refills. This periodic evolution has been necessary as a result of a continuing small reactor coolant inleakage into the accumulator on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 gallons per minute. The licensee requested an expedited review so that this relief may be implemented as soon as possible. The change would be only for the remaining part of the current Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. Unit 2 restarted from the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage in November 1990 and is scheduled to shut down for the Unit 2 Cycle 5 refueling outage in April 1992.

In its letter, TVA explained that Unit 2 has been experiencing a small reactor coolant system (RCS) inleakage to the No. 3 CLIA on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 gallon per minute (gpm) through the primary and secondary check valves. The TS 3.4.6.2 leakage limit for these check valves is 1 gpm. The RCS was borated at approximately 1,000-ppm boron and the concentration will decrease throughout the fuel cycle. TVA stated that Sequoyah is required to drain approximately 3,000 gallons from the CLIA and then refill the CLIA with borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) every two or three days. This operation is currently initiated when the boron concentration decreases to 2,450 ppm as a result of dilution from the RCS inleakage to ensure that the minimum TS limit of 2,400 ppm is not violated.

TVA stated that during this drain and fill operation, which takes approximately four hours, the CLIA is inoperable because the TS level and pressure requirements are not then being satisfied. As the RCS boron concentration decreases over core life, these drain and fill evolutions will become more frequent with one

being required approximately every 26 hours (at i.e., the assumed 0.2-gpm inleakage) when the end-of-core-life is reached. TVA stated that accumulator availability is accordingly decreased as a result of these drain and refill evolutions and, additionally, the more frequent evolutions present an increased burden on operations personnel.

TVA addressed several options it considered for resolution of this inleakage problem. The options included the following: shutdown and repair of the check valves, development of an online method to vent off the check valve leakage, or reduction of the CLIA boron concentration requirements to decrease the frequency of necessary drain and refill evolutions. TVA stated that the shutdown and repair of the check valves at this point in the Unit 2 fuel cycle would result in the accumulation of a large radiation dose at the valves in conjunction with a high temperature work environment. Additionally, RCS draindown to a reduced inventory condition for a nonrefueling outage activity would create the potential for a loss of residual heat removal (RHR) event coincident with a loaded "hot" core. Accordingly, the delay of this activity to a refueling outage could result in reduced task dose, elimination of an additional reduced inventory evolution by conducting this activity during another scheduled reduced inventory condition, and minimization of consequences of a loss of RHR event. TVA concluded that the online vent approach did not appear feasible at this time because of the large amount of vent piping that would be required to be upgraded to American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Section III, Class 3.

For the above reasons, TVA concluded that the temporary reduction of CLIA boron concentration requirements for the Unit 2 operating Cycle 5 is the best option for near-term resolution for the inleakage problem. This will decrease the drain and fill evolution frequency and increase overall CLIA availability. TVA stated that this decision was made after weighing the safety significance of retaining the current small inleakage condition relative to the previous concerns noted above and the generation costs for incurring an additional outage for repair of the check valves.

The proposed TS change would allow one of the four accumulators to be considered operable with a boron concentration between 1,900 and 2,700 ppm. TVA stated that this change would significantly decrease the frequency of projected drain and fill evolutions to approximately once every 19 days based on approximately 1,000 ppm RCS boron concentration and an inleakage of 0.2 gpm or less. This frequency will increase throughout the fuel cycle as RCS boron concentration decreases to approximately once every six days, but will not be as limiting as it is with the current 2,400 to 2,700 ppm boron TS requirement. TVA concluded that this change would improve CLIA availability, reduce the operational burden of frequently draining and filling the CLIA, and decrease the potential for a forced shutdown because of problems encountered during drain and fill evolutions.

In its application, TVA requested that the staff review its proposed change as soon as possible to reduce the frequency of draining and filling the No. 3 CLIA. The proposed change would only apply for the remainder of the current Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation.

2.0 EVALUATION

The CLIAs are four pressure vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. There is one accumulator for each cold leg of the RCS. During normal operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series. Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, as during an accident, the borated water in the accumulators is forced into each cold leg of the RCS. The accumulators are designed for the large break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). During the large-break LOCA, the accumulators provide an immediate source of (1) water to cool the core and (2) negative reactivity (i.e., boron) independent of the control rods to make the core subcritical.

Each accumulator has four instrumentation channels: two redundant pressure channels and two redundant water level channels. There is an alarm function on each channel so that the TS setpoints for the accumulators will not be exceeded and this alarm function will remain for both pressure and water level for each accumulator even with one channel for pressure or level inoperable.

TVA has proposed to reduce the required range of boron for one of the CLIAs in TS 3.5.1.1. from the current 2,400 to 2,700 ppm boron to 1,900 to 2,700 ppm boron for the remainder of the current Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. This proposed change would apply to only one CLIA.

2.1 Interfacing System LOCA

For the No. 3 CLIA, there is leakage from the RCS into the accumulator. The inleakage is reducing the boron concentration in the accumulator. There are limits in TS 3.5.1.1 on the minimum and maximum valves of borated water volume, nitrogen cover gas pressure, and boron concentration for the accumulators.

With the inleakage, the No. 3 accumulator must periodically be drained and refilled. The draining is to remove the low boron concentration water in the accumulator and the refilling is to add a high and acceptable boron concentration. The accumulator is not isolated from the RCS during the draining and refilling operation because TS 3.5.1.1, requires the isolation valve to be open but, while the accumulator water volume, gas pressure, and boron concentration does not meet the limits in TS 3.5.1.1, the accumulator is inoperable. The draining and refilling takes about 4 hours.

The leakage through the two check valves from the RCS into the No. 3 CLIA is stated by TVA in its application to be 0.1 to 0.2 gpm. This was discussed by the Sequoyah Project Manager with TVA in his visit to the site on March 14 and 15, 1991. A graph of measured leakage values from February 10 to March 11, 1991 showed the leakage rate was cycling between a maximum of 0.20 gpm and a minimum of 0.06 gpm. The TS 3.4.6.2 limit for leakage through these valves is 1 gpm; therefore, this leakage is acceptable.

The concern about leakage through the check valves is that there may be an interfacing system LOCA with a large leakage from the RCS. The CLIA are not designed for the RCS operating pressure; therefore, a large leakage into an accumulator may subject the accumulator to the RCS pressure and the accumulator would rupture. The relief valve on each CLIA at Sequoyah could not handle the

RCS pressure to prevent rupture of the accumulator and a resulting LOCA. However, as discussed in NUREG/CR-5102, "Interfacing Systems LOCA: Pressurized Water Reactors," dated February 1989, the CLIAs would not be easily overpressurized by small leakages because the accumulator is a large reservoir of water, a relief valve exists on each accumulator, and increasing water level and gas pressure in the accumulator are monitored and alarmed in the control room. This is true for Sequoyah.

The low leakages through the check valves at Sequoyah do not indicate that the probability for an interfacing system LOCA has significantly changed from that for no leakage. These check valves have a history of leakage and there is no report of check valve ruptures in NUREG/CR-5102. These valves have a TS limit of 1.0 gpm. If an interfacing LOCA should occur through the accumulator, the LOCA remains in containment and the three remaining CLIAs will discharge through the core as assumed in the Sequoyah Final Safety Report (FSAR). The pipe break would be smaller than that for the design basis LOCA in the FSAR.

The staff concludes that the low leakage through the two check valves up to the 1 gpm limit in the TSs is acceptable for operation and does not indicate a significant change in the probability for an interfacing system LOCA for Sequoyah. If the leakage would exceed 1 gpm, the unit would have to shut down within 10 hours unless the leakage could be reduced within 4 hours.

2.2 Reduced CLIA Boron Concentration

The current boron requirements for the CLIAs were increased from a range of between 1,900 and 2,100 ppm to between 2,400 and 2,700 ppm, before the Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. This was to account for changes during the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage in the fall of 1990, such as deactivation of the boron injection tank, removal of upper head injection system, use of Vantage 5 Hybrid fuel assemblies, and the potential increase of fuel cycle length, along with other considerations.

In performing the evaluation to account for these changes, TVA selected the highest boron concentration possible so that it would bound the deactivation of the boron injection tank (approximately 55 ppm penalty), to remove the upper head injection (approximately 45 ppm penalty), meet the LOCA post-accident recirculation subcriticality sump boron requirements specified in the Sequoyah FSAR and TSs, and provide a reasonable margin to the minimum boron concentration for future fuel reloads. For Cycle 5 operation of Unit 2, TVA stated that the increase in the TS boron requirement to between 2,400 to 2,700 ppm is very conservative.

TVA stated in its application that the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC) has evaluated the acceptability of reducing the CLIA boron concentration from between 2,400 and 2,700 ppm to between 1,900 and 2,700 ppm for one CLIA. This evaluation applies only to Unit 2 during the current Cycle 5 operation. The evaluation considers LOCA and non-LOCA accidents and addresses radiological consequences and piping thermal loading concerns. The accidents evaluated are large break LOCA, small break LOCA, post-LOCA long-term core cooling, steamline break core response, and steamline break mass and energy release

inside containment. All other licensing basis accidents for Sequoyah do not decrease RCS pressure below the CLIA injection pressure of 615 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) and therefore would not be affected by the change in boron concentration. In addition, LOCA hydraulic forcing function and hot leg switchover to prevent potential boron precipitation were considered.

TVA stated that the conclusion of the WEC evaluation is that the reduction of the minimum boron concentration to 1,900 ppm for one CLIA is acceptable for Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. This conclusion is based upon the following from the evaluation:

1. For non-LOCA safety analysis, all four of the accumulators were conservatively assumed to remain at 1,900 ppm. Thus, there is no impact of allowing one accumulator to decrease back to 1,900 ppm for the remainder of the Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation.

2. For radiological consequences of a LOCA, it was determined for retention of radioiodine in water inside containment that the effect of having one of the accumulators with a minimum boron concentration of 1,900 ppm, as opposed to 2,400 ppm with respect to post-LOCA sump equilibrium solution boron concentration, is so small that a quantitative change could not be determined. The decrease of one CLIA from 2,400 to 1,900 ppm boron reduces the mixed mean sump boron concentration by approximately 5 ppm. The mixed mean sump boron concentration means the average of the minimum values of boron inside containment.

3. For LOCA safety analysis, the proposed change in minimum boron concentration has no impact on either the large or small break LOCA's margin calculated to exist to the regulatory limits of peak cladding temperature in 10 CFR 50.46 because the accumulator boron concentration does not affect the peak clad temperature estimates made in a large or small break LOCA analysis. The post-LOCA long-term core cooling requirements of 10 CFR 50.46, paragraph (b), item (5), "Long Term Cooling," were also evaluated. The intent of the analysis is to ensure that the core remains subcritical following a LOCA. The commitment is that the reactor will remain shut down by borated emergency core cooling system water residing in the post-LOCA sump. The decrease in boron concentration in one accumulator will lower the mixed mean sump boron concentration. The WEC evaluation indicates that a conservative estimate of the mean sump mixture boron concentration, given one accumulator at 1,900 ppm, is approximately 1,980 ppm at the most limiting point in core life. For the core to remain subcritical with Unit 2's current Cycle 5 reload, a mean sump mixture of approximately 1,800 ppm at the most limiting point in core life would be required. Thus, a margin of 180 ppm currently exists to maintain the core subcritical.

TVA concluded that there was more than sufficient margin for Unit 2 to continue to operate with one CLIA at a minimum boron concentration of 1,900 ppm during the remainder of the Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation.

As discussed above, TVA has addressed the effect of one CLIA having a reduced boron concentration during the Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation. TVA addressed LOCA and non-LOCA analyses and showed that the effect of the reduced boron concentration does not significantly affect the analyses for the accidents. The major effect of the reduced boron concentration is that the mixed mean sump boron concentration is only reduced by 5 ppm out of 1,985 ppm and the margin to prevent recriticality is only reduced from 185 ppm to 180 ppm, at the most limiting point in core life. The evaluation is only for Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation.

Based on this, the staff concludes that it is acceptable for Unit 2 to operate with one CLIA with a reduced minimum boron concentration of 1,900 ppm for the remainder of operating Cycle 5.

2.3 Frequency Of Draining/Re-filling the CLIA

In its application, TVA stated that it takes approximately four hours to drain and refill the No. 3 CLIA. During this time, the accumulator is inoperable and the Unit is in Action Statement "a" of TS 3.5.1.1. The frequency of doing this operation was once every two to three days. Since its letter, TVA has been using control rod movement out of the core to prevent reducing the boron concentration in the RCS as reactivity in the core is burned up during power generation. This has been keeping the frequency of draining and refilling the accumulator to once every two to three days. During the visit of the Sequoyah Project Manager to the site on March 14 and 15, 1991, TVA explained that soon there would be no available control rod movement and the boron concentration would have to be reduced in the RCS. This will increase the frequency of draining and refilling the accumulator. Without the proposed TS change, TVA stated that the frequency could reach once a day in April 1991. With the proposed TS change, the frequency would decrease to approximately once per 19 days and would then increase during the operating cycle to once every six days. Because of the effect of the proposed TS change on the frequency of draining and refilling the accumulator, TVA requested that the staff expedite its review of the change.

The staff does not consider the draining and refilling of the accumulator as often as once a day a significant safety issue, but it believes that the frequency should be as low as possible because it is not a normal plant operation. Therefore, the staff has expedited its review of the proposed TS change.

The refilling is done from the RWST by the centrifugal charging pumps. These are the high head safety injection pumps. If there is an accident or event requiring these pumps (i.e., a safety injection signal), the accumulator would be automatically isolated from the pump. The line from the pump through the test header valve to the accumulator has automatic and redundant containment isolation valves which would close. During refilling of the accumulators, the pump would be in its normal alignment except the test header valve would be open. Thus, the pump would start injecting into the RCS.

2.4 Conclusion

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed TS changes to reduce the minimum boron concentration in one CLIA for Unit 2 Cycle 5 operation is acceptable.

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding which was published in the Federal Register on March 11, 1991 (56 FR 10287). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Donohew

Date: April 24, 1991